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ABSTRAC]'
This study is a diplonatic history of Anglo-New Zealand
economic relations through World War II and the postwar decade.
During this tine Britainfs priorities were such as to sharply
alter her economic interests in New Zealand, conpared both with
the pre-war and post-1954 eras. It is this transfonnation which
gives the period its distinctive coloration. Throughout these
years Britain wanted New Zealand to conserve and direct her
resources, initially to assist in the war effort, subsequently to
aid the tasks of reconstruction. New Zeal.and gave active support
to Britain. Nonetheless, she could not conpletely disregard her
own interests. In the short-tern, there was always pressure to
buy on the cheapest and sell on the dearest narket. In the
long-term, New ZeaLand faced nore fundamental decisions. Shou1d
she seek economic security through close association with Britain?
Should she diversify her econonic relations? Should she try to
insulate her domestic from the international economy? These
longstanding concems can be traced through ihe period. They, too,
noulded the course of events.
Chapter one looks at the record of econonic diplonacy before
1939. Chapters two to five look at the World War II period.
Chapter two exanines the period fron the perspectives of the restraint
Britain sought to inpose on New Zealand in the consunption of
resources. Chapters three to five trace the history of New Zealandrs
export industries - her rnajor contribution to the stmggle - through
the war. Chapters six to ten span the post-war decade. Chapter six
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follows the thene of chapter two thtough to 1949. Chapter seven
looks at Britafurrs concetrn about the eonnereiaf i@lieati.ons of
New Zealandts inport policies - a cenoern wllictr had taken a back seat
through the war. Chapters eight and ten take the history of the
food export industries through to 1954,. Chapter nine picks up the
thenes of chapters six aRd seven and tak-es then through to 1954' and
also looks at the nool trade after 1946. I;astl.y, chapter eleven
Loolts at how the relationship betwden tlre two eouRtlies elolved
aften 1954. The end of the lomg period of stringency meant a
retur,n in some, but certainly not in al.L, resXreets to Prg-war
cond;itions.
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PREFACE
This thesis exanines the diplomacy of New Zealandrs econornic
relations with Britain over the period 1939-1954. When I first
started work on this topic, and before I had settled on a particular
period, I had no firm idea of how to handle economic relations between
two countries, although I knew that I wanted to look at the politics
of such a relationship, that is, at the different aspirations which
the two sides held respecting the conduct of their nutual relations.
It was clear that through the period, and both before and after, there
were rnarked continuities in these interests. Nonetheless there were
also changes. I cane to the conclusion that the distinctive character
of the period 1939-1954 derived from the fact that alongside the
developnents and continuities of what I call connercial diplonacy, there
was to be found another series of interests, which I identified as
resource or supply diplomacy. These interests arose fron the exigencies
of Britainrs war effort and its postwar difficulties (hence ny thesis
title).
As this labelling is rny own, I want to devote sone space to
explaining what I mean by the terns and why I consider this categorisation
to be useful in enlarging our understanding of the economic diplonacy of
the period.
I'tuch Anglo-New Zealand diplomatic activity was directed at ensuring
that both countries could sell their exports under the nost favourabl-e
possible circumstances (or, where applicable, was able to secure a return
on capital on favourable terms). Under this head come negotiations over
tariffs, be they preferential or protective, and concern about such natters
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as quantitative restrictions, subsidies and exchange controls. I
identified aLL these matters as income concerns; that is, the comnon
diplonatic objective was to help protect the ability of groups (or
sonetirnes individuals) to make a living. I put then into a category
label led conmercial dipJ.omacy.
Within this category a number of patterns could be examined:
(1) The relative significance of the trade
of each country to the other;
(2) The extent to which either actively favoured
the other in the conduct of its corunercial
relations;
(5) The extent to which either favoured its own
nationals.
What trends show up in these patterns? 0ver the period from 1952 the
trade of each country with the other became proportionately more
significant to both. This was reflected in and reinforced by the
elaboration of preferential arrangements. Both also becane much nore
active in protecting domestic economic interests. Fron about the nid-1950s
some of these trends went into reverse. Trade relations diversified.
There was pressure to disnantle the preferential structure. On the other
hand, protection of domestic interests continued. And year by year,
there was a need to manage the trade in both directions, regardless of its
relative significance, or of the structures within which it operated.
This nanagerial responsibility looned large in the conduct of econonic
diplonacy. This was especially true for New ZeaLandts exports, which
followed a seasonal regine.
Equipped with an ordering of events of this kind, I had gone some way
to understanding the interests that operated in economic dipJ.onacy in the
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mid-twentieth century, and how they changed. But the puzzle was not
conPlete. I realised that with the outbreak of war, Britain acquired
a set of interests which were sharply different fron those which had
previously predorninated in her thinking. New Zealand, from being seen
as a market for exports and an outlet for capital, was now seen as a
collection of resources, economic as well as nilitary, to be connandeered
or volunteered for the war effort. While corunercial diplonacy did not
vanish, it becane much less significant. New Zealandrs own conmercial
diplomacy had to operate in a novel eontext.
If the conmon thread of commercial diplonacy was production - or the
incone derived fron it - the conmon thread for these other activities was
consurption - or the income needed for it. The same coin, but a different
face. Thus trade, usually nost inportant to the exporting country (because
of the incone earned) acquired irnportance for the importing country (because
of the goods which were obtained). Supply - of men, material, food -
became an al,1-enbracing objective. Thus there is resource diplonacy to
set alongside commercial diptonacy.
Although the war ended in 1945, the tasks of reconstrrrction, aggravated
by foreign exchange shortages, ensured that Britain retained a resource
orientation to her econonic diplomacy through to the rnid-1950s. The war
and its afternath is the subj ect of this study. The detailed narrative
elucidates the interaction of interests, conmercial and resource, New Zealand
and British through the period. It is not a neat pattern. Britain
forewent conmercial interests, but not entirely. New Zealand accepted the
resource orientation, but not entirely. But the classification of interests
I have outlined here helps nake some sense of events.
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Delineation of the two kinds of diplomacy also facilitates an
explanation of the links - or lack of them - between econonic and
political relations. In a peaceful world connerce can proceed largely
independently of the concerns of power politics. For no country is
the world more peaceful than the one which exercises a maritine
ascendancy - as had Britain since the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The causal connection between this ascendancy and the diversification
of commercial relations became obscure with the passing of the decades.
Even when efforts were nade to concentrate on imperial markets in the
1930s this reflected economic imperatives and had little to do with the
decline in British power. New Zealand rnay have been inclined to impute
a political significance to the Ottawa agreement but this was not
reciprocated. And indeed, even for New Zealand, trading conditions are
a sufficient explanation of the increased concentration on the British
market in the 1930s. During the war and postwar yearrs, some politicisation
of trade policy might have been expected, but it did not nanifest itself
very strongly in respect of New Zealand: the long-tern objective remained
the restoration of an open econony, and this distancing of politics and
conmerce was endorsed by the United States.
Resource diplonacy by its very nature inplied shortages and dangers,
a possible challenge to national security or independence, the end of
an inperial peace. Hence it had a much closer - or at least more obvious -
connection with power politics than did commercial diplornacy. In the
war years New Zealandrs role as a Supplier of resources was alnost
indistinguishable from her status as an ally. In the postwaT period,
Britainrs struggle was econonic rather than political, but was nevertheless
closely linked to powet politics, for if Britain did not nake an econonic
recovery she would never be able to regain the kind of position in world
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affairs to which she aspired. And New zearand was as determined to
realise this objective as was Britain herself.
With the end of the period of stringency in the rnid-195gs econonic
and political relations drifted apart again. Comnercial rather than
resource needs returned to prominence in economic diplonacy; noreover
security ties between the two countries were weakening.
To return to the points made at the beginning of this discussion:
in the thesis I have formulated a periodisation of Anglo-New Zealand
economic diplonacy. I have identified and classified the interests
which were at stake. I argue that the resource interests and diplonacy
which were active from 1939 to 1954 give that period its distinctive
character. Within this franework I have analysed the period in detait
to discover how the different interests interacted.
It is no accident that the principal achievement of the thesis is
taxonomic. I could not tackle the prinary material in the light of an
existing historiography, because none such existed. J.v.T. Baker's
volurne, The war Econoftta, is devoted to the inpact of the war on the
New Zealand economy, and does not concerrr itself directly with econonic
diplomacy, although it touches on a nunber of particular issues,
e.g. the contract negotiations in 1944, and some aspects of New Zealandrs
supply problems (it is one of the few sources of infornation on these).
F.L.w. wood, tn PoLitical and Etternal Affairs, looks at the nore purely
political dinensions of external relations, G.g. the security of New ZeaLand
against Japan, Comrnonwealth collaboration at the United Nations, and so on.
Although it occasionally touches on conmercial and economic relations, it
does not provide a systenatic treatrnent. woodrs study ends in 1945;
Bakerrs goes beyond that, especially in dealing with issues like
rehabilitation, but in a fairly sketchy fashion. rn this study therefore
r am not in any sense revising or repeating Baker or wood - ny objective
is quite distinct from theirs.
The British and Australian War Histories were very helpful but could
hardly be expected to provide a complete coverage of Anglo-New ZeaIand,
relations' nor do they. Neither political biographies nor institutional
studies share ny perspective, although often some of then were extremely
useful' This is true for instance of Keith Sinclairts Walten Nash,
which is particularly good on 1939 and on Nash at Geneva and Havana.
sinclair throws out sone tantalising cornrnents on Nash pertinent to this
study, but we never get any extended discussion of his thoughts and
activities over the whole of his political career - only observations nade
about particular negotiations.
Nash is the only participant on the New Zealand. side who is dealt
with at all successfulry by a biographer: James Thornr s pete Fz,aser
is nostly anecdotal; there are no biographies of, for instance, Ashwin,
Duncan, Holland or Holyoake. Wardt s A Conmand of Cooperatiues is useful
although ematically organised. Hayward I s GoLd.en Juhi,Lee has that weakness
and sone others. There is no published history of any government
department: the war history narratives range fron good to non-existent
and of course do not tackle the postwar period.
There is no standard econonic history of nid-twentieth century
New Zealand. Closest perhaps are the econonic chapters in the recentry
published oaford History of Neu zealand, and the writers, incruding
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Gary Hawke on the period since 1938, are fu1ly extended by the need
to cover all economic developnents in their respective periods in
around thirty pages. Condliffers better volume, Nas Zealand. in the
Maki,ng was published in 1930. Sutchr s Pouerty and. Progness 'Ln Nan
ZeaLand, and The Quest for Seetn'Lf,gr provide a stinulating nesh of
political and economic discussion. But they present a very black and
white view of British-New Zealand relations which does not advance the
reader very far. His Reeent Eeonomie CVwnges i.n Neu Zealand. (1957) is
much more useful.
The study of New ZeaLandfs external relations has been much more
thorough, but following Wood, has tended to concentrate on security
relations rather than econonic issues. Woodrs own article on what he
called the ttAnzac Dilernnatr is perhaps the nost stixnulating single piece
of writing about what I have been dealing with but it was written in 1952.
During the relatively prosperous 1950s and 1960s the resource dimension of
foreign policy could be taken for granted, so successful was the Pan
Ameniemta. In this respect the 1940s perhaps seem more faniliar now than
they did to our imnediate predecessors.
fn sum, there are a number of relevant studies, but nothing
approaching an historiography. This was a najor influence on my decision
to take a narrative approach. In coning to grips with a large body of
material tine provides one of the rnost powerful ordering tools. It is
never used alone of course, even by a narrative historian. The basic
task of telling the story involves nany decisions about interpretation,
many of which I have alluded to above.
My urain task in
delineate patterns.
this
The
thesis has been to provide a structure and
drawing up of a balance sheet on the bulk
xv].L
purchase trsystemrr which operated from
task. But sorne tentative conclusions
1954 has been a secondary
nade.
1939 to
can be
From Britainrs point of view the system was clearly much nore
satisfactory than the likely alternative of open narket trading. Prices
rose less steeply and supply could be planned rnore systematically. It
is not clear that the 1944 and 1948 agreenents resulted in increases in
output over and above what would have taken place anyway but Britain still
gained on prices. rndeed even in the brief periods when trading
conditions were depressed Britain was able to apply downward pressure on
prices. More generally, the contracts were initiated by her, and
terminated by her when she had no further need of then.
Does all this nean that New Zealand was exploited by the bulk purchase
systen? Not necessarily. savage nade it clear in 1939 that between
countries as well as within a country, there should be 'equality of
sacrifice". And while New Zealand nay have made sacrifices in accepting
the bulk purchase system, it also had its positive side. There was real
anxiety at the beginning and during the early war years about the
disruption that night be caused to shipping and thereby to New ZeaLand
exports, and this nade the agreements seen worthwhile. Britaints handling
of the surpluses question in 1941 may have been rough, but she would have
been under no obligation to deal with the problern at all without the
contracts. As the end of the war approached, anxieties shifted to the
prospect of a postwar slunp and, in Nashrs case, to the naintenance of
stabilisation. Through the years when higher prices were obtainable in
the open narket these factors increased the acceptability of the systeur
(as did the wish to keep butter competitive with nargarine). More
generally the experience of the 1930s had convinced New ZeaLand that however
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linited the British narket might be it had turned out to be New Zealandrs
saviour in the past and might yet have to fulfil that role in the future.
We will never know what would have happened if there had been a severe
slump after the ternination of the contracts. But even if through the
period of the contracts producers did not nake as much money as they night
have, they got by. The stabilisation accounts bulged with funds,
revaluation in 1948 was absorbed with barely a nurmur. A sharp contrast
to the 1930s. And after the contracts ended, there was little evidence
to show that the New Zealand pastoral industries had "sufferedtt by their
long concentration on the hitish narket. The problern faced by dairy
exports after 1954 did not last - there were some bad seasons but also sone
good ones, whilst new rnarkets for frozen meat were established without
too nuch difficulty. It would be well over ten years before pastoral
exports had to face reaLly serious narketing probl.erns.
What went for the farmers went for the econony as a whole. One
could argue that the bulk purchase systen distorted the New Zealand
economy and prevented adaptation. But how is the need for adaptation
to be neasured? During the period 1939-1954 New Zealand built up its
reserves of overseas exchange (adnittedly partly through under-inporting),
and witnessed a steady increase in the standard of living. Given those
successes, what would have been the airn of restructuring? Presurnably to
adapt to future conditions. But until 1966-67 economic conditions did
not alter all that much with the exception of two sharp dips in 1957-58
and 1960-61. The first of these did generate a lot of discussion about
the need for re-structuring but the crisis passed and so did the debate, to
revive again during and after the 1966-67 crisis.
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Otrerall, the systeo benefitted Britain, New Zealandts elEectations
gave it some merit in hef, eyes too, whitrst her elqrerie4ce ensu"ed thet
the appeal ilid not tlim too sltarply with the passing of tirne.
Moteovet, beyond the connercial considerations, short and long-terf,,
lay the pol.itieal gnes. Given that New Zealand bel,ieved in and supported
the aLliance uith Bti.tain, the logic o-f her posltion in the bulk pu,rchase
system was reinf,oteed - It nade sense in relation to the pol.itical
priorities of her e*ternal. relatisns. Was she rmlrise o have those
priorities? fui rmhistorical question perhaps. The alliance with Britain
was not just extredient - it was grounded very deeXrll" in a sense of Comon
destialr, There wore timos whqrr it was app opriate ts criticise, to'
oqrlore alternattves. Birt nst in tine of waf aild. reco-ver)r. Bnitainrs
weaknesses: ard fainures only reinfo ced the ifipulse to unqlra.lified support.
The alliance was onc,of the heart as weLL as the head,
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CHAPTER ONE
Economic Diplomacy Before 1939
1. Introduction
2. New Zealandrs export trade before the war
3. British interests in New Zealand and the exchange
crisis 1938-1939
4. People and institutions on the eve of war
5. The impact of war
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1. Introduction
New Zealandrs economic diplornacy before World War II had a
marked continuity. At the beginning, as by the niddle of the
century, New Zealand sought to protect the profitability of her
export trade, and to enlist British support in this enterprise where
necessary. She was a substantial consuner of British capital and
inports and hoped for some consideration in exchange. Britain, a
traditional adherent of a cheap food policy, and Laissez-fai.re
practices in comrnerce and finance, was unwilling to make extensive
comnitments to New Zealand. New Zealand had after all been self-
governing in nost aspects of her domestic life since 1856. She had
secured tariff autonomy soon after. Britain did not feel rmder any
corpunction to support New Zealandfs econorny despite New Zealandrs
mernbership of the Enpire.
Difficult trading conditions in the 1930s intensified New Zealand's
economic dependence on Britain and her need for some sort of
assistance, but did not narkedly increase Britainfs sympathy for New
Zealandrs problems. Nor did New Zealand have much bargaining power.
Her 1 500 000 people nay have consumed per eapita vety substantial
volunes of British imports and finance, but in absolute tenns they were
not so significant.
What were the alternatives to this kind of dependence?
Diversification, though attenpted, was hardly an option in the 1930s
when markets were contracting. Moreover, New Zealandts limited
dipLomatic resources, and the concentration of shipping and financial
connections on London, inhibited change. The Labour Government which
took office at the end of 1935 explored other possibilities. Its
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first priority was employment and decent living standards for all
New Zealanders. No longer would the country be subject to fluctuations
in prosperity because of its financial and trade nexus with the Old
world. This meant limiting overseas indebtedness, pronoting
industrial development to provide new sources of employment, and very
likely, controlling overseas exchange. This last requirenent would
result from the need to ensure that exchange was allocated to
appropriate uses - it would be particularly necessary if expansionary
policies placed pressure on overseas reseryes.
walter Nash, the Minister of Finance and Marketing in the new
Government, saw Labourrs policies in terns of a recasting of the econonic
relationship with Britain rather than a declaration of independence.
This was realistic - and accorded with deepseated feelings of loyarty
to the Enpire. Moreover, New zealand was so dependent on Britain
that econonic experinentation would go for naught unless Britain
concurred. unfortrmately she did not, British exporters worried
about New Zealand protectionism. British investors were concerned
about the financial stabirity of the Dominion. And financially New
Zealand was weak. In difficult discussions in the middle of 1939 she
accepted that she must take note of British concerns. Experinentation
was the child of depression: it needed prosperity if it was to grow
to naturity.
2. New Zealandts Export Industries Before the War
(a) Introduction
That part of New Zealandrs econonic diplomacy concerned with its
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export industries derived its primary dynamic fron the need to
protect the profitability of the farners who were at the beginning
of the production chain (interests further along the chain, notably
the ouners of the freezing works, and the shippers, were often British
doninated). It is difficult to separate out the interests of
producers and Governnent at any tirne before 1935. Both Liberal and
Reform parties respected the need to rnaintain producer profitability
and were prepared to do what they could, as will be shown.
The significance of Britain to the New Zealand econorny did not
stem sinply frorn the fact of corunon membership of the Empire. In
1865, a quarter-century after annexation, seventy per cent of New
Zealandrs exports went to Australia. The development of narkets in
Britain occurred because of a number of factors - the avaitability of
shipping services, refrigeration, unrestricted access, and rising
living standards in Britain. These circumstances were exploited by
all the principal pastoral industries. T.G. Harkness, president of
the National Dairy Association from 1899-f903, spelt the point out:
The pessinists say rthe Australian market has
gone and the South African market is closed
against us ... r I have always contended that
the narket of the world which we have to look
to is the English narket and the sooner we
recognise that the sooner we shall receive
an adequate return for the labour and energy that
we have put into this great industry. (l)
The destination of New Zealandt s fa:m produce in 1913 showed that
the advice was accepted. Most of New Zealandrs farm produce was
exported. The predoninant exports were wool, frozen meat, butter and
cheese (in that order). In 1915 they accounted for over 70 per cent
1. A.H. ltlard, A Conmand of Cooperatdoes, p. 23.
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of total exports. Virtually all frozen meat and cheese, over
two-thirds of the wool, and over half of the butter, was exported to
gritain. (2) In total (excluding re-erports) over two-thirds of New
Zealandrs export trade was with Britain. The nain change over the
next decade was that the proportion of butter, and the proportion of
total trade, going to Britain increased.
New Zealandrs advocacy of irnperial preference represented a
strategy for securing her position in this important market. In the
1903 tariff revision she introduced a preferential elenent in her own
tariff code, in this way favouring British ahead of other import
sources. For her part, Britaints unwiliingness to rnake special
provision for New Zealandrs economic interests was consistent with the
Laissez-faire assumptions which underlay her own external conrnercial
policy. The fact that New Zealand was a colony did not make a
difference. In the 1840s and 1850s, when the concept of an inqrerial
association between self-governing colonies and the netropolitan
country was being refined, Britain was moving away on nany fronts fron
policies which involved public regulation of economic life. The
econornic fortunes of the colonies were to her the concern of their
own Governments and peoples. This was an outlook which the passage
of time and the absence of any severe economic crises helped to
entrench. Thus, by the early twentieth century, Britain was quite
unaccustoned to feeling any sense of responsibility for commercial
interests in the Dourinions (as the self-governing colonies were now
known). While interventionist policies began to make an apPearance
2. Neu Zealand )ffieial Yeapbook 1918, p. 331.
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in the domestic arena, they remained absent fron imperial relations
with the Doninions, despite Joseph Chamberlainrs efforts.
(b) le l+- 1e24
The outbreak of World War I produced a surge of imperial
patriotisn in New Zealand which was reinforced, md also transnuted
in subtle ways, by events at Gallipoli and on the Western Front.
For Britain, New Zealand acquired importance not just as a recruiting
ground, but as a farm. The British Government Tequisitioned rnuch
of New Zealandrs exportable production for wartine purposes. The
rrinperial connandeer,rt, as it was known, was accepted in principle,
in accordance with the dictates of wartime solidarity, but sone
aspects of the operations aroused strong feetirrgs.(3)
There was dissatisfaction with cheese and butter prices,
especially in the early stages of the conmandeer: this was to be
remenbered when the World War II bulk purchases contracts were
negotiated. While shipping was not the problern it night have been,
post-war events etched themselves sharply on New Zealand menories.
The British Government stopped purchasing cheese in L920, but it
continued to buy butter. Exports fron Siberia had ceased, and other
suppliers were lured by high prices in the United States. New
Zealandrs prices were increased from 181s. per cwt in 1918, to 280s.
for I920/2L: production soared. The result could have been predicted.
When the butter commandeer ended in March L92L, the market was in over
3. Ward, Comnand of Coopenatioes, pp. 35-37.
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supply, and prices fell ,"uu"uly. (4)
Meat encountered similar circumstances. When the wartine
contract ended in June 1920 there was an entire yearrs production in
store. Producers were not just affected by depressed prices either
Ln L922, owing to increased freight and other intermediate charges,
they received only 46 per cent of the British price, conpared with
80 per cent in f914. Stocks of wool were also substantial, and
threatened to keep the market depressed for y"""r. (5)
Governrnent and producers reacted in a variety of ways to the
slump. Both believed it necessary to cut dornestic costs to natch
the fall in overseas prices - hence the Governnentfs retrenchnent
policies, &d wage cuts. More constructively, producers accepted,
with the Governmentfs encouragement, some centralised control. A
Meat Producersr Board was established by statute in February 1922,
and a Dairy Board followed suit in L923. The wool surplus was
effectively handled by the British Australian Wool Realisation
Association (B.A.W.R.A.) which controlled and rnarketed the output of
Australasian wool so judiciously that there was no redundant supply -
nor any domestic pressure fron woolgrowers for placing such
interventionist policies on a permanent basis. B.A.W.R.A. was
liquidated once trading conditions had returned to nornal.
The postwar slunp emphasised to both producers
they already knew - that New Zealandrs export trade
and
had
Goverrrnent what
to survive in
4.
5.
Ibid., p. 46.
D. Hayward (ed.), Golden Jubilee, p. 13.
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an unprotected envirorunent. During world war r, there was some
shift in British thinking. (6) The ,econonics of siegerf, as Hancock
carls it, gave credence to plans for imperial economic unity which
would maintain British strength in peace as in war. one outcome
of this mood was a resolution adopted by the Imperial War Conference
in April 1917 which stated in part that:
All possible encouragenent shoul.d be given
to the developnent of Imperial resources and
especially to naking the Empire independent
of other countries in respect of food supplies,
raw materials, and essential industries. (7)
But with the return of peacetine conditions, Britaints interest
ebbed. Discussions at the 1923 rnperial Economic conference had
already revealed differences in perception between the Dominion and
Britain before the1924 Labour Government knocked the idea on the head.
Massey told Ransay MacDonald that he believed that Great Britain was
acting rfcontrary to the best interests of the Empire as a wholefr.
The activities of the Enpire Marketing Board estabtished by the Inperial
Econonic Corunittee, were for New Zealand only a shadow of what rnight
h"ve brun. (8) The wartime change in trade relations proved to be
epheneral. Britainrs interest ebbed with the return of peacetime
conditions. New Zealand had been prepared to nake her produce available
for Britain, despite some problems. But the slunp reninded New Zealand
that its exporters had to survive in a comnerci-al environment.
Neither producers nor Government would be able to forget that over the
next fifteen years.
6. W.K. Hancock, SurueA of British Connnonuealth
fuobLems of Eeornmie PoLiey i.g1.B-l.g79, Part
Swwey II, l) p. 94.
rbid., p. 126.
Hayward, Golden ,Iubilee, p. Zg,
Affai.rs, Yol. II,I (hereinafter
.|
8.
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(c) 1924-1935
During the next decade, trade in all products was for many
years in a crisis, with sharp season by season price fluctuations in
the 1920s followed by a consistent downward trend fron 1930, which
bottomed out in 1933.
The producer boards did useful work, but they could not surmount
many difficulties which were essentially external in origin. During
the 1926-L927 season the Dairy Board ventured into urarketing. The
nove failed. Dissension within the industry did not help, but a
urajor hindrance was that the Board, while not a monopoly supplier, was
trying to fix prices on a falling narket, with buyers ready to collude
against it.
Depressed trading conditions encouraged producers to Look at
other markets. The Dairy Board induced the Goverament to nake a
trade treaty with Japan, and also looked at North Anerica. Between
1926 and L928, the Meat Board sent trial shipnents of beef, mutton,
and lanb to Canada and the United States, and by 1928/29 exports of
New Zealand neat had been raised to 50 000 tons. But the following
season the United States Government doubled the export duty on
imported neat. It was not until L937/38 when New ZeaLand and Canada
negotiated a new trade agreenent that any further initiative was taken.
The Dairy Board continued to explore markets in the 1930s, and rnanaged
to make sales in ostensibly unpronising places like Jamaica, and the
Panama Canal zone. But the deepening depression only increased
access problems. The Report of the Dairy Board for 1950/31 noted
that:
-9-
Great Britain has always been New Zealandrsprincipal rnarket for dairy produce, but nowit is practically its only market. Tariffs
are closing doors to other markets, md these
barriers are also responsible for the ever
increasing export fron other countries findingits way to the British narket. (9)
Inevitably prices on the British narket fell. Butter sold at
140s. in August 1930, 104s. in Novernber, and just 65s. through nuch of
1933. The total value of New Zealandrs pastoral export receipts in
f950/31 was 840 nillion, conpared with t70 million in 1928/29.
Trading conditions for Britainrs own industries were so depressed
by 1951 that the possibility of securing inproved access to Doninion
narkets by offering then protected access in her own presented itself
to Britain as a strategy. In February 1932 Britain imposed inport
duties, but exempted the Doninions for nine months. In July 1952
the Doninions, India and Britain, met at Ottawa to harrner out a
franework that would provide economic advantages for all of thern.
New Zealand sought to secure for herself a nore favoured
position in the British market than that of any of her conpetitors.
To achieve this she was prepared to offer Britain very liberal trading
conditions in her own market. This was Coatesrs stance when he cane
to Ottawa in July 1932. He was prepared to concede ralmost any
preferencer to Britain, but wanted her to institute quota restrictions
on the dairy produce, neat, pig products, fruit and sirnil.ar commodities
sent to her markets by foreigners. (f0) Besause Britain was prepared
9. Quoted in Ward,10. Hancock, Sorueg
Contrnnd. of Coopenatiues, p. 70.II, 1, p. 218.
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to make qoncessions to the Dominions in exchange for enhanced
opportunities in their markets, it proved possible to reach an
agreement. Coates reduced preferential duties on certain specified
goods, exernpted United Kingdom goods from custons surtaxes and
maintained existing preference nargins at not less than 20 per cent:
not very najor concessions, but New Zealandts tariffs were low
anyway conpared with Canada and Australia. In return, Britain
imposed a 15s. per cwt duty on foreign butter, whilst giving Empire
butter unrestricted entry for three years, that is, until 1935. (11)
There were major difficulties over meat. In the course of the
conference, Britain decided not to inpose a neat duty. Its preference
was for regulation preferably adrninistered by suppliers. Australian
pressure ensured that this entailed a fairly heavy restriction of
foreign imports - to 65 per cent of L93L/32 level in 1933 and would
rmder no circumstances be subject to quotas before I July 1934 or
duties before 1 July 1936. (r2)
Coates had managed to preserve a large part of the unrestricted
structure of New Zealandrs trade. Nevertheless, Britainrs
priorities wer:e such that this wouldnrt necessarily last. There
were two dirnensions to this problern. Firstly, the British authorities
htere aware that they had not solved the problem of hone producers and
began to consider ways of protecting their position. Secondly,
Britain was constrained in what she could negotiate with foreign
suppliers who were debtors and inporters as well as seLlers. New
11. I.M. Drumnond, frnperial Eeonomic PoLi.ey 1,917-1.939, p. 269.L2. rbid., pp. 263-264.
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Zealand could offer nothing to override these priorities, as she
found on the successive occasions when some sort of bilateral
arrangenent was proposed. In 1933, under pressure fron dairy
producers concerned about the prospect of quantitative restriction,
New Zealand proposed a Customs Union, which would allow free and
urrestrfcted entry for their produce, in exchange for sinilar
privileges for British manufactut""r. (13) The Dominions Office
would not countenance any such schene which favoured one Dominion
over others. Ministry of Agriculture officials were adamant that
they did not want unrestricted entry. Despite this knockback,
Coates raised the question again with Baldwin in 1935, but Baldwin
evaded the issue, saying it could only be dealt with at an Inperial
conference. (r4)
Despite the 0ttawa rhetoric, New Zealand could not expect
Britain to bale it out on any substantial scale. As with the post-war
depression, the early 1930s saw further moves towards collective
control in New ZeaLand. In 1934 an Executive Corunission of
Agriculture was established to coordinate the activities of all
five producer boards, (fruit, honey, poultry, were the other three).
Then this move was overtaken by the change of Government at the end
of 1935.
(d) Labour Before tlre War
During
views about
the
how
depression, the Labour Patty
the interests of the farming
had articulated clear-cut
industries should be
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protected. It believed that rnany of their problerns stemmed fron
the inevitable fluctuations of the international capitalist
econony. Planned production and distribution would help overcome
this, particularly if it were linked to pernanent arrangements with
purchasing countries. Walter Nash, who becarne Minister of Finance
and Marketing in the new Governnent, had studied the history of the
f915-1921 contracts. A businessman by occupation, and one of
linited resources by circurnstances, such a system appealed to his
commercial as well as his political sense. To producers, Nash
pronised a guaranteed price for their output which would effectively
protect then against overseas fluctuations.
The Prinary Products Marketing Act 1936 provided for
Government purchase of all primary produce. It was accepted by
the dairy industry and was therefore implenented in respect of butter
and cheese, but not for meat and wool. This was a substantial
corunitment for the Government to take on. In theory the Governnent
might argue that farm realisations would be maintained independently
of external price movenents. In practice, the finances of the
schene would be much more nanageable if sorne sort of narket security
could be achieved. In 1936 Nash went to London, taking with hin a
plan for reciprocal trade:
13 (2) The basis of any such agreenent [forthe promotion of reciprocal trade] shall be
that, in consideration of the purchase by the
Government of any such country of any prinary
products of New Zealand or in consideration of
the establishnent or naintenance of any such
country of favourable marketing conditions for
any primary products of New Zealand, the
Government of New Zealand will undertake to
arrange thTough the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
that the whole or a substantial part of the
financial credits therebv established in such
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country will be utilised for the purchase
of approved goods or classes of goods being
the pioauce or manufacture of that country. (15)
As a theoretical proposal this nay have seened fine, but
politically it confronted the sane obstacle as the proposals for
a Customs Union - to Britain its bilateral character was unacceptable.
In any case, it was not certain that Britain would gain in terms of
increased exports. Moreover the plan involved Governnent control of
inports and exchange, a principle that the conservative British
Government found unattractiu". (16)
In practice therefore, Nash had to continue discussions on
particular cornnodities just as had Coates. He dealt with neat as
well as butter and cheese. It had become apparent that the neasures
agreed on for meat were not having the desired effect on supplies and
prices. For Britain this was of direct concern because of the
situation of her own producers. She negotiated a further agreement
with Argentina in May 1935, in which the latter subnitted to
restrictions over and above those irnposed on her at Ottawa. But
poli-tically it was inpossible for Argentina to absorb all the
restriction; nor, probably, was it realistic, given that Australia,
far from voluntarily regulating her meat exPorts' was in fact,
continuing to flood the narket. British officials worked on a
scheme for protecting their own producers through levy-subsidies, a
system by which the home producer would be subsidised by revenue
rs suppliu"r. (17)
15.
16.
t7.
Sutch, Reeent EeortpnrLe Chmtges in Neu Zealand, p'
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New Zealand reacted violently to this scheme. The meat
problem was essentially a beef one. Only 2.5 per cent of New
Zealandfs neat production was beef, but over 25 per cent of
New Zealandts total exports were meat compared with 6 per cent of
Australiars and just 2 per cent of Canadafs. Why should New Zealand
carry the najor burden of a policy designed to linit supply of a
product which she did not produc"z (18)
Discussions in 1935 were heated, but did result in separate
treatnent for sheepmeats and beef. The former would not be
subject to any duty but would continue to be quantitatively regulated,
a systen which worked quite well. As it happened the proposed duty
on beef eventually came to grief on Argentinars refusal to accept a
duty of a nagnitude which would allow Britain to confer on the
Dominions a realistic preferential advantage. In the upshot
Argentinars duty rernained at a lower figure and the Dominions escaped
rl o\
altogether.'^-'
What in the neantine had happened to the hone producer? From
1934 the Treasury had been subsidising British producers at the rate
of t4 million per annum and this continued. (20) Thus protectionism
was not used to sustain the livelihood of British farurers, but
coupled with other measures nade for substantial increases in British
farm output.
Although Britainrs abandonnent of duties in 1935/36 did not nean
the end of quantitative regulation, New Zealand did not object. A
rbid., p. 24L.
Drunmond, InrperLal Eeonomle Poliey, pp. 348-349, 452.
Tbid., p. 354.
18.
19.
20.
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connection was perceived between quotas and rising prices and the
improvenent in prices was sufficient to allay most of the anxieties
about the restrictions on increasing production. In 1937 shipments
were held at 1936 levels and Nash regarded this as a triurph.
Late in L937, largely because of rising donestic production, British
lamb and mutton prices began to fall, and accordingly quotas were
reduced in 1938. Britain wanted to establish a council to regulate
nutton and lamb shipnents but New Zealand opposed this, arguing that
Australia was to blane for the price difficulties. Whilst her
shipments were still below the 1931/32 standard, Australiars were
about a third above. A council was set up, but predictably failed
to agree because of disputes between Australia and New Zealand.
The United Kingdorn ended up imposing quota restrictions again,
3 per cent below the 1938 levels for 1939. (21)
A sirnilar pattern of negotiation to that which took place over
meat occurred with butter. New Zealand had responded to the
preservation of her right of free entry to the British market by
trying to produce her r.ray out of depression. In 1933-1934 she
exported over 160 000 tons of butter for sale in the United Kingdon -
60 per cent up on five years earlier, but earning about 40 per cent
less. Although Britain was prepared to make sone differentiation
between foreign and inperial suppliers, she could not allow this
volune to continue as it threatened her own dairy industry.
Britain wanted New Zealand to accept some quantitative restriction and was
able to convince Coates" but he in turn was unable to convince
New Zealand producers. By 1934 New Zealand attitudes were
beginning to change. Recognition dawned that quantitative restriction
2L. Drummond, frnperial Economi.c PoLi.cy, PP. 387-388; Sinclair, Waltet
Nash, pp. L43, 151.
- 
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had certain advantages. However, at this stage British officials
formulated the scheme for a duty which, nonetheless' could not be
inposed in terns of the Ottawa Agreenent urtil January 1937.
In his diseussions in 1936 /L937 Nash managed to kill this schene'
but not singlehanded. Prices had risen and it would have been
far more difficult to convince the House of Coumons of the need for
a duty than it would have been in 1934, And the neat negotiation
had set a precedent. In late 1937 it was agreed to continue
subsidising British producers directly fron the Exchequer. Britain
wanted her retreat from the duty proposal to earn a qui,d pro quo"
Thus she suggested that the New Zealand Goverrunent night now be able
to proceed with schedules of tariff requests. But there was no
real likelihood that the duty plan would be revived if this request
was acceded to: it v,as too firnly grounded in the existing realities
of British policies and politics .Q2)
3. Britaints Interests in New Zealand and the 1958/39
E-xchange Crisis
The protection of her export trade to Britain absorbed rnuch
of New Zealandrs diplomatic energies between the wars. But in the
last years before the Second World War, Britain herself became
concerned about her econonic interests in New Zealand, a concern which
provoked a surge of diplonatic activity in 1939.
22. Hancock, &ruey II,
Poliey, pp. 322-325'
1, pp. 243-44; Drumnond, fntpetial Eeonpmie
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From 1875 the New zeaLand Government had possessed the right to
irnpose customs for revenues or protective purposes as it saw fit .Qs)
In practice the degree of protection accorded local nanufacturers was
very low and British extrlorters had little reason to conplain about
their access to a narket which in 1935 was one of the highest per"
capi.ta consumers of British goods in the world, and was also, despite
its snall absolute size (r 500 000), Britainfs sixth largest market.
Even so, the revision of the tariff in l90S had introduced a
preferential elenent which favoured Britain, and this had been
extended on later occasions.
Nonetheless, in the interests of securing its access to the
British narket, New ZeaLand was prepared to go further. At 0ttawa,
Britain sought acceptance of the principle that New zeaLand should
undertake to adnit British goods as if they were produced locally:
tariff boards should operate to ensure that the goods would enter
on appropriate terms.Q4) New Zealand had not wanted to establish
a Trade Board, but a Tariff Tribunal was provided for and the
Government pronised to reduce duties ttas speedily as possible to such
a level as will place the united Kingdon producer in the position of
a donestic competitor.rt Moreover, New Zealand had agreed to
protect only industries 'rwhich are reasonably assured of sound
opportunities for successr'. (25) New Zealand made sone changes in
1934, but conmercial interests in Britain, mediated through the
Board of Trade, remained alert to changes in circunstances.
23.
24.
25.
W.D. Mclntyte, The
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rbid., p. 246.
Cormnonttealth of Nations" Origi,ns and, fntpaet
Eeonomie Poliey, p. 232.
- 18-
New Zealand was an outlet for British capital as well as
British exports. Frorn the very first years of settlenent capital
had flowed into the country - through remittances to inrnigrants,
direct investment in businesses, and by way of loans, both to
private individuals and firns, and to the Government. The Colonial
Stock Act 1900, which conferred trustee status on colonial bonds
encouraged the flow of investnent to New Zealand as to other
Dominions.Q6) During World War I there was talk of directing
the flow of British capital to the Empire and away fron foreign
countaies. After the war Bnitainrs interest in such intervention
waned. Doninion leaders claimed their countries needed more
capital, but one of their problens may have been that they had too
nuch. Frorn the point of view of the investor, or the bondholder,
there were no problens. Interest was received, dividends were paid,
the pentier could sleep soundly in his bed.
Circumstances changed in the 1930s. Britain closed the
London capital market in 1951 and suddenly New ZeaLand found herself
short of sterling to neet obligations. The Government connandeered
the countryrs export revenue in order to ensure that it had enough
money to pay its debts. In fact the crisis passed. As was normal
in such circurnstances, the banks pursued deflationary credit
policies to counter the fa1l in sterling funds and by mid-1932 the
latter were again at a healthy level. But the donestic cost, when
added to the difficulties already created by the collapse in export
prices, was high.
26. Hancock, Swnsey lI, l, p. f83.
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In 1935 the Labour Government took office. It was opposed
to overseas borrowing. It believed that its consequences would
always be as they had been in I93I-32: a sacrifice of donestic
interests to those of overseas creditors. Labourrs deterrnination
to consider New Zealand before overseas interests had other
consequences too. The Government deternined to promote secondary
industry to provide jobs which the primary producing sector was
fail"ing to provide, and which could not be provided permanently
by an activity as f'unproductive, as public works. The Industrial
Efficiency Act of 1936 was passed to prornote the coordination and
rationalisation of industry in New Zealand. There was no automatic
connection between such a policy and any particular inport policy.
The Government was well aware that it would neet opposition if it
pursued its policy through protectionist devices. Savage argued
that a manufacturing policy would mean that Ner+ Zealand would:
make for itself a considerable portion of
the articles which at present we purchase
from the United Kingdom. Naturally we
would concentrate only on those industries
best suited to our economy. We have no
desire to set up unecononic industries
behind the shelter of a higher tariff wall.
Rather we would attempt to organise industry
in a rationalised plan. (27)
Nash agreed. His plan for reeiprocal trade was not inherently
protectionist although it could involve direction of inports as the
Government would control all New Zealandrs foreign exchange. In
February 1938 the average leve1 of tariffs was raised. The
Government aimed to maintain low tariffs for some sectors but
27. Sutch, Recent Eeonomie Ctnnges in Neu Zealanl., p. 136, quoting
Savage.
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reserve others for planned home developmer.t. (28) This was in
conformity with the way Savage and Nash envisaged developnent
proceeding, but it was not a change which aroused rnuch enthusiasm
in Britain. Particular exporting industries, e.g. footwear, were
hurt by the changes in the tariff.
Meanwhile, other Labour policies wete alarning investors and
lenders. The Government had embarked on a public works schene to
provide an innediate remedy for unenploynent, and it planned to
build large mrnbers of houses. In 1938 it determined on a
revision of social security and on the provision of state medical
care. A11 of these projects cost - or would cost - noney, but
none of them were rrproductive.'l
In the absence of any controls, the expansion spilled over into
imports. Coupled with a flight of capital and weakening exPort
prices Ln 1937/38, this led to a sharp deterioration in the
countryrs sterling funds. Inurediately after the 1938 election
controls were inposed on exchange and inports. But with a tL7 nillion
loan falling due at the beginning of 1940 Britain had a powerful
weapon with which to ensure that her interests wel.e protected: in
December 1938 New Zealandrs sterling funds stood at less than
t7 million (down frorn t23.1 million at the end of 1937) .Qg)
To take imports first. ftnport licensing comPounded the anger
of British exporters at the protectionist neasures New Zealand had
28.
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already introduced. Conplaints came fron the Federation of
British Industries about the complete prohibition of certain British
imports such as woollen goods and hardware. Such practices
undernined the value of Governnent clains that preference would be
given to British exports in the inport licensing system. Britain
was prepared to accept that sone forn of inport control was necessary
as a stopgap neasure, but it should not be used for protective
purposes. On 12 JuLy 1939, Nash signed an Agreement with Oliver
Stanley, President of the Board of Trade. In it Nash
assured United Kingdon Ministers that it was
not the intention of the New Zealand Goverrunent
to eurploy the inport licensing policy in order
to give protection to New Zealand industry
against inports of United Kingdon goods on a
scale which presented fuI1 opportunity of
reasonable conpetition. (30)
He also agreed that New Zealandr s import licensing policy
would not be used to foster unecononic
industries, and that, in order to assist(the New Zealand Governnent) in deternining
what goods could be econornicatly produced in
New Zealand, they would invite the views of the
United Kingdour industries concerned and would
take such views into account in reaching a
decision. (51)
The Agreenent thus restated the traditional orientation of
New Zealand irnport policy'at the exPense of recent developnents.
The other dinension of Nashrs talks was financial. In respect
of the loan falling due early in 1940
British financial institutions and private
investors who held the stock were not willing
to re-lend on the old terns. They virtually
demanded their money back. (32)
Quoted in Sinclair, Walter Nash, p. I84.
rbid.
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The British Treasury and the Bank of England were not in a very
sympathetic mood. Labour vras felt to be the architect of its
own undoing, and should not expect to have its cake and eat it;
deflation was the answer. Fortunately for Nash, there were
nitigating circurnstances. New Zealandrs reserves were so low that
default on interest payrnents was a real possibility - there was a
liurit to tow quickly inports could be cut back even with direct
controls. A default or devaluation rwould have a bad effect on some
alIies. But it was impracticable for Britain to take over New
Zealand as it had Newfoundland. Some short terrn assistance was
therefore necessary. Moreover the British press had observed that
Britain was giving loans and credits to East European states.
With war imninent, should a Dominion be less favoured?
On 21 June, Chamberlain directed that New Zealand be helped
and Cabinet agreed. Nash got t5 nilLion for defence orders and
t4 nillion for corunercial credits fron the Exports Credits Guarantee
Departnent. The latter figure was less than the tlO million he had
asked for, but more than the 82 million initially offered. Nash
had said he would accept a short-term loan to cover forthconing
naturities if import and defence needs were met, but he baulked
at the terns, The British Goverrunent was not itself prepared to
help - the terns had to be strict if the loan was to be successfully
floated. Montague Norman, Governor of the Bank of Engl.and, had
proposed a five-year, tt6 nillion loan, with nonthly repayments
which would be nade a charge on New Zealandrs exports receipts.
Nash wanted instead to give an unqualified undertaking to repay fronr
-23-
Government funds; this was acceptable provided it was fornalised
by order-in-counciL. Annual payments were agreed on but the te:m
remained five years. At this point Norman shifted the weight of
his influence and was instrumental in getting the Ioan floated. (33)
The money safe in his pocket, Nash set out for home, arriving on
5 September, two days after the outbreak of war.
The 1938/39 crisis was significant for both New Zealand and
Britain. Britain showed that she was prepaaed to act to ensure
that the configuration of New Zealandt s political econony continued
to favour her corunercial and financial interests. The Labour
Governrnent in New Tealand was not prepared to abandon its new
policies outright. But it recognised that they needed to be
grounded in an econonic strength which the New ZeaLand of 1939 lacked.
Nash, in particular, was reinforced in his distrust of the
consequences of overseas borrowing. In the futurq, he would pay off
debt as soon as he possibly could. Moreover, he constantly sought
ways of increasing New ZeaLandts overseas eartrings and reserves so
that he would not be caught again as he was in 1938/39. Inport
controls renained essential for this purpose - nor could it be
assumed that their utility as an enploynent-promoting device would
be conpletely ignored.
33. Sinclair, WaLter Nash, pp. 180, 181-182, 185-186.
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4- Peonle and Institutions on the Eve of War
Economic reLations are nediated through institutions and
people, as well as ideas and issues. In New Zealand, no single
office was charged with handling external econonic issues.
Farming nattets were historically the concern of the Departnent of
Agriculture, the departnent with which producer boards dealt.
In 1934 the Executive Commission for Agriculture was established
to coordinate the activities of the producer boards, but it did not
survive the change of Government. Producer boards had their own
representative in London; the Departnent itself operated through
the High Conrnissionerrs office. In fact if agricultural issues
reached this level of significance they becarne a natter for Cabinet
as a whole rather than just the Minister of Agriculture or his
Departnent. Prine Ministers always felt competent to nake
representations on trade issues when they were in London, as did
Massey in 1923, and Forbes in 1934. In 1936 the Marketing
Departnent took over the Dairy Boardts tasks in London, ild it was
under his new Minister of Marketing hat that Nash negotiated with
Britain on trade i.ssues in 1936/37. Othelwise the change was not
substantial. George Duncan, who becane Director of the l'larketing
Department in 1936, was the most inportant official dealing with
export matteTs for the next ten years. He was originally a Hawera
accountant, who had cone to prorninence as a nember of the 1934 Dairy
Industry Comnission. His appointment by a Labour Government was a
tribute to his personable character and unfailing sense of
discretion, as well as to his technical and adninistrative skills'
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An ideal senior civil. servant, he also was able to naintain good
relations with the dairy producers and subsequently the other
prinary producers.
Import policy was traditionally adninistered by the Customs
Departnent which accordingly took on the task of managing the
import licensing system in 1938. The task of deternining imPortant
priorities in a period of exchange shortage fell to the Departnent
of Industries and Commerce, which had traditionally been
responsible for Governrnent purchasing in Britain. Nash was
Minister of Custons and renained so throughout the duration of the
first Labour Government. Dan Sullivan, a former journalist, and
Minister of Industries and Conmerce until his death in 1947' did
not exercise a najor influence on policy.
Nash was also Minister of Finance fron 1935-1949, and his
distinctive views often had a direct effect on New Zealandrs
position on successive issues. Bernard Ashwin, Secretary to the
Treasury from 1939-1955 matched Duncan in significance. While
Treasury was primarily geared to acting as the Governmentfs
accountant, Ashwin was personally very familiar with the intricacies
of money and banking matters and macroecononic policy. Politically
and bureaucratically skilful as welL as intelligent and well-informed,
Ashwin was an adept foil for Nash, and injected a note of
political and econornic realism into discussions and negotiations in
which he was involved. The Reserve Bank, although nationalised by
the Labour Goverrunent in 1936, played a nuch less significant role
in financial policy. Its GovernoT to 1940, Leslie Lefeaux was out
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of synpathy with Labour policy, and with the use the Government
was making of the Reserve Bank, both in securing loans, and in
the adninistration of exchange control policy. In his own office
Nash made use of W.B. Sutch, an economist, who had also worked for
Coates. R.M. Canpbell, also an adviser to Coates, was based at
the High Conmission in London from 1939.
The conduct of economic diplomacy was institutionally separate
fron political relations. There was no Departnent of External
Affairs to coordinate external relations. The Prine Ministerrs
Department serviced the Prime Ministerfs own dealings with the
Imperial Governnent. 0n the occasions when a Prime Minister made
statenents on trade issues or such like, he would also have
consulted with Cabinet colleagues. The Departnent itself had
neither the obligation to be involved in such natters, nor sufficient
staff to have allowed such involvement.
Links with Britain penetrated every aspect of New Zealand life.
It would have been inpossible and meaningless to have apportioned
to one set of officials or one ninister, the task of rranaging the
relationship as a whole. The integration took place in rnenrs ninds,
not in nemoranda. This inforrnality was facilitated by the fact that
Britain did not treat New Zealand as a foreign country. The High
Connission in London dealt with the Board of Trade on corunercial
matters and the Treasury and the Bank of England on financial and
monetary matters. Such links were not unknown to foreign countries,
but the Foreign Office exercised a much more significant role in their
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relations with Britain than did the Dominions Office with the
Doninions.
Keith Sinclair has described the frame of nind of British
Ministers and civil servants towards Doninion politicians as
rrthat of weary, irnpatient schoolnasters, their tone tart and
superiea"(34) - frequent nenoranda l-eave no doubt of this, as will
often be denonstrated in the following pages. Party political
differences could aggravate such attitudes - this was particularly
noticeable in 1936-1939 when a predominantly Conservative British
Goverrunent faced rrsocialistsrr in New Zealand. But set against
these differences there was personal and cultural faniliarity.
R.M. Kershaw in the Bank of England was an Australian, and faniliar
with conditions in both Australia and New ZeaLand. Nash and Fraser
for their part, were both British born. So although New Zealanders
could be labelled (and relegated) as colonials, they were not
unknown quantities. Nor did they find the corridors of Whitehalt
and Westminister to be entirely alien environnents.
This inforrnal structure ensured an intinacy of contact between
New Zealanders and Britons, but it was not underpinned by anything
more concrete. Ideas of imperial federation had not survived
confrontation with political realities. The Irnperial War Cabinet,
established during World War I with Doninion ministerial representation,
did not long outlast the return to peace. The evolution of the
Imperial Conference system provided a means by which the Dominions
34. Sinclair, Walter Nash, p. L37.
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could discuss with Britain issues of connon concern. Through the
interwar years, one concern was to seek from Britain recognition
of the equal status of the Doninions with her. In 1951 the
Statute of Westminster gave legislative recognition to the equality
of status agreed to at the 1926 conference.
The New Zealand Govetnment of the tine saw no need for such
accelerated progress. It had as nuch independence as it wanted
- change night only diminish the beneficial closeness of the
association with Britain. The Labour Goveranent which took office
in 1955, after five years of severe depression, was convinced that
change was necessaly, that New ZeaLand needed to take on a greater
responsibility for nanaging its econonic life than had previously
been the case. It followed that it placed a gleater prenium than
its predecessor on asserting New Zealandts independent status in the
Conmonwealth comnunity. Whatever nay have been the predisposition
of New ZeaLandt s farners, a poweTful current was taking New Zealand
along an independent path. In 1959 Britain appointed a High
Conmissioner in Wellington, thus ending the diplomatic role of the
Governor General, and bringing relations between the two countries
closer to the norn of relations between two independent states.
5. The hnpact of War
The economic imperatives of war nade for a sharp transfonnation
in the character of Britainr s interests in New Zealand, one which
lasted for fifteen years. The war nachine was insatiable: valuable
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Tesources, resources likely to becone scarce, had to be husbanded
and safeguarded. In respect of New ZeaLand these objectives were
given an extra twist. Britain expected to be short of foreign
exchange and irnposed exchange control at the start of the war.
The resources of countries like New ZeaLand, which would accept
paynent for goods and services in sterling, were therefore especially
valuable. Britain nade bulk contracts with New Tealand to hel.p
secure her requirements of food and raw materials. The forner
continued through to 1954. Additionally, New Zealandrs consunrption
of inports, of services, of capital, even of her own output, was
discouraged if it meant a diversion of resources from the war effort.
The transfornation can be conceived of in a more abstract fashiion.
Econonic activity now had significance for Britain, not because of
the incomes it generated, the livelihoods it al.lowed people to make,
but because of the resources it made available.
The inpact of this transforrnation on economic diplomacy between
the two countries is the subject of this study. How did New Zealand
react? New Zealand became a belligerent too, and therefore there
was a presunption that she would cooperate with Britain to the best
of her abilities. But there were more particular reasons too.
Ttrere was a sense in which Britainr s new direction htas a fulfilnent
of Labourrs pre-war economic plans. Firstly' New Zealand exports
would enjoy more secure trading conditions. With opportunities to
exploit other narkets likely to be linited by wartine dislocation,
this was very appealing. Secondly, New Zealand would be able to
promote its employment and industry and at the same tine restrict
inports with a fair measure of concurrence fron Britain.
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To set out the extent of concurrence in British and New
Zealand objectives is not to suggest that there was conplete agreement.
New Zealand would not always constrain her consumption or her inports
in quite the ways Britain would have liked, Her own exchange crisis
made her particularly anxious about her sterling reserves. Reluctant
to borrow, she explored other ways of bui1ding up her reserves.
Given the shortages of some of her exports and pressure from
producers, a certain anount of tension between the two countries
over export and irnport prices was inevitable.
These probl.ens were the stuff of wartine economic diplonacy.
L940/4I was the rnost difficult year. Thereafter lendlease eased
the pressure on Commonwealth resources. Paradoxically though,
New Zealandrs food supplies became even nore valuable (additional
shipping was available and output had declined in other countries).
The end of the war meant the end of lendlease and the return of the
foreign exchange constraint. Britain had to continue direct
control of food. She also promoted exports to hard currency markets,
which in turn meant continued shortages in New Zealand as well as
Britain. These conditions lasted in one fonn or another until the
nid-1950s.
War made a big difference to the atmosphere of New Zealand-British
econornic diplomacy. The stress was on collaboration: traditions of
LoyaLty, kinship and patriotisn had a constructive role to play.
New Zealand came to play a full part in the world of nations at a
tirne when it was cooperating more intensively with Britain than at any
tine since the First World War.
CHAPTER TWO
Britain and New Zealandfs War Effort f939-1945
1. Introduction
2. British pressure on New Zealandrs war effort
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1. Introduction
The outbreak of war opened a new phase in economic diplomacy
between New Zealand and Britain. During the 1930s New Zealand
diplomacy had mostly concerned trade issues: New ZeaLand exports
to Britain and, to a lesser extent, British exports to New Zealand.
The war changed Britainrs perspective. New Zealand acquired
significance as an ally and as a contributor to the war effort.
Diplomacy became a natter of encouraging the nobilisation of resources
rather than of protecting trade.
How would New Zealand react to this revolution in Britainr s
attitude towards her econony? After war had been declared Savage
addressed the nation in forthright teflns
Both with gratitude for the past and with
confidenee in the future, we range ourselves
without fear beside Britain. lllhere she goes
we go; where she stands we stand. (1)
This chapter looks at the extent to which Savagets declaration
of solidarity held good in the economic sphere. The existing thrust
of Labourts economic policy ensured a general accordance with
Britainrs requirements. Through the war years the Government was
determined not to finance the war by overseas borrowing - a
deternination reinforced by the events of 1938/59. Indeed for Nash,
avoiding indebtedness becane a ruling passion. This conforrned with
Britaints wish that her capital resources not be depleted. Before
1. NZH" 4 Sep 1939.
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the war, the near-exhaustion of New ZeaLandrs overseas reserves,
coupled with an unwillingness to restore then through a deflationary
policy, had made exchange and import controls necessary. $lith the
war, Britainrs endorsenent of such a system became unqualified.
Over and above these peacetime policies, Labourrs wartine econonic
priorities also made sense to Britain. In particular, the
Govetnnent was deternined to avoid inflation, which had hurt working
people in World War I. If this was to be achieved, the Governnent
would have to restrict civilian clains on New Zealandrs resources:
if successful this would facilitate the diversion of resources to
the war effort.
Through the 1930sr producers and Government had been seeking
to protect the New Zealand market in Britain. Now it seened that
Britain would in effect provide that protection herself, through
cornmitting herself to bulk purchases of food products and wool.
New Zealand protectionism had caused some dissatisfaction in Britain
before the war. But New Zealand continued to extend to Britain
under the inport licensing systen the preferential access she
enjoyed under the tariff code. In any case, access for its exports
was a low British priority through the war.
In sun, Britaints wartime economic policies went with the grain
of New Zealandts econonic interests. But it would be erroneous to
suggest that there were no differences. Although New Zealand was in
theory conmitted to restricting its consunption of resources as
vigorously as did Britain, the practice was rather different, at
least in the first two years of the war. New Zealandrs Labour
governnent wished to maintain the employment policies and social
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security progranme it had introduced before the war. This meant
continued spending on benefits, on housing and on public works
concurrently with attempts to divert resources to the war effort,
with the latter sometimes sacrificed to the forner. Britainrs
civil servants and ninisters, aLready predisposed to see New
Zealandrs welfare policies as socialist extravagances, now had
additional - if to New Zealand, more acceptable - reasons for
setting their face against such indulgences. Guns nust corne before
butter, But New Zealand was an alLy, and donestic policies could
not be directly challenged, however many rnutterings they produced
in Whitehall. Moreover it was recognised that a reorientation
of New Zealandfs prinarily pastoral economy would not produce the
economic dividends that could be expected from economic mobilisation
in Britain or even Australia. Britaints econouric diplomacy focussed
rather on New Zealandrs consunption of overseas resources of capital
and goods. Britain was particularly anxious that New Zealand
restrict inports with a foreign exchange content - foreign exchange
being one of Britainfs scarcest resources. And she also wanted
New Zealand to bear as much as possible of the overseas cost of her
own war effort, as the war proceeded.
For relations between New Zealand and Britain L94I/42 was a
watershed year. 0n the one hand New Zealandrs nobilisation achieved
a completeness that satisfied the nost rigorous British observers.
On the other hand, pressure on Empire resources was eased with the
initiation of lend-lease, and Anericars entry into the war. In the
latter stages of the conflict, New Zealandrs war effort cane under
scrutiny by Britain in only one major respect - food consunption.
Food shortages were world wide and could not be conpletely alleviated,
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even when the productive wealth of North Anerica was taken into
account.
For New Zealandrs producers wartine economic diplomacy had a
different focus. There were many times in the history of wartine
trading relations when the determination to protect profitability
provoked protracted negotiations with Britain. Additionally, in
the latter stages of the war in particular, the foreign exchange
earning capacity of the export industries attracted the attention
of the Governnent which saw adjustnents in export receipts as a
more practicable and effective way of increasing its overseas
resources than by borrowing: and one moreover that was unlikely to
arouse Britainfs hrrath. These matters will be dealt with in
Chapters three, four and five.
2. British Pressure on New Zealandrs War Effort 1.939-1941
With the outbreak of war, the Government equipped itself with
special powers to direct the econony, and these were extended at
later dates. Provision was made for controls over prices, wages
and costs, and over nanpower. Authority was acquired to increase
taxation and raise loans internally for war purposes. A supply
organisation was estabLished. It operated initially through the
Industries Connittee of the Departnent of Industries and Conrnerce,
and subsequently through a fully-fledged Ministry of Supply. The
(
Minister of Industries and Commerce also assumed the portfolio of
Minister of Supply.
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The Government accepted the exchange control imposed by
Britain on all sterling purchases and earnings which were transacted
in gold or foreign exchange. Quite apart fron the clains of
wartine solidarity, New ZeaLand normally secured her foreiga
(i.e. non-sterling) exchange needs in London. Moreover, as she
normalLy earned less foreign exchange than she spent, the controls
were of obvious benefit to her. Nevertheless she was expected,
like other countries in the I'sterling area'r as it was labelled, to
lirnit expenditure outside the area, and import goods frorn within
it where at all possible.
Despite these changes, economic nobilisation proceeded rather
slowly. In 1939/40 this was hardly surprising. Britain herself
was experiencing the I'phony wart'. With Poland conquered, stalernate
followed. Britain and France waited to see what Hitler would do
next. In New ZeaIand, the petrol ration, inposed in the first
week of war, was liberalised for the Christnas/New Year holiday.
Quite apart fron the fact that this neant consunption would increase,
Whitehall felt it also discouraged Australia fron rationing.
Fraser explained that the initial rationing had been too drastic -
it had thrown people out of 
"o"t. 
(2) This was not an argrment likely
to nollify the British. Housing construction, a good indication of
the relative inportance accorded to the clains of itbuttertror ttgunstt,
continued at record levels. Permits issued for new state houses
reached nearly 4400 in 1939/40, compared with 4100 in f938/39.
Private housing construction contracted only very slightly compared
to the preceding year. (3)
TL60 Fl27l5/5, UKHCW-SSD, 10 Aug 1940.
Baker, War EeonoW, pp. 242-243.
?.
5.
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In the afternath of Dunkirk, the New Zealand Governrnent
stepped up its mobilisation in a nunber of ways. Direction of
manpower to the armed forces increased sharply during the winter,
and in October 1940 conscription was introduced. (The first
echelon of the second NZEF was nanned by volunteers.) Sales tax'
which was levied on a wide range of goods, was doubled from 5 per
cent to 10 per cent, and in July, a national security tax was
imposed - a flat 5 per cent on virtually all incom". (a)
Nevertheless there were other areas where Progress was not so
rnarked. Despite the Governmentrs own predisposition, it proved
politically difficult to implenent the sorts of wages and price
controls which were the most direct method of tackling continuing
inflation. At the Economic Stabilisation Conference in Septenber
1940, participants from econonic interest groups and Governnent
reached agreement that inflation was bad. But any conprehensive
steps to impose an anti-inflation policy were likely to offend
either wage-earners or enployers. 0n1y in Septenber 1941 was a
comnittee set up to work out a comprehensive stabilisation ptog""tn". (5)
Although inflation nade New Zealandrs rnobilisation for war more
difficult, it did not too di'rectly inpinge on British concerns. On
other natters action seemed much nore inperative with the deterioration
in Britainrs strategic and econonic situation and a new and more
dynamic Governrnent in office. Consurnption of dollars was a
particularly sensitive issue. In September 1940, the British High
Conrnission reported that al"though newsprint had to be drawn fron
Outside the sterling area, most newspapers in main centres renained
larger than major British papers. The New Zealand Governnent had
4.
5.
Baker, Ibtd., pp.
Baker, Ibi.d., pp.
75, 26L, 262.
282-283.
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received full particulars of the measures taken in Britain to
linit consurnption by reducing newspaper size, but still had not
followed ,,lit. (6) ,Consunption of tinplate was another sore point.
During 1940, New Zealand had inported 360 000 cwt conpared with
250 000 cwt average oveT the preceding four years.
Batterbee went on to corunent:
A11 this nay not natter much in the case
of New Zealand where savings to be effected
by econonies are not large in relation to
expenditure of the whole sterling area...
But the fact remains that nothing like the
same attempt has been made here to eeonornise
or to do without as has been nade in the
United Kingdon, and the people here are by
no means tteconomy consciousrt. (7)
At the Econornic Stabilisation Conference in Septenber 1940 Nash
stressed that New TeaIand should try and do without goods which were
not available frorn the United tcingdom. (8) But sonetines the need
became too pressing and this was accepted by Britain. In Novenber
1940, New Zealand found itself in need of supplies of fencing wire
which could only be obtained fron North America. Having approached
the United Kingdon, she was in due course infonned that she could
spend the requisite dollars as it had been ascertained that there
were no supplies in Britain or Austt"ti.. (9)
In May 1941 Britain Learat that 5000 tons of steel were being
inported to conplete the Picton-Christchurch railway.
6. 8T11/1458, 17 Sep 1940.
7. BT11/f458, UKHCW-DO, 19 Feb 1941.
8. DPM D4l5, 4 Sep 1940.9. T160 Fl27L5/5,4 Nov 1940, 26 Nov 1940; Baker, War EeortoW, P- L32,
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Nash has shown a disinclination to refuse
licences for imports fron dollar countries
to goods wanted for development of projects,
secondary industries or public services which
cannot be supplied from the sterling area. (10)
In June the New Zealand goverrlment was approached with the
object of securing an assurance that it would not call in Britain,
or spend dollars on plant or machinery unless they were I'essential".
Could New Zealandfs expenditure be nonitored more ti-ghtly? Batterbee
pointed out that once New Zealand had decided that it had to acquire
certain inports from the dollar zone, no Limit was in fact set to
the amourt of dollars New Zealand could draw.
I hesitate to suggest that the exchange
authorisation granted by the Reserve Bank
of New ZeaLand should be subjected to any
form of control by the Bank of England...
but worlld it be feasible to set up a rough
limit to the anount of dollars to be
available to New Zealand in any one financial
period so that New Zealand would have to
decide how nuch to allocate [between different
needsl ? (11)
British Treasury ofEicial, R.F. Kahn argued that such a ration would
help ernphasise in New ZeaLand the connection between restrictions and
the war effort. But J.R. Willis of the Board of Trade thought it
was problenatic. In the end, the United Kingdom would still have to
entertain requests for the provision of additional dollars and in
sone respects she would be foregoing influence by allocating a
ration outright .O2)
Batterbee made two other proposals with a bearing on the dollar
shortage. Firstly, that the United Kingdorn should adopt a longer
10. T160 Fl27L5/6, UKHCW-DO, 26 May 1941.
11. BTff/1458, UKHCW-DO, 19 Feb 1941.
12. BTlf/f458, Minutes 2l Mat 1941, 15 Apr 1941.
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view in naking ad hoe requests for econorny in various cornnodities.
In other words as Willis saw it, New Zealand would be asked to
conserve goods now in anticipation of future difficul-ties. The
probleur here was that it was not inconceivable that tall
comnodities are likely to become short before very long. I The second
suggestion was that New Zealand coordinate her purchases outside the
sterling area with those of other Cornrnonwealth countries: the
problem there was that purchases fron the United States were still
nade largely through conrnercial, not official chann"tr. (13)
Pressure was increasing on dollar supplies because supplies fron
sterling area countries, particularly Britain were diminishing.
Both Nash and Fraser when in Britain had got into the habit of
reinforcing the representation made by G.W. Clinkard, the supply
representative in London, for reLief of particular shortages,(lO) b.ra
there was an unavoidable contraction and this neant that New Zealand
irport volumes fell. Quite apart therefore fron any restraint she
herself exercised, imports from the United Kingdom fell in every year
fron 1958 to 1942, and only in the latter stages of 1941 did
significant supplies become available frorn other sources.
Despite this contraction, British observers, in the early months
of 1941, were still expressing concern at the 1evels of domestic
expenditure on civilian purposes. This was hardly surprising.
In I94O/41 pernits were issued for nearly as nany new state houses as
in the previous record yeat, and permits for private housing dropped
1r S)only slightly.'-'
13.
L4.
15.
JD1,d..
e.g. cotton piece goods:
nachine tools: EA153/L7 / 3,
See e.g. II{AF83/LL49, 31 Mar
BTLI/1712, passim;
3 Nov 1939.
194I; Baker , llar
fencing wire,
Eeonanu, p. 243.
-43-
It was still a politically delicate natter for the GoverDment
to increase the econonic burdens of the war. Its supporters
keenly remembered World War I and were reluctant to see social plans
sacrificed unless it was clear that the whole cornnunity would pay
the price.
To Batterbee, the fact that Fraser left econonic questions to
Nash conpounded the problen.
He is under the impression that New ZeaLand
is making the utnost possible contribution,..
and I doubt whether he realises how far in
the econornic sphere New Zealand has failed to
make the necessary sacrifices ... he would
like if he could to avoid sacrificing any
part of the labour progranme, or lowering
in any way the standard of living but if
necessity for particular sacrifices can be
brought home to hin by concrete instances
and if he is shown the extent of the sacrifice
which .... the United Kingdon is bearing I
have no doubt what his answer will be. (16)
Batterbee was always inclined to judge the Labour Goverrunent too
harshly. Whitehall officials recognised that there were difficulties
in increasing the war effort. For instance, New Zealand had so
little industry that it was unclear just how her resources could be
diverted to war production.
We cannot legitinately clain that the release
of New Zealandrs own resources of labour and
capacity are likely to promote the prosecution
of the war to the same degree as does the
release of our own resources. If for instance,
New Zealand has a domestic pottery industry, we
could not clain that the Ernpire would derive the
sane benefit frorn a reduction of its output as is
derived from a reduction in the activities of
Stoke-on-Trent. (f7)
16.
17.
T160 F127L5/6, UKHCW-DO, 26 ltlay 1941.
8T11/1458, Kahn nemo, 15 Apr f941.
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Various possibilities were explored nonetheless, including even
the idea of transferring labour to Australia where it could work in
war-related activities. The idea of New Zealand supplying arned
forces with various itens, e.g. equipnent, boots, clothing, biscuits
and processed food, was also floated, by New Zealand as well as the
United Kingdop. (18) New Zealand established a Supply Council in
1941: its tasks included the coordination and planning and
production in New Zealand of munition, foodstuffs, equipnent for the
services, and this was welcomed by Britain. And despite her
recognition of linitations on New Zealandts ability to re-direct
resources, Britain still sought further donestic restraint,
While it is noted that in the [1941] budget,
Mr Nash recognised that bomowing for public
works nust be reduced to the ninimum required
for essential works ... it is felt that there
must still be roon to reduce expenditure which
is not any direct contribution to the war effort.
In particul,ar it is premature to be thinking in
terms of development work as a preparation for
rehabilitation. (19)
************
Britainrs concern through these first war years had been to
restrict the flow of imports to New TeaLand with the result that
her traditional interest in protecting the access of British goods
to New Zealand went into recess. But there were qualifications to
this shift in policy. Britain was anxious to keep in ernplolment
labour which could not at that time be absorbed in other work, and
it wanted to retain its connection with the New Zealand rnarket with a
view to postwar trade. Accordingly, British officials renained wary
of the
BT11/f458, UKHCW-BT 25 Jun 1941, T160 F127I5/7, Note for
conversation, PBT-PMNZ, 29 Jun 1941.
T160 F127L5/7, 2I Jul 1941.
18.
19.
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continued tendency in New Zealand to regard
import restriction as a convenient opportunity
for expanding or setting up local industries
to produce goods hitherto irnported. (20)
In communicating its wish that New ZeaLand reduce imports
Britain asked firstly, that any reduction would rePresent a genuine
saving and not be nade up by equivalent iurports fron elsewhere,
either of finished goods ot raw naterials and plants for secondary
industries; secondly, that it not cause undue dislocation of
British exporting industries or permanent loss of the New Zealand
narket. (21)
Concern mounted in 1940 because the New Zealand Goverrunent r,ras
planning the import licensing schedule for 1941. Nash approached
the British High Conunissioner to seek infornation on goods which
Britain night or might not prefer to be adnitted, of which the nost
significant was motor vehicres .(22) willis at the Board of Trade
recognised that if the general policy of import restriction was
accepted Britain could hardly press motor car exPorts on New Zealand.
But the Australian and New Zealand markets were the nost important
ones for British manufacturers and with the Australian narket at
least tenporarily closed, the New Zealand one was particularly
. 
(23)significant.'-"/ The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders
(SMMT) lobbied the British Government on this basis and its Wellington
representative did the same here.Q4) The British Government took
the view that, although not wanting to encourage New Zealand to
inport motor vehicles it was hoped that if New Zealand did decide to
20. rbid.2r. rbnd.
22. T160 FI27l5l5, 9 Aug 1940.
23. BTI1/1458, 4 Sep 1940.
24. Ibid., 17 Sep 1940.
-46-
inport they woutd cone from Britain, thus saving dollars and
helping British industry. The licensing schedule as released
prohibited all motor vehicle inports, and accordingly the Doninions
0ffice asked their High Conunissioner to seek sone token exceptions.
It was not prepared to do more than this because it preferred to
direct erports to narkets where foreign exchange could be earned.(2s)
Pressure fron the SMlvft was part of a nore general phenonenon.
In August 1940 Batterbee had reported that:
although increased holdings of sterling shown
by both reserve bank and trading banks are
no doubt largely due to earlier payments for
export coupled with delayed fulfilnent of
orders for inports, the figures are being
used by traders both in New Zealand and in
the U.K. to bring pressure to bear on the
New Zealand Government to relax import
restrictions. (26)
With the release of the 1941 import licensing schedule, such
pressure increased fron groups affected by the restrictions, who
quoted from speeches made earlier in the year by British Ministers
about the need for naintaining Britainrs export trade. Nash
accordingly asked the British Government to publish the nenorandum
(of fS Sep 1940) in which the latter had stressed the need for
economy, particularly in irnports .Q7) Britain agreed, and early in
December the substance of the memorandum was released. As the
Etseni,ng Post was quick to observe, the despatch did not justify
Fraserts contention that Nash was'1100 per cent rightfl on import
BTLl/1458, DO-UKHCW, 26 Oct 1940.
T160 F127L5/5, UKIICW-DO, 9 Aug 1940.
BT11/1458, UKHCW-DO, 25 Oct 1940.
25.
26.
27.
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. r28)licensing.'--' But it did nake it quite clear that the nain
thrust of British interest Lay in seeing New Zealand reduce non-
essential inports to a nininun.
The low priority accorded access natters became even nore
evident after the introduction of lend-lease in March 1941.
Allied planning directed that New Zealand secure imports from
Australia and the United States rather than Britain. In 1943, the
latter supplied only 34 per cent of New Zealandrs inports.
3. Financing the Overseas War Effort 1939-1941
Labour had cone into office deternined not to borrow overseas.
It believed that the indebtedness which was the result of such
borrowing was a major contributor to the nisery of the depression.
The need to seek financial. assistance in 1939 and the circumstances
under which that assistance had been obtained, only increased Nashfs
determination not to borrow. With the war came another reminder of
the dangers of borrowing: by financing tltorld War I very
substantially through accumulating external indebtedness, the
Government had been hanpered in its ability to bl-unt the effects of
the postwar depression.
For all this, New Zealand faced difficult circunstances at the
beginning of the war. While to British eyes, New Zealandfs sterling
28. EVening Post, 9 Dec 1940.
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position had been dramatically improved - as a result of the
wartime wool purchase agleement in particular - New Zealand saw
things differently. To her obligations to neet inpolt payment and
debt-servicing charges was now added the tIl nillion ster'ling per
annum that it was estimated would be incurred in deploying force
overseas - a substantial sun considering that New Zealandrs
reserves stood at under €10 rnillion. Thus she had little option
but to approach Britain for the second tirne within a space of
nonths if she was to Py a military role in the conflict.
New Zealand did not expect Britain to cover her costs outright,
but she did hope for a loan which would provide her with the
necessaly sterling and an arTangement whereby Britain would supply
the t28.6rn required for the Air Training Scheme. Discussions in
Whitehall followed New Zealandts presentation of her case.
Britain hoped that New ZeaLand would be able to nake sone contribution
to her own war expenses, particularly as the Doninionrs export
revenue increased, and hopefully as her inport payments were reduced,
and this led Britain to scrutinise New Zealandts expenditure patterns'
as will be discussed below. However a decision in principle was
taken that in the first instance the United Kingdon would meet all
New Zealandrs external costs. The sterling would be lent to New
ZeaLand at the sane rate of interest at which the British Goverrunent
itself was borrowing on the London market. (29) Repayment would take
place as and when New Zealand found it possible, although it was
recognised that New Zealand was entitled to retain a 1evel of sterling
reseTves - f14m was suggested as an appropriate figure - to cover other
29. T160 F127L5/4, I Dec 1939, 2 Dec 1939, 23 Dec 1939'
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contingencies. In addition, the United Kingdorn would neet the
cost of the Air Training Scheme - it would pay Canada in dollars and
New Zealand would repay in sterling. (30) This approach seened
more straightforward than making a division between costs New Zealand
would neet and costs Britain would neet. It had the advantage of
precedent, having been the systen eventualLy worked out in World War I.
Consistent with the practice at that tine, it was agreed that the
noney wouLd be advanced under a rrnemorandun of securityr. Suns
would be placed to the credit of the Bank of New Zealand in london
for the account of the New Zealand High Connission. In Egypt" where
New Zealand troops were to train, the War 0ffice would advance funds
directly to the New Zealand Expeditionary Forces and recover thent
fron the New Zealand High Conmission. (31) That repayment might be
slower than Britain expected was already evident by February: it
had been suggested that the balance of the t5 million export credit
extended to New Zealand in rnid-1939 be directed towards war costs.
But New Zealand said t4 nillion of it had already gone and the balance
was earmarked for 'ressential suppliesil namely army requirenents and
netal stocks .$2)
The negotiations on war finance were conplicated by New Zealandrs
simultaneous attenpt to seek assistance for the narket debts which
she had incurred in the course of her pre-war borrowing. During f940
some t3.5 nillion would be required on account of capital repaynents -
€.1.5 million in respect of the t17 rnillion on loan, and t2 million
representing two half-yearly payments on the conversion 1oan. These loans
30.
3r.
32.
TL60 Fr27L5/4,
TL6O FL27t5/4,
T160 Fr27Ls/4,
memo, Mar 1940.
23 Dec 1939, I Jan
3 Dec 1939, 29 Feb
1940.
1940.
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constituted part of the financial settlenent nade in rnid-1939. (33)
In addition, there were interest payrnents anounting to about to.srn. (34)
It would have suited New Zealand if she could have bonowed frour the
United Kingdom on the same basis as for war finance to cover these
debts rather than deplete her own sterling resources even further
in meeting them. In discussions with Fraser the Chancellor of the
L
Excheqrior explained that this was not possible - New ZeaLand' would
have to re-borrow on the open market - or repay. Fraser said that
he appreciated the Chancellorts point of view and only asked that if
difficulties arose, the Treasury would be willing to discuss the
position. This was not an acadenic question, given the difficulties
New Zealand had met on the London narket in the niddle of the year.
In February 1940, New Zealand learnt that she would have to repay. (55)
Two nonths later the question re-surfaced, in connection with
five local body securities maturing at various dates between July and
December. In these cases, the prospect of refinancing seened unlikely:
the Bank of England believed the market sinply would not accept new
New Zealand local body securities on tolerable terrns. In any case the
Capital Issues Corunittee was by this time nost unlikely to authorise
such conversion at a tine when all capital issues were stringently
controlted. (36)
Would it be more appropriate to
repay the securities, or expect even
ZeaLand the noney to
the way of repayment of
lend New
less in
33. See above p. 27.
34. T160 F127I5/4, memo, D.d., 2 Dec
35. rbnd.; Tt60 FL6320/02, CE-NZHCL,36. T160 F127LS/4, 15 Apr 1940.
1939.
7 Feb 1940.
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war advances than might previously have been the case? F.S' McFadzean
of the Treasury thought that if the United Kingdon agreed to refinance
the loans it seemed appropriate that New Zealandrs sterling balances
which would have been available for that pulpose be put towards the
cost of the second N.Z.E.F. (37) Kershaw, in the Bank of England,
thought that New Zealand would make a far greater effort to conserve
its sterling resources if it had to find the noney to repay the
narket debt. Britain was alteady corunitted to neeting war expenses
anryay, in the first instance. However much pressure Britain applied
to extract money for war finance it was unlikely to be quite as
successful in extracting sterling as would be the pressure to meet
a market a"Ut. (38) Moreover such a policy would be consistent with
the adnonitory advice the United Kingdorn had given New Zealand before
the war
It seens to ne that there is much to be
said for encouraging the New Zealanders
in every possible way to meet their naturing
corunitments out of their own resources'
This was the task they undertook, for which
they have been preparing following upon last
yearts conversion. It is one which they
can discharge and which will irnprove their
credit....Therefore, I should leave then to
carry out their existing obligation and
relieve then by way of loan for the time
being of this liability for external war
expenditure. (59)
McFadzean defended refinancing of the debts for rnore pessimistic
reasons: he did not expect any conpensatory contribution in war
fti.d., 12 Apr 1940.ftid., neno, n.d., Mar 1940.fbid., 15 Apr 1940.
37.
38.
39.
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expenses: on the contrary it seemed that there was nore chance
of getting a debt repaid if it was extended in connection with
neeting conmercial naturities than as yet another Part of the war
finances. (40) Kershawrs more sanguine expectations prevailed.
In naking formal conrnunication to New Zealand about the arrangement,
the overall level of sterling was the crucial issue, although
allusion was made to the difficulties encountered in finding
sterling to neet local loans. The United Kingdon Treasury and
the Bank of England did not want to think that the British Governnent
was making an oPen-ended commitnent to particular costs:
in view of the present level of New
ZeaLandt s sterling resources in relation
to her comnitnents in 1940, and, in
particular, the necessity of repaying the
naturing local loans, we ate prepared to
advance to the New Zealand Goverrunent the
sterling and dollars necessary to neet the
overseas expenditure.. . . In conveying this
information to you it is scarcely necessary
for me to enphasise, that we do not wish
this arrangement to be regarded as precedent
for subsequent yeats' and that, when the
question of financing the New Zealand war
effort in 1941 is considered, we hope that
your Government will be in a position to
provide at least a proportion'of the
necessary sterling. (41)
This was hardly a surprising aspiration. By naking advances
to New Zea1and for war purposes Britain was increasing New Zealandrs
ability to clain on her own current resources. She was prepared to
do this to the extent that it was "beyond the immediate resources of
New Zealandrr to find the money. But her own overriding aim was to
40. fbt:d., 16 Apr
41. TL60 Fr2715/5,
1940.
Treasury-NZHCL, 17 May 1940.
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reduce all non-essential claims on her resources to a rnininum so
as to maximise the contribution of the econony to the war effort.
Against the extension of credit to New ZeaLand was therefore set
the wish that New Zealand do everything in her power to limit claims
on British resources.
In May 1941 T.K. Bewley, of the United Kingdon Treasury'
estinated that United Kingdon payments to New Zealand would probably
be t20 nillion greater than payments in the reverse direction,
in the second year of the war. Moreover it seened likely that the
disparity would continue, Britain being expected to spend 835 nillion
on New Zealand goods in the third year of the war as opposed to
New Zealand expenditure of t18 nittion. (42) Given the current level,
and likely expansion of New Zealand's reserves
they could and should contribute sone
sterling towards their erpenditure abroad. . . .
Probably they coulcl only give us t3 - 4m [sic]
but it is important that they give us
something. (43)
New Zealand was anenable to making some paylnent despite concerrl
about the financial effects of the shipping shortage. But she wanted
to retain the systen whereby Britain met all the costs of the war in
the first instance: This was preferable to Britain reducing the
level of advances. Fraser in the United Kingdom Treasury, argued,
as McFadzean had in 1940, that this left New Zealand with no cornpulsion
or inducenent to cut its own external expenditure,
42. T160 Fl27L5/6, Bewley-Kershaw, 2L May 1941.
43. TL6O FI27L5/5, Kershaw-Fraser, 9 Jan 1941.
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Whereas if we can get a finn pronise of
some inmediate figure of repayment at the
beginning of the year, they rnay be forced
to make econonies in order to be sure of
being able to reach [it]. (44)
0n the other hand, it could be adnitted that I'no doubt they are
doing their bestfr. (45) In the upshot New Zealand agreed to pay
€4m on the 31 March 1941 (as against a suggested t6m). She
proposed, however, that part of it go toward settling the balance
of the fSn erport credit dating from 1939. Although Kershaw thought
this might cone in useful if export incorne fell, New Zealand clearly
felt that it was preferable to clear debts not covered by the
Memorandun of Security as soon as possible. Britain explained that
she intended to raise the natter of further payrnents later in the year.(46"
In May, the question was discussed by British officials, in the
knowledge that Fraser would be in Britain from the end of June.
0n the basis of the figures instanced above, t6m as a total now seened
rather low. on the other hand, S.D. warey(47) didn't think that
New Zealand should be corunitted to any definite repapnent for any
long time ahead. Britain should request a nininun repayment for
1941, which could be increased if it were found possiute. (48)
On 11 July 1941 a letter frour the Chancellor of the Exchequer
to the New Zealand Prime Minister conveyed Britainrs request. Just
four days later it was followed by a payment of nearly [5 million
clearing all debt outstanding at 3l March 1941 (since when just
t1356550 had been advanced. ) As Professor D.H. Rob""trorr(49)
44. TL60 FI27I5/6, Fraser-Kershaw, 18 Feb 1941.4s. rbid.
46. T160 Fl2715/6, passi,m, Feb-Mar 1941.
47. A senior official in the United Kingdon Treasury
Waley).
48. T160 F127L5/7, passim, Jul 1941.
49. An econonist working in the Treasury through the
Dennis Robertson.
(1ater Sir David
war (Later Sir
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connented, it cane as a rrvery surprising and gratifyingil move, to
gritain. (50)
But was it all that surprising? As Nash told the House of
Representatives in his 1940 budget statement, borrowing meant
piling up dead-weight overseas debt that
will be a heavy burden on us for nany years
after the war, when our ability to pay nay
be less than it is now. We have therefore
every incentive to strain every nerve to meet
fron New Zealand the costs of naintaining our
forces overseas as such costs accrue....
Similarly, Ashwin in his submission to the Economic Stabilisation
Conference in September 1940 had argued the desirability of New
Zealand meeting
sone part of the cost of maintaining our
forces overseas ... not only to relieve the
people of the United Kingdom at a tine when
they are carrying an enormous burden, but
also in our own interests. Our export
income is now up to a record level, but after
the war it may be lower by t20 000 000
a year or nore. Is it wise to pile up a
huge war debt abroad to be net out of a
snaller export income after the war? (51)
In other words there was a broad conformity of interests between
Britain and New Zealand over nobilisation for the war effort because
the restraint and nanagenent of resources which nobilisation entailed
furthered the New ZeaLand Governmentrs donestic econonic policies, as
well as allowing it to help Britain. Differences were of degree
rather than kind, and even these were overcome during L94L/42.
s0. T160 F127LSl7.
51. WAII10/CN111, Ashwinrs statement to Economic Stabilisation
Conference, Sep 1940.
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4. Britain and New Zealandrs War Effort 1941-1945
During 1941 the scale of New ZeaTandt s war effort ceased to
be a cause of dissatisfaction to Britain. At the end of 1940 the
United States Governrnent had taken decisions that altered the basis
on which it would nake goods and services available to the Allies. (52)
This was the beginning of lend-lease, fornalised in March 1941' by
which the productive wealth of the United States was supplied to
enJ otrer ruid
Conrnonwealth/countries on a non-colnmercial basis. In this way the
foreign exchange constraint on sterling area purchasing was eased
- at a tine when the supply situation was deteriorating world-wide.
For Anglo-New Zealand relations, lend-lease neant an easing in the
tension over supply issues. There was a general switch in New Tealand
inporting fron the sterling area to North Atu"i"t. (53) The Ministry
of Supply which becane the countryrs principal importer' securing
goods direct fron al1 over the world, facilitated the re-directiot. (54)
While external constraints had eased, New ZeaLandrs ovm economiC
mobilisation had been conpleted under the inpact of the events of
1941 and early L942. Early in the year the seriousness of the
shipping shortage was brought home to producet interests when bans
were imposed on the export of certain classes of meat. (see Ch. 4).
Through April-May and June long casualty lists were coning fron
Greece and Crete: they had a sobering effect on the country leading to
heart to heart searching as to whether the
Doninion is putting as rnuch behind the war
effort as possible. (55)
52. Sayers, FinaneiaL PoLicy, pp. 373-374.
53. Baker, War Eeonotny, P. 121-. Lc1dteorr' J;). touvo'lfswQ ttflQ lT'srt'< nlZtl
54 . Ibid. - - - ' .*^ rrgp! p,sSt^.'$' u.tit dtn, *.d - -l9tz r
ss. TL60 Frzlrs/7, uKHCw-ssD, 2l Jul 1941. (to-"<'rt Ly r'ofgrr&'ldd''''
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Peter FTaserr s visit to Britain in the middle of 1941 undoubtedly
had an effect and then at the end of the year cane the shock of Pearl
Harbour and, not long after, the fall of Singapore.
By the end of 1941 all age groups of single nen had been
mobilised: between Novernber 1941 and May 1942 the percentage of
the nale labour force in the armed forces went fron around 16 to
nearly 50 per ."rrt. (56) In ,January, the Government took the
power to conscript men for industrial purposes. Two internal loans
were floated in L942, and the surcharge on incone tax was increased
frorn 15 per cent to one ttira.(57) By L942-43 expenditure through
the war expenses account amounted to 50 per cent of national incone, (58)
cornpared with around 25 per cent in 1941-42. Conversely, to take
the neasure used before, total new housing permits dropped fron 9000
in L940/41 to just over 7000 in L94I/42 and. under 2000 in Lg42/$.(59)
And at the end of L942, after nonths of delay, a ful1y fledged
stabilisation scheme was introduced, under which all wages costs and
prices woul.d be controlled for the duration of the war. Britain
would benefit to the extent that pressure on scarce resources -
fsgr)
including inputs for agriculture production - was eased.
In September L942, a Treasury official reported that New Zealandrs
war effort was pz,o rata as substantial as Britainrs - a fair recognition
of what had been achieved by that tir". (60)
The one area of New Zealandrs nobilisation where there was sone
56. Baker, War EeonomU, pp. 27, 71.
57. fbid., p. 26t.
58. rbid., p. 76.
s9. rbid., p. 243.
60. TL60 F127I5/8, 25 Sep L942.
tSeaJ f6nqat ly P\Frror Jc].J\An'. thdr
Plesvi Gr! hb lt eorr\ fD ttr €rle^t
a1<t elt-q. *rt c)iect q(th 9a-{-ia^
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dissatisfaction on Britainrs part in the latter stages of the
conflict was food rationing. It nay seem surprising that this
had not been sorted out far earlier in the war. The inhibiting
factor was the shipping crisis, with great uncertainty as to whether
New Zealandfs produce could get to Britain at all. Rationing nright
only have meant ever greater quantities of butter and neat accumulating
on the waterfront.
The easing of the shipping problem should have rneant that
plenty of butter and neat was available for Britain, but there was
a weakening in supplies from other countries: the additional volume
that could be secured from New Zealand if the latter imposed
rationing would be valuable.
The discrepancy in per capita conswnption certainly was narked.
0n carcase weight it was calculated that meat consurnption per head
in New Zealand in 1943 stood at 237 lb per anntrm compared with
L36.4 lb in the United States and 107 .2 lb in Britain. (61)
However just as Britain found at tines that domestic political
priorities could conflict with wartime obligations to alIies, so did
New Zealand. The patterns of pressure rneeting procrastination so
familiar in 1939-41 were now repeated.
The first approaches were nade over dairy Products. In
March 1943 both the Conbined Food Board in Washington and the London
Food Committee took decisions to get New Zealand and other countries
to exanine their consumption of fluid milk and nilk products with a
61. MAF 83/1181 brief n.d.
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view to restricting consunption and increasing total availability
of milk products.(62) New Zealandrs initial response was cautious.
New Zealand Government would be prepared
to consider butter rationing with view to
increase in export of cheese corresponding
to reduction in domestic butter consunption
but is not desirous of Placing anY
restriction on availability of fluid nilk
for children and domestic consumption. (63)
Despite this caution, the London Food Connittee cane back and asked
whether butter rationing could be introduced in tine to allow extra
cheese production in the L943-44 season. New Zealand took a
month to reply to this and then it was nerely to say that the matter
was under 'rfu|l investigationr' - and a reply would be sent after
Easter. (64) At this tine New Zealand also learnt that Britain was
interested in seeing New Tealand ration meat consumption. Wooltonrs
letter committing Britain to purchasing the exportable surplus raised
it as a possibility and New Zealand representatives having
discussions in Canberra discovered that the Australians were
contemplating it in the likelihood that the United Kingdon would
demand increased supplies. (65)
Progress was at a snailrs pace. In mid-June Bankes Amery'
the head of the British Food Mission to Australia' reported that
New Zealand was still at the 'rgiving consideration't phase' (66)
The Ministry of Food thought further pressure was inadvisable.
Jordan at this stage was asking for further information on butter and
cheese rationing; the Ministry of Food was convinced that Britainrs
disappointment, expressed at the official level, would percolate higher
62. DPM Sunnary of cables, L942-46, Mar 1943"
65. Ihnd., PM-NZHCL' 19 Mar 1943.
64. Ibtd., 23 Mar 1943, 23 APr 1943.
65. Ibid.', 3 May 1943, 5 May 1945; MAF 83/1180, 29 Apr 1943'
66. MAF 35/1181, Bankes Anery-MF, 15 Jun 1943.
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up. \-"r Such patience required real discipline: by July it
seened that the butter ration would be threatened by the end of
the year unless supplies were naintained. These tactics did not
pay off. In nid-July, Britain learnt that because of New Zealandrs
forthconing election, there could be no question of any irnnediate
introduction of rationing. (68) And the election wasnrt until
25 Septenber.
Bankes Amery was apopleptic at such a vital neasure being
delayed on purely electoral grounds, and vented his spLeen at not
being allowed to talk to the New Zealanders, in a retter to H.s. Turner
of the Meat Division, Ministry of Food:
I an afraid that I was disappointed and
surprised at the reluctance of the Ministry(of Food) to authorise me to go to New ZeaLand
with a special nandate to discuss these
questions with the New Zealand Goverrunent.
I believe fron my previous experience in
New Zealand that I could have got the New
ZeaLand Governrnent to do the decent thing
because all these people respond very hunanly
to anyone who can talk to them with knowledge
of United Kingdon conditions.... I notice the
skilful way in which your letter to Jordan of
25 June worked in references to Australiars
plan for rationing neat but I also see ... the
alnost equally skilful way in which the New
Zealand Goverrunentfs telegram of 15 July in
reply completely evaded all reference to
rationing and took refuge in a snoke screen
professing willingness to rnake the greatest
possible quantities available for shipnent to
the United Kingdorn. Nevertheless the estimated
production was estinated to be the same in 1944 asin 1943. No reference whatever to the possibility
of increasing lanb weights! No reference to the
curtailment of supplies to butchers as inAustralia! Let us in fact continue for several
electoral nonths to a11ow our voters to eat 5 Ib
of meat weekly and 13 oz of butter! (69)
67. Ibid., MF-Bankes Amery, 19 Jun Lg4S.68. MAF 83/1749 UKHCW-DO, t4 Jut t945.69. MAF 83/118f, 20 Aug L945.
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Although Harry Davis, a New Zealander seconded to the Ministry of
Food, attenpted to downplay the significance of New Zealandfs s1owrrurr(70)
the procrastination was annoying. Nor did the election result help.
Labourrs position having weakened, the Government was more
susceptible to caucus pressure than before. Batterbee thought
that under these circunstances, willing though Nash and Fraser were,
they would resent further pressure. (71) However on 8 0ctober yet
another reconrnendation was received fron the Conbined Food Board
which urged that:
in view of the prospective supplies of
al1 dairy products falling seriously short
of requirenents and the increasing call on
avaiLable supplies your urgent consideration
of the recommendation in which Governnents of
Canada and United States have already concurred,
will be appreciated. United Kingdom Ministry
of Food hope that the reconnendation which
clearly involves rationing will have New Zealand
Governmentrs most favourable and earliest
possible attention. (72)
In fact by this time the decision had been taken, and on 28 October
a butter ration of 8 oz per citizen per week was introduced.
Domestic consumption of cheese was also linited and consumption of
crean prohibited, although ice cream was excluded rfor political
f1a\
reasonsl. L/J'l Harty Davis wrote to George Duncan that he was
rrimmensely relieved" that New Zealand had finally rationed and hoped
she could do more to keep up with the rest of the United Nations.(74)
Britain had of course hoped that neat rationing would be
introduced at the sane tine, and Batterbee expressed his Governmentrs
70. MAF 83/1159, 9 Aug 1943.
7I. MAF 83/IL49,UKHCW-DO, 28 Sep L943' 4 Oct 1945.
72. DPM Summary of cables, 1942-46, 8 Oct 1943.
73. MAF 83/1159,UKHCW-DO, 16 Sep 1943.
74. DPM 82, 13 Nov L943.
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disappointment about this to Nash, then the acting Prine Minister.
The Americans too continued to be sharply critical of the lack of
austerity in New ZeaLand living conditions. Moreover, according to
Bankes Amery the press and inforrned public opinion were in favour
of neat rationing. (75)
Yet other rcealities continued to intrude. Batterbee understood
that protests about butter rationing were "pouring in'r. He also
reported that the Labour caucus took the line that New Zealand had
done more than her share in the war: there was in any case widespread
doubt whether sheepmeat rationing would serve any useful purpose,
whiLst because of the United States forces beef was already in short
(7 6\
supply. t'uj Bankes Amery, for his part' could not believe that
Ministers and their supporters in New
ZeaLand are so different from corresponding
peopLe in Australia, who have responded so
well to our representation....We should indeed
hope...to have secret discussion with leading
members of Caucus if they are to [be] the
governing factor.... (77)
Both Bankes Amery and Batterbee saw Nash as an ally. But Fraser
had always taken a personal interest in the nattel. It was he
who had stopped the Food Mission couring to New Zealand before the
election according to Bankes Anery and Nash did not feel he could
reverse this decision without consulting t it. (78)
so the matter dragged on. In rnid-January L944, while in
Canberra, Fraser announced that New Zealand would have meat rationing
r70\
at an early dateL'tJ - and it was in fact introduced in February.
75.MAF83/1I59,UKI{ChI-DO,3Nov1943;BankesArnery-MF,9Nov1943'
76. Ibi.d., 3 Nov 1943.
77. Ibid., 9 Nov 1945.
78. MAF SS/tfSf, Bankes Arnery-MF, 15 Oct 1943; UKHCW-DO' L7 Nov L943'
79. IbLd.,UKHCW-D0' 18 Jan 1944.
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After all the delay, the tirning caused some embarassnent to Britain.
Because of a glut, and shortage of storage facilities, Canada
suspended its neat ration shortly thereafter. (80)
As far as Britain herself was concerned though, the assistance
came at a tine of extrene crisis: in February 1944 consideration was
being given to elininating butter from the food ration altogett"t. (81)
The 1943/44 season was bad climatically in New Zealand and production
was affected - meat production fe1l by five per cent (27000 tons)
compared to L942/43; butter production, which unl.ike meat, had not
sustained pre-war output levels, also fell slightly. Rationing
therefore helped. It was estinated in October 1945 that an
additional 35000 tons of meat per annun was made available through
. r82)rationing,'"ut whilst New Zealandrs per capita butter consumption
fell from 45 lb Ln L942/43 to 56 lb in L944/45. These were
substantial changes.
Britainrs food needs also impinged on New Zealandrs military
contribution to the war effort. The New Zealand Goverrunent had
reckoned that it did not have the manpower to deploy two divisions
overseas and also to naintain food production. (83) By late 1943
it was clear Britain needed food more than soldiers. In early 1944
an interin decision was taken to scale down the 3 Division deplolment
in the Pacific with one aim being to release men for production tasks
184)in New Zealand. \ ' rrom ..rune 1944 soldiers were drawn back from the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
MAF 83/1181, DO-MEA , 24 Mar 1944.
DPM 82, UKHCW-NZG, 18 Feb, 23 Feb 1944.
Baker, War EeonoW, p. 204,
Wood, PoLitieaL and, Esternal Affairs, p. 277.
Ibid., pp. 277-292.
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Pacific to New Zealand and placed on leave without pay to work on
farms - or in other industries to which they might be directed.
Possibly this was an over-reaction - climatic conditions had been
prinarily responsible for the drop in output in L94s/44 which even
then was 8 per cent above pre-war levels, (85) as a result of
increased productivity through rnechanisation. Output in 1944/45
was 14 per cent above the pre-war average - unlike Australia where
output was falling.
Britainr s policy of econornic mobilisation for war enbraced her
allies as well as herself. It met with acceptance in New zeaLand,
not just because that country had a deep comnitment to the struggle
against, the Axis Powers, but because such a nobilisation accorded
with nany of the Governrnentrs own economic priorities in wartine.
The New Zealand Goverrunent was committed to welfare and
employment policies but these slowed down rather than haLted New
Zealandfs rnobilisation. Britainrs representations focussed on
the effects of New Zealand policies on consunption of overseas 
.r
resources. From I94I/42 though, New Zealandts nobilisation was so
complete that such representations were not necessary except in
respect of rationing. rnsofar as New Zealand sought to extend her
clain on Britainrs resources she did so through her export trade
(as will be discussed in Chapter five).
85. Baker, l'lar EeonomU, p. 204.
CHAPTER THREE
The Bulk Purchase Negotiations 1939
1. Introduction
2. New Zealand accepts bulk purchase
3. The contract negotiations 1939: short-term
cons iderat ions
4. The contract negotiations 1939: protection
against shipping difficulties
5. The contract negotiations 1939: long-term security
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1. Introduction
Byanyreckoning the most substantial part of New Zealandrs
contribution to the war effort had to be its ability to produce large
quantities of food and raw materials which it did not require for
its own consunption. It might seern that nothing could be simpler
than to accept that such resources should be at the disposal of the
Alliedt war machine for the duration of the conflict. The fact that
New Zealand had been seeking for years to secure its access to the
British narket would facilitate concurrence with British plans.
But New Zealandrs output of food and raw naterials provided a
livelihood for tens of thousands of New Zealand farners. However
convinced they were of the inportance of the war effort, these farmers
also needed to be able to nake a decent living. There were sharp
memories of Britaints handling of the finances of the revealingly-naned
World War I commandeer. To sorne extent these sentiments were to be
directed at the New Zealand Government in World War II. But although
there were nany producer - government differences, the latter could
not turn its back on the tirne-hallowed task of protecting fa:mersl
Livelihoods. Moreover, its ideological diffidence about naking life
too confortable for private capitalists had to be juggled with the
realisation that if production was to be naintained, so must profitability.
This outLook was explicit in the Govetnnentts relations with the
dairy farmers whose incones the Governnent had been guaranteeing
since 1936. Unless it wanted to draw on other financial resources to
sustain these incomes it was necessary for the Government to dispose
of dairy produce profitably.
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Reinforcing this disposition to protect producersr livelihood, was
the Governmentts interest in the export industries as the countryrs
single nost inportant source of overseas exchange. This was an interest
which derived not least fron the experiences of the preceding few months
- the near exhaustion of sterling reserves and the Governmentrs reluctance
to restore external barance through deflation or by borrowing. The
retention of such self-interested criteria might seen to invalidate
wartime rhetoric. But Britainfs position was not dissinilar. The
supply agreenents she wished to nake with New zealand were not, and
lrere never intended to be, open-ended 
- they were devised to neet what
were expected to be transient problens, and would be dispensed with as
those problems receded or were overcone.
This chapter covers the negotiations in l9s9 which set the pattern
for the entire history of bulk purchase. The issues which were raised
then persisted in one form or another, throughout the rife of that
r6gime' chapter four covers the vicissitudes of the export industries
through the difficult years of the war, 1940 
- 1943. rn chapter five the
focus shifts. The short and nedium tenn outlook for meat and dairy
produce is good' Both producers and Goverrunent seek increased payrnents,
the latter because it wanted to boost sterring reserves. only with
wool was the need to seek protection against a depressed nrarket still
an imnediate concern.
2. New Zealand accepts bulk purchase, ]9S9
Britain envisaged rnaking bulk
comrodities for a number of allied
purchase agreenents for various
reasons. She wanted to urinimse the
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uncertainties and costs normally attendant on securing essential
supplies in wartirne. She planned to enter into bulk contracts for the
purchase of a number of commodities. Prices would be stabilised, suppLy
assured, and, where the contTacts were with sterling area countries,
foreign exchange .onr""u"d. (1)
The first approaches to Dominion Governments were nade at the
June 1937 Inperial Conference. It was explained that the United Kingdon
wanted to ascertain, as a general principle, whether she would be able
to rely on the cooperation of the Doninions in furnishing the necessaty
supplies. New Zealand assured Britain that she rrwas anxious to
cooperate in any way possi61""(2) - the faniliar and predictable language
of inperial solidarity. In the nore detailed discussions with the Food
(Defence Plans) Department(3) which followed, New ZeaLand learnt that the
najor comnodities required from her would be mutton and lamb, beef and
veal, frozen pork, butter and cheese. Fruit would not be included. (4)
The Iurperial Conference accepted a report by one of its connittees
on supply questions. The Comrnittee recognised that agreenents could
take the forn either of undertakings to purchase the whole of the
exportable surplus of a particular produce or more ad. hpe arrangements:
shipping difficulties rnight rnake it necessary for Britain to meet its
needs fron cLose at hand. (5)
1.
2.
5.
4.
5.
Charlotte Leubuscher, BuLk Buying fnom the Coloni'es, p. 2.
WAII 10/59, K.R. Miller and R. Rowley, Hi,stony of the Matketing
Departrnent (Eryort Dittisi,on) [hereinafter Htstory], P. 155
Became the Ministry of Food in Sep L939.
Miller and Rowley, HistonU, pp. 155-156.
fbid. , p. L57.
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Planning continued ove" the next two years but this did not nake
for any significant changes to the outline proposals discussed at the
rmperial conference, only in June l9s9 did plans take on a greater
degree of precision' New Zealand learnt that dairy produce and meat wouLd
take priority over other foodstuffs. rn due course agreenents were nade
for a nurnber of ninor products: flax, scheerite, talrow and hides.(6)
wool was also included. Britain had opened discussions with
Australia on ffichasing her wool clip in the event of war, as had been
done in world war r, Talks during the last few weeks at the Ministry
of Supply included New Zealand as well as Australian representatives.
It was logical to include New ZeaLand as it had been included in lgl5-191g
- in fact New Zealandrs crossbred wool was particularly useful for
utilitary clothing. The underrying reasons for Britain proposing the
purchase were the sane for wool as for neat and dairy produce. rt
seened likely that Britain could easily absorb at least g0 per cent of
Australasian output: denand fron the rest of the world would easily
absorb the renainder and, if Britain did not buy the lot, raise prices. (7)
How did these plans 
- to which New zearand had agreed in principle
by the outbreak of war 
- dovetail with the Dominionfs own interests and
activities? The Government was predisposed to concur. A properly
adninistered bulk purchases systen accorded with its philosophy that
the burdens of the war should be fairly ,h.ted. (8) Moreover it exempli-
6.
7
8.
Miller g Rowley, Histotg" pp 166-167.
R.S. Sayers, Finanaial poliag Lg3g-1g45, p.
F,L.W. Wood, The Neu ZeaLand people at Ww:Entermal Affar,rc, p. 115.
297.
PoLitLcaL and
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fied the kind of planned direction of economic activity pronoted by the
1936 plan for Reciprocal Trade. Additionally, there was the nenory
of the postwar slump of 1921. rf bulk purchase was accepted there shoul4
be a better chance of maintaining price stability when the war ended.
The conviction that there would be another postwar slunp was ve"y wide:
spread. It would hurt the farmers and hurt the countryrs export
receipts. If both risks could be avoided, so much the better. A rnore
inmediate consideration was that it was believed that bulk British
purchase meant that Britain would assune responsibility of providing
shipping. It would not be much use withholding produce fron Britain if
wartine difficulties nade it irnpossible to ship the produce elsewhere.
Producerst initial reactions were very favourable. On 6 Septenber
1939 the Dairy Board had passed a resolution stating that it offered
the Government full co-operation inin which it can be of asiistance in
crisis. The Boatd will hold itselfto undertake any activity which may
of the Goverrunent. (9)
any
the
in
be
direction
present
readiness
the desire
The neat and wool- industries, although still conpletely in private
hands, reacted very sinilarly. Ministers had a series of meetings
with the Meat Board and other representatives of the meat industry in
the weeks after war broke out. The producers and the industry as a
whole accepted the Governrnentrs role as purchaser of neat for sale
overseas: the Government nade it clear it did not wish to intervene
directly in the organisation of the industry in New Zealand. (r0)
9.
10.
Mil ler
rbid., pp 330-333.
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securing the cooperation of the wool industry proved equarry
straightforward. rn this case special agreements were nade with
woolbrokers t, wool scourers I and woolbuyers r associations which made
provision for the enployrnent of their nernbers on contract to the
Governmena. (1r;
With no producer board, interests in the wool industry hrere more
diffuse than in the other two. At a neeting carled by the Governnent
in septenber, representatives were present fron the sheepor,rners,
Federation, the Meat producersr Board, the Farnersr union, stock and
Station Agents, Woolbrokers, Woolbuyers, the Wool Council and the
Bank of New Zeal'and. Accepting the British proposats without qualifica-
tion, the conference also settred on the domestic purchase price, and
agreed on the establishnent of a wool Advisory corunittee to advise the
Minister and supervise purchase and sare operations. Agreenents were
nade with the Associations of woolbrokers, wool scourers and wool Buyers
for the employnent of their members on contract to the Governrn"nt.(12)
That producers accepted burk purchase in principle did not nean
that its introduction was merely an administrative matter. Like the
Government, their acceptance irnplied certain assunptions about how the
r6gime would operate. First and foremost was profitabirity. Dairy
farners, into the fourth season of the guaranteed price, we?e detennined
that the Government hold firm to its connitment to tie the guaranteed
price to the cost of living, not overseas realisations. Nonetheless
11. rbid.,72. IMd. 
"
472.
41 I 
-413 .
p.
pp
they,
awale
and even norebo the
I
I
of what prices were
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other producing interests, would be keenly
agreed to in London.
Profitability was not just short-tern, and war carried with it
two dangers to which producers were alerted - shipping problems and
postwar srump. The former in particular, being the nore irnmediate,
convinced producers of the worth of introducing a bulk trading systen.(f3)
We then have three producer concerns which the Government had to
negotiate on - short-term profitability, protection against shipping
disruptions, and protection against a postwar slump. To these three
we can add the Governmentrs own concern about foreign exchange to get
a taxonomy of four themes which dominated the negotiations which were
conducted fron Septenber through to December 1939. The last-nentioned
was intertwined with the other three.
************
The existence of the Prinary Products Marketing Departnent made
the transition to wartine trading circunstances very snooth. Renaned
the Marketing Department, it took over the purchase of other products
in the sane fashion as it had been dealing with butter and cheese since
1936. George Duncan renained the Director of the Departnent and becane
its chief negotiator in dealings with the British 
- he was in tondon
for this purpose both in l9J9 and 1940.
13. Interview with Sir Arthur Ward, 2l Aprit 1981.
-t.J-
In London, interesting changes took place. The two officials
of the Marketing Departnent, H.E. (Harry) Davis and J.W. Rodden,
were seconded to the Ministry of Foodrs Milk Products Division.
Sinilarly, R.S. Forsyth, London Manager of the Meat Producers Board
since L923, became Director of Inported Meat in the Ministry.
H.S.E. Ttrner, who had been New Zealand Manager of the New Zealand
Refrigerating Conpany before the war, headed the Meat and Livestock
Division. F.S. Arthur, who was New Tealand representative to the
newly-established International Wool Secretariat, became the Secretary
of Wool Control, the division of the Ministry of Supply which adrninistered
the British woollen industry fron gtadford!ra)
These nen were true state servants, giving their Loyalties to the
institution for which they worked at any given tine. But their
fauriliarity with New Zealand conditions, their personal contacts and
allegiances, helped blunt the natural antithesis between buyer and
seller, consurner and producer, and give sone reality to the aspiration
for a collaborative war effort. At tines indeed, the results couLd
be rather curious. The Marketing Departnentts operations in London
were adninistered by R.M. Carnpbel-l, forrnerly adviser to Coates and
Nash. His deputy was British-born Norrnan Mclumpha, fonnerly the
Meat Boardts salesman in the United Kingdom. So in sorne of the neat
negotiations a Briton negotiated on New Zealandt s behalf with a
r 1s)
New Zealander - Forsyth - representing Britain)-
The importance of supply in British thinking neant that the
activities of the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Supply
t4.
15.
E.L. Greensmith, ffie New Zealand llool Conwission, p. 116.
Hayward, Golden JubiLee, pp 60-61.
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overshadowed the peacetine pattern of New
producer issues. The Doninions Office and
still played a role but they were more in
ZeaLandrs deaLings on
Ministry of Agriculture
the background.
The Contract iations 1939: Short-term Considerations
of the issues on which New Zealand sought certainty in its
negotiations with Britain, agreernent on the prices to be paid admitted
of no delay, the new production season being already under way.
Britaints plan was to pay to all its suppliers prices that were an
average of recent narket realisations. No enhanced prices were to be
paid, nor would clains for prices above recent narket averages be
recognised, even when such averages could be denonstrated to be
inadequate to neet production costs. (16) The narket had not been
buoyant for New Zealand.--xports in the lgsg/tglg season, and
New Zealandrs negotiators argued that, particularly if output was to
be maintained, prices had to cover costs. Britain agreed that purchase
prices should be reviewed if war conditions produced cost increases:
moreover in practice, prices set for the LgSg/lg4} season were realistic
in terrns of current costs. (17)
Throughout the whole contract period fron l9s9-lgs4 price
discussions were a vehicre for pursuing short-term advantage.
New ZeaLand sought to cover her costs when the narket was depressed,
and to folLow the narket when it was buoyant. with the elaboration
M_ill_er Q RowLey, Histoz.t1, p. l7I.
rbnd.
16.
17.
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of stabilisation poricy in the niddle of the war though, the Government
becane less enthusiastic about high prices, and there was thereafter
frequent dissension between Government and producers on the natter,
as the forrnerrs cormtitnent to a long-tern strategy renained rather nore
wholehearted than the latterrs.
For woo1, Britain had initial.ly proposed purchasing at the average
price realising during the season ended s0 June 1g3g. This had not
been a good year however 
- the average price was 9.17d. per lb. conpared
with average returns in rgs6/rg37, LgsT/tg3g, of 1s.71d. and 10.04d.
respectively. The three year average $ras 11.64d. From this basis,
with a 5.24 per cent increase, a figure for 1939/1940 was finally agreed
on. When certain additional charges were taken into account this gave
a sterling price of 10.55d. per lb. (Lz.zsd. Nz): this was compatible
with the rnininum price of 12d. per lb. (Nz) that would be paid to
producers. New Zealand pressed the view that the purchase price should
be net to the farmer for wool derivered at brokers I warehouses 
- a
departure from peacetine practice, under which certain charges incuped
subsequent to delivery hrere debited to the farrner. (18) Although
prices could be reconsidered in May of any yeat, this did not entail
too nuch risk for New Zealand given the price that had been agreed.
whil'e only 5.24 per cent over the r9s6/ 1939 average it was 3s.6 per cent
over the average for the depressed lgss/lgg9 ,".rorr. (19) And although
not spelt out, the way in which Britain had shifted fron its initial
offer suggested it accepted that the price it paid had to bear a
relationship to costs. rn setting the price, the Australian price
was also taken into account, a significant relationship that continued
Ibid., p. 408.Ibid., p. 407.
18.
19.
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through the war- New Zear.andrs percentage increase was srightly
higher than Australiats, because the denand for New zealand cross-bred
wool was particularly great in Britain and France. As a result
New Zealand could not expect to nake nuch profit out of the resale of
wool to other countries .Qo)
For meat, Britain first proposed passing the rmported Meat Trade
Association (I.M.T.A.) prices for 1938, worked back to an f.o.b. basis.
New Zealand agreed in principle, but reserved the right to nake
qualification in cases where the I.M.T.A. classifications were
disadvantageous to certain kinds of her meat products. rn working
prices back to an f.o.b. basis (I.M.T.A. prices were ex-store London)
Britain allowed inter alia for a two per cent conmission. The Governnent,
after consulting with the Meat Board resisted this decision as a
considerable portion of New Zealand meat was delivered directly fron
the ship to wholesale and retail buyers. The Ministry of supply stood
by it though, and New Zearand eventuarly concurred as otherwise
negotiations would have been delayed .GL)
For dairy produce the negotiations were particularly significant.
whereas the New zeaLand Government for the first tine would be sole
purchaser for the countTyfs wool and frozen neat export production,
with dairy production it had been doing this for three years and at
the beginning of the 1939/1940 season there was a deficit on the
Dairy Industry Account. The united Kingdorn initially suggested basing
20.
21.
Appen&ices to the JoutttaLs of the House of Repreeentativee(hereinafter AJHR) 1940, H30B, p. 8.Miller 6 Rowley, Eistotg, pp SZl-524.
', -f
the price on 1938 or 1939 average market realisations, but subsequently
put forward a tentative (and higher) figure of 121s. per cwt. for butter"
and 70s. per cwt. for cheese. (These were prices ex-store London too;
they would then be converted back to f.o.b.). The butter prices had
been computed by averaging AustraLian and New Zealand narket prices at
1 septenber 1939 (rr6s. and L24s. respectively) then arlowing for a 2s.
nargin' (22) George Pottinger, Acting-Director of the Marketing Departnentrs
Export Division informed Nash, that
should the prices paid by the British Governnentnot exceed 12r.s. per cwt. for butter and 70s. per cwt.for cheese, and, the present guaranteed prices Le
continued for the 1939-1940 ieason, theie wirl be a lossto the Governnent of 9670 000. To enabre the continuanceof payrnent and of the present guaranteed prices[we need to selr] butter at rz4s. and chelse at 73s. (zs)
Jordan thought it wourd be unwise to emphasise that the price
New Zealand sought was necessany to enable her to naintain the guaranteed
price at hone. But she did want her production costs 
"ouurud. 
(24)
New Zealand accordingly enphasised that the requested prices were
needed in view of the uncertain effect of war conditions on costs and
manPower, and to ensure maximun production: she informed Britain that
she sought 130s. for butter and 76s. 6d. for cheese. If certain
safeguards involving protection against excessive storage charges,
and payurent in the event of shipping delays, and longer-tern prospects,
were agreed to, she was prepared to accept 125s. and 74s. (25)
Unfortunately, at this tine New
an irnproved price were jeopardised by
Zealand,ts prospects of securing
Australia accepting the
22. DPM DSIJ passim.23. Miller G Rowley, Hi,story,24. DPM D3l3 NZHCT to NZG, 6
NZDB, 8 Sep 1999.25. DPM D3l1 MMk ro Chairman
p. 202.
Sep 1939; DPM D3l1 MMk to Chairnan
NZDB, 30 Oct 1959.
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united Kingdonrs initial offer. New Zealand considered that there were
convincing reasons why, unlike Australia, she courd not do this.
Australia, she contended, could afford to serl at a lower price than
New Zealand. Dairy produce represented ress than t0 per cent of
Australiats exports, but s9 per cent of New Zealandfs. Moreover, the
Australian domestic narket consumed a fairry high proportion of total
output at fairl.y high prices. (26)
By mid-october Britain was sti1l not prepared to concede nore than
121s. for butter. The New zealand, Governnent held out, not just on its
own account, but because of pressure fron producers in New Zealand, who
thought the existing guaranteed price was too ton.(27) At the beginning
of November a new offer was made 
- butter to be sold at rzss. zd.
(1r2s. 6d. f.o.b.)" which was equivalent to 1s9s. 7rd,. NZ (conpared with
the average price paid for cre€rmery butter under the guaranteed price,
1938-1939, of l39s - 6\a. To this New zeaLand agreed, and with it, to a
cheese price fo 7ss. 11d, (64s. sd. f.o.b.). Thus she had secured a
butter price very fractionally above pottingerrs nininun, which, he
observed, would not provide for the cost of adninistering the Marketing
Departnent, estimated at approximately tl00 000 p.a., but was
otherwise r"it. (28)
As has been noted, dairy producers in New ZeaLand did not concern
thenselves very directly with overseas prices at this time: they were
deterrnined to hold Nash to his obrigation to pay then a guaranteed
price tied to donestic circunstances not overseas realisations. Nash
was safe for another season, but if he was not able to secure a price
Miller-& Rowley, Hi.stotg" pp 205-204, DpM DS/L, Acting DMk toMMk, 25 Sep 1959.
DPM D3lt passim,
Mil-ler-$_Rowley, Histozg, p. 20S, DpM DSlf Acting DMk to MMk2 Nov 1939.
26.
27.
28.
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incrr.ase in 1940 he rnight be in difficulty.
Another dinension of pricing that concerned New zealand was the
relationship of returns to the final price. Britain agreed that if
she sold woor to a third party the profits would be shared equalry
between the two goverrurenar. (29) Fraser raised a sinirar issue in
respect of butter: he thought the margin between the f.o.b. price, which
New Zealand received, and the retair price, was rather large. He
received assurances 
- but no nore - that nargins were fair and that the
purchase price for New Zealand, butter would not be used to subsidise
purchases frour other supplierr. (30)
iations: Protection ai.nst Shippi Difficulties
rf Britain paid New zealand for what she bought, on rsrunerative
terns, New ZeaLand would have little to conplain about. But what if
she did not buy? Britain had initiatty suggested that she wanted to
purchase exportable surpruses of all produ"ar. (51) This would nark a
big break with the constantly recurring prewar arguments over quantitative
restrictions. But it quickly became apparent that her plans for raw
naterials and for food differed. rn the case of wool, Britain was
prepared to purchase the entire clip. For butter, cheese and meat, the
29.
30.
31.
A,IHR 1940 H30B, p. 8.Miller & Rowley, History, p.
DPM D3/1 rnenorandun entitled
186.
ItWar and Prinary Productsrf .
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Ministry of Food had apparently expected to nake a siurilar connitnent
untiL rreasury queried its propor"rr!32) certainly New Zealand hoped
for such an arrang"r"rt!33) But when the New Zealand Goverrunent explained
that by f'al1 surplus outputil she meant all production surplus to
domestic needs, the United Kingdon Government countered with the
definition rrthe quantity which having regard to available ships could
in fact be export"6"(34)
At the heart of this difference was the (anticipated) shipping
problen. Britain did not want to conrnit itself outright to purchasing
linitless quantities of perishable produce which rnight be stranded in
the country of origin. For New ZeaLand producers, protection against
shipping problens was one of the principal advantages of the contracts'
and the Governrnent agreed. Britain had suggested that purchase of all
products should be on f.o.b. terms, i.€. transfer of ownership would take
place on loading in New Zealand, (for wool, at appraisal pointl (3s1
This seemed sensible as the nerchant narine which handled the
United Kingdon-New Zealand trade was entirely British and had cone under
the control of the Admiralty on the outbreak of war. It neant that the
United Kingdorn absorbed all freight and insurance charges and was
responsible for shipping schedules. Given that this was so, New Zealand
argued that it was up to Britain to organise shipPing, the inference
being that it was unreasonable for New Zealand to be penalised for a
problen over which she had no control !36)
32. R.J. Harnnond, Food, Volurne III, p. 203.
33. AJHR 194Q H30B, p, 4.
34. Miller f1 Rowley, Historg, p. 176.
35. For wool, at appraisal point.35. Miller 6 Rowley, Hi,story, pp L76-L77.
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Producers in New ZeaLand were concerned. The Farrnerst Union asked
the Government what would happen if, producers having increased production'
the British Goverrunent restricted exports.GT) Dairy producerst
opposition to quantitative restrictions went back to depression days:
theydidnot wish to suffer in wartine what they had successfully avoided
before the war. For the L939/1940 season a conprotnise energed whereby
Britain gave a firm undeltaking to purchase defined quantities which
approxinately covered the estinated seasonal surpluses for export' over
and above these definite conmitments she would rdo her best to lift any
balances of quantities available for exportr ' Whether such an arlangenent
would hold for further seasons if shipping conditions deteriorated
remained to be tu"rr. (38)
Theprospectofshippingdelaysraisedfurtherproblenstoo.
New Zealand had to provide for continuous payment of debts and inports'
and overseas exchange was therefore necessary in adequate anounts at
regular intervals. If Britain paid out only at tine of shipnent' what
would happen to New Zealandrs finances if there were major hol'd-upst(39)
Britain was reluctant to rnake firm comnitments in the event of delays'
but agreed in principle to pay on account 50 per cent of the value of
the produce which had to renain in cool store in New Zealand by reason
of the Ministry's inability to adhere to its shipping prograrnme'(40)
The other sinilarly problenatic area was storage costs. Britain
said it was not prepared to pay storage charges in New Zealand' but
shouldtherebehardshipthroughahold-upthequestioncouldbe
37. DPM D3 1 2 Nov 1939.
38. Miller & RowleY, Histotg'
39. AJHR L940 H308, P. 5.40. MiLler 6 Rowley, Histot't1'
p.178.
p. 180.
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rai.sed. Here again it was difficult to
the problem was anticipated rather than
make a concrete argunent when
t".t. (41)
In his talks in London in Novenber 1939, Fraser, in alliance with
S.M. Bruce, the Australian High Corunissioner, put nore Pressure on the
British, but to no avail. The Minister of Shipping pointed out that if
shipping was short the tine factor nust dictate that Britain seek its
supplies fron closest to hand. Bruce pointed out that
it was not sufficient to look for the quicker and
easiest neans of supplying the needs of the United
Kingdon frorn the point of view of the Ministries of
Food, Supply and Shipping. There were wider
considerations . . . particularly affecting Australia
and New Zealand as exporters of dairy produce. (42)
Fraser added that New Zealand had nade plans for extending her cold
storage accomnodation but these had not been carried out before war
broke out. New Zealandfs financial situation would be prejudiced if
exports could not be maintained. The Ministry of Shipping, although
it accepted there was a need for coordination, and that the Doninions
had inportant interests, was not prepared to conunit itself to lift their
produce under all circunstances. (43)
The possibility of shipping shortages gave rise to schenes for
reducing the volurne of cargo by processing and handling it in new ways.
This was particularly the case with neat which was bulkier than either
wool or butter. In October 1939 Britain suggested telescoping mutton
( LAl'
and lamb. L++J New Zealand reluctantly agreed, Britain paying New Zealand
4L. rbtd.
42. EAL53/L712, 7 Nov 1939.
43. Ibid., aLso Mil,ler Q Rowley, HistonT' pp 183-184'44. Telescoping means severing the carcase crosswise at th,e pin-bonejoint aira inen packing the leg portion inside the trunk. Tttis
iesults in a considerable saving of storage and shipping space.
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1s.6d. per lb to cover the costs. 0ther space-saving strategies were
explored as the war progressed, for instance, de-boning and canning
(related to the shortage of refrigerated vessels). chilled beef
shipnents were suspended indefinitely!45)
5. The 1959 Negotiations: Long-Term Security
0f all the war-related contingencies against which New Zealand
sought protection, probably the most significant was a postwar sltrnp.
The fact that war prices would probably be high but uncertain was
stressed in the report on the negotiationr!46)
In cabling its proposals in Septenber 1959, New Zealand suggested
that purchase arrangements for food products should cover the period
of the war and at least one year thereafter. Except in respect of
wool, this suggestion was not entirely accepted by the British Govemnent,
but it was generally assurned for the purpose of the negotiations that
the arrangements would cover at least the period of the 
""t!a7)
In this respect, Fraser queried the distinction made between food
and raw naterials. In his discussions with the Minister of Food, the
latter pointed out that the perishable character of food products nade
for a major difference - also New Zealand foodstuffs did not constitute
a large proportion of the worldts supplies - Long terr arrangernents
45. Miller &46. AJHR T94O
47. MiLler G
Rowley, History,
H30B, pp 2-3.
Rowley, fuistorg,
p.
pp
326.
r84-185.
-84-
between Britain and the Dominions could not necessarily be expected
to prevent a price co1.lapse as they might with wool. As with other
issues, New Zealand did not hold up the agreements being negotiated
on account of this difference. For her part, Britain agreed that it
should be considered at a later d"t". (48)
With their countryfs overseas reserves at nearly an all-tine
low, New Zealand,rs negotiators could not overlook the inportance of
export receipts to the countryrs balance of paynents. The wool contract
provided a rnajor boost. This was partly technical. Britain would pay
for wool imrnediatel.y it was appraised - a more beneficial arrangenent to
the vendot than the peacetine practice of pa)4nent against receipt of
shipping documents. (49) But more generally, with wool exports providing
around 40 per cent of New Zealandts overseas exchange, she had security
for her balance of payments of a kind unknown in peacetine. Nevertheless,
arxiety persisted. What would happen if import prices increased?
New Zealand suggested that she be provided with assured quantities of
essential connodities at agreed prices. Britain suggested that
cornnodities such as iron and steel, fencing wire, woollen and other
textiles, could be purchased at controlled prices, though she was not
prepared to connit herself to neeting all such increases in New Zezland
iurports on the sort of basis iruplied in the Septenber cable.(50)
As New ZeaLand would learn when she pressed this I'terms of traderr
argunent at a later date, (51) the nultilateral character of British
trade nade it quite impracticable for the United Kingdon Government to
contempl.ate holding the prices of goods traded with any one custoner
48. Miller 6 RowLey, Hi,stoz't1" p. 186.49. Sayers, Einmtsial Poli'ey' p. 301.
50. AJHR Ig4O H50B, p. 4t l,tilter 6 Rowley, Hi,story' p. 175'
51.. See below, chapter five.
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in equilibriun with the prices of the particurar imports it received
fron that country.
Peter Fraser took up the issue in the ministerial talks
London in Novenber 19s9. There should be, he said, a ,price
based on existing revers which the two sides should endeavour
The most though to which Morrison would agree to was to enter
discussion at a later date, if necessary. (52)
he had in
equi libriunrtt
to naintain.
into
Another dinension to long-term thinking was that New zealand under
certain circunstances wished to be able to divert production away from
nritain' (53) Trading difficulties in the l9s0s had encouraged New Zealand
to seek alternative narkets 
- in the case of dairy produce, this had been
active Government strategy. In lgsg five per cent of butter exports
went to narkets other than Britain. Britain agreed informally that sone
such selling could continue, a policy compatibre with her wish to take
defined quantities of production herself. In 19s9 and 1940 sales were
nade to North Anerica and the west Indiur.(54) rn the case of neat,
caution prevailed in the initial stages. Britain agreed in principle
that New Zealand could reserve sone neat for sale outside the United
Kingdon, but when New Zealand sought permission to ship ls 000 tons to
New York this was de.tined. (55) with wool, New zeaLand, wanted to naintain
trade connections with other countries. Britain allowed supplies to go
to other Connonwealth countries and allies, but not to non-bel.ligerents
like the united states and Japan. would Britainfs caution about
diversion last if the shipping situation deteriorated? rt renained to
be seen. (56)
52. AJHR 1.940 H308, p. 6.53. AJHR 1940 H308, p. 18.
:1. !? gfn.tal Ieaybook Ls4s, p. ts7.55. Miller Q Rowley, Histotg"'p. 325.s6. IbLd., pp 421-422.
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Tlre negg,tiatiors tn lggg suceessfully neal.ised their aim of
orga4islng a trading rdgirre accepcable to borh eountri.es, Britai,n
hed assured herself of, suppLies at tolerrable prices. 0n Nerry Zeal.andrs
side the irmediate outl,ook rvas good. While ablo to pride herself on having
foregone rthigh but uncertain priees* the palment schedules agre,ed on
were in fact a substantiar ,advance on the rggglrgsg ayerages - especiarly
for ws-0,1. The long-ter-n orrtlook,was hauier, but this was hardly
surpli.siugl and at least sone ge[eral connitments,]nd been extraeted
frm Britain. Tirne aod circunstance wouxd allo,w New Zealand to judg3
just how srrbstantiel those connitne:rts were.
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1. The 1939-1940 Season and Dairy Produce Negotiations 1940
Whilst so much of New Zealandfs attention during the 1-939
negotiations had been centred on securing some protection against
unwelcome wartine occurrences, the 1939-1940 season was really the
last one of the peace.
Britain over-estimated the degree of disruption to shipping
likely in the first nonths of war; butter was rationed, large
quantities of nargarine (which could be produced in Britain) were
provided for, but in the neantine supplies cane forward in New
Zealand and Australia at a rnuch higher level than in the preceding
season and a glut developed, with stocks of butter - and neat -
accunulating in New Zealand, and stocks of butter in the United
Kingdom at record levels. Large shipments at the end of March, an
increase in the butter ration and the invasion of Dennark in April,
eased the problen. But consunption was stiLl depressed when New
ZeaLand sought an adjustrnent in the butter price for the L940/41
season.
The complications encounteaed in setting the price in 1939 led
the Goveranent to propose talks with the Australians to coordinate
the position of the two countries on price and other questions.
0fficial tatks took place in Canberra (50 May - 7 June 1940). A
ministerial visit did not eventuate, but there were ninisterial
exchanges. Australia did not intend to seek a price increase for
L940/4L partly because of the war situation, In any case her
output would be profitable at the existing rate of return. However,
recognising that New Zealandts conditions were different, she did
not want to stand in the latterrs way, particularly if the increase
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could be absorbed without further advance in the united Kingdon
retail price (the price increase at the beginning of the war was
believed to be a major cause of the farl in butter consunption).
Moreover, if New Zealand did get an increase, Australia would erpect
a natching one to preservu prrity. (l)
Although New Zealand recognised the force of the war crisis
argument, she felt she did have a valid craim for higher prices to
cover increased costs. A1so, she contended that there was a danger
that world production night fal1 short of requirenents, in which case
it was important for Britain, by price or other mezrns, to encourage
maximum output - an argurnent hardly likely to appeal to Britain at
this time. In making its case to the Ministry of Food, New zealand
explained that it had no conplaint about price levels in relation to
pre-war costs, but costs of irnported conmodities had soared since the
outbreak of war. Phosphate, which had cost ils.6d. per ton, had
now reached 60s. principally because the ships which usually plied
the run had been requisitioned by the British Governnent. More
generally, it was pointed out that the British wholesale price index
had increased by s2 per cent since the beginning of the ,0"t. (2)
Miller and Rowley, Historg, pp. 2IO, ZIS. The two sides also
agreed on the need for food contracts to last through and after
the war and for Britain to take the entire exportable surplug to
rnake payment on account after a specified period in store, and
contribute to storage costs. The conference did not haveinnediate diplouratic consequences, as these issues did not generate
much discussion in 1940. Both countries continued to negotiatebilaterally. But as trading conditions deteriorated in early
1941 particularly, they drew closer together.
Ibid., pp. 2I2, 2L8-2I9, 22I. DpM 14/2/5, passim.
1.
2.
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No nore than in 1g3g was the Ministry of Food prepared to
concede an increase on the rast nentioned basis: nor was it in fact
prepared to accept any unqualified increase at arl. The increase
would be passed on, and this would further depress the rnarket. (3)
New Zearand abandoned the claim for an increase to natch the shift
in the wholesale price index, and concentrated on seeking sone rmodestf
compensation for increases in inported goods and fertilisers.
Trading a decrease in the price of whey butter against an increase
in the nain categories was suggested but in the event neither proposar
was pressed. The Ministryrs only other suggestion was to offer to
consult with the Ministry of shipping about the possibirity of
restoring British ships to the Nauru trade - which the Marketing
Departrnent in New Zearand did not think would herp uruch. Nash had
cabled George Duncan, Director of the Departmentrs External Division,
early on in the negotiations, to the effect t.hat New zealand was not
prepared to exert pressure on the united Kingdorn if the ratter was
clearly Teluctant to concede the increased price. This renained
New Zealandts stance and so in the upshot no arterations were rnade
in the schedules for the new seasorr. (a) Nonetheless it is an open
question whether it was wartime solidarity or a recognition that the
market was too weak to support an increase, which was the prinary
influence on this decision.
The fact that
for any change in
the Dairy Industry Council had decided not to press
the guaranteed price ilin order to assist in the connon
3. rn June 1940 the ration was reduced to 4 oz per week frorn g ozper week, and in July a combined 6 oz ration'of butter andnargarine was introduced. under such circumstances it seemsunlikely that this argunenr woutd trave treiJ;il.
Miller and Rowley, Htstory, pp. ZIS, 2IL_ZZZ, 2ZS.4.
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war effortrr (as werl as to conpete against margarine) made it
easier for the Governrnent to forego any further pressure. There
was agitation from the industry rater in the year after a 5 per cent
general wage order: the Government granted some subsidies but
didn't budge on the guaranteed price. rn March 1941 the rndustry
council decided to reave the question in abeyance because of the
war situatiorr. (5)
while New Zealand producers had coped with the problem of a
narket in oversupply through 1959/40, indications were not wanting
that the centrar probrern would be getting piggy to market rather than
selling hin once he arrived.
rn April 1940, after Dennark had been invaded, New Zealand felt
enboldened to enquire of the Ministry of Food whether it would agree
that
New Zealandrs maximum production forerport [to the United kingdom] shouldbe regarded as inportant and is a
contribution to the war effort. (6)
But despite the recent events in scandinavia, the new Minister of
Food, Lord Woolton, would not concur. He would
rather postpone for a little whilegiving New Zealand any indication of a
change in outlook so far as your exportsare concerned, than make a premature
announcenent.... I should be sorry if onny authority any expectations *erl created
among producers in New ZeaLand which itnight later prove impossible to realise. (T)
5. fbid., p. 229; Ward, Cownand. of Cooperatives,
an account of the surge of hostility to ttash atDairy Conference.
Quoted in Miller and Rowley, History, p. 2I7.rbid.
pp. 105-108 gives
the October 1940
6.
7.
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This was an interim reply, however, and when negotiations for a
new contract for dairy produce opened in June (those for neat
followed two nonths later) New Zealand felt it was in a position to
raise this and alried questions again. At this tine, Britain agreed
trin principre't to purchasing the erportabre surprus, but in practice
still wanted quantities named. The cornrnitrnent given for the rgsg/4O
season' to take a quantity ,as nearry as possible (subject to
shipping and other considerations) to the naxinum for which you are
able to contract ...fr was reiterated. (8) For cheese the quantity
naned was very favourable. Britain wanted as much cheese as she
courd get and New Zearand comnitted herserf to supplying 107 000 tons,
15 000 nore than the quantity shipped over the 1g3g-40 season.
For butter, Britain agreed to take 120 000 tons, but gave an assurance
that she would arr*nge the shipping schedule to accept r30 000 tons
if that became practicable. The t9S9/40 figure had been 115 000 tons
but actual shipnents (including whey) had totalred r2g ooo tons.(9)
The dairy industry in New zearand accepted and cooperated in the
planned shift frorn butter to cheese production: the Governrnent provided
financial assistance to individual suppriers and comparri"r. (10) rn
the final stages of the butter and cheese negotiations, New zearand
tried to get Britain to agree that if difficulties arose because of a
shipping problern, or something similar, the two Governnents would
discuss the position on the principle of the United Kingdom Government
having agreed to purchase to the naxinun and the New zealand Governnent
having rrade its plans accordingly. But Britain would stilr not cone
at this and confined itself to stressing that the risk of any
9. AJHR. 1941, H30, p. 6.9. Miller and Rowlef, nistony, pp. 206_208.10. DPM Box 23: araii parfiailentary paper entitledSupplies to.the United Kingdom i"i.i"g tf,e-War,,0ther Supplies',), p. 17.
'rFood and Other(hereinafter 
'fFood and l
I
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interruption in trade occasioned by
shared as may be agreed between the
The
the war rnust remain one to be
parties. (11)
Crisis and the Meat Negotiations 1940-1941
For frozen neat the situation was far worse than for butter -
the possibility of severe quantitative restrictions, because of the
shipping shortage, looned large. There was certainly no Prospect
of gaining even the very general statenent of support for New Zealandrs
meat industry which had been extended to the dairy industry in Lord
Wooltont s letter. The Ministry of Food argued that dairy produce
had never been the subject of quantitative regulations as had been
the case with neat, (12) but this in and of itse1f was hardly the
reason for the difference in treatment. This was more accurately
conveyed by the observation that
whilst we shall probably be anxious to
lift all the butter you can produce, the
position in regard to neat is quite
different In the circumstances I think
it would be contrary to the spirit of our
mutual relations to accept a forrnula in
which we undertake to purchase quantities
ras near as practicable .... to the rnaximum
for which yo.t ate able to contract (13)
In other words, Britain was regulating neat more vigorously than
dairy produce not because it had done so in the past, but because of
the existing situation of oversupply and uncertainty about future
shipping ProsPects.
11.
L2.
13.
Miller and Rowley, Histoty, P.224; AJHR, L94L/42' H30' p' 7'
MAF 88/116, Ryan-Carnpbell, 26 Oet 1940'
fbid. The quoteJ pi.t"t"'is taken fron the Minister of Foodrs
letter enbodying-"ti.ttg"tents for supply of-dairy produce for the
Ig4o/4L season (see AJHR, Ig4L/42, H30, p' 6')
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New Zealand learnt, in rnid-July, that Britain was estimating
that her quota for the L940/4I season might be as little as 250 000
tons, inclusive of the 47 700 ton carry-over fron the L939/40 season.
hlhen negotiations got underway in August, this frigure had not
changed much - 275 000 tons was the naxinum (exclusive of pigrneat)
which Britain was prepared to commit herself to purchasing. (14)
The New Zealand Government had discussions with industry
representatives and learnt that 550 000 tons of neat would probably
be available for export from the L940/4L season. There had been a
canpaign in New Zealand to help Britain by increasing food production
while the ernphasis had been on cheese, bacon and eggs, the overall
effect would be to make it almost certain that neat production levels
would be naintained, despite manpower and other shortages. The
Government had naintained its comrnitnent to purchase alL export meat
"in confident anticipation that United Kingdon Government would
purchase and lift 11.,,(15) with the 47 7oo tons carry-over to take
into account New Zealand might have up to 100 000 tons of neat
surplus to British and New Zealand needs. Unsurprisingly, New
Zealandrs representatives in London stood firm for a nininum
unconditional purchase of 350 000 tor,". (16)
Not only was New ZeaLand dissatisfied with
offered by Britain: relativity with Australia
contention. Australiar s quota for 1940/41 was
the
was
225
absolute figures
also a bone of
000 tons and the
14.
15.
16.
DPM Box 23 rrFood and Other Suppliesrr, pp. 22-23.Ibid., p. 23.
7A;,1
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relationship between the two tonnages was that of the volunes
contracted for in 1939/40. New Zealand argued that that allocation
had itself been unfair as Australiars proposed 240 000 tons had been
accepted without amendment, whereas New Zealandrs proposed 330 000 tons
had been cut back. Moreover, during 1938/39, New Zealandrs mrtton
and lanb shipments had been subjected to a restriction, gT per cent
of the preceding yearfs loadings. As a result New Zealand had a
carry-over of 45 000 tons at the beginning of the lgsg/40 r"rror,. (17)
Two additional considerations added to New Tealandt s sense of
grievance. Firstly, Britain was prepared to take as much pigneat
as either country could supply. But for New Zealand, pigrneat
production was not readily substitutable for beef or sheepneat
production, and she could only have exceeded the estinated 21 000 tons
by decreasing donestic consumption[18) 
"hi"h would not have directly
helped absorb surplus sheepmeat or beef. Secondly, actual seasonal
loadings, which had been the basis of quotas prior to the war, were
ignored in setting the L94Oi4L figures. (rg) This seened particularly
unfair to New Zealand, as actual loadings over 1939/40 (550 000 tons)
had far exceeded those from Australia (260 000 tons). During the
1930s this principle had sometines worked to New Zealandts disadvantage.
Ncw, when it would have been advantageous, it was overlooked, at a
time moreover when producers had been encouraged by the New Zealand
Governnent to j.ncrease prod,r"tinrr. (20) To Britain, however, the
actual experience of the 1939/40 season was not a consideration:
that season was exceptional. She had been building up stocks as fast
as possible:
17. MAF 88/116, 8 Oct 1940.
18. Ibi.d., 11 Nov 1940.19. Ibid.,' Campbell-Ryan, 28 Oct 1940.20. DPM Box 23, "Food and 0ther Supplies", p. 2J, quoting cable to
NZHCC, Jul 1940.
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In the event we took additional quantities
of Z0 000 tons from Australia .r,d SO 000 tonsfron New ZeaLand, which was very favourableto New Zeatand. We cannot, however, agreethat these final liftings nust be the basisof future allocations between the two Dominions. (zr)
rn this vein the discussion dragged on welr into the new season,
feeding on a tradition of quibbling which antedated the war.
Meanwhile the external situation was deteriorating. By the end of
November, the availabirity of refrigerated shipping had reached crisis
point, and the decision foreshadowed in the Novenber l9S9 discussions
was taken: to switch the naximum amount of cargo space away fron
the Australia-New Zealand route to the plate.
It is vital to the maintenance of civilian
norale and the efficiency of the fighting
services that more meat should react thii
country in 1941 than is possible under theexisting arrangements. The Minister sees
no possible way of achieving this save bythe transfer of ships from ihe longerAustralasian to the shorter South American
route. The round voyage to the SouthernDoninions is now taking 25 weeks: in the
case of the plate the period is 15 weeks . (22)
Lord woolton praced the restrictions firnly in the context of
necessary wartine sacrifices.
We want to keep the goodwill of the Dorninions,
whose business we are danaging a great deal .:..I an anxious they should know-thai we are
conscious of the suffering inflicted on them.Only stern necessity made us denand suchsacrifices. (23)
saclifices they undoubtedly were and despite Wooltonfs assurance that
the problem would be treated ,as one conmon to the Doninions and the
. ()a\united Kingdom" L'*/ the New Zealand Goverrunent was very ararmed. rn
its 20 December cable, the Ministry of Food had suggested that total
2r. rbid.,22. Mil1er
20 Dec23, Evening24. DPM Box
Ryan-Campbell, 26 Oct 1940.
and Rowley, History, pp. 540-S4l r Quoting neno MF to NZG,1940.
Post, 15 Jan 1941.
23, trFood and Other Supplies", p, 24.
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purchases fron Australia and New zearand. would be around 4s6 000
tons of which New Zearandrs share would be 239 000 (zrg 000 and 21 000
tons of baconers). Taking into account the ca*y-ovet of 47 000 tons,
New Zealand would be left with nearry 140 000 tons for which she
would have to accept sole responsibility.
statements and reports in the New Zealand press in rnid-January
1941 on the prospect of restriction aroused concern. (25) s,G. Holrand,
Leader of the opposition, deprored the need for .any restriction on
a New Zealand produced comnodityfr and hoped that the restriction would
be of a brief and tenporary nature. (26) Fraser pubricised prans
already being realised for increasing storage capacity, but sone sort
of appeal to Britain was inevitable. rt was rnade the more compelling
by the pressure the Governrnent was und.er from the rneat industry.
on 27 January r94r the North and south rsland Freezing coqpanies
Association inforned the Goverrunent of their nenber conpaniesr belief
that
they cannot continue buying and paying forthe new seasonrs neat without ,or"'aeiinite
understanding with the Goverrunent as to theirposition in regard to payment, storage charges,quality clains and weighr claims. fZZl
The Goverrunent sununoned a conference early in February at which neat
buyers stated that unless the Goverrunent was prepared to guarantee the
ultimate purchase of a1r exportabre meat they wourd have to cease
operations entirely. The Minister of Marketing emphasised the
Governmentrs preparedness to do this - but negotiations on details,
25.
26.
27.
MAF 88/1r6, UKI{CW_DO,
Euening Post, 15 Jan
DPM Box 23, nFood and
2l Jan 1941.
1941.
Other Supplies", pp. 35-36.
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especially the exact
precluded the speedy
responsibility for storage and payment,
conclusion of an agreenent. (28)
Meanwhile the news from Britain was getting worse and taking
the Ministry of Food even further away from New Zearandrs goal of
securing a corunitnent to buy the entire seasonal .utput. In
nid-February the expectation was that only rg0 000 tons might be
lifted fron New Zealand: barery harf the export kilr from the season.
Nervously, New ZeaLand wanted to know what were
the actual possibilities of New Zealand
and Australia securing agreement withUnited,Kingdom Governmeni for purchase of[sic] financing of certain prescribed quantityof neat beyond rhat acruatfy shipped. (30)
The New Zealand High commissioner in London explained that the
Ministry of Food and the British Government were wavering
between agreeing to firrn purchase oftonnage taking account of our normal
exports and as cautious alternative
restricting purchases to low tonnagethey estimate can be lifted while fromisingto help in dealing with the probtems thatwill resutt. (St)
The full gravity of the situation had dawned on producers and the
public. In January both had taken comfort in the reflection that
circumstances might be transient, an attitude encouraged by the
Government.rs reassuring statements on neat storage.G2) By the end
of February the Meat producersr Board was restricting rivestock
available for export and in mid-March the Government sunmoned a
National conference of arr neat interests under Nashrs chairmanship.
28. rbid., p. 56.29. Ibid., p. 29.30. Ibid., p. 31.
1\. Ibid., p. 31: NZHCL_NZG,32. MAF g31164, UKHCW_SSD, 27 13 Mar I94L.Mar 1941.
(2s)
-99-
Representation of the Meat producersr Board, freezing cornpanies,
stock and station agents, shipping conpanies and neat operators
were all present, and a special comnittee was estabrished to report
back to the Government. The reconmendations were nostry concerned
with various strategies for dealing with the expected surplus of
stock and/or meat, both for the current and the forthcoming (rg4r/42)
season. Diversion to other markets should be actively encouraged.
90 000 neat carcasses were shipped elsewhere, nostly to North
Anerica, but ironically, a shortage of refrigerated shipping limited
further sales there too. Expansion of canning output was also
advocated' production plans were implemented, despite the fact
that the price offered by the united Kingdom meant that the New
zeaLand Government had to subsidise the canneries. (s3)
Proninent in the reconmendations was the proposar that the
Governnent should restate as soon as possible its intentions to
purchase arl exportable meat for the current production year
In the 1ight of past assurances toproducers about the purchase of frir"ryproduce during the wir and the imninenceof a General Election the Governnent-*iffcertainly do all they can to find a sorutionsatisfactory to the farners, even though atheavy cost to New Zealand finances. Ifthe United Kingdon Exchequer 
"r" t" persuadedto shoulder part of the burden, ,o ,ir.n tf,"better for New Zealand. (S4)
This expectation of the British High comrnissioner was correct.
At the suggestion of the Australian Government, tarks had been herd
in wellington in February to coordinate responses to the crisis.
DPM Box 23, "Food andHistory, pp. S4L, S4Z.
MAF 83/164, UKHCW-SSD,
Other Supplies,,, pp. J6-40, Miller and Rowley,
27 Mat 1941.
33.
34.
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Now, both Prime Ministers conveyed their concerrr directly to the
Dominions secretary. Fraser stressed the need for early
clarification, but he was quite direct about the sort of clarification
which would be welcone. Reiterating the point already made to the
Ministry of Food about the heavy potential liabilities the New Zealand
Goverrunent faced he agreed that
In view of Lord Wooltonrs menorandun...
acknowledging the problem as one comnon tothe United Kingdom and Doninion Govemnent[the New zeaLand Government] consider arrangements
should be concruded between the two Governnentsfor actual purchase by United Kingdon Governmentof alI Ig40/4L export meat at f.o.b. or after
agreed period in store and recognition storagecharges. (SS)
whether or not this cable made an inpact, in early Aprir the wavering
ended. The Ministry of Food agreed to firm purchase of the volunes
proposed in December, i.e. a total of 436 000 tons frorn Australia and
New Zealand. New Zearand did not charlenge the overarr figure but
did raise the question of proportions once again. As before Britain
had based them on the contracted vorumes for 1939/40. Jordan, ,rstormed
the strongholds'r of the Ministry of Food to seek a revision (as in
0ctober) based on actuaL liftings which would have given her 266 000
tons. No more than before courd Britain accept this, not least
because she would get into serious difficulties with Australia if the
agreed proportions were departed fron. Britain did, however, agree
to an increase to 24g 000 tons. This was justified on the grounds
that the total figure incruded baconers, which had previousry been
separately listed. At the end of February, Britain had reversed its
pigneat policy, as it no longer wanted all that could be produced.
The new figure was proportionate to Australiars production excluding
55' PMNZ to ssD, lJ Mar 194r in DpM Box 2s, 'rFood and 0ther suppries'r,pp. 32-ss.
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pigmeat, a ratio in which New Zealand gained an edgs. (36)
rn the aftermath of the National conference the Goverrunent
reached agreement with the neat buyers. The crucial problems had
been the questions of payment and storage charges. The conpanies
wanted 50 per cent of the f.o.b. price after two months. Agreement
was reached on 50 per cent after three nonths, the balance after six
months. storage charges incurred by the Governrnent would not
rrexceedrr fu. per pound and would only appry after six monthr, (321
The Governnent in its turn sought commitnents from Britain to
natch these obligations. rn the letter setting out the dairy
produce contract for the Lg4o/4L contract, Britain had agreed that
in the event of delay in shipnents, the Ministry of Food wouLd pay
50 per cent of the value of any butter which had to remain in cool
store one month ronger than wourd have been required by the schedule.
This was an inprovenent on the 19s9 agreement which had specified
two months. New Zearand now sought two - or three - months fron
the Ministry of Food but the natter was handed over for discussion
to the Surpluses Comrnittee. (38)
rn respect of storage costs, Britainfs obligations in the dairy
contract for r940/4r had remained as vague as they had in Lgsg/4O
despite New Zealandrs wish for a change. with meat the problem was
now more urgent: moreover, the New Zealand Goverrunent had agreed to
assist the freezing companies in the extension of cool storage facilities
to the tune of around t400 000. Fraser raised this matter in his
36.
37.
38.
MAF 83/164, passim.
DPM Box 23, 'rFood and OtherMiller and Rowley, Historg,
Supplies'f , pp. 27, 4O-4L.pp. I80, 226.
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cable of 13 March rg4l but it too was passed on to the surpluses
Conmittee. (39)
New Zearandrs discussions with Britain in r9s9 had set price
levels as well as agreeing on quantities. But the two natters were
inter-related, and frorn the start of the neat negotiations in August
1940 it was thought wise to concentrate on obtaining the rargest
possible tonnage and forget about prices. Although earry in the
negotiations carnpbell did atlude pointedly to New Zealandrs
forbearance in this respect, the natter was not raised again. rn
the absence of any agreenent on a contract for the 1940/41 season,
the Goverrunent decided to pay producers at the scheduled rates for
Tgsg/4}.Exclusive of some ninor adjustnents this was accepted by the
industry. As expected, the agreenent reached in April rg4r hrith
Britain confirmed these rates. (40)
The deterioration in trading conditions in the early months of
1941 made it all the nore inportant to New zealand to secure Britainfs
agreenent to an extension of the contract periods for neat and dairy
produce to bring thern into line with wool. Although in the 1g40
contracts it was stated that
39. DPM
40. MAF
DPM
Box 23, 
'rFood and Other Supplies'r, pp. 2g, 52.88/116, ?! t"e le40; Milt;; 
"r,J no"iuy, ittiiooy, p. JSe;Box 23, rrFood and Other Supplies,r , pp.'25, 54.-'
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the general arrangements for purchase and
sale of butter and cheese would continuefor the duration of the war and for aperiod to be agreed thereafter (41)
nothing more precise than that was offered.
By the tine this matter was dealt with in the meat negotiations,
Britain was exPecting the shipping situation to remain difficult for
sone tine. Accordingry, a special sub-connittee of the war cabinet
was established to consider the problems of export surpluses. l{ith
the assistance of officials of the various departnents involved this
conmittee would formulate policy for the renainder of the war period.
The question of extending the contract,s became its responsibility.
shortly after the establishrnent of the sub-comrnittee, at the
beginning of March New Zealand learnt that butter, as well as frozen
rneat, had becone a problem export. For over a year Britain had been
encouraging New Zealand to promote cheese rather than butter production.
Early in 1941 the butter ration was cut fron 4oz to 2 oz per week and
Britain proposed to Australia and New Zealand that butter exports be
cut to a joint total of 118 000 tons, less than New zearandrs total
exports in 1939/40. Further, Britain warned that if she found it
possible to maintain the fat ration in other ways, imports might be
halted altogether so as to free more shipping space for cheese and
( Aa\
meat. \*'/ [Of the three products cheese was the nost valued.
Nutritionatly it was a substitute for neat. Meat required refrigerated
shipping and was also available fron closer at hand. Neither caveat
applied to cheese. l
41. Mi1ler and42. Miller and
Row1ey, Histong, p.
Rowley, Eistoty, p.
223.
234.
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At the beginning of April, British officials subnitted for
New Zealandrs consideration a draft statenent, "Policy with regard
to New TeaLandts Surplusrr. Britain was not prepared to offer
contracts for production over and above what she couLd ship, either
for the forthcoming season, or for ones after that. She did
proPose that during the war period she would share equally with
New Zealand the cost of acquiring and storing reserve stocks, after
New Zealand had rnade every effort to adapt production, for example,
through de-boning, canning, or diversion to alternative narkets.
The quantities to be held in reserve would be agreed between the two
Governmenar. (43)
This offer fell far short of what New Zealand would have wished.
There vras no question of Britain taking full responsibility for the
exportable surplus. It also seemed unlikely that the shared
responsibility would cover all unshipped production.
Neither Government nor producers nor public opinion in New
Zealand were prepared to accept the full irnplications of Bnitish
planning. These were that, although Britain would provide sone
assistance, she would also expect New Zealand to help herself by
restricting production insofar as the strategies suggested would not
absorb all the surplus.
In the 1930s restriction had been seen as a
would secure advantages at New Zealandrs expense
way by
and in
which others
1941 the
43. MAF 83/257, n.d.
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reaction was no different. Fraser believed that as a consequence
of war conditions and the provisions of rend-rease, the united states
would gain a preferred position in the British narket, which it would
be difficult for New Zearand to regain after the war. public opinion
was incrined to criticise the Government for not standing up for
New Zealand interests in dealing with Britain: not a reasonable
criticisn. Ir was fert that New Zealand was being hit harder than
other Dorninions who could mitigate the inport of restriction by
expanding secondary industries. (44)
According to W. Garnett of the United Kingdon High
wellington, who had confidential discussions with Duncan
the Government was
Comnission in
and Cockayne,
unwilling to face up to the question ofrestriction because any fall in revenue fronprimary production will upset the whole ofthe New Zealand economy, lnd will involve
reduction in the "standard of living'r the
naintenance of which is the basis oi theGovernmentrs policy and would result inpolitical difficulties,
Despite the ample warning that production
would have to be slowed down, the Goverrunenthave failed to take any serious steps in thedirection of restriction and prefer to hidetheir heads in the sand hopirrg tt"t somethingwill turn up which will reiieie then of the
need for taking action.
The only measures of relief so far taken havebeen the exclusion of certain low gradequalities of meat from the quantity acceptablefor export, and certain ,rlrir,g, in- tonnale
owing to processing, but the ictual values ofproduction remains [sic] unaffected. Nothinghas been done to reitriit production of dairyproduce. There may, however, be a fatl inproduction owing to less favourable seasons andto the high cost of labour. (45)
44.
45.
MAF 8jl1149, UKHcw_sSD, St Mar 1941.
MAF 83/164, Garnett-Ctutterbuck, tS lvtay 1941.
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rnevitabry, New zeaTand sought to rnodify the terns of the
proposed agreenent and thereby avoid having to take nore drastic
steps. She proposed that Britain contract to purchase certain
rninimum quantities, which would be related to annual production,
and to the carryover from the previous season. For meat, Jordan
initially suggested 2S0 000 tons, close to the LgS6/Sg annual
average. But for Britain the furthest rinits of her full
responsibility would be to pay for what she could ship. Beyond
that she was only prepared to share costs and on this she would not
budge. Quite apart from her sense of what was appropriate in
terms of New zeaTandfs export industries thenselves, this was a
tirne when Britain was seeking a greater comrnitment from New zealand,
to the war effort: financing surpluses was one way of contributing.(46)
Fraser, who had been in the Middre East theatre, was in Engrand
from 20 June at churchilrrs invitation, for discussions about
different asPects of war policy. These ministerial discussions would
seen to have made for modification of the surpruses Agreenent which
was published as a white paper on 26 June l94l .[d7) simultaneously,
Fraser received a letter fron the secretary of state for Dominion
Affairs. In it the latter refened to the prirne Ministerrs desire
that production in New Zealand should, so far as possible, be
naintained at pre-war levels. He gave an assurance that the British
Governnent fully appreciated the inportance New Zealand attached to
this point and added that "within the lirnits of physical possibilityrr
account shourd be taken of those levers in deterrnining amounts to be
46.
47.
DPM Box 25, f'Food and Other Supplies", p.
T160 FL27IS/7, 24 Jun 1941.
See appendix, p. f3lA 
-
MAF 83/257, n.d. ,
-r07 -
stored in paragraph (s) of the agreenent. (48)
Through July and August 1941 discussions took prace on the
amangements which would be nade for rneat and dairy produce for the
forthcoming (r94r/42) season. In accordance with the surpluses
Agreement, the nain task in terms of setting quantities was to decide
the volunes of production Britain wourd be responsibre for shipping
or storing: volumes known as production targets. At this point,
the extent to which the white paper covered over rather than
resolved differences became apparent.
To look at butter first. The Ministry of Food was firm in its
intention to purchase and lift only around g0 000 tons of butter.
However, Ministry and New Zealand officiars did reach tentative
agreenent that a production target of r20 000 tons would not result
in the accumulation of unmanageable stocks. A fornura on these rines
was tabled for consideration at a departmental meeti_ng with the
New Zealanders.
F-or the period of thq war and one yearthereafter, New ZeaLand, will ain to limitproduction for export to approxinately
120 000 tons per annun, or luch largeirlgures as may be agreed. The UnitedKingdour Government will either lift thisquantity as a Ministry of Food purchase orwill share responsibiiity under'the agreed
auangenent for dealing with surplus produce. (4g)
48. Paragraph (5) listed criteria for determining reserve quantities asI'probable demand during and after the warf', Indrrthe importance ofthe industry to New Zealand".
DPM E4/3, Annex to notes of meeting 22/2s Jul 1941. The exact
l{rour.rt wourd depend partly on the proportion in which the unitedKingdom would lift New zearand relative to Australian butter, whichthe two countries had to agree to between thenserves. New Zearandhad nore butter stored, bui Australia had rnore-problems disposing ofits second grade butter and its cheese industry was ]ess deveroped.New Zealand supported the Ministryts original attocation of g0:s7,whereas Australia wanted g0:57. rn septenber New zeaLand accepteda 3:2 division, but in fact improved conditions made the arrangementredundant. (Mirler and Rowrey, History, pp. zs7-238: DpM r4/z/s,pass'i.rn.)
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This formula did not neet with approval ersewhere in whiteharl.
The Ministry of Econonic warfare was angry that the Ministry of Food
had exceeded its Urier. (50) Ministry of Food officials thenserves
realised that New Zealand had
been trying to pull a fast one! We stated
over and over again that we were making no
attenpt whatever to interpret the White paper,principally because none of us understood it,-
and we for our part attached little inponanceto the formula .... (Sl)
sir Edward Bentharl, of the surpluses Departnent, Ministry of
Economic warfare, who chaired a subsequent interdepartnental neeting
with New Zealand officials, took the lead in criticising the forrnula.
A target figure for seasons beyond the forthconing one could not be
accepted, nor could such a high target figure. He suggested to
New Zealand that i-t was in her own interests to restrict production 
-
if shipping schedules were seriousLy upset, unmanageable problens
would be created in the fourth year of the war. Jasper Knight
reckoned that in the Ministry of Foodrs talks
the reference to production levels was ...really of 1ittle meaning since storage capacity
would autonatically lirnit production .... (SZ)
Now Benthall made this point explicitly to the New Zealanders.
Britain could not accept liability for surpluses which accunulated at
a rate in excess of storage capacity. (53)
The New Zea'Iand officials argued that restriction of production
was a shortsighted poricy. severe restrictions could only be
acconplished by destruction of capital in the form of livestock.
once such a reduction had taken place, it would be very difficult to
50. MAF 83/257, draft tetter n.d.51. fbid., Knight-Watl, 26 JuL 1941.s2. rbid.53. DPM E4/5, Notes of neetines 22/23 Jul 1941.
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r-ncrease exports rapidly if shipping prospects subsequently irnproved.
New Zealand preferred to face the need for curtailnent when it arose
rather than anticipate a contingency which might not naterialise.
More specifically, New Zealand took issue with Britainls wish to
linit the production target by both volurne and tine. Britain had
suggested reducing the butter target by the equivalent of the whole
of the arnount to which milk had been diverted to cheese production.
But in order to produce cheese as rapidly as Britain wished, ruilk
production had been increased. As for time, from the agricultural
point of view the third year of the war had arready begun, and the
Governnent wished now to be abre to give guidance for a ronger period. (54)
with these specific points at issue, a series of informal
discussions were held in an attenpt to reach agreement. with Fraser
still in London, discussions were also held at ministerial level.
As a result of these talks, the British made concession on both points.
They agreed that the production target should be 115 000 tons, although
this woutd decrease if cheese production increased above 160 000 tons.
And they agreed that the target wourd apply to the period of the war
and one year ther".ftu". (55) Moreover although Britain continued to
stress that its responsibility was linited to what could be shipped or
stored, it was agreed that once the stores vrere full, there would be
further discussion. (56)
Britain believed New Zealand courd restrict butter production
in part because nilk production could be diverted to cheese.
54.
55.
56.
rbid.
A decision which had to be
Export Surpluses.
DPI{ E4/5, notes of meeting"
approved by the Ministerial Comnittee on
6 Aug 1941.
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consistent with this view, Britain was prepared to nake a l0ng-term
contract for cheese, not very dissimilar to that for woo1. Britain
had originally envisaged New Zealand producing I30 000 tons of cheese
(compared with 92 000 shipped in lg3g/40) but discussion in New Zealand
had produced a figure of 160 000 tons. The quantity was accepted for
the year L94L/42 without question but the cruciat point for New Zealand
was whether Britain was prepared to agree to a l0nger contract and
this was ..c"ptu6. (57)
The negotiations on an agreement for meat supply were sinirar
in character to those on butter. As with butter, New Zealand sought
a degree of comnitment fron Britain which Britain was not prepared
to give. rt was true that by June expectations about riftings for
the next season had improved compared with March 
- enough in the opinion
of one officiar rto nake Fraserrs visit a howling successt. (58)
But this was being over-optimistic. As with butter New Zealand
proposed a firm contract for the war and one year thereafter. The
proposed volune was 27s 000 tons - the figure first proposed for the
L940/41 season. Atthough above actual Ig4O/41 tiftings (2S0 000 tons),
it was considerabry below New Zealandrs export production figures.
rt also meant that New zearand did not expect to crear the carryover
frorn earlier years. Although liftings of 170 000 tons were nour
thought possible, even the Ministry of Food accepted that a firn
contTact was not on, unress it was for the absolute nininum which
Britain expected to 1ift. Rather than pubricise such a row figure,
New Zealand preferred not to have a contract amount set at 
"rr. 
(59)
57.
58.
59.
Miller and Rowley, HistonU, p.
MAF 83/164, Wall-Knight, lq jun
DPM E4/3, notes of meetings, 14
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rnstead, as with butter, discussion centred on establishing a
target production figure. 27s 000 tons was fairry readily agreed
between New Zealand and Ministry of Food officials as appropriate:
if optiuristic expectations abour both shipping and the quantity of
neat which could be canned were realised, there should be no storage
problern. Treasury wished, however, to consider a rather rower
figure - 270 000 tons was suggested. subsequently z7s 000 tons was
accepted but finality was not reached because it was unclear whether
or not canned meat was included in the target figurs. (60) Britain
wanted it to be included as that nade it less likely she would have
to finance a surplus of frozen meat. New Zearand for the exact
opposite reason wanted it excluded. She argued that Britain wanted
as much canned meat as she could get and it should not, therefore,
be seen as an arternative way of dearing with the surprus but
purchased on its nerits. (61) As New Zealand was envisaging a total
seasonal output of j35 000 tons
point to make. It was all too
where
this was a particularly inportant
easy otherwise to imagine a situation
liftings of frozen meat were say 200 000tons then canned meat at 22 000 tons [= 75 000tons of carcase meat] wourd comprete ihe utited
Kingdom riability under the surpluses agreementthus excluding ... S0 000 tons or more .... (62)
As an alternative, and in recognition that she did want carned neat,
Britain worked out separate targets. This did not nean a frozen neat
target of 275 000 tons though. rt seemed reasonable to pitch it
closer to what might be shipped. In exchanges between the Ministries
60. DPM
61. MAF
62. DMk
E4/3, Meetings
88/202, 24 Sep
- NZHCL, 17 Oct
I4/I5 Jul 1941, 22 Jut 1941.
1941, 14 Oct 1941.
1941, Miller and Rowley, History, p. SSZ.
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of Food and Econonic warfare figure s of 220 000 tons for frozen
meat and 57 r50 (carcase equivarent l1l s00) for canned neat were
agreed to. Meat not canned over and above to this figure would be
deaLt with under the surpluses Agreernent. The two Ministries did
not want to go berow zza o0o tons for frozen neat because they hoped
that at least that amount would be lifted and they did not want it
to go into canning if it courd be avoided. Treasury and the
surpluses Departnent of the Ministry of Economic warfare, were
reluctant to see such a high figure. They argued that Fraser had
accepted 275 000 tons and that to ask for an increase in New Zealand
production would be courting disaster in the fourth and subsequent
years of the war when refrigerated shipping possibilities night almost
become negligibte. Moreover, it was thought New Zealand had stores
of around 120 000 tons (actuarry 7s 000 tons at I october 1g4r) which
could be drawn on if shipping inproved. (63) Accordingly, New Zearand
was offered and agreed to, a firn purchase of fgO 000 tons of frozen
meat' shipped or unshipped, and 37 rsO t,ons of canned neat. If
that quantity wasntt canned the balance wourd be dealt with under the
surpluses agreenent. Thus, in effect, Britainfs responsibility had
been expanded from 275 000 to 301 500 tons of carcase meat. By
contrast with the butter agreernent though, this nore precise
arrangement was only for lg4r/42 not for the whole war period. (64)
As for 1,940/41, neat export figures
in relation to Australian quantiti"r. (65)
for New Zealand were set
The relationship which
63.
64.
65.
IIAF 88/202, 24 Oct 1941, 8 Nov f94f.
AJHR, 1945, HSO, p. 10.
so were butter export figures: Australia protested at, buteventually accepted, a quota of s7 000 tons for r94L/4i, Butlin,War Eeornmy lg7g-42, p. 70.
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Britain had used (and which New zeaLand. had criticised) gave a s:4
advantage to New zea\and, based on pre-war liftings. shifting to
separate targets for canned and frozen neat raised serious
difficulties, as if the established ratio were preserved solely for
frozen neat New Zealand would be disadvantaged overall as Australia
was able to produce much larger quantities of canned neat.
Alternatively the 5:4 ratio could be transferred to carcase neat as
a whole. Eventually Australiafs overall target figure was quite
close to New zealandts 
- 2g0 000 as against s01 500. To New Zealand
it was pointed out that the united Kingdon wourd take more meat
frorn New zearand if canning capacity was greater, Even so, the
united Kingdorn had responsibility for a total quantity well above
pre-war figures. (66)
4. Prices for the 1941/42 Season
As in the r940/4r negotiations, prices were not a major issue
for L94l/42, at least not for butter and frozen neat. Initially
New Zealand had proposed that prices be adjusted to take account of
increased costs incurred in adaptations to meet the shipping shortage.
This was really a covert way of financing surpluses and was recognised
as such by the Ministry of Food, which did not see why New Zealand
should I'have it both waysfr, i.e. seek higher prices, but also
financial assistance under the surpluses agreernent itsetf. (67)
66.
67.
14 Oct
22 Jun
MAF
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83/2s7,
1941, 6 Jan 1942.
1941.
vtctant6 11"!'lrfQetTY OF wELt lNGTOll
- 114-
In the meat negotiations, New zeaLand made a nore specific
case. rn 1940, prices for some of the rower grades of offar had
been reduced, whilst for the forthconing season certain grades were
to be excluded frorn shipnent. The result of these changes was
that the net returrr to the producer was below average r93g prices,
the agreed baseline. It was, therefore, suggested by New zealand
that equivalent compensation should be given by upward revision of
certain remaining itens in the schedule. The clairn was linked to
production costs and British export price increases, which also
underpinned a reiterated claim for an increase in the butter price. (68)
rn the discussions of July r94r New Zearand accepted that
there would be no price changes for frozen neat or butter, on the
grounds of cost increases, while the terms of trade argunent was
loaded on to 
"hu"ru. 
(69) 
rn septenber, Britain nade new contTacts
with Argentina and conceded meat price increases across the board.
New Zealand and Australia would learn of these increases: it was
argued that it was in Britainrs interests to illook gracious about itrt
and nake the corresponding adjustments in their prices, without being
asked. From I october lg4r, the beginning of the new season, purchase
prices were increased by *d. per pound sterling for beef and ramb
products, and baconers, and by id. per pound sterling for rnutton and
pork prod,r"tr. (70)
These increases helped ease relations between
Governrnent and the neat industry. The arrangement
the New Zealand
nade with the
68. DPM
69. DPM
70. IvtAF
E4/3, note.s for pMNZrs talk with I{nF.E4/.3, talks t4/LS Jul 1941, 6 Aug 1941.88/236, 3, l0 Oct t94t; tutitter ind Rowley, Histong, p. 355.
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industry to purchase the exportabre surplus expired on 30 september
1941- rn the discussions between the industry and the Goverament
on its continuation, the Government had been seeking to ensure that
the export value of live nutton (export of which was prohibited) be
maintained by subsidising its purchases frorn other receipts. The
agreement reached with the Board provided that the additionar prices
wourd be used to fund a Meat poor Account. This wourd then be used
to naintain storage and insurance charges on neat and to provide for
the capital liabirity on emergency cannery plant, buildings and cool
stores' Any surplus in the account at the end of the energency
period would be utilised for the benefit of the industry: a deficit
would be absorbed by the Government. This agreement arso enabred
the Government to neet the freezing conpaniesr request for a renewar
of the agreenent covering the L940/41 season: although New ZeaLand,
had failed to settle the question of how nuch Britain wourd pay
towarcds storage, the Meat pool Account would provide a buffer.
rn fact in the new agreenent freezing conpanies enjoyed iurproved
conditions 
- full payment for stock thirteen weeks after kilring
(formerly twenty-six) and payment of storage charges after seventeen
(also fornerly twenty-six) weeks .QL)
Both with meat and dairy produce, New zeaLand concentrated its
case for price increases on those products which were in denand, i.,€.
canned neat and cheese. Under the existing price regime, New Zearand
was losing money on canned neat: t4l2 000 on 1g 000 tons of corned
beef, tl 000 000 on 10 000 tons of canned nutton. Moreover, she was
7L' Miller and Rowrey, flistory, pp. sss, ss7; Hayward, colden Jubilee,pp. 77-zB.
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now intending to can higher quarity neat than before. Britain
explained that no increase could be paid, since clairns for corresponding
increases by other suppliers wourd forrow and would be difficult to
resist. This consideration arso prevented her fron paying more for
higher quarity meat as south Anerican countries were pranning to
can it too. Meat was canned because there was a surprus, and Britain
felt it should be dealt with under the surpluses agreenent. New
Zealand accepted the principle but subnitted that both Governments
should contribute to subsidising the costs of canned meat production.
Britain argued that the white paper provided for canning to be
undertaken by New zeaLartd, but New zealand argued that this did not
imply that she should undertake canning solely at her own expen ru.uT)
rn the interin, the matter was reft unresolved. New Zealand
placed on record her reservation of the right
to state a claim for a subsidy to help coverthe cost of carning carcase ,L"t, and undertookto submit figures of costs
Britain
undertook to examine these figures without any
conmitnent on-the principle oi such subsidy.It was pointed out, however, that at the
neeting o.f 22 July the United Kingdom had
expressed themselves as unwilting to pay anincreased price on canned meat. (73.)
Despite discussions at ninisterial level, involving the prine Minister,
no further progress was nade. Britain now argued that lend-lease
rnight solve sone of New Zealandrs difficulties .Q4) subsequentry,
her outlook changed. The contract with Argentina settred, she was
72.
73.
74.
DPM E4/3, talks L4/lS and
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MAF 88/202, t'atks, t9 Aug
22/23 Jul, 6 Aug 1941.
1941.
-7I7 _
prepared to offer New ZeaLand increases of 9d. per dozen for L2 oz
canned corned beef, which sharply diminished the cases for a subsidy.
Her relative generosity about production targets probabry helped
secure this agreenent. (75)
rn recognition of the reduced demand for meat and butter, New
zealand loaded nost of her case for increased renuneration on to
cheese. There were two aspects to the claim. on the one hand,
New Zealand sought to cover increases in costs and, in particurar,
the increases incu*ed in the changeover from butter to cheese.
Equally she was interested in obtaining sone recognition of the
deterioration in the terms of trade which she had experienced since
the outbreak of the war.
rn his discussions with Lord woolton, Fraser had explained that
achieving an output of 160 000 tons of cheese would cost New zearand
f1-25 million and he urged that the Ministry of Food shourd take this
expenditure into account. In particular, there were costs attendant
on carrying whole mirk instead of cre€rm by truc\ and higher factory
costs. rn discussions with Ministry of Food officiars at colwyn Bay
one week later, Duncan proposed a price of 75s. Britain was not
unresponsive to the denand for an increase, and proposed to nake the
price up to 70s. frorn 64s.id. on the basis of ss.6d. for increased
cost of naterials, and 2s.3d. to cover capital costs incurred in the
changeover from butter to cheese - figures far berow the calculations
nade by the New zearanders 
- which added up to rls. (cairns in the
Ministry of Food pointed out to carnpbell that there was sone incentive
75' AJHR, L942, HSO, p. 14; MAF 8g/202, Benthalr-chirver, 14 oct r94r.
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for New Zealand to shift to cheese" quite apart frorn Britainrs
needs, because of the butter situation.) Broadley, of the Ministry
of Food exprained that the Ministry had had difficulty in getting
authorisation for 70s. and stated that that price had been calculated
on the basis of the Ministryrs own estinate of increased costs.
Later, New Zealand officials were told that 70s. would apply to all
cheese, and not nerely for that cheese which was now to be produced,
in excess of that in the second year of the war, by diversion fron
butter productior.,. (70; A statistical battle did not follow. As
early as 3 July, Fraser had sought Nashrs approval for 70s. He had
discussed the natter thoroughly with Duncan, and had learnt that
Australia had accepted 67s. which meant that if New Zealand accepted
70s- the traditional premiurn was preserved. Nash agreed, whilst the
British explained that any proved increases in costs in the third
year of the war would be taken into account in fixing the price for
the L942/45 season.QT) Atthough rreasury had wanted a rider in
the contract to allow for price revision if cheese became a surplus
corunodity, this eventuality was only covered by the onnibus clause
which recorded that I'in the event of unexpected shipping difficulties,r
the contract would be review"a. (78)
Given this resistance to any major increase, it was not
surprising that New Zealand nade no headway in her claim for a price
adjustnent to take account of the shift in the terns of trade. rn
discussions in May, campbell had mooted a possible price of 100s. per
cwt which would add t4.g million to New Zealandrs sterling income.
76.
't'7
78,
DPM E4/3, passim, MAF 83/1158, I0
Rowley, History, p. Z4S.
DPM Mf/2, Fraser-Nash, S Jul l94l;
Rowley, Histoty, p. 245.
DPltl E4/3, talks, 9 Jul t94t; MAF
May 1941, 27 May l94t; Miller and
Nash-Fraser, 8 Jul 1941, Miller and
83/257, neeting, 18 Jut 1941.
- 119-
At the colwyn Bay rneeting he presented a menorandun submitting
that the 54 per cent increase in the Board of Trade index between
August 1959 and July 1941 justified sone increase (not necessarily
54 per cent) in the prices to be paid for New Zearand's exports.
The submission was underpinned by Fraser invoking his understanding
reached with w.S. Morrison, the then Minister of Food, in November
1939. But at the Anglo /New zeaLand officials meeting herd toward
the end of July, the Treasury made it clear that they courd not neet
this request. Acceptance of the principle would be very embarrassing
to the united Kingdon and might have repercussions on united Kingdon
import prices. True there had been a movement of the ter.ns of trade
in Britainrs favour, but it seened likely that New Zealand,s barance
of paynents would improve over the next twelve nonths. Moreover, in
tenns of volune and price, New Zearand exports over the third year
of the war would be in sight of pre-war revers. rn general, the
effects of the war on New Zealand export industries seened likely in
the near future to be ress adverse than on those of Britain and
Australia. Rather ingenuously, in that it ignored the barance of
papnents benefits, it was also contended that any increase in price
would not in fact improve New zeaLandts ability to import during the
war. Despite further representations at ministerial level, New
Zealand did not rneet with any success. (79)
Although New zearand had discussed 
- and secured. - a
for cheese primarily in tenns of the costs of the switch
it was not until after the increase had been granted that
price increase
in production,
arrangernents
79' MAF 83/1158, 27 May 1941, \iF gs/2s7, l8 Jul rg4r, DpME4/s" 9 Jul
and 22/23 Jul 1941.
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were nade with dairy producers. A special Account (cheese
changeover Account) was established fron the proceeds of the
price increase against which the costs incurred by the industry in
the changeover wourd be debited. The interest and storage charges
on butter as welr as cheese, after two months in store, would arso
be a charge on the account. As with meat storage charges, this
commitment was made in the absence of any final agreenent with
Britain on this issue. undoubtedly, the estabrishment of the
account had eased the way for the Governrnent to nake the corunitnent.
The working out of the details of this agreenent doninated relations
with the industry in 194r. An increase in the guaranteed price
was turned down yet again. (80)
when the price of canadian cheese was increased, New Zearand
nade a further approach to the united Kingdom for an adjustment.
Britain recognised that, in principre, such a criterion, i.e.
conparability, was reasonabre, and in fact she was applying it to
the meat price schedure. But there were situations, and this was
one of them, where such a course of action did not seem desirable:
the price increases were part of a cornplicated package with the one
particular supplier(8r) (New Zealand herself would be the beneficiary
of such an arrangement in 1944).
80.
81.
Miller and Rowley, Eistory, pp. Z6L-264.
MAF 83/1158, 25 Sep, 30 sep,-1 oct 1941.
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5. Wool 1940-41
However secure New Zealandrs wool trade may have looked,
conpared to neat and dairy produce, it too renained subject to
shifting circumstances. The German occupation of France ended
shipments to that country, but during rc l/ L shipnents to Canada,
Australia and India increased, mostly for nilitary requirenents.
Shipments to the United Kingdorn actually decreased sLightly because
of shipping problems. Because of the nature of the contract, this;
did not raise difficulties about responsibilities and ownership -
Britain bought the wool at appraisal point, and even if it stayed in
New Zealand, it was unequivocally her responsibility. Yet at
30 June 1941 it did nean that 515 704 bales were either unshipped or
held for scouring. If the wool trade had been purely an Anglo-
New Zealand affair this would not have been too serious a problen.
But the predominant wool supplier was Australia, and her difficulties
were much greater by 1941. Whereas denand for New ZeaLand crossbreds
remained fairly buoyant, Australiars predominantly rnerino clip was
not so much in denand and Britain faced the prospect of accunulating
larger quantities of unsaleable wool, which it would have to try and
offload at the end of th" ,"t. (82)
At interdepartnental discussions in Whitehall through 1941, the
possibility of seeking sorne revision of the wool agreenents was
argued out, proponents of change being found in Treasury and to a
lesser extent the Ministry of Economic Warfare, with the Ministry of
82. Miller and Rowley, Histotg, p. 429; Tf61 5455LL/I, draft note,
7 May 1941.
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Supply and the Doninions Office favouring the status quo.
Although, in the end, no specific approach was nade to the Doninions,
the discussions are revelatory of the extent to which Britain was
prepared to negotiate in the face of changing circunstances.
Moreover some of the proposals became antecedents of plans for a
post-war Joint Organisatiorr. (83)
One of the two main courses of action which was proposed - it
seems initially by Lord Keynes - was to take advantage of the provision
for annual revision of prices in the contract, and reduce the price
on the basis that demand had fall,en. Keynes does not seem to have
realised that the 50 per cent increase from the 1938/39 average was
not a very useful way of measuring the current payout, which was only
about 5 per cent above the 1936/39 average. Moreover the narket
price was still above the contract price. It was also possible that
the Dorninions could clain that production costs had increased since
the beginning of the war. In a broader political sense any such
move seemed ill advised. The Doninions had just learnt of the full
extent of the shipping crisis and its irnplications for their butter
and meat exports; the wool contracts had great political significance
in Australia and New Zeatand - and even nore so in South Africa.
The crucial objection related to Britainrs role as seller rather than
buyer and there the contention was that she would have to reduce her
own prices. Quite apart frorn the fact that this would nean that her
margin in these sales would remain the sane, there would be great
resentnent in the United States which had only recently nade very heavy
85. T161 5455 LL/ I , passi.m.
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purchases at current prices. (84)
With such stTong opposition, the idea of a price reduction was
dropped, but discussion continued on another ProPosal which was that
surplus wool should be a joint responsibility, and any ultinate losses
should be shared on a 50/50 basis rather than absorbed entirely by
the United Kingdon. Keynes felt that as such arrangements, were being
accepted by the United Kingdom for butter and meat stocks, it was
only reasonable that they be accepted for wool as well, particularly
as the alternative might be to face a battle of interests after the
war with Britain trying to offload her wartime stocks and the
Doninions putting new seasonsr clips on the market. The fact of
the situation seened cornpelling: the Ministry of Supply estinated
that Wool Control could be holding a surplus of 2.5 nillion bales on
1 Septenber 1941, and fron 4.5 to 5 rnillion bales on 1 Septenber 1942.
If the surplus continued to increase at the rate of 2 to 2.5 million
bales per year, the post-war liquidation of the supplies would present
forrnidable political and econornic difficultiur- (85)
obtaining the Doninionsr agreenent was another matter and after
nuch discussion the proposal was not followed up. Applying the
surpluses principle to wool involved revising an existing agreenent -
a nuch more difficult exercise than that faced in the butter and neat
talks. The Dominions' 0ffice argued that the political rePercussions
would be disproportionate to the financial benefits: New Zealand did
not have a substantial surplus anyway, whilst Australia would probably
84.
85.
Ibid., memo, Mar 1941,
1941.
rbid., 3l Mar, 2 May,
Keynes-Dunnett, 31 Mar 1941' neeting 2 May
7 May 1941.
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have to borrow to nake up for lost sterling earnings, and utight
(86)
never repay. - The possibility of offering the Doninions a
fully-fledged partnership was mooted, but this seemed to run the
risk of liniting Britaints own freedom of action and was not followed
up at this time. (87)
6. The 1941/42 and 1942/43 Seasons
Even before the Lg4L/42 season got underway, it was apparent
that New ZeaLand might survive the shipping crisis without too much
disl0cation to its trade and finances. In the House of
Representatives, at the end of July, while the Prine Minister was
negotiating in Britain, J.G. Barclay, the Minister of Marketing' was
making reassuring statenents about storage capacity in New Zealand and
the neat industryfs ability to conserve shipping space by the various
techniques which it employed. More importantly' the shipping
situation itself did not bear out the most conservative estimates'
0ver the Lg4L/42 season, 2g7 00O tons of rneat was shipped which left
a carryover of just 40 000 tons. For butter the situation was sinilar'
with stores by 3l August 1942 actuaLLy below normal peacetine levels. 
(88)
Naturally the inprovement was weleome to New zealand. Not all
of the strategies planned to cope with the crisis were successful'
Attenpts to establish narkets in the united states and canada for
86. IbU., MaY/Jun 1941.
1941.
87. 8T11/1697, Passim.88. Eventng Post, 24 Jul
DO argrunent is recorded on PaPer of 27 MaY
1941, Miller and Rowley, History, P. 354'
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buttet and neat came up against the sane shortage of refrigerated
shipping that was hampering trade with the united Kingdon. over
the L94L/42 season New Zealand managed to produce only 21 500 tons
of canned neat rather than the 37 150 tons for which Britain had
contracted. (89) plans for dry butterfat production, an alternative
to the conversion of butter into cheese, rnade only slow progress as
facilities had to be set up and tested: it was not until March 1942
that a contract was nade with the Ministry of Food. Drought in
Australia affected exports from that country. Shipping difficulties
recurred in 1942, but the United States Joint Purchasing Board
started buying New Zealand neat in June 1942 and this eased anxieties
about surplus output. From then until 1945 the United States took
up to one quarter of New Zealandrs exportable surplus, but increased
output in L942/43 and Ig44/45 and the introduction of rationing in
New Zealand in Lg44, allowed exports to Britain to be maintained' (90)
Evidence accumulated through the I94L/42 season that the worst
of the shipping crisis night be over. The surpluses agreenent did
not become operative. 373 000 tons of meat was shipped over the
course of the season. Despite the fact that the production target
of 301 500 tons had been exceeded the carryover' at 40 507 tons' was
considerably less than the nearly 78 000 tons carried over at the
beginning of the ,"rrorr. (91) There were parallel developnents in
respect of butter. Drought reduced cheese output in Australia to
only 57 000 tons. And the entry of the United States into the war
sharply altered the supply position with respect to cheese, with
89.
90.
91.
Mi11er and
Baket, Wat
Wat Eeonorny
Miller and
Rowley, IltstorY, PP. 258, 353.
nconomy, pp. zo+,-105, zos, 209; Butlin and Schedvin,
1939-42, PP. 511-512.
Rowley, Hi'story, P. 334.
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consequent favourable effects on Britaints need for New Zealand
butter. (92) These changes had their effects on negotiations for
the 1942/43 season. At the time the negotiations started, the
British Food Mission in washington was subject to strong pressure
fron the Anerj.cans and at very short notice had to accept 156 000
tons of Anerican .h""r". (93) (This circtrmstance was presented to
New Zealand as rrunexpectedly heavy quantities of cheese are now
available on short haul fron North Arnerica".)(94) If supplies from
Australia and New Zealand had been naintained at theil anticipated
level, i.e. 160 000 tons from New Zealand and up to 20 000 tons from
Australia, these quantities, together with the supplies from Arnerica,
would have produced a volume of cheese imports in excess of total
British consumption. Accordingly Britain asked New Zealand whether
it night be possible for the latter to decrease her cheese supplies'
Fortunately Britain did not have to request an absolute reduction in
milk products. Australia having had such a very bad season, it
became clear that over Lg42-43, on the existing plan, not enough
butter would be lifted fron Australia and New zealand to rnaintain the
2 oz ration. Accordingly, Britain was happy for New Zealand to
increase its butter production, by perhaps 20 000 - 30 000 tons and
envisaged a reduction in cheese supplies by 40 000 to 60 000 to"'' 
(95)
NewZealandagreedtotheproposedchanges,butaskedfora
price adjustnent to rneet the difficulties arising frour the second
change in production policy in such a short period. Britain agreed to
92. Miller and Rowley, History, p. 256'93. MAF 83/1158, memo 30 JuL 1942.94. Miller and Rowley, Histotg, P.256'
95. MAF 83/1158, 30 Jul 1942.
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purchase butter at LL7s. per cwt and cheese at 73s. per cwt. No
firn quantities were fixed: the tern of the contract nerely set
out that New Zealand was to readjust production to secute as far as
possible fron 115 000 - 120 000 tons of butter and 90 000 tons of
.hu"ru. (96) The price change set off a protracted dispute between
Australia and the United Kingdorn over butter and cheese prices, with
the Australians seeking parity with New Tealand. Although this was
not traditional, the issue was politically delicate. (97) The
principle of Britain accepting New Zealandrs exportable surplus was
not spelt out, but the volunes agreed on were generous considering
that New Zealandts energies through the preceding season had been
devoted to increasing cheese and decreasing butter output.
In January 1943, when Britain learnt that New Zealand was
exploring butter markets in North Anerica, she affirned her wish that
New Zealand produce as nuch butter for Britain as possibl.e. Britain
also urged New ZeaLand to maintain cheese production as shipnents fron
the United States were below expected levels. Provided New TeaLand
produeed at least 115 000 tons of butter she would take all the 
"hu"r". 
(981
With frozen meat, circumstances were rather different,
principally because the United Kingdorn continued to be concerned about
possible shortages in refrigerated shipping- In the lead-up to
naking decisions on the contract for 1943 (the terms of the L94L/42
neat contract were extended by three nonths, so as to place contracts
96.
97.
98.
Miller and Rowley, History, p.
MAF 83/1f58, passim, including
DPM Sunnary of cables L942'46,
268.
ninute, Mar 1943.
NZHCT-NZG, 13 Jan 1943' 23 Feb 1943.
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on a calendar year basis thereafter) Britain discussed with the
United States a plan to cope with the shipping shortage by directing
Australian and New Zealand meat to North Anerica and supplying
Britain from across the Atlantic. Depending on the availability
of supplies fron the tlnited States, Australian and New Zealand
shiprnents to Britain could be cut by 50 per cent. (99)
Australia and New Zealand were doubly concerned at the
inplications of such discussions. Firstly, the principle of
consultation was being ignored - and unfortunately for Britain,
Fraser had first heard of the plan informally in Washington. (100)
Australia and New ZeaLand already had anxieties about the extent to
which the new streanlined Combined Boards in Washington were aware
of their interests. As Clutterbuck, of the Dominions 0ffice,
observed
there was justification for [Mr Fraserrs]protest directed as it was against the
procedure followed in a natter of vital
interest to New Zealand. (101)
To assuage the anxieties that the plan aroused, the Ministry of Food
got interdepartnental agreenent to inforrning Australia and New Zealand
that Britain would purchase the sane quirntity in 1943 as in 1942 -
for New ZeaLand this was estinated at 328 000 tons of frozen meat.
She would also take as nuch canned and dried meat as New Zealand could
produce. Canned neat contracts were made for 24 900 tons - only
slightly nore, that is, than the total shipped itt L94L/42-(u02)
99. MAF 85/1180, 1 Oct 1942, 6 Oct L942.
L00. Ib+d., PMNZ-SSD, I Oct L942.]oL. rbid., 10 Oct L942.
102. Miller and Rowley, Hi,story, PP. 362, 37I.
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Nonetheless, New Zealand and Australia continued to be
concerned about the implication for shipping to which the diversion
proposals had drawn attention. In Pafticular, the status of neat
that was not shipped, but stored, the object of so nuch discussion
in 1941 again cane under scrutiny. The Surpluses Agreement had
established that the l.jnited Kingdom would only pay for what it
-_.\,,,,,i. New Zealand now wished to move away fron this f.o.b. basis
for payment. In Decenber Jordan proposed to the Ministry of Food
that it nake payment to New Zealand thirteen weeks after killing,
regardless of whether the production had been shipped or not, and
absorb storage and insurance charges after seventeen weeks in store. (103)
A month later, after discussions in Whitehall, the Ministry agreed
to some departure from f.o.b. purchase. Although not as substantial
a change as was proposed by Jordan, the offer was not nade in detail
- Britain wanted to leave further consideration until the position
with respect to supplies from the United States had been cleared up:
moreover such a sweeping departure fron the basis on which Britain
purchased worldwide would be bound to raise a clarnour for similar
concessions in other parts of the world. (104)
Apart fron shipping, irnother difficulty which persisted fron
Lg4I/42 was the denand that United States forces might make on
New Zealand production gnder reverse lend-lease. Accordingly New
Zea|atd sought from the United Kingdom a change in the terms agreed
on in October. New Zealand proposed that instead of conrnitting
herself to 328 000 tons, Britain take New ZeaLandt s e4)ortable
103. MAF 83/1180, 9 Jan 1943.
L04. Ibid., 5 Apr 1943.
supplies,
to United
supply to
to decide
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having authorised the diversion of specific quantities
States forces. The Ministry approved the procedure for
united states forces innediately, but took a little longer
on the natter of the exportable surplus. (105)
That Britain could absorb the production was undoubted, but
shipping was still a problen. However other factors were pushing
her forward to acceptance of the principle of the exportable surplus'
Although the United States had promised Britain neat at the rate of
468 000 tons per annun, it seerned that it was going to be a real
effort to get even 150 000 tons peT annum. Moreover United States
forces purchases from Austratia and New Zealand and United States
and Russian purchases from South America we:re making a big dent in
world resources. The United States expected Britain to mininise
her purchases under lend-lease which involved taking all available
neat fron elsewhere. This neant trying to stop Australia and New
Zealand fron sending neat supplies to the l'lnited States, even although
Britain had not undertaken to buy all the meat hers"ff. (106) Wilson,
in the Ministry of Food, was convinced, as were others, that Britain
should tcut the knot and go for the whole surplusr, even if this
raised difficulties with regard to payrnent or fron Argentina, with
whon Britain wanted to trade such a guarantee against increased
, 
-: __ (107)productlon. '
reached in Whitehall therefore, and at
the Minister of Food, informed Jordan
the
that
end ofAgreement was
April Lord l'9oolton,
105. Miller and Rowley, History, pP. 362-363'
106. And shipping difiiculties in the early part of
meant that itorage facilities in some districts
as the season progressed. Miller and Rowley,
107. MAF 83/1180, passi.m, Mar/Apr f943.
the L942/43 season
becane verY tight
Hi,stornT, P. 37I.
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Britain was
PrePared to buY the whole of the New
Zealand exportable surplus (of neat)
without any soft of linitation as toquantity. In fact, if anything could
be done to increase this surPlus bY
control of consunption in New Zealandt
it would be very welcome to us' (108)
**********
NewZea].andacceptedthebul.kpurchasesysteninl-argepart
beeause it promised to protect the interests of the primary ptoducers
better than any fr.ee narketing alternative. In particular it was
hoped that New Zealand would be rrinsuredrr against any dislocations
consequent on shipping shortages. There were tines in the 1940-45
period when the trade-off seerned very inequitable. But arguably'
the fact that Britain had incurred sone obligations, however ill-defined'
was a benefit'
New Zealandrs aeceptance of the disl0cations reninds us that
the contracts were at odds with New Zealandrs interests in particular
respects,ratherthaningeneral.Asinthelg30s,therewerenot
many other narkets open to New Zealand products. And the shipping
shortage would have created almost as nany difficul'ties in supplying
other markets as it did in supplying Britain. New Zealand had Little
choice but to endure what could not be avoided'
los. Ibi.d., 29 Apr 1943.
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APPENDIX
THE SURPLUSES AGREEMENT 26 JUNE 194I
I His Majestyrs Governments in the tlnited Kingdon and New ZeaLand,
in consultation, have agreed upon the following statenent of
principles for dealing, on a basis of co-operation, with the surplus
produce of New Zealand for the period of the war.
I His Majestyts Government in the United Kingdon fully recognise
the grave difficulties created for New Zealand industries by the
shortage of shipping. They are anxious to continue taking all the
New Zealand produce that can be shipped. They also appreciate the
serious effect upon New Zealandrs econonic and financial structure
which these difficulties are causing. With a view to rninirnising
these effects and preventing the impairment of New Zealandt s war
effort, the tlnited Kingdorn Government are prepared to join with
the New ZeaLand Goverrunent in co-operative arrangetnents to ease the
burden falling on New Zealand during the war, framed on lines that
will not prejudice the post-war position.
t The two Governments have agreed that the following principles
should be applied as a basis for such co-operation:
l. The United Kingdon Government to purchase the New Zealand
produce that can be shipped and to pay for such produce at the
price and upon such terms and conditions as are fron tine to time
agreed with the Ministry of Food.
2. The New ZeaLand industries to nake every effort to adapt their
production to shipp:ing possibilities, e.9., deboning, canning or
pressing meat.
5. Alternative markets to be developed wherever possible.
4. Reserve stocks of storable foodstuffs to be created up to
certain quantities to be agreed.
5. The quantities to be stored to be deternined in relation (a) to
probable denand during or after the war; (b) to the importance of
the industry to New Zealand,
6. The financial burden of acquiring and holding these reserve
stocks, pending their disposal, to be shared equally between the
two Governments.
7. The payments to be rnade for produce acquired for the reserve
stocks to be agreed between the two Governments. While it will be
necessary to take due account of such matters as costs of storage,
depreciation, etc., it is intended that the paltrents shall be
fixed on such a basis as will so far as practicable achieve the
13rB
obJective of koeping the industry oPerating eiEf,i.ciently while
avoidirrg the creation of urrnanageable surlll.uses.
8. The detailed applieation of the above principles to be
ref,er ed to eonpetent re.presentatilres from the two coreutrles.
'r The New Zealand Gqvef.rt,n€ot wil.l be readlr to col.l.aborate in
any diseussions whieh n4p be convened r+ithin the Enitish
Comonwealth or inter.nationalLy to consider na,f,fteting or rel"ated
probleus.
Miller and Rowley, Eiatorg, pp. 240-741
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1. Preludez 1942-L943
Fron 1940 until L943, the export industries had to a considerable
extent operated under crisis conditions. The inprovement in shipping
conditions eased this problen. At the sarne tine it becane clear that
there weTe severe world shortages of both butter and frozen neat, and
to a lesser extent, cheese. Under these circumstances the producers
would ordinarily have expected to see their returns rise. The systen
of buLk purchase provided a buffer to the transformation of the shortages
into price increases. But the awareness was there and it was a background
influence deternining the course of the contract negotiations in 1944-
These negotiations were conpLex, in large part because of the
interests which the New Zealand Goverrunent brought to bear on then. By
1944 Government and producers had distinct ideas on the appropriate thnrst
of New Zeal'andrs trade diplonacy. The Goverrunent had elaborated a stabili-
sation policy which it wanted to protect against any undue pressure. fitis
neant that it was less than sympathetic to any proposals for substantial
price increases - even although a stabilisation systen existed to absorb
then. The political costs of indefinitely withholding substantial payouts
were judged to be very high. Additionalty, the Government renained
anxious about the possibility of postwar price falls. Accepting limited
price increases was thought to be a good way of ensuring sympathetic
treatment when the depression c€rme. To set against all this, the
Government welconed the additional sterling which high prices represented.
Oyerseas indebtedness was a danger - ove?seas earnings helped avert it.
- 
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The result of these strands of thinking was that the Goverrunent
sought increased sterling paynents formally separate fron any price
adjusunents, but in fact paid in lieu of then. Producers on the other
hand recognised that there rnight be sone long-term gain in not riding the
narket. But if any paynents were nade they should be nade to producers
as per unit increases or be lodged in the stabilisation accounts '
The different conponents of the Governnentrs strategy can all be
detected in the 1939 negotiations, but the evolution of the strategy
itself is most usefully traced back to devel'opnents in L942 and 1943' In
1942 New Zealand sought a gUarantee of its sterling reserves in case of a
loss of export earnings. In the sane year the Governnent paid out a large
price increase to woolgroweTs. Subsequently it inplernented its conpre-
hensive stabilisation schene.
with the movement of Anerican forces into the Pacific in 1942 a
systen of I'reverse'r lend-lease was organised (and given formal status in
an exchange of notes between New Zealand and the united states in septenber
lg42). Under this system, many of the requirenents of Arnerican forces in
the Pacific - food, clothing, nedical needs and services, were supplied
by New ZeaLand on a non-nonetary basis, as with lend-lease itsetf' 
(1)
NewZealandwas anxious about the effect of these transactions' especially
the food supplies, on her sterling earnings. Moreover, Britain would be
receiving exports fron the United States in substitution for the goods
ordinarity procured fron Nu* z".1atd(2) - a shift which night have serious
long-term effects. coupled with New Zealandrs existing anxiety about the
M.P. Lissington, Neu ZeaT'arzd
Sayers, FinarwLal PoLieY, P-
and. the Uni,ted States 1840-1944, P' 70'
304.
1.)
- 13s-
likely fall in its sterling earnings with the end of the war, these
conceTns were sufficient to provoke an approach to Britain in 1942 in
order to seek some increased guarantee of its sterling t"r"t'r"r.(3)
Australia raised similar issues with Britain at this time. The
latter offered in response to alter the systen by which Australian and
New Zealand war expenditure would be financed. Under the Menorandurn of
Security, Britain had made interest-bearing advances' Now it was agreed
that in conformity with other inter-a}lied loans, no interest would be
charged. For Australia the surn of t40 nillion was fixed as a threshold -
advances would be nade if her sterling balances fell below that let'"t'(4)
The New Zealand Governnent did not regald this anendlnent as sufficient
It sought clarification of the postwar debt situation - in effect a
corrunitment fron Britain that debts incurred in connection with the
prosecution of the war would be wiped out at the end of the war' It had
always been Britainrs philosophy that
the war should not leave behind it any monetary
indebtedness as between those who have been
partners in the conmon war effort' (5)
But this was a little different from making an ironclad conrnitment at a
tirne when the outcome of the conflict was still in doubt. Keynes in
particular was adamant that Britain should not unnecessarily hanper
herseLf by naking pieceneal settlenents. If Britain agreed to wipe out
her debts she would lose some of her power' especially with her creditors'
rA\
to influence the outcome of any postwar financial settlement. \"'
3. MAF 83/1149, 15 May, 6 Jul 1942; Baker, Wat Eeon'onry' pp 320-32I'
4. T1.60 F12715/8:, S.D. Waley, 27 JlI L942'
5. fti,d. , 27 J:uI 1942.6. Ibnd., 10 May, 27 JruL L942.
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A letter fron the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Nash conveyed
the sense of Britainrs offer in the terms outlined above. No particular
figure was stated - there was simply a reference to Britainrs preparedness
to rsafeguard New Zealand as regards her sterl-ing positionrt. Waley had
pointed out to Nash that it could be rather controversial if a particular
figure were chosen. This was presumably a way of saying that any figure
Nash was likely to suggest would be too high for Britain to accept' The
assurance did take into account New Zealandrs anxieties about the impact
of reciprocal lend-lease on New ZeaLandrs sterling earning,, 
(7)bt" 
"o
commitnents were nade. Food shipnents were not very seriously affected
by diversion to American troops who in any case spent considerable surns
in New Zeaiand on itens not covered by reciprocar aia'(8)
In his discussions with Treasury officials and the Chancellor in
JuIy 1942 Nash went rather further than seeking - unsuccessfully - a
firn comnitment to erase all war debt. As has been noted, New Tealand
was anxious about forthconing naturities and the sterling and foreign
exchange requirements that would result fron her need to reconstruct
and restock after th" *"t. (9) Nash did not nake specific proposals
- e.g. that New Zealandfs contractprices for its prinary products be
increased - but asked for British suggestions. It seened to Waley that
Nashfs aim was sinply to increase New Zealandrs sterling reserves:
to put it brutally, Mr Nash wishes New Zealand
to Le enriched during the war... (10)
7
8.
9.
10.
fu|d., 15 Aug, 31
Sayers , EinmteLaL
TL6O Fr27t5l8, 5lfuid., note on 30
Jul, L942.
Policy, p. 305.
Jul 1942.
Jul 1942 talks.
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0n both requests Britain declined assistance, feeling that in
neither case was the issue directly related to the war. The question
of assistance with comrnercial naturities had been debated in 1939/1940.
Treasury was still unwilling to get involved in New Zealandrs coumercial
debts, certainly to the extent of lending New Zealand the noney which
would convert then into a Government-to-Government debt:
it would be nost undesirable, for Governnent-to-
Goverrunent debts becone a political question and
all-too-often have to be remitted. (11)
Both Keynes and Lord Catto stressed that Britain should not acquiesce
in allowing New ZeaLand to build up sterling for neeting naturities -
assistance was in terms of naintaining a balance suitable for current
( 1)\
needs.rLL) The nost the British Treasury was prepared to do was to
assist a conversion issue, if at the approPriate time, New Zealand prefer-
red to convert rather than repay - this again was essentially sfunilar
to the assurance given in 1939/1940. In the letter to Nash it was
spelt out that loans maturing in wartine would fall into the category of
"exceptional issuesrr on which there would be consuLtation between the
New Zealand Governnent and the Treasury, whilst the latter would
cooperate in every possible way to assist the New Zealand Government in
successfully dealing with loans which fel1 due in the early post-hostili-
rl llties period. t'"J Although this comnitnent was a little more strongly
worded than had been intended, at least one officiat, H. Wilson, did
not think it would nake much difference.(14) Keynesrs and Cattors
reservations applied even more forcibly to Britain assisting the build-up
of New Zealandrs sterling reserves to enable her to neet postwar costs
of reconstruction and restocking.
11 . ftid.L2. rbid., 5 & 6 Aug'.1942.
13. Ibnd., 15 Aug 1942L4. Ibid., Cobbold, 17 Aug L942.
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Undoubtedly the war will funpoverish New Zealand
to the extent that stocks are run down, repairs and
capital works suspended, etc; but we shall be
inpoverished to a much greater extent and there
seens sone reason to hope that New Zealand will
be less impoverished than nost countries' (15)
Moreover if New zeaLand did build up balances for such purposes it
would have an inpact on Britainrs own postwar prosPects. New Zealand
would be exercising a clain on Britainfs current resources but this would
be derived from funds acuunulated in the past. (16)
In 1945 New Zealand suggested that she did not have enough sterling
because of the operations of reciprocal aid - a contention which Treasury
officials 
"uj""t.d. 
(17) New Zealand rather gave to the Lie to her
clairn by repaying substantial anounts of debt later in the year' 
(18)
But the following year the claim for additional sterling would be
presented in a nore potent context-
During the sane period that these stexling negotiations were being
conducted, stabilisation policy was also being fonulated and inplemented'
In 1942, Australia took the initiative in seeking a price increase
for wool on the grounds that costs had increased since the outbreak of
war. She received a 15 per cent increase (having asked for 22'5 per cent)
despite the fact that it was now very likely that there would be a
postwar wool surplus. Financial and political considerations sinilar to
those which influenced policy in the previous year contributed to this
d".isiorr. (19)
15. ftid., Note on 20 JuI 1942 talks '16. rbnd.
L7. TL6O FL27LS/8, Jan-Mar 1943, passi'm'
18. rbid.19. Sayers , Fi.nancial rolicy, p. 295 '
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New Zealand received the increase, but it created difficulties
between Government and producers. At the outbreak of war there had
been complete accordance between the two sides. But while the Government
still wanted increased receipts because they built up the countryrs
sterling reserves, it was cornnitted to an anti-inflation strategy: if
the woolgrowers received the 15 per cent increase this would represent
a substantial growth in domestic money supply, as well as being seen aS
inequitable by other sections of the conrnrunity. Overal1, stabilisation
would be underminud. (20)
At a conference with representatives of the Sheepowners Federation and
other organisations in June 1942 the Minister of Marketing, J.G. Barclay,
set out these points. The Governnent presented a Treasury plan for
paying producers only the 6.8 per cent allowable on grounds of increased
costs. Most of the balance of the increases should be paid into a pool
account. Producers were vehement in their rejection of the proposals,
so Government proceeded on its own acting mo?e generously than Ashwin
had wanted, but not as generously as producers would have wished. Owners
of greasy wool were to be paid 5 per cent of the total increased price
in Goverrunent bonds or stocks, in other words their increase in the hand
was slightty less than 10 per cent. Owners of slipe wool would also
receive a 10 per cent increase, and the balance would accrue to the
Meat Pool Account. (21)
The vigour of the plroducers t response emphasised that the Government
could not rely on the industry to coopelate wiLlingly in any long-tern
stabilisation schemes such as had already been constituted for dairy
produce, and to a lesser extent, for rneat. It was Perhaps fortunate that
20. T27 /9 4 Jun 1942 memo ST - Acting MFn.
2L. Miller & Rowley, Hi,story, pp 432-438.
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the 1942
the war.
per cent
paid out
increase was the onlY one
For the 1943/ 1944 season
in stocks and bonds, but
ir, ."rh. (22)
nade by Britain in the course of
the Government Paid out the five
in I944/L945 the full increase was
In the meantime, the Government had nonetheless implemented an
all-enbracing stabilisation policy. with Ashwin appointed as Director
of a new departnent, the Econonic stabilisation corrnission, the
conmifinent to the new policy was clearly total. Two powerful Tepresen-
tatives - F.P. Walsh, representing labour and w. Marshall, the chairnan
of the New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Company representing the enployers'
ensured that the policy would be effective. on 15 December L942 it
was announced that wages and salaries and all other fotms of
renuneration would be stabilised at the rates ruling on that day' Farm
prices woul.d not be increased, but neither would costs. The operations
of the Dairy Industry Account, the Cheese Changeover Account and the
Meat pool Account had nade producers familiar with this policy' Now
it was to become comprehensive. Agreenent with the Farmerst Federation
on the inplenentation of these measures was reached in June 1943'
Three nonths earlier the Goverrment learnt that Australia was
determined to seek increased returns for its dairy produce. Nash was
quick to suggest joint ninisterial discussions on the matter 'Qs) Talks
took place in May, at which New Zealand learnt that, although Australia
did seek increased returns, she was opposed to increased prices per
unit of output. Australia was facing up to having to pay out najor
subsidies to its dairy producers, and hoped to secure a contribution
22. Ibid.' PP 442-444.23. DPM, Surnrnary of cables Lg42-.L946, 11 Apr 1943, also ltAF 83/1158
Bankes nnerY - MF 17 MaY 1943'
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to those subsidles .Q4) This certainly accorded with one of New Zealandts
concerns. As Nash had pointed out in April, New ZeaLandrs stabilisation
policy
involved Government in considerable expenditure in
subsidising farners costs of production and we have
al.ready agieed to neet such increased costs. This
may necesiitate approach to United Kingdon for
intreased paynents to cover accumulating debits in
war expenses and stabilisation accounts on account
of subiidies to prinary producers. (25)
However, the identity of interest between the two countries was
incomplete. British officials were rather puzzled when they learnt
inforrnally that both Australia and New Zealand wanted a contribution
to subsidies, as New Zealand was not paying subsidies direct to
producers. Harry Davis explained that New Zealand wanted 'ran indirect
subsidy for general production purpose not necessarily related
specifically to dairy production". (26)
This strategy was not necessarily unwelcone to the Ministry of
Food. Its dual ains in food procurement were stability of suppLy and
prices. Paying contributions to subsidies was nore advantageous,
particularly in tenns of dealings with othet suppliers, than paying
higher prices. Moreover, such schemes dovetailed with Britainfs plan
to offer New Zealand and Australia long-tern contracts as a way of
securing increased production. The pros and cons of such contracts
were discussed in WhitehaLl in 1943.
24.
25.
26.
rbid., 5 May 1943. DPM B3/2, 14 May L943'
DPM Siunrnary-of cables L942-I946, 11 Apr 1945'--.
MAF 83/115-8, Interdepartnental talks, 10 Jun 1945'
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If Britain wanted increased output, she had to contenPlate sone
sort of long-tern planning because of the lead-tirne between taking a
decision to increase production and result. For beef four to five years
was the nininun; for sheep and pig neats, rather less. Even if the
interaction of suppl.y and denand would in due course bring the necessary
production, Britaints situation was too alarning to take such a risk.
Rather she hoped both to secure supplies and avoid rapid price rises by
coming to arrangements with suppliers.
The proposal for long-term contracts was first nooted in connection
with Argentina, a nuch more unpredictable supplier than Comnonwealth
countries, with whom Britainrs bilateral relations were most fragile.
Nevertheless it was recognised that it would be inappropriate to nake
any proposal to Argentina without having first approached the Dotirriorrr(27)
and at least assured then that they would not be treated less favourabl'y.
Also, tirning was important. If Britain acted in the niddle of the year
then it could expect to influence killing rates over the I943/L944
season - e.g. could encourage retention of a greater number of la'rrbs for
breeding purposes. Although the decision-naking was not as sPeedy as
that - for one thing there were argrrnents with the Departnent of
Agriculture about likely postwar production levels in the United Kingdon
and about the status of home versus overseas ptodrr."tr(28) - progress
was made.
27. MAF 83/1L80, I Feb 1943.
28. MAF 83/2905, passim.
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In September 1943 Treasury concurred in the Ministry of Food taking
steps to approach Australia and New Zealand, where questions of foreign
exchange did not arise. In December the Lord Presidentrs conmittee
added its support: this applied to dairy products as well as neat 'Qg)
Fron the time the matter had first been raised in nid-1943 it had been
recognised that as Britain was likely to face a shortage of dairy
products as well as neat after the war, both conmodities should be
included. Formal approaches were made to New Zealand at the beginning
of January and the beginning of March offering long-term contracts for
frozen neat and dairy products respectively. The text of one sets out
the urotives behind both:
Asyouknowworldsupplypositionformilkproducts
is causing us some anxi.ety and I believe your
Governneni views with sone concern the steady
decline in exports fron New Zealand to the United
Kingdom and a1lied nations. You may consider a
long-term contTact for a period sinilar to that
suggested for meat about which I wrote you on
SlDecernberlast.Itnaynotonlyhelpsterrthis
decline but nay well stimulate production to an
extentthatwouldenableexportingtoberesumed
on a scale more nearly approaching that of
irunediate Pre-war Years. (30)
That Britain had detenrined to seek long-tern contracts did not mean
that New zealand would necessarily find the proposals acceptable'
C.R. Price at the Doninions office, wondered whether the Doninions
would be attracted by the stability of dernand which Britain was
offering when produce was in such short supply' 
(31) They would be
concerned that if they did accept, other exporting countries like
Argentina would be able to secute the benefits of the shortages'
29.
50.
31.
Tr.61 Ss1255/1,
27 Jan 1944.
DPM Sunnary of
T161 551255/1,
Wilson-Holland, 18
cables I942-L946,
Price-Blagburn, 17
Sep 1943, TreasurY merno
3 Mar 1944.
Nov 1943.
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It was iurportant for Britain to nake a contract with South American
states as wel1, whilst continuation of centralised control of shipping
and food distribution would nerp. (32)
r<S)
In fact, as officials in the Ministry of Food were aware, \-
New Zealand had looked on the proposal for long-term contracts very
favourably when the first contract was made in 1939. The New Zealand
Governnent reasoning had been partly that stability was preferable to
violent fluctuations in price. In agreeing to discussions on a contract
for neat it was argued that it was
in our best interests to follow up innediately
this first concrete aPproach for postwar 
-buLk- -
contract arrangenents. A secure outlet for all
our exportable surplus of neat will not only
assist rehabilitation and stability but should
give fanners confidence to plan-for the increased
iroduction asked for by the Ministry of Food' (541
This was the straightforward response' The
judgnent of the value of long-tefln contracts
next few months.
complexities of New Zealandfs
became evident over the
2. Negotiations in March and April 1944
Agreement
Nashts arrival
principle to the long-tern contracts coincided with
London for the Commonwealth Econonic Conference and
1n
an
32.
33.
34.
MAF
DPM
DPM
83/1037, Brief
82, DMk-Davis,
82, MEA-NZHCL,
for Prine Ministersl
18 Oct 1943.
11 Jan 1944.
Conference, 5 MaY L944.
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financial talks with the Treasury. British officials learnt that
New Zealandrs clain was nuch more substantial than could have been
inferred fron cornments made in mid-1943. Linked to the costs of
donestic stabilisation was the need to supplenent ovelseas reserves
which had been depleted because import prices had risen sharply over
the period since 1939 whilst export prices had been relatively stable'
In total New Zealand was asking for around t100 million sterling which
would be used to neet urgent postwar needs - the replacement of inports
foregone, reconstruction, and debt maturities. It was suggested that
compensatory payments for past yeafs be nade in the forn of a postwar
credit with lurnp sum cash Paylnents for current and future years'(35)
British reactions were two-fold. Firstly, whatever the realities
of New Zealandrs need for sterling, she could not accept that such need
was to be deternined by reference to relative movenents in import and
cnor.c) t\at it h'ej
export prices. It *.51i""..itable in wartime that terms of trade should
nove against prinary products since war made industrial products scarce
as compared with agricultural products. And although it might be possible
for New zeaLand, which did 90 per cent of its trade with one other
country, to argue for conpensating price movenents, the sane simplicity
did not exist for Britain, which traded alL round the world' Britain
did not consider that in rejecting the terns of trade argunent she was
going back on her word as she had never, at any stage accepted the
main terms of the argument - Morrisonrs observation in Novernber 1939'
which New Zealand had invoked, certainly could not be construed so
(36)
precLse ry.
DPM 82 MEA - Nash, 10
T150 F12715/8, 11 Febp. 8s.
Feb 1944.
L944; MAF 83/I476'
35.
36. 22 Mar 1944. See above'
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But in any case, leaving aside the particular forn in which
New Zealand couched her request for more sterling, British officials
werenft at aII sure that New Zealand was so badly off as she cLained,
either in the present or in terms of future prosPects. one Treasury
official argUed that the gTeatest reduction in irnports was probably in
non-essentials rather than capital goods - there would therefore be no
need for rreplacenentr. Moreover, it was understood that New Zealand
had current sterling holdings of t30 nillion. Adnittedly she owed
Britain f12.5 million, but by 1945, if this was paid off, her balances
would again be up to about t28 nill"ion.G7) New Zealand, for her part,
had derived some benefit from lend-lease which had to be taken into
account, whilst the costs Britain was herself incurring in financing
the war frorn Indiawereareal contribution to New Zealandrs security.(38)
Accordingly, Britain was not only unprepared to accept New Zealandrs case
for payrnents al.ong the lines Nash had presented, but was not keen to
make any assurance about postwar sterling balances'
Mr Nash is a very skilful negotiator and if we
offer hin any sort of assurance he will not be
happy untiL ire has turned it into a promise- of-?
frei- gift in sterling in case New Zealand should
run short.... (39)
The Chancellor of the Exchequer accordingly inforured Nash that although
ItNew Zealand could count upon us helping her through any postwar
difficulties which were within our means, we do Do*: Corlr1nit ourselves at
thi.; stage to any detinj-te promises.'r Nash was "a long way going off
with t100 rnillion in his pocket."(40)
37. T160 Fl27 15/8, I Mar
58. TL60 FI27L5/9' 30 Mar
39. T160 F127I5l8, 3 Mar
40. MAF 83/1476' 23 Mar'
1944, 25 Mar 1944.
1944.
1944 (S.D. WaleY).
22 Mar 1945.
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Britaints diffidence was confined to the principle on which
New Zealand's claim was based and the substantial sum involved. It did
not nean that she was opposed to any adjustment at all. she was happy
to grant quite substantial price increases in sone forrn or other on the
understanding that prices would thereafter remain fairly stable for the
duration of the contracts that were being proposed. As New Zealand did
not want product prices increased, the obvious way of assisting was to
paral].el the arrangement being rnade with Australia and pay New Zealand
a contribution to her subsidies - even although the subsidies were
general ones rather than specifically tied to products. Over and above
this sone sort of Payment which would help inprove New ZeaLandfs sterling
position was envisage4. (41)
Ministry of Food officials set to work to calculate the sums that
would be involved. An a pto rata basis with Australia, New Tealand would
get t.3,5 nilliot per &Lnum as a contribution to her subsidies. Tttis
worked out at approxinately 15 per cent above what Britain was currently
paying for irnports of butter and cheese. The idea was to present to
New Zealand a proposal for makinl; c.ollateral payments of an ancunt
rather greater than this - say €4 nillion or t5 nrillion - and wrap the
whole up as a recognition that repair of New zeaLandrs productive
capacity had been deferred, and that united Kingdon export prices were
unlikely to fal1. Additionally it was expected that these Payments wouLd
protect Britain against New Zealand seeking najor price increases during
the four years of the contracts other than I'in the case of necess ity" '(42)
Note that
wool for which4L. MAF S511476, Dunnett (Il - Knight (MF) ' 11 Mar L944'the discussion revolved around food products and not
no offer of a long-term contract had been nade'
MAF 83/1976, Dunnett, 17 Mar L944.42.
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The plan was put to the New Zealanders at an official level meeting
on 22 March. campbell, of the New Zealand High conmission, said the
increase was not sufficient conpensation for the difficulties of the past
few years. Britainrs proposals nay have seerned satisfactory in terns of
the needs of New Zealandrs farming industry, but they went no distance
to neeting New zealandrs need for sterling. Dunnett explained that the
officials could not go any further on this - the ChancelLorrs statenent
to Nash set a rinit. (43)
At this tine, however, Nash established that New Zealandrs cutrent
sterl.ing obligations wer'e rather greater than he had originally thought'
New Zealand owed at least t25 million in connection with war exPenses
and beyond that there were other charges still coning to hand' Fron
wellington he also learnt that over and above these amounts there was
another t4.4 nillion owed to Austral.ia which would have to be settled
in sterlirrr. (a4) Nash brought these figures to the attention of the
united Kingdom Treasury, and in due course he was inforrned that the
Treasury would advise the chancellor of the Exchequer that, as
New Zealandts sterting position was not as satisfactoty as had been
understood when the talks had started, New zealand should be able to
carry forward 912 miLlion for settlenent at a later date, in addition to
the arrangement aLready nade for collateral payrnents.(45)
Further pTessure fron New Zealand produced a minor adjustment on
this offer. The collateral payment was upped to t6 rrillion pe? annum
and an additional t6 million was to be irnnediately credited to New Zealand
as evidence of Britainrs willingness to build up New zealandrs financial
position in the United Kingdorn so that she would be able to inport
43. Ibid., Notes of rneeting, 22 Mar 1944'M. DPM B3l2, 18 Mar 1944, 20 Mar 1944'
45. T160 Fl-27l5/9, EadY, 28 Mar 1944'
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capital equipnent in the Postwar period. (46)
Quite apart fron her own priorities, &nY greater generosity than
this would have created difficulties with Australia. Dunnett thought
that even as the offer stood there night be sone danger of this, but
Britain had already told Australia it would be giving New Zealand sone
additional help. The Ministry of Food, although worried about the
repercussions on the long-term contracts if New Zealand did not find the
offer acceptable, went along 
"itn it. 
(47)
N,ash cabled Fraser:
if we ultirnately decide to use every avenue to
obtain a larger sum then I believe we can do so"'If the surn oifered was nearer to t10 rnil'lion then
we could consider acceptance but .. ' the present
offer is inadequate. (48)
Fraser was less conPlacent.
not enough, he wTote directlY
as telling Nash that t10 nillion was
Doninions Secretary, arguing that
As well
to the
to continue on anything like the present basis would
not only leave us'without the overseas funds essential
for postwar reconstruction but would involve a lower
staniard of Living for our people - to expect us to
write off about 980 million sterling of overseas
purchasing power nerely because-we refrained frout
pressing 6ur clain whiie the United kingdon was menaced
would be most inequitable. (49)
46.
47.
48.
49.
Ibid.r meno to Chancellor of the Exchequer' 30 Mar 1944'
fui.d., meeting 30 Mar 1944.
DPM B3/2, 1 Apr L944.ftid., 3 Apr 7944.
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Fraser also harangued Bankes Anery about the runfriendly attituder of
the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Nashfs pfoposals connected with
postwar trade; and his expectation of the public indignation that would
er:upt in New ZeaLand when the country I'earnt that its econonic future
was being sacrificed by Treasury attitudes.(50) But having vented his
spleen, Fraser did not take any drastic action. Rather he suggested
to Nash that the matter be adjourned for resunption at a later date -
it was something he could discuss with Nash personally in Washington' 
(51)
3. Interlude: APril and MaY 1944
Prior to the tadjourrunentt the Ministry of Food had been anxious
about the fate of the long-term contracts if no financial agreement was
reached. Although New Zealand was coruritted in principle to the contracts'
there was a detectable difference in her attitude towatds then conpared
with say 1959, pronoted, no doubt, by her awareness of the current state
of world food supplies. The Government wanted to supplenent its
sterling reserves and envisaged doing this through paynents which would
be conpatible with a fairly stable price regine such as would obtain
with the contracts. But at the nargin New zealand would be prepared to
secure the finance she considered she needed through the rnarket'
50. MAF 83/1149' 5 APr L944'51. DPM 82, 3 APr 1944-
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A distinction can be drawn between Nash and Fraser. While Nash
was terrier-like in his defence of New Zealand interests, long-tern
arrangements and stabilisation were at the heart of his definition of
those interests. Fraser was less involved in day to day econonic issues,
nore aggressive in negotiating style, and carried nore explicitly than
did Nash the status of representative of an ally. Atl in all, he was
nore prepared to go out on a lirnb on this issue.
Before Fraser arrived in London, official Level neetings were hel'd
at which Heads of Agreenent for meat, butter and cheese contracts were
worked out; nothing was gained by stalling on such prelininary work'
The comnifinent to erportable surplus remained - there would be no
linitation steruning from any shipping problens or for other reasons.(52)
The exception to this was pigneat. Inclusion of it in the rneat
contract would cTeate difficulties with hone producers. In any case it
was essentially a short-term conmodity which did not require lengthy
advance notification of any wish to increase output. New Zealand did
not like this complete exclusion. A conpromise proposal was accepted'
Britain would take the exportable surplus for two years and look at the
situation again in 1946. As at this time Arnerican soldiers were eating
all New ZeaLandrs surplus pork, this corunitment wasnrt too burdensonu.(53)
How long would the contracts last? Britain proposed four years'
This would cover the period of shortages - but what about the expected
period of over-supply thereafter [at this tirne it was not thought the
52. DPM 82, Apr 1944, Passim.55. T161 S512SS/1, nernb to G.S. Dunnett, 19 Apr L944'
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Pacific war woul.d end before 1946) ? Britain initially nade provision
for consideration of future arrangenents six months before the end of
the contract. For the moment this was left aside. (54)
On this tentative basis, the New Zealand Goverrunent was abl'e to
secure the assent of the Dairy and Meat Boards to the principle of the
contracts. Both made reservations about prices but price details were
not resolved at this time, nor could they be until sone progress had
been made on the financial talks. (55)
Fraser was in London fron May, at the Prime Ministers I Conference,
but he found tine only for one neeting with the Chancell'or' at which he
re-stated New Zealandfs position, stressing that all she asked was to
"come out of her financial relations with the United Kingdon as well as
any other nember of the Cornmonwealth". Further detailed discussions was
postponed until Ashwin arrived in the niddle of 'lt"'"' (56)
4. The negotiations in June 1944
when Ashwin arrived it was decided not to pick up where discussion
had been adjourned in April, but to work on a different tack ' firere would
be two parallel sets of talks. One would decide "the proper price for
r c,7\
the united Kingdon to pay fel New zealand exports"t''/ - this would
54. T161 551255/1, 11 Apr 1944; MAF 83/1037,,notes of talks 17 Apr 1944;
brief for Prime Ministerst conference talks, 5 May L944.
55. DPM 82, MEA-NZHCL, 12 May 1944,-1-Jun 1944'
56. MAF S5l1037, neno 25 May 1944;'ibi,d., Tout-Dunnett, 50 May 1944'
57. MAF 83/1037, Dunnett-Tout, 13 Jun L944.
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entaiL working out increases in costs of production since the beginning
of the war which had not been net by Britain. Ashwin wanted to interpret
production costs in such a way as to produce a fairly genelous result'
but the British established that any wide-ranging itens should be left
for furthef general talksls8) nfatough this separation went against the
grain of New Zealandrs stabilisation policy, it was not incompatibLe
with it.
New Zealandrs case on the narTower ground was presented in terns
of the costs of dairy production: because of the introduction of the
guaranteed price in 1.935, there was much nore detailed information
availabl-e about production costs of butter and cheese than there was
for meat. George Duncan, the chief negotiator for this segment of the
talks, denonstrated that there had been a 37 per cent increase in costs
sincethebeginningofthewar,conparedwithaTpercentincreasein
r qo\price..--, British officials found this discrePancy rather hard to
swallow. As they understood it, Britain was currently paying prices
25percentabovetheprewarprice.whichlefta12percent,nota
30 per cent difference. The New Zealanders reacted in a fairly hostile
way to this analysis. Ttrey pointed out that prices in the dairy
industryinthelgSSseasonwerenotenoughtocovercosts:the
Governnent had had to pay 12.5 million frorn the Dairy Industry Account
toneettheguaranteedprice.Inotherwords,thecortectstarting
point for price was the 1939 contract price which alnost exactly covered
costs,ratherthanaveragelg3Srealisations.AlthoughtheMinistryof
Food reserved the right to look further at New zealandts figures it was
thenceforth tecognised that the contention that costs had increased
3Tpercentsincelg38wasonewhichitwasdlfficulttochallenge.
s8. rbi.d.
s9. T160 FL27LS/10, 19 Jun L944.
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Moreover, if it was contested, it
New Zealand would simPlY increase
tatks. (60)
seened more than like1Y that
its demands in the general financial
Accepting therefore the calcul.ations presented by the New Zealanders,
a butter price of 152s. 7d. was reached. Taking this figure, Britain
thought it worthwhile to try and rnatch the ptice against that which they
expected the Australians to ask for - 147s. 2d. It would be enbarrassing
to concede an increase to New ZeaLand which would Pronpt an Australian
clairn on the grounds of preserving the traditional differential'
Accordingly it was decided to suggest to the New Zealanders that there
were one or two items mentioned in their cosq;-tatenent which the
Ministry of Food should not have to take fully into account' firese
might be assuned to amount to 2s. thus bringing the New Zealand price
to a level which would not pronote rePercussions with Australia' fite
New Zealandels were quite happy with this provided the 2s. would be taken
into account in the talks between Ashwin and the United Kingdon
Treasury. (61)
Atthispointthoughadifficultyarose.Duncansaidthatthe
Dairy Board was not sure that it wanted a long-tern contTact at all -
frit was in their interest to take what profit they could while the
going was good',.(62) If this were the case, it did not put the British
in a very easy position but their irnnediate response was to point out
that Britainrs financial assistance both through price increases and
Treasury assistance was conditional on price being fixed for two years
fui,d., neeting
Tt6t FL2715l10,
tutd.
20 Jun 1944.
Wilson note 20 Jun 1944.
60.
61.
62.
- 15s-
- in other words an agreement to the contracts. Whether Britain would
have pushed this argunent to the f.init is open to question - certainly
the tenor of the general financial discussions suggested the boot was
on the other foot - that Britain night have had to pay market prices
if she did not neet New Zealandrs request for supplenentary palments.
As it was, Rodden (one of the New Zealanders with the Ministry of Food)
was fairly convinced that New Zealand dairy farmers werenrt as hostil,e
to the contract as Duncan had suggested, but that the source of the
trouble was Goodfellow, the representative of the Dairy Board. Goodfellowr
strength of personality and status in the dairy industry were unquestioned
and his relations with Governrnent corfespondingly fragile, and it was a
fair judgement that if Britain nade "a show of firmness" the difficuLty
would be renoved. (63)
Without any sirnilarly unsettling influence on the neat side, the
price talks proceeded rather more smoothly. New ZeaLand argUed that
costs were broadly sinilaT to those for dairying, but the British were
inclined to think that they were rather lower, and in the upshot a
5d per cent increase was agreed ao. (UO) lrlhile agreeing to keep these
prices fixed for two years, the New Zealanders were keen on a floor
price for the third and fourth years. This was left over for later
d""ision. (65)
As night have been expected, the two parties brought to the general
financial discussions very different conceptions of what further
adjustnents were required over and above the price increases agreed to'
hrhen the financial talks had adjourned in April, the British position
631 rbi.d.
64. MAF 83/1057, meeting 24 Jun 1944.65. Ibid., Turner - Broadley, 24 Jun L944.
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was that:
(a) they were prepared to postpone settlernent of
t12 nillion of New Zealand's debt
Cb) they were prepared to nake collateral annual
paynents of t6 nillion per annum in lieu of price
increases
(c) they were prepared to make an additional cash
paynentoft6nillionperanntrnplusanadditional
f.6 million lump sum for 7943/1944'
The proposal which Ashwin now nade, although not based explicitly
on the ter.ns of trade criterion, was still nuch more generous to
New Zealand than this. He argued that in the price discussions with
the Ministry of Food two elenents were not taken into account - an
allowance for excess depreciation, and a contribution towards general
cost of living subsidies. Depreciation on the dairy industry alone was
put at f14 million. Irlhilst cost of living subsidies wele not specifically
applicable to the agricultural exporting industry there was no doubt that
New Zealandrs export prices would have been higher if subsidies had
not been paid out and the t5.8 nillion given earlier as a figure was
not in fact the full cost. Accordingly, in addition to the price
increases, estinated at f.7 million per annum' Ashwin asked for an
additional 86 nillion per annum to cover these itens to be spent only
on capital goods in the united Kingdon, even if this involved waiting
several years. In effect Ashwin was asking for the price increases plus
the lunp suns promised in March' He was PrePared to forego the
retrospective cash payment (in fact about a third of it would be paid
out as price increases). (66)
66. TL6O FL27LS/10, notes of neeting 21 Jun 1944'
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RatherthanhavetlZmillionofdebtdefetTed,Ashwinrequested
cancellation of t30 rnillion of debt' This' it was observed by the
British,wouldputNewZealandina,tvetystrongposition|t.Ashwin
agreed,butpointedoutthatNewZealandhadtofacetlSnillion-
t17 niLlion worth of nraturities in 1945 and sonething Like another
t15 rnillion over the next 5-6 years. And although it was true that 
they
wouldnotneedanyhelpoverthis'assessmentsinNewZealandestiurated
the countryrs sterling needs at Sl00 nillion' as against the t52 
nilfion
which New Zealand wouLd earn through the price increases and 
coLlateral'
. 
(67)
paynents (as ProPosed bY her')'
As one British official pointed out lthere is a plausible argunent
forMrAshwin|scase,anditisclifficult...topointtoanyonebit
of it as being unjustifiable.,'(68) But this did not nean that Britain
was about to accePt the proposal without quaLification' To Waley'
the whole approach was yet another exarnple of the New zealand Governmentrs
desire
to be enriched during the war at our expense
enough to cover postwar reconstruction needs
and to pay off "' New z"Ltanils rnarket loans' (69)
Waley particularly stressed that aLthough the United 
Kingdom had never
fixedanypreciselevelbelowwhichitwouldbereasonablethat
NewZealand'sbalancesnotbeallowedtofal'l,afiguresomewhere
betweent'15nillionandtsOrrillionseenedreasonable.NewZea].and
currentlyhadbalancesoft34nillionagainstwhichtherewereclains
of at least t25 niLlion. But with hau this debt postponed 
and a
67. rbid.68. rhi,d.;r: r,llr asl1476, mernorandum 22 Jrn 1944'
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t12 rnilLion cash Paynent
balnces would rernain at
under her belt (as Britain had offered),
over f,30 nittion. (70)
Payments to cover increased costs was another vexed issue.
New Zealand had assuned that it was quite reasonable to seek supplenentary
paFnents to cover various ilunascertainablesil given that price increases
were to cover only ascertained cuffent costs. Britain had initiall'y
offered supplementary payments tied to current food prices, and did not
intend that the forner should rernaj-n unaltered if food prices were
increased - as they had been. (71) On Britaints initial calculation,
ascertained cost increases to have been reimbursed would have amounted
to t3.15 niLLion per annum, leaving plenty of roon for unascertainables
to be paid out of the original f6 million per annun offer .Q2) But in
the end price increases of [7 nillion per annuln (not f3'15 million) had
been agreed to and the idea of accepting any additional clains seemed
unattractive, particularly as Britain herself was paying out subsidies
to stabilise the cost of living (which helped keep British export prices
down).
while it is reasonable enough [Waley cornnented]
for New ZeaLand to hope that some fairy godnother
will provide her with funds to cover her reconstruction
needs-, the suggestion that we should be fairy
godrnoiher oveilooks the fact that we shall also have
[reat reconstruction needs but so far from having
6een enriched by the war we have gone into 
-the red to
an extent of some t2.5 thousand nillion' (73)
70. rbi,d.7r. T160 FL27S/L0, SSD-CE, 27
72. MAF 85/1476, 19 Jun L944.
73. Ihid., S.D. WaleY, 22 Jun
Jun 1944.
1944.
- 
1s9-
The chancellor agreed with wal.ey in reacting very unfavourably to
Ashwinrs proposals and did not depart fron the original offer (although
agreeingthatpToposedannualpaymentsoft6rrillionpefannumbe
replaced by the price increases estinated at t7 rnillion per annum) 'Q4)
When this decision was conmunicated to Fraser, who was still in London'
a najor diplomatic row imrnediately threatened. Fraser put his reaction
on paper in terns reniniscent of his response nearly three months earlier'
He reiterated New Zealandrs case, and suggested that New Zealand had
been nisled by Treasury officials over the natter of the relationship
betweenpriceincreasesandsupplementarypaynents.Havingcovered
such specific points Fraser dilated at length on his feeling that the
responsewascontrarytothespiritofthewartimealliance:
In unity with the United Kingdorn New Zealand
pledged herself to contribute all available
t"roit""t to the conmon war effort' We have
gone forward in the faith that a helpfully co-
operative approach would govern our postwar as-
well as our wartine relations' We have no wish
t.o pass on to other shoulders our fair share of
the cost of our war efforts ' But to be asked
on top of them to bear the burden of great
uncoriected disparities in prices is a
proposition to wttictt no Governrnent of New Zealand
could agree
New Zealand has undertaken to produce nore food
poti.,rf"rly dairy produce, foi the United Kingdon'
and for Uniied t{ati-ons forces in the Pacific'
Plans involving much organisation, sacrific-e and
devoted effort for the next few years have been
laid towards this end.
I frankly fear the consequences on this part of our
war effoit and on the fine norale and spirit of
the New Zealand f"opf" when it nay be inevitable for ne
to admit that ali our efforts to get that friendly and
conradely co-operation in the economic field' which has
meant so nuch to both our countries on the battle field
and in o.rt g"r,"tal war effort, have failed' (75)
74.
75.
'rL,i.1!UUU. titoo Ytzllsllo, PMNz-cE, 23 Jun 1944'
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This was strong stuff, but the nost potent part
spelt out. In a departnental memorandum for the
pointed out that
of the appeals was not
Minister of Food, it was
New Zealand knows we attach considerable
importance to the contracts and no doubt
Mr Ashwin is going to suggest to you that
those contracts will be prejudiced unless
the Chancellor takes a more reasonable view
on the financial arrangements. (76)
Four days later Lord
Britainrs dilenna to
had t,alked with the
Cranborne, the Doninions Secretary presented
the Chancellor in sinilar terms. His officials
New Zealanders and an impasse see'med likely:
If you feel unable to neet then [on the financial
natters] then there would be no alternative for
then bui to agree to a contract for one year only,
with a view to denanding greatl-y increased prices
nextyearandsubsequentlywhentheirproducts.will
be in- even greater demand than now' They realise
that this nay involve the abandorunent of their
pricestabilisationpolicy:ontheotherhandthey
ieel that they cannot possibly afford to continue
the latter if this means in effect that they get
underpaidfortheirexports.Theywouldbeverylothto
contenrptate any such dlvelopment, but it is clear that they
feel tirei" porition to be sb serious that they would
inevitably be driven to this course' (77)
This set out New Zealandts priorities clearly. Her preference was
to have the money and the contracts - but if necessary she would get the
money in the way that dairy producers had suggested - by taking what
profit she could. The New Zealanders may have been bluffing, but
Britain preferred not to test that. Even if the Doninionrs arguments
were less than convincing, it seemed wise to pay. Additionally, Cranborne
told the Chancellor, he was greatly disturbed
76.
77.
MAF 83/f475, nenorandun 22 Jun L944'
riOO FIZTLE/LO,--SD-CE, 27 Jun 1944. See also MAF 83/1037'
DO-UKHCW 12 Jul 1944, for siutilar account'
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not only by the difficulties disclosed but at
at the sense of injustice which rightl'y or wrongly,
the New Zealanders evidently felt it would
be nOst unfortunate if Fraser were tO leaVe tomolrow
feeling that we had not given hin a fair deal. I
very much hope that you will be able to stretch a
point to rneet him. (78)
'Ihis pressure had its effect - in fact it was anticipated by Treasury,
which was prepared to accept supplenentary payments of t3 nillion per
annun over and above the price increases: there was no financial
justification, but they could be approved on the grounds of imperial
policy if it neant that the New Zealand Government would be satisfi"a. 
(79)
In the upshot, a suppletnentary payment of f4 nillion was offered.
Additionally the [12 rnill.ion Tetrospective cash payment would be over
and above the price increases conceded for the 1943-L944 season which
wouLd bring in an extra f,4 million. And the amount of debt deferred
(not cancelled) would be increased to f.L8 million -rrnot really an
expensive concession as New Zea|and pays off the debt as and when she
can so that in effect she can obtain a postponement by simply not naking
,.n0)
any paymentrr. \v!
This proposal proved acceptable to New Zealand and so a crisis was
averted. In the words of one historian, New ZeaLand'rtook the cash and
let the doctrine ge". (8t) There was no allusion to terms of trade
argunents. But quite apart form the Payments to cover those years
New Zealand had received substantial retrospective paynents, and its
sterling position was greatly improved. Cranborne let Anderson know
78. T160 F12715/10, SSD-CE, 27 Jun L944.
79. Ibnd., 26 Jun L944.
80. Ibid., Waley, 27 Jun L944-
81. Sayers , Firtanetal Poliey, p. 305-
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how grateful I an for all you did to smooth
out the difficulties with Fraser about the
terms of trade. I was so afraid that if we
reached an impasse it would have undone nuch of
the good achieved at the Conference. As it is,
I think the New Zealanders have gone away feeling
quite satisfied that we have done all we could
to neet then .... (82)
And Britain for her part, although she had parted with a lot of
noney, had at least kept sone stabil.ity in her trading relations with
an important food supplier.
5. Finalising the Contracts
While the settlenent rernoved financial questions fron the agenda,
nany contract details renained to be resolved. New Zealandrs approach
now followed nore conventional channels. On the One hand, although
prices were settled, she still had sone interests reLated to trading
conditions for the forthconing season. On the other hand, she sought
to nake the long-teflD contracts more secure than had been possible at
a tine when they were sti1l under discussion.
Before leaving England, Fraser had written to the Chancellor setting
out the basis for an agreement. As well as incorporating the last
minute financial concessions made by the Treasury, the letter spelt out
New Zealandrs wish that prices for the third and fourth years of the
contTact trbe subject to review upwards on subnission of a case for such
82. T160 FL2715l10, SSD-CE, 30 Jun 1944.
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revision by the New Zealand Goverrunen1". 
(83) Fraser pointed out that
as producers were pushing for annual revision, a conpronise of setting
the L944/1945 price as the nininum for the contTact period should be
acceptab 1e.
In his rePIY
such a commifinent
its own farmers.
the chancellor stood firrn on this, not least because
wouldbenoregenerousthanBritainlsconmitrnentto
Inourviewthereviewrtustbeoneinwhicheither
side can argue for a change in prices' This seems to
us the only fair rnethod of doing business' (84)
It seems that New Zealand felt obliged to Pronote the argunent
on account of her producers. Following the Chancellorts reply both
Ashwin and Nash agreed to accePt that in the third and fourth years
prices could go either way depending on changes in costs. 
(85) 
changes
in export prices in other significant supplying countries would also
be invoked as a reason for adjustment'(86)
That nay not have been all that likely within the duration of the
contract. But what about the longer term? In communicating his Govern-
ment's agreenent to the contracts, the New Zealand High Conmissioner
also pointed out that
even at this tine a nain concern " ' must be
continuing market for our produce - particularly
as preseni plans are calculated to increase
83. DPM 82 Fraser-MEA, 28 Jun 1944'
84. DPM 82 CE-NZHCI in NZHCL-MEA, 14 Jul 1944'
85. DPM 92 Nash-MEA, 20 Jul 1944'
86. AJER L94S H30, PP 6, 18.
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production for export. We hope-that tonnage
"iff te gteater in fg+S than today, and it wouldbe a mosi serious natter if having increased our
production ... the principal market were then to be
curtailed. (87)
The Minister of Food in his reply evaded
giving a Delphie assurance that Britain would
issue by graceful'lY
forget all that New Zealand has done at
our side throughout the war. (88)
At one neeting caurpbell asked his British counterparts what would
happen if the two countries could not agree on prices for the third and
fourth years of the contract. (89) He was told that contracts between
governments could not be enforced in the normal waif and anounted to no
more than a declaration of intention. The observation was really very
significant, because it ernphasised that New Zealand hal no peTmanent
claim on Britainrs benevolence - nor could a contract secule such a
clain.
This situation is thrown into relief by considering the influenee
of the negotiations for postwar international comnercial order on the
Anglo-New Zealand discussions. There was a general concern about the
future of imperial preference under any new regime and at the Prime
Ministersr Conference in May L944, Fraser reiterated New Zealandts
a on\
suppoTt for the continuation of imperial preference. t""' But the more
substantive j,ssue at this tine was the future of inter-governnental
87. DPM 82 NZHCL-I'hF in NZHCL-MEA, 31 Jul 1944'
88. DPM 82 Iv!nF-NZHCL in NZHCL-MEA, 31 Jul 1944'
89. MAF S3l1037 Knight-Rodden, 18 Jul L944'
90. EAI04/4/1, I MaY 1944
the
not
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contracts. At Corrnonwealth talks in October/Novernber 1942 and
June 1943, the New Zealand Governnent stressed that it favoured the
continuation into peacetine of the wartine contract ,yrt"t. 
(91) The
Anglo-tunerican draft proposals in circulation in 1944 had, at the
insistence of the United Kingdon, preserved the right of State trading
organisations to enter into long-term contracts - an outcone welconed
by Fraser at the Prirne Ministersr Conference. Bulk purchase was:
The greatest security that we and the U.K' could
have for our produce. (92)
Nonetheless, in July 1944 a letter from the State Department
cornmunicated disquiet to the Foreign Office. (95) The Foreign Office's
reply stressed that the aim of the contracts was to secure food supplies
and prevent violent fluctuations in price - these were objectives of
United Nations food policy agreed on at the Hot Springs Conference' 
(94)
It denied that the contracts could be seen as an aspect of a Connonwealth
econornic policy, pointing out that it was coincidence that najor supplying
countries happened also to be conmonwealth members. Ttre state Departnent
aLso initiated talks with the New Zealand Enbassy in washington. The
Department recognised that New Zealand could legitinately welcone long-
telIn contracts in the short-tern: New Zealandfs products were designed
for high income markets, and in the years after the war she could not be
expected to face the gamble involved if she refrained from securing even
one market. But 1948 was felt to be definitely postwar, and in the
91. EAL04/4/r.92. EAIO4/4/L, 8 MaY 1944.
93. T161 551255/1, 17 Jul 1944.
94. Reference to itre United Nations in the covering letters
contracts enPhasised this Point'
to the
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eyes of other countries would look nore like the foundations of a
permanent system than a transitional arrangenent' (95)
New Zealand producers remained much nore exposed to the narket
than did other producers because the New Zealand Governmentts resources
were too Lirnited to a1low it to nake the sort of connitment to its
farmers that other Goverrunents rnade to theirs. Nor would another
Government - such as Britain - make up the difference. Anerican
pressure, as nediated through the international negotiations, like
Britaints own outlook, expressed the reality of the conpetitive environ-
ment in which New Zealandrs export trade had to thrive.
with prices settled, the attention New Zealand paid to current
trading condition centred nostly on putting an end to wartine restric-
tions where they disadvantaged her.
Meat producers were interested in the chilled beef trade, which had
onlyjustgotunderwayinthelg30s,withArgentinatakingthe
initiative. New Zealand was not a significant beef exporter in any
forn, but both she and Australia had secured the right to nake experinental
shipnents, and there seerned to be scope for expansion, until the war put
an end to such developments. Thus, New Zealand welconed a clause in
the contract which provided for a resumption of the chilled beef trade
as soon as shipping space became available. New Zealand was to be given
,'an equal and coincident opportunity (which did not in fact arise until
1951) for resuming and increasing shiprnents of chiLled beefrr' Whether
the two criteria - shipping sPace and equal opportunity - were compatible
was left to further discussio"' (96) other wartime requirements were
looked at. Britain agreed to lift the requirement that carcases be
95. DPM F1l8, 18 Oct 1944
96. MAF 88/405 passim, DPM 82 NZHCL-MEA, 18 Aug L944, MEA-IIZHCL' 9 Aug 194'
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telescoped as soon as shipping permitted, The export of dehydrated
neat would cease at the end of Ig44. Canned neat production would
continue on a contract basis, but with quantities and price negotiated
annually. (97) Dairy producers were concerned about the future of
butter in relation to nargarine. Though nargarine was a cheaper
product, it was generally considered to be an inferiof one' But if it
were de-regulated before butter, the availability of an unrestricted
supply rnight turn the British consumel peflnanentLy away from butter'
New Zealand was assured that butter and margarine would be treated
identically (it was assuned that consumers would express a preference
for branded products on the grounds that they were likely to be of a
more uniform and therefore higher quality) ' (98)
The other nain concern of the dairy trade was the question of diver-
sion of production to markets other than Britain. In 1939 sorne diVersiOn
had been agreed to in principle as a way of enabling New Zealand to
retain a toehold in the snall rnarkets she had laboriously established
prior to the war. while the argunent was reiterated in 1944 it seems
likely that short-tern market plosPects increased the appeal of diversion'
New Zealand suggested five per cent of her exportable surplus should be
withheld from Britain. The latter resisted on the grounds that she would
have to extend the prefeTence to other suppliers' Moreover it was
undesirable, at a time when New Zealand production was I'so far below
pre-war level,,. This was not quite fair - New Zealandts production had
falIen, but fron the wartirne peak, not fron pre-war levels' Nonetheless
she accepted that the maxinun she could divert would be two and a half
r99')per cenr. - This followed logically enough from acceptance of the
contracts earlier in the year. Eut if the narket remained buoyant and
MEA-NZHCL, 17 Aug 1914'
UKHC$I-MEA, 6 Oct 1944.
Also, MEA-NZHCL, 20 Oct 1944,
97.
98.
99.
DPM 82 NZHCL_MEA, 9
DPM 82 MEA-UKHCW, 1
DPM 82 NZHCL-MEA, 6
NZHCL reply, 25 Oct
Aug 1944,
Jun 1944,
0ct. 1944.
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was certain the issue would reappear.
consistent withthis stance, Britain was prepared to allay
New Zealandrs anxieties about conpulsory diversion. The contract'
although substantively an Anglo-New Zealatd agreenent' was fonnally a
part of the food allocation system of the Conbined Food Board of the
United Nations. New Zealand wanted to ensure that if supplies were
diverted avray fton Britain, supplying countries would be equally treated
- New Zealand did not want only such diversion to becone a back door
nethod of undermining her position on the British narket. Britain l
confirmed that any allocation would have to have New Zealandrs aPProval.(10(
The new contract prices were not publicised. Britain had negotiated
with New Zealand and Australia first Partly so as to f'get then out of
the way'r. But, having reached agreement, she did not want to be too
restricted in her bargaining with Argentina, by the latter having knowledge
of what she had conceded to New zeaLatd. Accordingly it was agreed between
New Zealand and Britain that the neat price-.recorded in the schedule and
paid out to the producers would be those set for the 1943-1944 season'
The balance of the 35+ per cent increase would be paid over in a lunp
sutn. In this way that increase would be hidden from Argentina' Ttre
New Zea\and Government went along with this part of the way, but at the
end of October felt obliged to pass on full details of the agreement to
the Meat Producersr Board and the House of Representatives, because of
strong pressure from both quarters and the suspicion which continued
secrecy was generating. Publicly, however, it still seemed that
New Zealand prices had not been increased above the 1943-1944 leveL and
this renained the case until after the Argentinian negotiations wel.e
100. DPM B2 MEA-NZHCL, 20 Oct L944,
letter). MAF 83/1037, 27 Oct NZHCL-MEA, 
26 JuL 1944 (Llewellinfs
L944, 6 Nov 1944.
- 169-
concluded. (101) only in November 1945 were details of the contracts
made publ' c. (102)
Britain also wanted New Zealand to forego publicising the new
contract prices for butter and cheese but this placed the New Zealand
Governrnent in an enbarrassing position as it had already pronised to
pass these detaiLs on to the Dairy Board. The information was not
sr:pposed to be transnitted out of the country but a few days later
Australian newspapers carried the details' 
(103)
A further difficulty attending the finalising of the price schedule
for butter and cheese arose when it becane plain that Australia would
not be content with the L47s. 2d. per cwt butter which the Ministry of
Food had envisaged her settling for. Rather, the Australians sought
161s. ld. - well above New Zealandts 150s. 6d. It was possible that
the problem could have been resolved by extending the Australian price
increases to New Zealand but New Zealand wasnrt happy with this idea.
0n neat, Australia had asked for snaller increases than New Zealand had
received. There would be problens between neat and dairy producers if
reLative prices were adjusted and it was estinated that New Zealand would
end up with less sterling. Nor did New zeaLand seek to preserve the
differential at the higher Level, o'iz. clairning 163s. 10d. as against
Australiars 161s. ld. Ttris would have gone against the grain of the
Governrnentrs wish to rnininise per unit price increases' Moreover it
would have almost certainly entailed a reduction in the lump sun paFnents'
lt Aug L944; MEA-NZHCL'
Bankes AmerY-Knight'
10r. DPM 82 NZHCL-I'IEA,
30 Oct L944.
LoT. EA'S/2/2/1, EP 7
103. DPM 82 MEA-NZHCL,
10 Aug 1944.
1 Aug 1944; NZHCL-MEA'
Nov 1945.
I Aug 1944; MAF 83/1037
-L70=
At the beginning of Septernber the United Kingdon proposed to Austral'ia
that it accept a per cwt price of 147s. 6d. and have the balance to the
agreed 161s. ld. nade up in a lunp s111n Payment. Britain considered it
important that the differential be preserved otherwise the whole
argunent would simply be transferred back to New Zealand. The Australians
were not at all happy with this proposal, and while they rnade up their
ninds" New Tea|and withheld the final initialLing of its own agreement'
But in March 1945 Australia accepted Britaints terms and New Zealandrs
own contract was finalised. (104)
In the neantine there had been a major dispute in New Zealand about
the fate of the new payments agreed to by Britain. The Governnrent had
been successful in keeping the bulk of the increased payments out of the
hands of the producers: the lump surns were not paid in respect of
particular products and did not therefore go into the stabilisation
amounts. There was thus a double barrier to the inflationary inpact of
the increased receipts: firstly, in that the Per unit increases would
go into the producersr stabilisation account, secondly, in that the lurnp
sum would remain out of the hands of the producers altogether, and at
the disposal of the Government.
Producers were vocal
payments. The Government
policy, nor of foregoing
but it exhibited a sense
in laying clain to ownership of the IuIP sunn
had no intention of abandoning stabilisation
the special status of the lunp sun paynents'
of diplornacy in inviting consultation with the
104. MAF 83/1037 neno, 20 Jul 1944; DPM
NZHCL-MEA, 51 Oct 1944; MEA-NZHCL,
13 Feb 1945, 2 Mar 1945. See also
L942-L945, PP 508-509.
82 MEA-NZHCL, 17 Aug L944;
11 Nov 1944; IvIAF 83/1038,
Butlin & Schedvin, War EeonotnY
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dairy and neat industries for the purpose of deciding how to deal with
the increased export income in the light of the stabilisation policy'
In response the Meat and Dairy Boards constituted a Joint cornrnittee
which negotiated with the Econonic stabilisation connission' representing
the Governnent. [105)
In so acting, the producers clearly repudiated the more extrene
criticism of stabilisation, and the discussion revolved substantively
on just how much money the producers would end up with in their stabilisa-
tion accounts. After several successive meetings with representatives
of both boards, the latter came to accept that the luup sun pa)'nents
were not paid in respect of costs accruing to the farmer' Ttrey agreed
rather that they had been paid to plotect New Zealandfs overseas
sterling situation, and to meet part of general stabilisation costs'
Ihere was no possibility, in other words, that prices would have been
increased if the runp sum payments had been reduced in si'"!roe)
The fact that the producers had been "deprived" of the lurp sum
payments nade then all the nore determined to ensuTe that only the bare
mininum of subsidies be debited against the stabilisation accounts in
which the increased returns were to be lodged. Debate revolved around
both the exact inplications of the Farners Union - Government agreenent
of June Ig43, which had supposedly covered all such contingencies' and
the particular costs the British Governnent had taken into account in
agreeing to a price increase. If certain costs were not provided for
at either of these tirnes then the producers did not see why they should
I Aug 1944 (P. 218) I
1944, (p. 23r) .105. Miller Q RowleY,106. DPII B4/2, 1 Mar
Hi.stotg, p .
1945, 16 Mar
304; NZPD NordneYer'
1945. 1 Fraser 8 SeP
SEED
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be debited to the stabilisation acco,rtt. (107)
It is not appropriate to scrutinise the details of these discussions
here as they involved a matter of donestic policy, and as well as
coning to terms on Past charges, attempted to tray down guidelines for
the future. Agreenent, was reached at the end of March, with the
exeeption of one iten - the cost of the subsidies paid in respect of
butter and cheese produced for the local narket. This went to arbitration
and a rnajority decision found in favour of the Governrnent. Nonetheless
it was considered politic to reirnburse the Dairy Board Stabilisation
Account fron the Consolidated Fund, for the cost of the subsidies'(108)
**********
The 1944 settlement was verY
strengthened her sterling position
for her food exports.
favourable to New Zealand. She
and also secured Price increases
underlying this success uas Britainrs need for food. Although
New Zealand wanted long-term stability the fact that she could consider
bargaining it against a satisfactory financial' settlenent eutphasised
how much noTe urgent was Britainrs neect compared to hers.(109)
Britain hoped for increases in New Zealand's food output, whilst it
was noted optinistically that the Doninion expected to get rnost of its
irnports fron Britain. Yet in neither respect did New ZeaLand enter
into firn cornnitrnents. (rro)
107. DPl[ B4/2 passim.f08. See Mitlei & Rowley, Eisto*y, pp 505ff for details.
109. MAII 83/1476 meno for lrhrF, zs_.lun 1944. MAF 85/1037 Do-UKHCW,
19 Aug L944.
110. T160 51255/1 Dunnett-Price, 19 Aug 1944.
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Although New Zealand made a sharp distinction between
increases and the rest of the nonetary settlement, Ashwin
agreed with the British official who told hin that:
To neet this sort of
with twenty-one citY and
prr.ce
one
criticisn the Chancellor held an informal talk
financial editors. He stressed the fact that
the
for
on our side we should treat any increased
payment to New TeaLand as, in effect a price
intrease I think that whatever settlenent
there is wil,1 have to be borne on the Ministry
of Foods vote, except insofar as it involves
postponernent of payment by the New Zealanders of
tttuii indebtedneis to the United Kingdorn' (111)
The fact that any price increases on account of wool were
considered out of the question also emphasised the fact that the
New Zealand case derived its strength fron the food shortage, even
if she did not want all payments to be translated into prirnary product
price increases. (112)
In November 1944 there was some discussion of the settlenent in
the British financial press after the chancellor had announced details
to the House of commons. It was diffi.cult, thOught wte Eeononrtst
to avoid the inpression that this is another
evidence of that single-ninded mood of unlinited
liabil.ity in which giitain has been waging the war'
When the overseas war debt, excluding lend-lease
already totals t3000 nil'lion, what does an
additional t46 nillion natter? (113)
111. 83/1037 Dunnett-Gardner, 13 JunILz. DPM 82 Ashwin-MEA, 6 JuI 1944'
113. The EeornmLst, 18 Nov 1944.
1944.
And see below section (6).
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the paynents to New Zealand were intertwined with New Zealandrs
stabilisation policy and could be justified on costs grounds, even
although it suited both parties to keep them seParate. 
(114)
New Zealand secured a najor improvenent in her sterling position in
Ig44, and she did it within the frarnework of long-tern trade arrangements'
But while these aTrangements provided some predictability they did not
obligate Britain to bale New Zealand out of a postwar depression'
l,{ew Zealand night gain Britainrs assent to protecting her against the
full consequences of high prices - on guarantees against price falls
Britain was rmrch rnore elusive.
why then did New zealand agree to the contracts? Political and
enotional loyalties nay have played a Part' And for Nash' at least'
an arrangement which underpinned stabilisation was better than one
which did not. For others in the Government, and for the producers'
the prinary concern was still postwar trading conditions. Even if
the contracts were not watertight, they could be expected to provide
New Zealand with moTe security than the vagaries of the open narket'
6. Wool: The establ'ishrnent of tne 'loint Organisat
While wartine dislocation ensured a buoyant denand for New Zealandrs
meat and dairy produce once the shipping crisis had been overcome, the
same dislocation neant that the wool conswption had dropped' Conbined
with the expectation that Post-war trading conditions would be depressed
114. T160 Fl2715/10 memo of
UKHCW-DO, 27 Nov 7944;
inforrnal talk, 27 Nov 1944;
EA58/2/2/1 NZHCL-PM, 6 Dec
MAF 83/1049
t944.
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the outlook was gloorny. From June 1940, with France no longer in the
Lrar, Britain had been accurnulating wool far in excess of her requirenents'
In 1944 it was expected that by 30 June 1945 British owned stocks would
stand at 3 550 million rUr.(115)
New Zealand, like the other Doninions, (116) was unaware of the
nagnitude of the probable surplus which Britain would face' Nonetheless'
the Government was concerned enough about the prospect of a depressed
InaTket to express interest in a long-terur contract which would parallel
those offered for food products - an interest which Britain did not
(1 17)
reclprocaEe. -
Britainrs existing obligations were onerous enough: cLearly she
had to take the initiative. one possibility was a price reduction -
perhaps back to the level obtaining before JuLy 1942- Certainly
wool control felt that the vast accunulation truly justified a downward
revision - but it was an undesirable approach, in view of the sensibili-
ties of the Dominions. the preferred strategy was to nake forthconing
and accumulated wool output a joint rather than a solely British
responsibility. Losses anticipated in disposing of the wool would be
shared equally between Britain and the Doninions, rather than incurred
solely by the forner. The problen of the post-war life of the contracts
would be resolved as the new systen would ovegide Britainrs obligation
r118)to purchase entire wool c1iPs. '
115. T161 545511/2 memo, I MaY 1944'
116. Britain had contracted to buy south African wool as well in 1940'LI7. BTIL/I737 ninute, 1 Apr 1944, also DPM-82 NZHCL-MEA, 5 Apr 1944'
118. T161/545511/2 nerno, 1 May 1944 & addendum, 3 May 1944'
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A paper prepared by l]\Jool control provided the basis for interdepart-
nental discussion in whitehall airned at forrmrlating a proposal to be
presented to the Doninions. The rnain point at issue was the allocation
of financial responsibility. Draft heads of discussion presented in
JuIy 1944 suggested that the Doninions would be entirely responsible
for purchasing unsold new wool. Britain would transfer its stocks to
the organisation and would be credited with a sum equal to their cost'
which would be liquidated as sales proceeded. In effect, once the
new organisation was under way, Britain would have no obligation to
purchase, but would "until such tiure as its capital connifinent has been
substantially reduced" receive all the proceeds fron sale'(119)
fireassurqltionunderlyingthisplanwasthattheDoninionshad
healthy sterling balances and that therefore they should be responsible
for the current financing. Britain, for its part, was anxious not to
increase its sterling tiabilities.(120) Clutterbuck of the Doninions
office was convinced though that the Doninions would not find such
,,onerous termsrt acceptable. Fforde, in Treasury, tried to convince
Cluttetrbuck that Britain could not play 'rlady BountifuL"(121) Waley
recognised that the negotiations wouLd be difficult because rrthe
Doninions al'e very good at asking and very bad at givingt', also because
itwasinportantforBritaintosticktoKeynes'pointthatshewas
no longer able to afford I'to make concessions which have no justification
on neritsil.(122)
119. fhi.d' draft heads of discussion' Jul 1944'
LzO. Ibid, 18 Jul L944, talks'Lzt. rbtd.
L22. T161 S4SSLL/Z, 3 Aug 1944'
-r77 -
Ttre schene presented to the Dorninions in october still envisaged
thern taking full responsibility for new wool, but it invited discussion'
The New Zealand Goverrunent responded favourably to Britainrs suggestion
for a conference, agreeing that rrsome plan of co-ordinated disposal
seemed inperativs".[123) An extension of the contract was not an option
- co-ordination provided more protection than free trading against
a price collapse. wool growers in New Zealand also welcorned the conference,
This was not surprising. The operations of B.A.W.R.A. after world war I
had benefitted producers and the stockpile of wool was now uuch greater
than at that tine. The only disagTeement was a brief one over the extent
of producer representation.|J24) Appropriately, given his status as
head of the Marketing Departnent, George Duncan led the delegation'
Other Marketing Department officials attended, as did a Treasury official '
Producers weTe represented by N.R. Jameson and w. Horrobin' They were
respectively chairrnan and deputy of the newly-constituted wool Board'
which provided for the industry an organisation parall'el to the Meat
producersr and Dairy Board. Representatives of wool buyers and scourers
completed the delegation. (125) The Conference was chaired, with the
agreement of all the delegations, by H.J. Hutchinson of the Ministry
ofSupply,atypicallyskilfulseniorl{hitehallnan.Heclaimedto
have prepared for the conference by reading Ngaio Marshrs trDied in the
Woolrr .026)
L23. Miller & Rowley, Histotg, pp 445-450'
I24. EA I04/6/3L/4, 'w t'S llov l-g+a; Dom'" t7-!9v L944'
l2S. Greensmith-,' NZiooL CormrrLes'Lon, p. b: NZPD voL. 267 passi-m.
LZ6. Greensnith', 
-N, 
Woot Co*ot"si,o", i. 16; E.L. Greensmith, interview'
11 Feb 1981.
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The del.egation left New Zealand for the start of the Conference in
April 1945, convinced that the plan for a Joint Organisation was the
best way of dealing with the problern. Nevertheless there was some
discussion of the alternative of allowing the existing contract to run
its course and then discussing joint plans. One leason for this was that
total profits on sales outside Britain, estinated at E7 000 000 at
30 June 1.945, could possibly be t8 500 000 two or three years later,
whilst stocks night not have increased significantly. However Britain
pointed out that if the contracts were continued she would wish to
liquidate her liability as quiekly as possibLe: the irnplication was that
profits might not increase. Moreover she refused to accept that the
Dorninions could withdraw existing profits on the grounds, firstly, that
they night still disappear, and secondly, that the Doninions had no
contractual right to the noney until the agreenents were ended, and
thirdly, that she would have to borrow to pay then out.(L27) Unsurprisingly
then, the Conference stuck with the plan to establish a partnership
before the contracts exPired.
In the early stages of the Conference, Britain had agreed to find
25 per cent of the cost of purchasing wool from current clips' But other
dinensions to the plan seemed to New Zealand to be unfair to the
Dominions.(128) Britain wanted 5 per cent interest to be paid on
capital invested in the organisation. As in the initial stages she was
providing most of the capital - in the form of the baLes of Doninion
wool she owned, (valued at t32 500 000 in New Zealandrs case) this
seemed unreasonable - an opinion the Doninions gave form to by contending
t27. EAL04/6/31/4 DMk-MMk , 24 vtay 1945, cable no' 1188'I28. EAr04/6/sL/4 s MaY 1945.
I2g. Ibi.d.' 24 MaY 1945, no. 1188'
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that such charges should be contingent on the final profit/loss outcome
of the Organisationts trading activities. Biitain also proposed that
although operating costs should be shared equally, three-quarters of the
levy inposed on sales to neet these costs should be met by New Zealand'
New Zealand contended that the effect of this arrangenent would be to
allocate money to Britain to which she was not entitled' because it was
provided by growers (New Zealand) not purchasers' Further, Britain
proposed that 60 pe1 cent of sales should be fron current clips in the
first yeaT, and 70 per cent thereafter. New Zealand argued that it
night be more econonic to sell more new woor' (130)
solving the question of the proportions in which old and new wool
should be sold indicated a route to a nore satisfactory overall agreenent'
Britain had been concerned about possible deterioration of ol'd wool - and
clearly it was important that a given anount of accumuLated stocks be
disposed of each year if she was not to be saddled with large stocks of
unsaleable wool. It having been established that no deterioration had
or would take place, it became impossible to naintain an unequal
division of financial responsibility between old and new wool, as it
would result in constant and unresolvable pressures fron both sides to
sel1 the stocks for which they were responsibr"' 
(131)
AccordinglyasystenofjointownershipwasploPosedandaccepted.
The new scherne neant that the Doninions would in effect buy back 50
per cent of the wool held by Britain, whereas Britain would take a 50
per cent share in new wool.|J32) This plan sidestepped the problens
associated with the draft scheme: the two sides wele no longer divided
over the issue of what proportions of old and new rvool were to be sold'
130.
151.
r32.
ftid., 24 May 1945, no. 1188.
8TII/2760 Habakkuk, 22 MaY 1945.
EALO4/6/21/4 DMk-MMk, 24 May 1945, no. 1188'
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The difficult question of interest on Btitish capital was avoided
because hal,f of the capital would be coning fron the Dominions ' Ttrus
there was no question in this respect of Britain being penal'ised'
With the plan for equal responsibility, al.location of revenue fron the
levy also fetl into place. operating costs were apportioned 50/50
between the industry and the Joint Organisation itself. Ttre levies
would pay the industryts share and the Joint Organisation would tax
before sale to raise its funds. t133)
Although final agreement was reached
of the details was withheld until the end
Britain tine to consult the United States
approval. There had been some anxiety -
- about how the Americans would react to
at the Conference, Publication
of August, in Part to give
and secure the latterrs
unncecessary as it transPired
a ,,producers! cartelrr. 
(r34)
The wool Board accepted the conclusions reached at the conference,
helped by the fact that its delegate could explain details to growers'(155)
The electorat college of the Board recorded its opposition to any setting
ofaguaranteedprice,aslong-teflngovernnentinterventioninthe
industry. (136) But this was not an issue. Quite apart fron the nenory
of the row in 1942, no one thought it very likely that prices would rise
in the near future: there was no point in trying to elaborate a
stabilisation scheme against producer opposition, to cover such a
contingency. Equally there was little incentive for the Government to
naintain wartime compulsory purchase when the market outlook was so
gloony.
153 .
r34.
135.
136.
lDLA.
T161 545511/4 nemo, 15 Mar
E. L. Greensmith, interview,
EAto4 / 6 / 3114 MEA-NZHCL, 10
1945; DO-NZG, 17 Aug 1945'
lL Feb 1981.
Sept 1-945.
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Fron I January 1946, the New Zealand Wool Disposals Comrissionr I
the New Zealand subsidiary of the Joint Organisation, comnenced 
I
operations with George Duncan as the chairnan but with producer represen-
tation. For the first six nonths of the year it adninistered wool
rnarketing as the successor to the Marketing Departnent, but fron I July 194(
the sale of wool by public auction resumed, thus ending the Governmentts
r+artime intervention in the trade. (137)
Negotiations over wool in 1945 possessed a different charactef from
the meat and dairy produce negotiations of the previous year' prirnarily
because of the different circr:mstances of the narket. Agreenent between
Britain and the Doninions was expressive of the wartine cooperative
spirit. But it also helped that by virtue of the stocks she had
accunulated, Britain vras a seller, as well as a buyer, and therefore
shared a perspective on the probleur with her allies. If Britain had
only had a buyerrs interest in the trade, hel' syupathies for Australia,
New Zealand and south Africa night have been less evident'
L37. MiLler Q Rowley, Histozg' pp 454-455'
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A HI.MOUROUS INTERLUDE
New Zealand was not slow to point out to Britain how the
Doninion was affected by rising costs, but the real bargaining
started at the end of 1943 and early in 1944 when it was obvious
that the Allies were winning the war.
New Zealand wanted sone lump sum paymentS for her meat, and
other foodstuffs to conpensate for the higher price of British
goods. lvfuch of the baigaining was done on New Zealand t s behalf
by Mr. (later Sir Bernard) Ashwin, secretary to the Treasury.
On one occasion when he was involved in a wrangle with British
officials as to how much New Zealand should be paid for neat, he
pointed out that steel fencing wire was essential on Nelr Zealand
it"*t, but this had to be bought on the open narket' and the wartime
cost had sky-rocketed.
Sir Bernard produced a New Zea|and newspaper describing how
a sheepfarrrer had been prosecuted for stealing wire fron a cemetery
fence. Sir Bernard quoted the neat producelrs defence - in which
he argued that the people in the cemetery would trstay Put'r ldithout
a fence but that his sheep would not!
This piece of rural philosophy rnay have had its effect on
British Governnent officials, and helped to win a higher payment.
On another occasion the sum to be paid to New Zealand farmers
was being finalised at the tiure the doodlebug bombs were making
life unpleasant for London. 0n one single day, while the
negotialions weTe going on, doodlebugs came over early in the
noining, before lunch, before dinner and again in the evening'
Each tirne a spotter on the roof of New Zealand House in the Strand,
where the talks were being held' reported a doodlebug getting close'
the staid sombre-suited Government officials dived under their
respective sides of the table.
As they went down for the third time in Less than half an hour,
Sir Bernard was saying that he would not accept the British offer
without another p"i."ttttge increase. A few moments later, the chief
British negotiat;r (a titled gentleman) popped his head above the
table, and with the two men siill on the floor, with only their heads
visible, declared rrDonelrf
It was these price discussions which led to a famous snooker
natch the story of which has been recounted at nany after-dinner
functions in both Ulhitehall and Wellington during the twenty-seven
years that have since Passed.
Britain had agreed to pay an increase based on a Percentage of
the original contrict. This was finally settled, after much hard
bargaining, just before negotiations broke up for dirmer.
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During the dinner break, Norman McClunpha, the Boardrs London
managef, siarted to work out the new prices for the whole range of
rneat conmodities. He discovered that the percentage arrangenent
resulted in unwieldly cunbersomefractions. The new price for beef,
for exanple went to more than four decimal points of a penny. This
would obviously nean much tedious calculation, and unnecessary work,
for those who had to work out the new prices and Payments.
The obvious solution was to adjust the fractions to the nearest
halfpenny. But the question was whether the adjustnent shoul'd be
up or down.
The New Zealanders argued that the adjustrnents should be up.
Naturally the British officials wanted it to be dovm. For a few
monents it looked as though negotiations would have to be resuned
all over again. Then Sir Bernard reninded his British hosts that
a snooker natch had been arranged after dinner. Why not let the
results of the match decide?
The British agreed with this sporting suggestion' and afteT
dinner the snooker natch was held at the fanous Carlton Club'
The game was even, with first Britain, and then New Zealand,
taking the lead. The result was in doubt right until the end when
only lhe black ball renained to be played._ It was Ashwinrs shot.
The black was sitting ri-ght on the edge of a pocket. The white ba1l,
with which he had to shoot was also sitting on the edge of a pocket
diagonally across the tab1e.
If he hit a straight ball he woul.d certainly sink the black'
but also equally certain the white ball' would follow it into the
pocket for a penaltY against him.
Ashwin decided his best hope was for a cushion shot. He aimed
the white ball against the side of the table intending it to
ricochet back, and send the black into the pocket with a glancing blow'
It missed. Britain had won. The fractions were adjusted downward'
The story of the snooker match went round Whitehall like wildfire'
New Zealand had pressed its case hard in these negotiatignsr-and had
becone a little unpoputar. This sporting gesture inmediately
restored its popularitY.
As a leading trade official said a few nonths later: rrlt was
good public relaiions. It did us a lot of good at very Little cost
as the difference in the fractions represented only a few thousand
pounds out of a paynent of several million'fr
Flayward, GoLden Jubilee, PP. 78-81
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1. Introduction
The pattern of wartine economic relations between Britain and
her Doninion allies such as New ZeaLand continued into the peace'
Indeed, Britaints political and econonic circumstances enhanced her
awareness of their value. With the end of the war it becane clear
that the United States did not expect the American alliance, which
had overshadoued the Corrunonwealth relationships from 1941-1945, to
continue. It was inportant for Britain, if she were to retain a
position of influence in international affairs, to naintain a close
liaison with the Commonwealth states. She had welconed the Canberra
Pact of January 1944 because it had spelt out the willingness of
Australia and New ZeaLand, to accept noTe resPonsibility for security
in the south Pacific. Moreover, it was seen as enhancing the
Conmonwealth - and therefore the British Position in the face of
overwhelming American strength. At the Prime Ministersr neetings
heLd in April and May 1946, British ninisters in the new Labour
Government sought a greater Australian and New Zealand corunitment to
defence spending, a commitrnent which would be discharged in a
Comrnonwealth context .
In Septernber 1945 the United States abruptly terminated lend-lease.
Britain now had to find the hard cugency to pay for goods and services
already ordered from the United States' and the likely very large orders
which woul.d continue to come forward. The shortage of hard currency
reinforced the significance of Comrnonwealth food supplies, including
those from New Zealand,. Coupled with the feconstruction needs of the
British econony it also made it important for Britain to seek Dominion
cooperation in limiting their claims on British resources, especially
- 
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of foreign exchange. Despite the end of the war, Britainrs
circumstances resenbled those she faced in 1939-41, rather than
the last years of peace.
New Zealandrs Labour Government, in office until 1949, resPonded
very positively to the continued calls for sacrifice and restraint,
for the Commonwealth was stitl its natural political hone. Fraser
and Nash wanted Britain to pl.ay an effective part in world affairs
because they believed that this benefitted the Connonwealth as a
whole. Furthermore they wanted Britain to continue to play an active
role in the Pacific. sentiment also pl.ayed a part - shared experiences
in l{orld War II and multitudinous ties of kinship ensured that at the
popular level there would be a wann and substantial resPonse to any
appeal to help Britain. Above all, it was believed that New Zealandrs
economic health would be threatened if Britain did not recover her
economic strength.
As had been the case throughout the war, New Zealandfs narrower
economic interests conformed to British needs. As long as Labour
remained the Government, Nashrs deternination to refrain from ovetseas
borrowing, to naintain a healthy level of reserves by controlling inports,
and to restrain inflation, remained cardinal principl-es of policy.
They dovetailed with Britainfs ovm priorities, ensuring that pressure
fron New Zealand to consume Britainr s own resources would be limited'
But in some respects the accordance was not complete. As had
become evident during the contract negotiations in 1944, the Governnentrs
reconstruction needs, and in particular its anbitious rehabilitation
progtfatnme entailed a najor capital dernand which could be net in part
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only by importing goods from overseas - housing naterials, fencing
wire, fertiliser, water piping and notor vehicles for instan.". (1)
Thus there was at tines Pressure frorn the New Zealand Goverrunent to
have access to nore British resources than Britain was pfePared to
countenance. New Zealandrs consurnption of its own food resources
was still occasionally a contentious issue too.
2. The Sterling Gift 1945-1947
The cessation of lend-lease did not nean the end of Anerican
assistance to Britain, but it placed it in a different context - that
of a loan. Through the latter part of 1945 British and American
officials engaged in difficult negotiations airned at settling on the
tems under which the loan would be extended to Britain. The latter
sought American assistance in the reconstruction of her economic Life
even though this might involve for a time policies discrininatory to
American conmerce. The United States on its side was prepared to be
generous to Britain, but took exception to the large reserves of
sterling accurnulated through a doubLe process - payment by Britain to
the countries concerned for goods and services including many required
for war purposes, and the direction of the British econony towards the
war effort which meant that the reseTves were not expended on current
consumption. With the war ove1, it could not be expected that sterling
holders would wish to naintain such restraints. But the collective
extent of the clains which they represented on the British eeonony was
Rehabilitation Board.,
New Zealandtt, passim.
1. "lTai History of RehabilitatidriL in
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far out of keeping with the resources of that economy. If Britain
was to recoveT it needed to be able to draw on the resources of others
and there would be no point in doing that if the resultant production
was to be dissipated in satisfaction of the clains of sterling holders
rather than in making plovision for the reconstruction of the econony
and for earning, through sales to hard curlency countTies, the wherewithal
to repay tf,er. (2) This at least was the view of the United States
and accordingly it wished to see sterling balances either cancelled or
severely written down. However much the British authorities rnight
have welcomed such a decisive action they could not practically
contemplate it. The post World War I experience nade soxne cautious -
another postwar slump would nean that the purchasing power represented
by the sterling balances would be very welcone. But of greater current
significance was the effect that such a move would have on Britainrs role
as the political and financial centre of the Connonwealth associatior,. 
(3)
Britain would in effect be defaulting which would put an end to her role
as a banker. Trading patterns, and political alliances night also
shift to her disadvantage.
The British bargained hard in their financial negotiations with
the United States. The United States wlote off wartime lendlease aid
to Britain and funded through its loan the flow of certain goods to the
united Kingdom since the end of the war. Article 10 of the Loan
Agreenent [Cmnd 6708 FinarrciaL Agreenent betUesn the united Kingdom an'd
the (Jnited. States, December 19a5] set out the basis of settlement that
2. Judd Polk, sterli,ng. Its Meaning i.n world Fittartce, p. s7: Polk
points out that th! funericans did not concern thenselves with the
direction of donestic consunption and investnent pattern I'no doubt
due to the traditional diplomatic convention under which no country
would be rude enough to suggest changes in the ways in which friendly
neighbours ran their households."
Ibi-d., p. 67; susan strange, sterli,ng and. tuLti,sh PoLi.cy, PP. 60-61.3.
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Britain would seek to reach with sterling holders'
be divided into three categories:
Balances would
(a) to be released immediately and made convertible
into any currency for current transactions
(b) to be similarly released by instalnents over a
period of Years beginning 1951
(c) to be written off.
Despite their concern about the political and financial consequences
of too rapid an attack on sterling balances, the British could see that
they had a case in equity - not just to receive noney from the United
States and Canada but also to linit clains by others. (4)
For a hundred good reasons we have had to
accept during the war a postwar burden entirely
disproportionate to what is fair " " we did itin the interests of getting on with the war " "
As a tesult, we, and we only, end up owing vast
sums, not to neutrals and bystanders, but to our
own Allies, Dominions and Associates who ought
to figure in the eyes of history as our
mercenaries, unless ttre balance is redressed' (5)
In his 1946 budget statenent Nash pointed out that as New Zeal'and
relied on the United Kingdom for dollar funds, the loan would be of
benefit to New Zealand, sd mol'e generally, would enable a quicker
restoration of international trade. But over the more specific
question of adjustments to sterling reserves a note of caution crept in'
4.
5.
J.M. Keynes, Colleeted Wri,tings, vol . 24,
Sayers , Fi.rnneial PoLiey, p. 484, quoting
Wt662/3/28 draft, 26 Jun f946-
p.491.
Keynes. See also DO55
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Throughout the war period, Nash explained, the prices New Zealand
received for its exports were governed by bulk contracts and there
was therefore no question of profiteering at Britainrs expense.
Under such circumstances it did not seem fair that New Zealandfs
reserves, which had accumulated to a healthy level particularly
since the 1944 settlenent, should have to falI again. Not only were
there the denands of rehabilitation and reconstruction and the
still-present fear of a postwar slump; Nash was also determined to pay
off overseas debts, a reflection of his experiences in 1939. In
early 1946 three large debt repayments totalling tI41 nillion sterling
were rnade. One was the t18 million outstanding under the Memorandum
of Security: the other two debts were noflnal pubtic issues to the
London rrrk"t. (6) This had the effect of making capital available for
other purposes in Great Britain, and nay have seerned to Nash to have
been a sufficient contribution. In discussions with Britain on the
application of ArticLe 10, New Zealand concentrated principally on the
need to nurture reserves in the event of unfavourable novements in
export plices and the demand for irnported goodS for reconstruction
purposes. In a reversal of 1944 New Zealand used the sane argunents
but to protect the sterling she had, rather than to secure more.
The first talk took place in February 1946 between Fraser and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer. The fate of a total sum of t42 nilLion
was at issue. (This excluded the t18 nill.ion under the Menorandun of
Security which Fraser thought had been written off and was in fact
shortly to be paid back). It was proposed by the chancellor that the
6. T series 23 25, 21 Dec f949.
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t42 nillion would be dealt with in general conformity with the
Washington Agreement, that is, half would be liquidated and half
would be made available in agreed instalnents. Current earnings
from a set date, e.g. I March 1946 would be freely available for
current transactions world*ia". (7)
Fraserts reaction was very cautious. Although he said that
'fhis Goverrunent would want to co-operate even to the point of
sacrifice", he was veTy doubtful whether New Zealand could get through
on only half its present balances, particularly, as, being a
predoninantly agricultural country, het economy lacked the elasticity
of the United fingdo*. (8) There the natter was left until Nash went
to England in May. Fraserts conments suggested that sone hard
negotiations lay ahead, a supPosition that was stlengthened when he
wrote to Dalton - again in an echo of 1944 - that he felt that what
was suggested by Britain would not be possible "without striking a
severe, if not nearly fatal, blow at the economy of this country.rr(9)
The British High Connission in New ZeaLand reported back to London in
sinilar vein - it thought that although New Zealand had expected sone
approach the very drastic nature of the Treasury proposals would cone
as a gleat shock. The inplications the proposaLs rnight have on
conrnercial relations between the two countries was pointed out'
New Zealandts determination to retain her current inPorting policy
would be increased, as a way of protecting her remaining reserves'
And she night be tempted to seek major price increases for her exported
connodities for the same reason even although this would go against the
Doss wT662/3/28,
J-D1d..
0035 I't't662/3/28,
19 Feb 1946.
PMNZ-CE, 20 Mar 1946.
'7
8.
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grain of her stabilisation policy. (10)
In a detailed British Treasury nenorandun on New Zealandfs
external finances, A.T.K. Grant nonetheless concluded that New Zealand
frcould well afford to pay something,rf He outlined a situation already
faniliar to the latterts authorities. At the end of 1945 New Zealandrs
reserves stood at [75 nillion. Since then she had paid back large
anounts of debt but her balance of payments remained strongly positive,
and it looked as if reserves night reach [80 rnillion by the end of
1946. This healthy situation derived straightforwardly fron the
buoyant demand for New Zealandrs major exPolts, a demand that Grant
thought would continue at least until 1948. If New ZeaLand was going
to be pressed to nake a contribution, it should not extend beyond that
rlr)date. - -
Grant was ignoring the extent to which New Zealandrs healthy
balance of payments reflected under-importing, which New Zealand did not
want to continue. In talking to Nash in May 1946, British officials
did not dwe1l too overtly on these figures: they did however stress
the significance of New Zealand - a country rfclose to the United
Kingdon" as it was put - setting a precedent. With both major sterling
holders, Egypt and India, there were major political difficulties: if
principles could be worked out for Australia and New TeaLand it would
be easier to negotiate with najor holders.(J2)
Nash did not respond to this softening-up, but tal.ked instead
about New Zealandfs own situation, Without saying so directly, he
bid., uKFlcw-Do, 16 Apr 1946.fuid., 17 Apr 1946.Ibid., 7 May 1946.
10.
11.
12.
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conveyed the impression that New zeaLand had done quite a lot for
Britain already. He pointed out that the E18 nillion had been repaid,
although I'he had been urged very strongly not tor" and interest had
been added, although New zealand was not strictly liable for it' New
ZeaLand was endeavouring to direct its inport needs towards Britain'
whilst on the export side it had kept prices down despite the fact
that this had led to a deterioration in the terms of trade. The
settlenent in 1944 had not fully met this disparity. The inference
which could be drawn from these observations was that New Zealand would
be much tougher in its conrnercial dealings with the united Kingdom if
it was expected to nake financial sacrifices' (13)
Although in a purely Anglo-New Zealand context this sort of
reaction rnight not have carried too nuch weight, the inportance of
getting something out of New Zealand in terns of negotiations with
other sterling holders rnade the Treasury responsive' The idea was
nooted of rnaking all sterling that was not written off available at
once, if New zealand would agree to write sonething off. New Zealandrs
subsequent manoeuvres lessened Treasuryts intelrest in extending
favourable treatment to her. At one meeting, Ashwin produced estinates
of New Zealandrs balance of payments to 1950, designed as one British
official put it:
to prove that she will becone destitute without
any'writing down of balances. In fact he has
seriously overshot the nark .... he assunes a
rate of inport into New ZeaLand vastly in exc-ess
of what thl United Kingdon wilL be able to afford'
even after running into debt to the Arnericans
and Canadians. (I4)
13.
L4.
Ibi'd., also DO-UKHCW, 29 ltlay 1946'
Ibid., minute 28 Jun 1946.
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Treasury regarded these estinates as rrso preposterous" that they
wished to apply Article 10 to New Zealand in its full rigour. In
a draft memorandun, it was nooted that those balances which were
released would only be nade available subject to an agreed linitation
on the rate at which they were expended. (15) The Doninions Office leas
able to ensure that this proposal did not preclude Britain fron reverting
to the May proposal if Nash proved cooperative. At the subsequent
talks, just before Nash left for New Zealand, he would not conunit
hirnself. However, he agreed to take a brief to discuss with his
colleagues. (f6) The British Treasury at this stage was holding out
on dairy prices but it did not naintain this position. New Zealandfs
attitude was still ostensibly open. Indeed, the Treasury deened it
unwise to jeopardise a satisfactory solution by refusing to pay out
to cover costs. Nor did New ZeaLand seek to link the two issues for
bargaining purposes: there was still room for nanoeuvre. (17)
Nonetheless, New Zealanders were not too pleased at the relatively
favourable terns Argentina extracted fron Britain over its sterling
balances, in connection with the conclusion of a neat contract' (fS)
In New Zealand it was reported that London correspondents saw
litt1e prospect of Australia and New Zealand acquiescing in the scaling
down of sterling balances. Qfficial opinion had always recognised
that because their balances had arisen from conmercial transactions
rather than from nilitary expenditure as in the cases of Egypt and
India, the two countries would not be pressed so hard. Also the
15. Ibid., draft memo, 26 Jun f946.
16. MAF 83/f668, D0-UKHCW, 15 Jul 1946.
L7. Ibid., 16 Apr 1946, 28 Jun 1946,4 Jul 1946'
18. Ibid., UKHCW-DO, 20 SeP 1946.
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absolute sums were not so large. But politically sone contribution
would be welcone. (19) With an election inminent in New Zealand the
issue languished.
one course of action canvassed in whitehall was to folLow up
New Zealandrs expression of preparedness to contribute nore to the
Comnonweatth defen"u. (20) Nash alluded to this in his 1946 budget and
a British interdepartnental conmittee decided to take it further'
on the other hand, with political difficulties in India increasingly
the forefront of British thinking, the need to negotiate with New
Zealand lost some of its urgency.
Early in 1947 New Zealand fairly abruptly made a 'tgift" of t10 million
sterling. The Anerican loan was being expended more rapidly than
expected. On the New Zealand side it would seen that Ashwin convinced
Nash that it was better to give sonething voluntarily if a contribution
would have to be made at some tite' (21) rn naking the announcement of
the gift, Fraser said that it was
in recognition of the magnificent and
r.rrrpt.."I"nted effort of the United Kingdont
and her people in naintaining freedom and
naking possible its expansion in years to
cone.* It recognises the enornous burden
that the United Kingdon has carried and is
bearing during the post-war period' (22)
The gift was warnly applauded in financial and other circles in
llellington.
19. EA58/2/2/I, EP, 8 Aug 1946.
20. D035 WT662/3/28' 4 Jul 1946'
21. Comment bY GarY Hawke'
22, NZH, 6 Mar 1947 '
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3. Supply Problerns and the Dollar Shortage 1945-1949
The expectation of victory in Europe 1ed British industry to
start thinking about production for non-nilitary use whilst
New Zealanders were happy enough to have the opportunity of resuming
traditional contacts.
At the end of 1944, Dan Sullivan visited Britain on a supply
nission. However, G.W. C|inkard, the London rePresentative of the
Ministry of supply inforrned wellington in April that there was a
continuing conflict between the desire to ease up and develop export
business, and the necessity to continue the war effort at the necessary
( )7\high rhytlxo. 1", Similarly, in February, the New Zealand High
Cornnissioner in London had informed Wellington that the textile and
in particular the cotton position was likely to be very difficult -
nainly as a result of very large dernands from Southeast Asia which
for political reasons Britain had to do its best to neet' Jordan
told his superiors that theY
should neglect no opportunity of securing
any textiles available ... and " ' should
not lightly part ... with any textiles
particularly cotton which nay be 
-availableind which cbuld be held against future use .... (24)
On the other hand, Jordan instanced some kinds of seni-manufactures,
raw materials, many consumer goods and engineering products, for which
the Board of Trade reckoned the supply position would improve fairly
(2s)
rapldly. - '
IC series 32 53, Clinkard-Marshall, 6 Apr 1945'
EL58/2/2/1, NZHCL-MEA, 10 Feb 1945.
EL58/2/2/1, EP, 3 Feb 1945.
23.
24.
25.
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In the middle of 1945 clinkard returned to New Zealand on a
visit and used the occasion to enphasise the cooperation displayed
by nanufacturers and officials in Britain in dealing with New Zealandrs
requests. He reckoned that the principal problem Britain faced was
not so much machine capacity or even raw naterials but labour power -
both in numbers and quality. clinkard spent six weeks in New zeaLand
having discussions with Ministry of Supply officials and the
industrial and conmercial comnunity in New Zealand about the prospects
for obtaining goods in the United Kingdon, and the necessary procedures
to be fottow"d. (26)
At this tine though there was no expectation that the war in
Japan would end so quickly, nol. that the return to peace would be
acconpanied by the ending of lend-lease. That sudden terrnination -
effective from 2 Septenber 1945, the date of the Japanese surrender -
placed Britain and other sterling area countries back in the situation
they had known up until Lg42 - confronting a scarcity of goods which
was partly a scalcity of dollars. Britainrs need to reconstruct her
economy and earn foreign exchange through exports, as in 1939-1941'
neant that New Zealand's supply needs slipped even further down the
list.
In March 1946 Frank Picot, the connissioner of supply' went to
Britain on a supply nission, looking especially for tinplate for packing
foodstuffs and for transport needs. These were items which a yeaT
before New Zealand night have expected to obtain fron the United States'
Whereas before the war Britain produced around I 000 000 tons of tinplate
26. Ibid., EP, 16 Jun 1945.
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annually, by 1945/46 it was only producing half of that anount - an
extreme expression of the situation in the steel industry as a
whole. Although production was increasing, the backlog of denand
frorn both donestic and overseas users was so great that centralised
allocation had to continu".(27)
In Decenber 1946, Fraser himsetf took the trouble to connunicate
with the British authorities about the steel shortage. He pointed
out that despite the fact that Nash had rnade replesentations to the
President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps' some nonths
before, there was still no sign of increased supplies. How could
New Zealand be expected to increase food exports if it could not
secure goods essential to production? cripps was not encouraging:
We are ful1y alive to imPortance of doing
anything we czrn to maintain supplies of steel
to New Tealand fron this country especially
as these supplies are essential to naintenance
of food production. Unfortunately we have
ourselvel suffered a serious short fall of our
imported supplies of semi-nanufactured steel and
we have been unable to supplement our own
production sufficiently to enable us to use to
the full our finishing capacity. (28)
cripps pronised nonetheless that he and the Board of Trade would
do their best especially where a specific order would help naintain food
production. And it was true that, generally speaking, New Zealand did
over the next rnonths receive sone priority in the supply of irnputs for
prinary production. But for itens for civilian use, for exanple cotton
goods, she was obliged to take her place in a long queue 'Qg)
EA58/2/2/1, Southern Cross, 16 Mar 1946.
Ibi.d.., NZHaL-MEA, 7 Jan Lg47 , enclosing text of PBT-NZHCL.fbid., Domin'Lon, 11 APr 1947.
27.
28.
29.
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On his visit to London in March and April 1947, supply questions
wer.e at times uppernost in Nashrs rnind. He and Cripps met with their
officials and Nash presented his "enormous dossier" of aLl New Zealandrs
overseas suppry requirenents which he went through iten by it"t. (50)
He stressed itens which were essential to agricultural production -
neat wraps, dairy cloths, alkalis (for exanple, caustic soda and
soda ash) and jute wrappers for wool bales. He hoped that a smaLl
supply of textiles could be found for the New Zealand Girl Guides - a
supply had been provided in 1946 following representations fron Fraser.
Other clothing and textile items, for exanple, worsted and wooll-ens,
yarns and knitting nachinery - featured on Nashrs lists. On the natter
of jute wrappers, Nash pointed out that unless Britain could assist,
New Zealand would have to divert 10 000 tons of butter to India.
Nash was not above pressuring the British, but in this case Cripps
suggested that the best thing would be to recycle o1d jute wraPPers. (31)
The Board of Trade could not always be very helpful in respect of
New Zealand needs, particularly as it was trying to disengage itself
fron direct conttol of exports. It tried to adhere to the policy of
liniting dollar irnports, and this neant helping New Zealand if by so
doing dollar expenditure could be lirnited. At the sane time the
Board suggested to New Zealand that sone of its requirenents were
non-essential and could be dispensea witt. (52) Progress was nade on
some products though. By August 1947 what was exPected to be sufficient
quantities of cotton goods for New Zealandrs imnediate needs had been
found, whilst the outlook for jute was also pronising- But netal goods -
particularly wire - remained a difficult area. (55)
50. BT11/371 1,
31. WrL/ 37L6,
32. WrL/3717,
s3. wLL/37L6,
31 Mar L947.
passim.
menos t9 May, 10 MaY L947.
2 Aug 1947.
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Although supply problems were partly a reflection of war-created
sholtages, they were mostly connected to balance of payments problems.
With dollars in short supply, all sterling area countries wele
encouraged to miniurise dollar expenditure.
At the beginning of 1947, the New Zealand Governnent had learnt
frorn the Dominions Secretary of the "disquieting weakness of the
United Kingdon dollar positionrt and the need to take steps to adjust
the balance or face a restriction in the I'United Kingdomrs means of
payment in the Western henisphere" - with a consequent curtailment of
Britainrsrrliability to furnish dollars as required by the rest of the
sterling arearr. New Tealand, like other sterling area countries, was
asked to try and conserve dollar resources I'without weakening your
econonic efficientyrf, but, "at the exPense of a tenporary postponement
on relaxation in consunption", if possible. (34)
part of the price of the United States loan agreed to in Decenber
1945 was that within twelve months of the agreenent coning into force
(15 July 1946) the United Kingdon would allow a large measure of
convertibility of sterling into other currencies - a move which
accorded with Amerieats reluctance to let inpediments to trade and
payments to persist any longer than necessary.
With the rapid deterioration of the payments situation after the
introduction of convertibility in July, Attlee sought New Zealandrs
cooperation in more substantial measures to restrain the use of dollars
and of British resources generally. (35) In New Zealand the Governnent
EASS/2/2/I, SSD-PMNZ, 3 Feb L947.
futd., PMUK-PMNZ, 12 Aug 1947.
34.
35.
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convened an I'Aid to Britainrr Conference at Parlianent to discuss
ways and means by which New Zealand could help the United Kingdom, in
line with Attleets suggestions and following this, an Aid for Britain
Council was established. In London a Sterling Area Conference took
place between Britain and other sterling area countries on future I
plans and expectations for dollar expenditure and income. At a
neeting on 23 Septenber, New Zealand officials, led by Leicester Webb
of the Economic Stabilisation Corrunission, met British Treasury and 
l
Bank of England officials to discuss the formerrs estinates of
New Zealandrs balance of payments situation and her import tTade with
the United States. New Tea]and's speedy reaction was not entirely I
altruistic: the prornptness with which New Zealand had responded to
the request for dollar economies and the detail in the estinates
impressed the British offici.rr. (36)
In the first instance Britain was interested in the nine months
from October 1947 through to June 1948. Over this time it was agreed
that New Zealandrs net dernand should be no more than 25 million
United States dollars and 18 rnillion Canadian dollars. It was hoped
that these figures would be regarded as an absolute maximrn:
anything further that could be done to
reduce dollar requirements would be a
very real construction towards relieving
the burden on the reserves of the sterling
area during a very glrave period. (37)
The New Zealand High Cornmissioner accepted this target but emphasised
that the figures supplied were
36. Ic106/1, Webb-Nash, 24 Sep L947.
37. ICL06/L/L, NZHCL-MEA, 13 Oct L947.
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tentative estinates and might be upset
by such factors as substantial price changes
or a failure to secure essential requirenents
on order fron sterling sources- (38)
In pursuit of the objectives discussed in London, New Zealand froze
the unspent portion of current licences to inport goods fron the
dollar aTea, and reviewed then on the grounds of essentiality.
The strictest economy was to be exercised over other renittances to
the dollar alea as well as payments. It was planned to cut United
States dollar licences in 1948 to around one third of their 1947
Ievel. Early in 1948 petTol rationing was introduced again - after
having first been proposed by Britain in August. (39) Wheat production
was promoted in par't to conserve dollars spent on shipping wheat to
New Zealand.
The crisis in the sterling arears reserves did not only affect
conmerce with the dollar area. Britain had rnade arrangenents with
certain European countries which meant that accumulations of sterling
above certain levels would oblige the United Kingdom to settle the
balance in gold or dollars. New Zealand was therefore expected to
keep imports frorn sone such countries to a ninimum, depending on which
ones were accumulating too nuch sterling - Sweden, Switzerland and
Belgiurn atl had to be watched at this time. In all three it seened
likely that settlenent would have to be in gofa. (40) Moreovet,
New Zealand was also asked to cut back on imports from Britain, so
that they could be directed to dollar narkets. Britain wanted New
Zealand to keep imPorts
lb'?d..
ICf06/1, MEA-SECRO, 27 Jan 1948.
ICL06/\/L, NZHCL-MEA, 15 Oct 1947;
58.
39.
40. T6L/\/L, 31 Oct L947.
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at least within the linits of current
income. During the imnediately critical
situation it is inportant for us that you
should avoid any necessity for draining
down your sterling balances and we should
hope that you would be prepared to hold
further sterling if there should be any
possibility of building up your assets' (41)
In response the New Zealand Goverrunent recalled import licences for
1948 and re-issued them on the basis that inports for that year would
not exceed exported current income. This action created some
problens as importelrs were quick to invoke Board of Trade staternents
suggesting that the United Kingdom did not wish New Zealand to linit
sterling irnports. (42)
It was clear that the Governmentts readiness to accept Attleers
request reflected its own predisposition and concern about the balance
of payments, At the neeting of the newly established interdepartnental
balance of payments conmittee on 51 October 1947 Ashwin argued that
directives from the united Kingdom to rlive within our inconer would
be helpful
since in any case we would have to put
restrictions on at this end sufficient to
keep our payments in balance. It was a
fallacy to suppose that our London funds were
plentiful. (43)
Despite the restrictive policies, New Tealand did not feel precluded
frorn doing what it could to secure essential supplies. The Board of
Trade was approached in Septenber L947, and New Zealand managed to
secure her requirements of steel and tinplate for some months' But
to set against this, the Board of Tradets role was more linited than it
had been in wartine. It was no longer directly controlling exports'
New Zealand needed to be able to approach manufacturers as welL'
41. EA58/2/2/1, PMUK-PMNZ,
42. BTlf/3758 , Pass'Lm, see4s. 16r/Llr.
12 Aue L947.
below-P. 224-226.
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The Board was not always able to give any clear idea of what goods
could be supplied fron gritain. (44)
Moreover, New Zealand discovered that as well as goods being
diverted to North Ameriea, they were being nade avaiLable to
particular countries which would not accept sterling as Payment and
would not provide Britain with essential items unless they received
necessities in exchange. When Fraser learnt of this constlaint he
inrnediately informed the Comrnonwealth Secretary, Lord Addison (at
that tirne in New Zealand) of his dissatisfaction.
it appears to me unsound that a country
such as Argentine [sic] should have anypriority since the supply to New ZeaLand of
these items, which we must obtain frorn any
source' will not onl.y save dollars on our
part but will enable us to supply to the
United Kingdorn essential foodstuffs which
can otherwise only be acquired fron dollar
sources. (45)
British officials did their best to explain to Fraser, that while
Britain was obliged to make arrangements with cormtries like Argentina,
there was no intention of interfering with supplies to New Zealand. (46)
But New Zealand was anxious.
Clinkard, now the Secretary of the Departnent of Industries and
Corunerce, drew up a report on the procurement of essential supplies
and listed classes of goods on which some action was necessary:
If we do not Press for United Kingdom supply
and secure official goodwill and backing and
at the sane time arrange hereafter to continue
to press our authenticated claims both in the
44. T6L/L/L,31 Oct L947; T6L/I, NZHCL-MEA, 24 Sep L947.
45. 8T11/3758, 50 SeP L947.
46. Ibnd., Oct L947, Passim.
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official and conmercial fields in the
United Kingdon we shall find ourselves
ineffectivefy in cornpetition with nany other
suppliantt *ito, like ourselves, are short of
hard currency but who, at the moment' nay not
be as weLl oiganised as we are to prove their
needs. (47)
0nthebasisofthereportCabinetapprovedthedespatchofa
supply mission to Britain. It would approach the Board of Trade'
individual manufacturers and also the Export Groups into which the
exporters were organised. Although the Board of Trade did not have
conplete information, private sources weTe not always reliable either'
Dunlop had recently stated that there were no truck trres available
fron Britain but this had proven not to be the 
".ru. 
(48)
The Mission visited Britain in February and March 1948' clinkard
reckoned that as a result of the efforts and subsequent representations'
the flow of more important comrnodities had inproved considerably' at
least to the point where vital needs could be met. There were two
inportant exceptions however - heavy chenicals, and steel., in almost
all its forms. clinkard nade these judgnents in June 1948' At that
tirne he expected there to be some nore progress on chemicals but steel
looked very difficult. (49)
Did this mean New Zealand had been hurt by Britainrs bilateral
deals? clinkard reported in June that officials in the united Kingdon
had given a definite denial to the supply Missiont s suggestion that
47.
48.
49.
T6L/L/L, t0 Nov 1947 (RePort on
IC106/f, 10 Nov 1947; T6L/IlI, 6
ICL06/LlL SIC-MIC, 9 Jun 1948'
T6I/L, 7 Nov 1947).
reb ig+a; rclo6/1 , EP n.d., Jan 1948'
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New Zealandrs steel allocation had suffered because of the deals'
But inportant steel groups, for example the sheet nakers and wire
drawers stated that New Zealandts share of the export quota was being
curtailed because of directions fron the Board of Trade to supply
definite tonnages to other countries. Clinkard thought the situation
was not representative of cornmodities other than steel, but that was
not much consolatiorr. (50)
At the balance of paynents conmittee neeting in February 1948,
Ashwin had expressed the view that if New Zealandts difficulties in
obtaining essential supplies became acute, New Zealand might
eventually have to attach conditions to the export of its produce to
gritairr. (51) In June, the President of Federated Farrners nade the
saure point publicly,(52) In London for the contract negotiations'
Ashwintookup-'|rathervigorously''asoneBoardofTradeofficialput
it - the shortage of fencing wire. Given its link to food output, it
was recognised that the 5000 tons New Zealand had asked for
are essential if the New Zealand farners
are to increase their food production and
their food suPPlies (53)
But there were real problems in finding such a volune, quite apart fron
the 20 000 tons New Zealand sought for 1949. Unsatisfied hone denand
had priority: Britaints current plan allocated 5000 tons overall to
rc4)
New Zealand in 1948 of which only 1000 tons was fencing wire''"
To get nore either Britain or New ZeaLand would have to spend hard
currency - the problen was partly that of "getting a quart out of a pint
r('(\
Potrr. \""'/
50. rcL06/L/L, 9 Jun 1948.
51. T6L/I/L' 6 Feb 1948-
52. EA58|2/2/I, EP, 3 Jun 1948.
53. BTff/4082, W.G. 0nslow, minute 1 Jul 1948'
54. Ibi.d., Passim, Jul-SeP 1948'
55. Ibid., S.L. Hohnes, 5 Jul 1948.
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would Ashwin put his strategy into practice? The Ministry of
Food hoped not.
We have so far avoided any bil'ateral deal
with New ZeaLand such as those we have had
to adopt with other countries, whereby
supptils of food for this country are offset
agiinst manufactured goods needed by
sippliers. I hope we should not be driven
to such-an expedilnt in the case of New Zealand
and I think il we could give reasonable
assurances about the supply of nanufactured
conrnodities which we need, such a situation
need not arise. (56)
Ironically, while the British were worried about New Zealandls
determination and what it rnight cost, there was dissension in the
NewZealandcanp.BackinWellington,F'P'Walsh'anenberofthe
Dairy Products Marketing comnission, wondered whether Ashwin and
Marshall had rnade full provision for safeguarding the supply of
essential goods before concluding the contract. 
(57) But before his
cable arrived, Marshall had inforned wellington that while every
possible effort had been made, the conrnission could not negotiate a
bilateral agreement and the contract had been settled without one'
walsh vented his anger by cabling an adnonitory message. He found it
rrnost difficult to understand" Marshallts action in
closing deal without authority of colleagues
on ID.P.M.C.l. While adrnitting you are not
empowered to negotiate bilateral agreenents
your action in -tosing deal has ?- [sic] the
bargaining power in securing supplies of
essential"c-omnodities for firners and country. (58)
Marshall and Ashwin were also strong-ninded and Ashwin was quick to
reply pointing out that
matters were nuch more likely to be hindered
tfran frefped if Dairy Products Marketing Conmission
comproniies its position by going beyond statutory
scope. (59)
56. WLL/4082,1''lnF-PBT, 24 Mar 1948'
57. DPM MP, 12 Jun f948.
58. Ibi'd., 3 Jul 1948.
59. DPM MP, 14 Jul 1948.
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In fact the final text of this contract did include reference to
the provision of supplies in connection with Britainrs wish that
New Zealand increase production. And the Ministry of Food thought
the New Zealanders had nade their pointrrwith the utmost insistengs"'(60)
At the end of July New zealand was seeking from the Board of Trade
sone assurance of progress on the fencing wire issue. By september'
the Board had managed to find an extra 1500 tons of which 500 tons
was suitable for f"r,.irrg(61) - not to be conpared with what New Zealand
wanted, but better than nothing. In 1949 Britain was able to meet
all of New Zealandrs current needs, but not nake up wartine arrears' 
(62)
all rehabilitation orders were satisfied'
FiguresfordollarinportsalsobespokethefactthatNew
zealatdrs stance renained cooperative. Fron t23 million in 1947'
inports fron the united states feLl to 814 nillion in 1943' And
inports from canada fell frorn t12 million tn L947 to f7 nillion in
re48. (63)
Throughtg4Sthebalanceofpayrnentsofthesterlingareahad
improved and this was also reflected in sone easing of supply
difficulties. But by the niddle of 1949 another crisis was in full
swing. In JuIy the connonwealth Finance Ministers net in simil"ar
circunstances to those in which the sterling Area conference of
septenber 1947 was held. Britain proposed that all' sterling area
countries cut their dollar irnports to 75 per cent Of their 1948 figure'
For New Zealand, Nash pointed out that irnports fron the dollar area had
60. BTIL/4082, 22 Jvl 1948'
61. 8T11/4082, 22 Sep 1948.
62. T6L/3/5, 21 Jul 1949'
63. F.W. Holn"r,-iilluut'- zeaLand in the world Econorny 1958-56r" p. 11.
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totalled$1l7millionin1947butjustunder$75milLionin1948'
and this had neant a reduction to bare essentials'
... while New Zealand had every wish to
cooperate fully in the general problen it
"ould be difficult to cut inports by 25%withoui-g""uu disruption to lhe econornies [sic].
A furthei difficulty arose fron the fact that
commitnent had been made under licences issued
covering the full Year 1949' (64)
Nash suggested that New Zealand could concentrate on increasing dollar
earnings but cripps said that the seriousness of the situation neant
that cuts were also necessary - in fact if they were not nade it
might not be possible to naintain the sterling al.ea - by which Cripps
presunably meant that Britain would no longer feel able to nake dollars
available fron its reserves to other sterling area countries. Even
if there were increases in dollar earnings it would be preferable if
they were not imnediately expended on imports as it was necessary to
restore 
""r""ruur- 
(65)
As in 1947 there was sone diScussion on prospects of increasing
sterling area dollar earnings, but more of the discussion concentrated
on cutting back and re-directing imports. Britain assured New zealand
that it could expect incteased supplies of steel in 1950 despite the
fact that output was being directed towards C"rrtd.' 
(66) Ashwin said
New Zealand stil.l needed to get certain kinds of tractors fron the
united states and also hay baler nachines. In both these cases the
British authorities pronised supplies from the united Kingdorn in the
near future, Despite these assurances New zealand was not above
keeping an exit route: there could be difficulties in reducing inports
64. T6I/3/5, MnF-MEA, 14 Ju1 l'949.
65. Ibn'd., meeting fi luf 1949; neeting 16 Jul 1949'
66. T6L/3/5, 21 Jul 1949'
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particularly as licenses had already been
issued and conmitments probably nade for
the first half of the Period, we had
therefore reserved the right to nake our
contribution by a reduction of the deficit
by other neans such as increased receipts
fron exPorts. (67)
In fact in 1949 New Zealand managed to reduce its inports from the
dollar zone to s16.5 million, compared with t21 rnillion in 1948, and
in 1950, despite the caveat quoted above a further reduction was
achieved which exceeded the 75 per cent target' (68)
New Zealand and the Postwar Food Shorta
Through 1945 and in the early nonths of 1946 it was very apparent
that Britain's need for New Zealand food would continue unabated for
sone time. Early in 1945 New Zealand learnt frorn Britain that the
neat position in particul.ar for the coning year uras exPected to be
very difficult, and New Zealand was asked to make a 10 per cent cut
in cugent consumption, not so much because it would nake a very large
contribution to reducing the deficit, but because it would nake a good
inpression on the Anericans who were increasingly feeling that other
countries were not pulling their weight. (69) Further requests
followed later on in the year. At the end of May New Zealand did cut
the neat ration from ls. 9d. per capita to ls. 6d. The butter ration
was also cut frorn 8 ounces to 6 ounces per capita. Britain welcomed
this contribution and expressed the hope that while New Zealand could
67.
68.
69.
T6I/L/L,11 Aug 1949.
F.W. Holmes, rrNew Zealand in the
EALO4/3/4, MnF-NZHCL, 9 Feb 1945;
World EconomYrr, P. 12.
SSD-MEA, 25 MaY 1945.
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not be expected to decrease its supplies to
during 1945, it might be able to alter its
the United States forces
allocation in 1946. (70)
The rapid end of the war in the Pacific meant an end to cl-aims
from the United States forces, but Britain faced other difficulties
in securing food supplies. Denobilisation in the United States meant
on balance an increase in donestic clairns on Anerican consunption,
whilst political and econonic difficulties with Argentina nade
supplies fron that country uncertain. In Britain itself, the need
to naintain cereal supplies for human consunption meant a cut in
supplies to livestock and consequently, an expected decline in neat
(71\
productiorr. t"J The end of lend-lease meant that sterling area food
supplies acquired enhanced importance.
By the early months of 1946, towards the end of the long European
winter, the food supply situation had becorne acute in nany parts of
Europe including Britain and it was natural for the British goverrunent
to look to New Zealand for assistance. In his last few weeks with
the British Food Mission in Melbourne, Bankes Amery renained zealous
in drawing attention to the failure of the New Zealand Government to
be as deternined in encouraging increased production through incentives
to producers and rigorous in liniting consumption, as he thought
appropriate. He argued that although production had been at high
levels, this had been due to favourable seasons and the desire of
farmers to maintain the only permanent market they had rather than to
any special encouragenent from the Government. The Doninions generally
en}
had done little nore than offer to increase productionr(1.<ir''i' would
70. DPM London Food council and combined Food Board 1942-45, MF-NZHCL'
15 Jun 1945.
71. EAl04/3/4, SSD-MEA, 12Mar 1945'
-2L0-
anyway as service demands 
""r*d. 
(72) Bankes Amery was not
ar. .r'trCcsco ovtts.Jt
being entirely fair. A drought in the North Island severely affected
Productioninthe|945/46Season-o.nlygs000tonsofbutterand(73) Nevertheless'85 000 tons of cheese were produced for export ' '
sone of the New Zealand Goverrunentrs actions suggested that it was
unwilling to take steps which would have entailed conflict with
domestic policies - in particular nr:w that the war was over' with its
wish to naintain a teasonable level of consunption arnongst the working
population. Much was nade of the gift of 16 000 tons of dehydrated
vegetables valued at tl rnillion to Britain in February 1946' But
not only had the itens involved been withdrawn from sale in New zeaLand
nost of then were not any use to Britain because supplies were
(7 4\
already available there- The gift was diverted to Europe"
Nonetheless,withthepublicj.tyattendingsuchagift'itwas
difficult for Britain to put mol'e pressure on New Zealand to tighten
rationing. cabled nessages in March 1946 made more general requests
for assistance. The New Zealand Goverrunent responded by conrnitting
itself to taking
every possible step to see that the naxinum
quantiiies of meat and dairy produce are made
available for exPort ' (75)
which was exactly what it was not doing. Despite pressure fron the
churches and in the editorial columns to cut the ration, the Government
did not introduce any new compulsory restrictions on consumPtion' A
Famine Energency corunittee was estabtished after a neeting at
72. MAF 83/1567, Bankes Anery to French' 3l Jan 1946'
Mission coniinued after Bankes Aneryrs departure'
longer extended to New Zeal-and'
MAF 83/1567, meeting at D'0', 30 Apr-1946'- 
- 
.
rhi.d.., uKHcw-Do, 15 Feb 1946; Doninion' 16 Feb 1946; EP' 20 Feb'
21 Mar 1946.
EA LO4/3/4, MEA-SSD' 15 M:r 1946'
Although the Food
its activities no
73.
74.
75.
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parriament. prans were worked out, partly through an inter-church
council, for a voluntary surrender of coupons' and this met with a
substantial response. The British High Corunissioner, Sir Patrick Duff'
took to the road, drawing attention in his public speaking engagements
tothemeagrerationsenduredbytheBritish.(Forinstance,only
7 oz of. edible fat per person per week - and that incl'uded cooking
rt6)fat and lard). \'
ThesterlingcrisisofAugustlg4Tsawarenewedeffortput
into the canpaign to supply more food to Britain' In his cabLe of
12 August 1947 AttLee stressed to Fraser that
the level of distribution of foodstuffs
in this country depends prinaril'y upon
the degree to whic-h 
"e a"e 
able to obtain
supplies frorn other than hard currency
sources " ' AnY stePs which can be
taken to increase and accelerate those
supplies of neat, dairy products.and
aninal fats would U" 
" 
contribution of
the highest importance in the present crisis ' (77)
The Aid to Britain National Council, established after a national
conference held about the crisis, set up district connittees throughout
the country, which in large part took over the work of the Food for
Britain conmittees which had been established in 1946' Individuals
were again encouraged to express their support for the cause by
handing in coupons and making food gifts available for gritain' 
(78)
As in 1946 the response at this level was overwhelning'
Bylateinlg4Sthecrisisatnospherehadebbed.Itwasvery
apparenttoBritishHighConunissionstaffthatrnanyNewZealandersgot
76.
78.
T series 73, Press statements
passim.
EL58 / 2 / 2/ 1, PMUK-PMNZ.
Ag 1037, D.d., Aug 1948'
Apr/MaI L946; MAF 83/1567, MAF 83/16L6'
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as nuch neat as they wanted in one way or another. 
(79) Although
the Aid for Britain National counciL reckoned rationing saved around
S0lbpercapitaofneatPeryear'theHighComnissionthoughtthe
figure was more like 3 Ib. In late September 1948' noreover' it
was decided to end neat rationing. Despite the arguments A'H' Nordneyer'
the Minister of Industries and comnerce presented to the British' it
seened quite apparent to then that the decision had been taken because
it would be PoPular donesticallY:
References to the Aid for Britain Council as
guarantee for assurances that suppl,y to Britain
wonrt fall is disingenuous... I feel that the
nanner in which this decision' which so
directly affects us, has been taken without any
attenptatdemonstrationofitsanticiPatedeffect'
is in most sharp contrast to consideration and
consultation which New Zealand Goverrunent claim
from ourselves whenever any step affecting theilf
interests is in contemplation by us' (80)
Britain (for whose citizens rationing would last another five years)
wasjustifiablyannoyed.onbeingtoldthattherationcontroller
had informed Nordneyel that rationing was saving 29 000 tons' Nordneyer
saidthatthefigurewasbeinginflatedtojustifyfetentionofjobs
which would be done away with when the adninistrative organisation
was disnantled. (81)
ExchangesbetweenBritainandNewZealandoverthelatterls
consunption of resources, be they of local or ovetseas origin, should
notobscurethebasicidentityofinterestonthetwosides.For
New Zealand this was partly a case of a clear-headed identification
of where the balance of her economic interests lay. The wish to
conserve foreign exchange, Nashrs deternination to lirnit borrowing'
79. MAF 88/410,
80. MAF 88/411,81. rbid.
16 Jul 1948.
UKHCW-CRO, 24 SeP 1948'
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and the long=tern interest in a prosperous Britain, all counselled
cooperation. &rt the idontific-ation with Eritain Also drew on
deepseate'd popular sf@athy for that co.untrlr. The vol.urrtetlr e'fforts
nadE in the Food, for Britain caupaign in 1946 and the Aid for Britain
carnpai,gn of L947-50 are a virricl expression of, this sl4pathy and
belief iR a comnon fate and destiay.
PUBLICITY MATERIAL
Produced bY the
AID FoR BRITAIN NATI0NAL COUNCIL, 1947-1948
0riginals are held at National Archives, Ag 1037
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CHAPTER SEVEN
ort Polic and Britainfs Conmercial Interests
945- 1949
New Zealand's buy British import policy
Bilateral conflicts
New Zealand, Britain, and the negotiations for
a post-war international economic order
1.
J
3.
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Before the war, Britaints principal econornic concerns in
New Zealand were to ensure that the country remained accessible
to her exporters and that capital investnents in or loans to the
Doninion were secure. Britainrs response to New Zealandts 1938/39
balance of paynents crisis nade this clear. But within weeks of
taking such action Britain was at war and such concerns were overlaid
by others: only sporadic attempts r.rere made through the duration of
the conflict to challenge New Zealand protectionism, and the nassive
diversion of New Zealandts import trade to Pacific countries in the
latter stages of the war was accepted as a necessary part of
alliance strategy.
At the end of the war circumstances changed yet again. New
Zealand was encouraged to re-direct its inport trade to Britain.
This was a necessary part of the sterling arears efforts to eonseTve
foreign exchange. But sone of Britainrs representations on New
Zealand purchasing decisions had a conmercial as much as a financial
motive. Britain also took a renewed interest in the protectionist
potential and reality of New Zealandrs systen of inport and exchange
control. Concern at the implication of the system for British
interests was particularly evident in the successive rounds of
discussions on a postwal international econornic order. With eyes
on the period after the expected dislocations of the imnediate
postwar years, it seened irnportant to Britain to ensure that
restrictive practices were prohibited or at least discouraged.
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1. New Zealandrs Buy British Inpgrt Policy
The end of lend-lease made it inperative that sterling area
countries like New Zea[and direct their orders away fron hard currency
suppliers. New Zealand vras not averse to conforning to this
objective. The war had temporalily overridden, rather than eliminated'
New Zealandts preference for British inports. That preference was
traditional, but it was also grounded in the belief that the
maintenance of a conneTcial policy favouring Britain was a way of
protecting New Zealandrs access to the British narket. Thus there
was little opposition to and nuch active support for, pleas to
"buy Britishrt. When import licensing had been introduced at the
end of 1938 provision had been nade for preference to be given to
British inports in the issue of licences'
In late 1945, the United States released its proposals for an
international conference on trade and employnent. The New Zealand
Government agreed that it would
carefully consider any proPosals that will
inprove world trade whilst at the sane tine
aslisting in the recovery of trade by-the
United Kingdom. We would wish to maintain
preferences for the United Kingdon in
New Zealand as well as preference granted to
New Zealand comnodities by the United Kingdom
but we would raise no objection to reciprocal
reduction of tariffs and preferences by
negotiation and agreement' (1)
More generallY:
Public opinion and the natural regard 
-of thepeople oi t'1"* Zealand is strongly in favour of
pt"f""".tes for the United Kingdom in this
irarket... if goods are available in the United
1. EA IO4/4/1, MEA-SSD, 13 Nov 1945'
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Kingdon and prices and quality are
reasonably approximate to prices and
quality submitted by other countries,
licences have been issued for inports
fron the United Kingdom. (2)
Thus both the preferential tariff and the licensing system favoured
Britain. In talks in 1946 Nash stated that he was doing everything
possible to get orders placed in the United Kingdorn, working on the
basis of the full value of the preferential tariff plus a further
r?\10 per cent.'"/ Later that sane year Nash ernphasised that import
licences for the United States and other countries would not be
granted when it seened possible for Britain to supply the goods.(4)
In February 1947, when her foreign exchange situation was
deteriorating Britain expressed the hope that New Zealand would
feel able, with due regard to the linits
inposed by United States susceptibilities
and until the picture is changed by a general
international acceptance of an obligation not
to discrininate in import controls, to naintain
the differential treatment which United Kingdorn
and other sterling area imports enjoy under your
import controls... (5)
New Zealand was as aware as Britain of Anerican pressure for the
establishnent of a rnultilateral trading system and an end to imperial
preference. In August L947, during the sterling crisis, H.E. Blyde,
the President of Federated Fanners, argued that one of New Zealandrs
goals should be to inport as much of Britainrs production as she could.
Nash pointed out though that the United States thought that New Zealandrs
import licensing policy was .crue1". (6)
2. rbid.5. DO35 $n662/3/28, 7 May 1946.4. EA 58/2/2/1, Dominion, 17 Oct 1946.5. EA 58/2/2/1, UKHCW-PMNZ, 3 Feb 1947.6. EP, 20 Aug 1947.
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During 1947 tafiff and trade negotiations were proceeding in
Geneva, and subsequently at Havana, (parallel to the ultinately
abortive efforts being nade to establish an International Trade
Organisation). The seriousness of Britaints crisis blunted Anerican
paessure on irnperial preference. When he returned to New Zealand in
1948 Nash explained that New ZeaLandt s pro-British tariff was
accepted because it would contribute to Britainrs and thereby to
I
Europets revovery. Sixty-three per cent of the preferences Britain
enjoyed in the New Zealand narket were unaffected by the international
negotiations, and only two per cent were elininated. In 1948' one
official stated that, in respect of Governnent inports into New zeaTand
33| ner cent was used as a rough working rule: official purchases
would be rnade in Britain provided that the prices were no more than
a third above those for similar goods available from other sources. (7)
In 1949, when another postwar sterling crisis revived concern
about using scarce foreign exchange on inports, Nash said that
New Zealand could not give any greater preference to Britain than she
had given already. Two countries had already protested that the
benefits given by New Zealartd to Britain contravened the general
agreenent on tariffs and trade (G.A.T.T.1- (8)
Nashrs contention was justified. In Septenber 1949 the Labour
newspapel Southerm Cyoss, proclairned that New Zealand was 'rneaTer
parity with Britain than ever befot"", (9) that is, the percentages of
imports coming fron Britain nearly rnatched the percentages of New
7. T6l/l/L, 1 Jul 1948.
8. T6I/3/5, 16 Jul 1949.
9. EA58/2/2/L, Southerm Cross, 23 Sep 1949.
Zealandrs exports sold them.
was nonetheless true that in
inports did reach 60 per cent
of around 49 per cent in the
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If this was rather exaggerated' it
1950 Britaints share of New Zealandfs
- considerably higher than the average
vears 1934-39. (10)
2. Bilateral Conflicts
Nonetheless the h'aters were not entirely untroubled. Disputes
over import licensing reflected the fundanentally different
perspectives held by New Zealand and Britain. To the forrner, inport
control of this kind was a part of her full ernploynent policy, it
was a way of ensuring that full employment did not lead to, or was
not threatened by, a shortage of foreign exchange. Britain accepted
that this argument had sone validity - she had after all practised it
herself through the war - and the Labour Governnent which took office
in July 1945 was more favourably disposed than was its predecessor.
But with the revival of interest in exporting, no British Governnent
could conpletely ignore complaints by exporters about nunfairrf
restriction on their trade with New Zealand.
In July 1945 the British Trade corunissioner, R.G. Boulter, met
Frank Picot, the Corrunissioner of Supply, to discuss various commmications
he had received fron the Board of Trade. Boulter stressed that the
outlook of British nanufacturers and the Board of Trade was one of
concern rather than of criticism. The point nost at issue was the
10. Holmes, rrNew Zealand in the ltlorld Econony'r, p' 10'
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complete plohibition of certain inports where local industries had
recently been established and British exporters therefore deprived
of a trreasonable oPportunity of conpetitionrt, as paragraph 4 of the
Nash-Stanley agreenent put it. Boulter instanced electric transforrners,
agricultural tools like shovels, and t'bobby pinsrr. (11) This was a
fairly cautious approach. Although occasional references were made
ro the good terns New Zeal.and got from Britain for her ploducts,
nothing was nade of then, pelhaps because the balance of advantage did
not lie clearly with New Tea|and. Official representations were
seconded, but with nore vigour, by local pressure grouPs like the
AssoCiated Charnbers of Connerce, the Bureau of Importers, and the
united Kingdom Manufacturers and New Zealand Representatives Association
(UXI4NZR). And National Party politicians also drew attention to the
issue. S.G. Holland, Leader of the Opposition' visited the United
Kingdorn early in 1945 and stressed on his return
the very strong and widespread objection,
amounting to resentment in many cases'
against the decision to lock out a wide
viriety of British goods, and then deny
British manufacturers the right to compete
with high tariff protection plus the high
exchange and shipping charges. (12)
In controversy about New Zealand protectionism, both official' and
private interests nade frequent reference to the Nash-Stanley agreenent
and in talks with British officials in June 1946, Nash raised the
question of its future. He explained that New Zealand felt that the
part of the agreement concerned with industrial development was
ICLAz/z, CSs-MSs, 12 Jul 1945-
EASS/2/2/L, Domtni'on, 23 MaY 1945-
1r.
12.
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derogatory to national development since it implied - or could be
held to imply - that in this natter New Zealand was subordinate to
the United Kingdorn. Nash did not want to act unilateral1y, but the
United Kingdom was reluctant to terminate the arrangenent at all'
Nash obviously thought that it might become an election issue if not
ended and the British felt controversy was more likely if it was ended. (13)
Britain was not intelested in holding New Zealand to promises
which had never been fully adhered to nor in beconing linked in Nashrs
nind with the National Partyts election plank of nassive import
liberalisation. Yet she did not see why the agreement should go
without sonething being done about the "real'r issue - the denial of
opportunities to conpete with New Zealand industries when the latter
could rneet all local needs. It was Pointed out to New Zealand that
the United Kingdom, which had a much severer balance of paynents
problen than New ZeaLand (this was arguing by overstatenent of course
as New Zealandts payments wele in surplus at this time) had recently
introduced a token irnport schene: such a schene could be irnplernented
by New Zealand, and probably in a way which wouLd neet most conplaints
about the exclusion of British goods - New Zealand, as one official
put it, had "obligations to the United Kingdour export trade'r. This
proposal had the merit of attacking the nost obvious transgression of
the Nash-Stanley agreenent: total prohibition of inports of nany
. rr4)products. -
Nash returned to
anv resolution of the
New Zealand in the middle of the year without
issue. The Customs Department was instructed
13.
14.
8T11/5711, neeting 5 May 1946; DO35 WI662/s/28, DO-UKHCW, 15 Jul 1946'
8T11/3711, 5 MaY, 28 Jun 1946.
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to examine the licensing schedule with a view to selecting itens
on which there was a conplete prohibition on imports from the
united Kingdorn. on the other hand, it was argued that New Tealand
should not nake any conmitnent until it knew what was going to happen
at the rnternational Trade Conferet... (15) In the event' it was not
until January Lg47, with the election over' that a list of goods
which New Zealand was prepared to inport to the extent of 20 Per cent
of the value of 1938 irnports, was forwarded to the Board of Trade'
In exchange it was expected that the Nash-Stanley agreenent would be
terminated. This offer, however, only covered about seventy classes
of goods out of about 300 or so which were at that time total-ly
prohibited. It included some useful items, but excl'uded significant
products like assernbled motor vehicles, most tyles of clothing'
footwear, radios and washing nachines. In value the list probably
covered 25 per cent of the trade prohibited in 1938 whereas Britain
had hoped the whole range of trade would be covered' (16)
In return, Britain subrnitted an expanded list. Nash was not veTy
responsive. He Pointed out that
there had already been a great deal of pressure
frorn United States representatives in New Zealand
to cease funport licensing discrirnination in
favour of tire United Kingdom and he,was afraid
that in due course the New Zealand Government
wouLd have to give in to this' (17)
He also argued that some of the items had never been imported into
New Zealand or could now be futly supplied dornestically: moleover,
New Zealandts sterling balances were already fully comnitted to capital
irnports and to honouring outstanding import licences. This al'gument
15 Sep 1946.
31 May L947.15.16.
17.
IC162/1, Customs DePt. -MC,
EA58/2/2/ 1, MC-PBT, 23 Jan
BT1I/3711, 51 Mar 1947.
19 Aug 1946; CSs-MSs,
1947; BTll/3711, notes
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did not impress the British - the total trade under the schenes
was not expected on the most generous estimate to amount to more
than 81 000 000 - New Zealandts reserves were at least f60 000 000'
But by May L947 Britain wanted New Zealandfs cooperation over the
international trade talks - in any case at least one official was
aware that British industry could hardly be said to be suffering
from trthe loosely-adrninistered import prohibition". (18)
It was decided that Nash would take back to New Zea[and a pl'an I
I
for a general token inport schene based on inporting 20 Per cent by 
I
value of all cornrnodities of which there were significant inports r
before the war: Britain prroPosed that this should be a general system
to which, however, there would be exceptior,r. (19) In the upshot, I
New Zealand did not adopt this principle, but did expand its original
list and introduced the scheme in November 1947. The new President
of the Board of Trade, Harold wilson, spoke approvingly of New Zealandrs
initiative without alluding to the nore generous arrangement Britain
had hoped for. In return, Britain agreed that the Nash-Stanley
agreement should lapse. (20) For Nash the ternination of the Agreenent
must have been especialty welcome. It suggested that Britain
accepted that New Zealand had the right to pursue a conmercial policy
of her own, not Britainrs choosing - sonething which had seened in
doubt in 1939. The course of events had taken the two countries a
long way away fron the circunstances of that year. New Zealand was
no longer a nendicant debtor but a creditworthy source of nuch needed
food supplies. It is also important to remember though that import
18, The British discussion is found on 8T11/5711. See also 8T11/3669'
22 ttay L947.
19. 8Trl/3669, 22 MaY 1947 -
20. ICL6,2/I, Sep-Nov L947. EA58/2/2/L, W', 28 Mar 1949'
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control, even of the kind practised by New Zealand' was still
favoured and at times actively encouTaged, b)r Britain. Her
preparedness to a1low the Nash-stanley Agreenent to lapse was
grounded in her own current interests as well as in a recognition
of New Zealandt s changed situation'
In her efforts to combat the 1947 stelling crisis the united
Kingdon requested sterling area countries to spend only their current
sterling income rather than drain down sterling balances' In this
way the ability of the British economy to devote its resources to
exporting to hard currency zones and rneeting priority dornestic needs
would be increased. In octobet 1947 the New Zealand Government
recalled and cut the 1948 import licensing schedule with this ain in
nind. This rnove provoked strong Ptotests fron traditional interest
groups in New zealand who were able to invoke Board of Trade statements
to the effect that Blitain did not want Doninions to slash imports for
c reasons,,. (21) The Government in turn successfully
secured British endorsement of its poLicy, the chancellor of the
Exchequer stressing that
if the major cuts already made will not by
themselves fitnit expenditure to current incone
and further cuts are necessary neither [the
President of the Board of Trade] nor I would
suggest any further relaxation' It is only
afler balance has been achieved that
relaxation in favour of United Kingdon exports-
in relatively plentiful supply would be justified' (22)
DesPite this statement
particular atea of PTessure
the issue would not lie down' One
concerned motor vehicle inports' For the
21. Quoted in BTlf/3758, UKHCW-CR0'22. rbid., cE-NzHcw, 2 Dec L947.
28 Oct L947.
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1948 licence period the govefirment doubled the allocation provided
for the inport of commercial vehicles but provided no additional
licences for private notor vehicles. The motor vehicle inporters
association protested vigorously at this continued restriction:
British policy statennents were inuokud. (23)
The Goverrunent accordingly approached the British explaining
that it gathered that
the Board of Trade is actually pressing
certain nanufacturers to export to New
Zealand and these manufacturers cannot do
so because of our refusal to grant licences
in conformity with the apparent wish of
the United Kingdom government. It mrst
be explained that strict conformity with
Prine Ministey's and Chancellorts wishes
leave us no alternative but to diminish
considerably below 1947 level our irnports
fron United Kingdorn. We could only attain
1947 level by departing fron formula of
keeping denands of Sterling within current
earnings. (24)
Despite Board of Trade acceptance of the Chancellorrs statement on
general poli.cy, criticisn continued tO come from chanbers of conmerce,
Federated Farmers and other organisations and confusion was conpounded'
Harold Wilson was reported as saying that although the United Kingdon
wanted New Zealand to live within its current income
by and large there should be no limitation
upon the extent to which British exporters
should meet orders from New Zealand within
the bounds laid down by New Zealandrs oun
import restrictions. (25)
This statemont seriously enbarrassed the New Zealand Governnent, but
Wilson did not think it would be wise to issue a further statement as
23. EASS/2/2/L, Passim.24. Ibi,d., MEA-NZHCL, 30 Jan 1948.
25. EP., 24 Apr 1948.
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it might only compound problens. British officials were well
aware that New ZeaLand, was exploiting the request to live within
its incone. on the other hand, while priority was being accorded
to the needs of the domestic and hard currency narkets Britain could
do little about it. As one ninute writer put it
... we donrt exPort for the sake of
exporting and we must exarnine the retutn
we get- If all that we get is a reduction
in New Zealandts sterling balances, then
the exports are not playing their P-art
It is irue that [our- request that New Zealand
should live within her incone] enables the
New Zealand Government to answeT criticisn
by blarning us for the restrictions, and in
sone casel t"y enable then to get away with
excessive restrictions. But this cannot
be helPed. (26)
while Britain took exception to New Tealand protectionism, New Zealand
sonetines felt that Britain exploited her favoured position in the
New Zealand narket. In the early postwar years, the comnercial
issue on which most attention focussed was the inport requirements
for some of the New Zealand Governmentts najor development projects'
notably the hydro-electric schemes at Karapiro and Maraetai on the
waikato River. Tenders had been called for the supply of the
generating ptant for Maraetai at the beginning of 1945 - business worth
approxirnately L2 000 000, which would open the door to nore of the sarne
for the firms who secured it. Britain had earnarked capacity for
the Maraetai project in July 1944, before it was known that it would
be put out to tender. The tender required that the first two sections
of the plant arrive in New zealand by the end of 1946, and it was
feared that the order might be placed outside the United Kingdon'
because the capacity of united Kingdorn firms to live up to the delivery
26. 8T11/3758, 25 Mar 1948.
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date was in doubt. Fraser was approached by the High commissioner,
and sul,livan by the President of the Board of Trade. Both stressed,
in sinilar vein, the united Kingdonrs ability to supply the equipnent
and its serious interest in so doing, and reninded the New Zealanders
that United Kingdon firrns had always supplied New ZeaLand needs in
this respect. Both went on to the offensive. They expl'ained that
they understood that Swedish tenders had been put in at a "dunped'r
price. surely favours would not be granted to a neutral who had
escaped the burdens of war and was now apparently granting heavy export
subsidies? The tenders from other countries were very conpetitive'
Indeed, Sullivan said, on these grounds alone it looked as if the
United States and Canada together would get about two-thirds of the
contract, and sweden a quartel with only the balance going to the
united Kingdon. Possibly the swedish and British proportions could
be reversed. It had been disturbing that for certain Parts of the
contract, quotations fron British firrns were identical - a practice
bound to arouse antagonisn in New zu^t^nd'(Z7)
In the upshot, most of the large contracts for electricaL
nachinery were given to canada and the united states. s.G. Holland,
Leader of the @position, tried to nake political capital out of this'
suggesting that if New Zealand wanted to maintain her narket in the
united Kingdon, she had to find ways and neans of buying British
goods. (28) Batterbee, the British High Corunissioner in New Zealartd'
appealed to nobler sentiments:
Discussions are recorded
n$A/ 2/ 2/ l, Doninr)on, 23
on 8T1112771, Passim.
May 1945.
27.
28.
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Britain ... was nost anxious to secure this
business. It is true that deliveries were
not so pronpt as fron other countries, &ild
in some cases the prices higher. But as
these delays and prices are the direct result
of the war, during which factories were
heavily bombed, it is felt that Britain is
being further penalised by these much-desired
orders being given to other countries at the
very tine when Britain is struggling hard to
recover her lost export trade. (29)
At a later date the W.lvl{ZR Association also expressed disappointment.
In a speech during the Hamilton by-election canpaign in May 1945,
Nash took the time to stress that
where the question of establishing new
industries was involved -.. the policy was
followed of giving every consideration and
preference to the claims for participation
in such industries of rnanufacturers in the
United Kingdour who had been important suppliers
of the goods concerned to this market.
At the sane time, he pointed out,
there had been numerous occasions where
orders had been placed through official channels
in the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdon
through inability to supply had advised that
they be directed to another source. (30)
During 1946 there was still some friction over the question of
contracts, and the natteT was raised by the British at talks with Nash
in May 1946. Nash erplained the circunstances connected with the
Maraetai scheme, and reminded the British of the fact that not only
were British prices higher but that there was evidence of collusion -
in one instance six firns had tendered the sane price. The ChanceLlor
of the Exchequer thought that as a result of action that had been taken,
this sort of problem would not arise again. Nonetheless in 1949, Nash
rbid.
Ibid.t EP, 25 May 1945.
29.
30.
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inforned the British that there were still indications that New
Zealandts policy of encouraging inports fron the United Kingdon
was being unfairly exploited by sone firrns and that tenders were
being fixed artificiafly high in consequur,.". (31) Through to the
1950s the problen Persisted.
New Zealandrs preparedness to support Britain by favouring her
as a source of imports ran into two difficulties. Firstly, New Zealand
wanted to be able to protect certain industries of her oum - and this
neant from British as well as other overseas conpetition. secondly,
New Zealand wanted to be able to buy conpetitively on the world market -
which did not necessarily nean frorn Britain'
New Zealand. Britain and the tiations for
Postwar International Economic Order
New Zealandr s inport and exchange controls became an issue in the
many discussions held fron L942 to 1948 on a postwar international
econonic order. They were Promoted by the united states, who sought
to establish a pattern of international economic collaboration which
would avert a repetition of the econonic difficulties faced in the
1g30s. Trade between nations would be encouraged in particular by
removing restrictions on conmerce and stabilising the international
monetary systen. These aspirations were set out cLearly in Article 7
31. T6L/3/5, 16 Jul 1949.
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of the United Kingdom - United States
which provided the starting point for
trfutual Aid (lendlease) agreenent,
future discussions.
ARTICLE VII
scheme at realising a
crucial question was
The terns and conditions upon which the United
Kingdorn receives defense aid from the United
States of funerica and the benefits to be
received by the United States of America in
return therefore, as finally determined, shall
be such as not to burden comnerce between the
two countries but to pronote mutually
advantageous economic relations between then
and the betterment of world-wide econonic
relations. To that end, they shall include
provision for agreed actions by the United
States of Arnerica and the United Kingdon, oPen
to participation by all other countries of like
ninh, direlted to the expansion, by appropriate
international and domestic measures, of
production, enployment, and the exchange and
tonsurnption of goods, which are the naterial
foundaiion of the liberty and wel-fare of all
peoples; to the elinination of all forrns of
discriminatory treatnent in international
connerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and
other trade barriers; and, in general, to the
attairunent of all the economic objectives set
forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 14'
194f by the President of the United States of
America and the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdon.
At an early convenient date, conversations shall
be begun between the two Governments with a view
to d"i""*ining, in the light of governing econonic
conditions, the best means of attaining the
above-stated objectives by their own agreed
actions and of seeking the agteed action of other
like-minded Governments .
New Zealand was in principle an enthusiastic supporter of any
more satisfactory world economic order' The
the definition of "more satisfactoryt'' Since
1935 the Labour Goverrunent had taken its own steps towards protecting
New Zealandrs economy fron disruption. These steps had enabled the
Government to naintain fu1l ernployment of New Zealandrs resources while
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avoiding the foreign exchange difficulties which usually put paid
to such an objective. New Zealand was reluctant to dismantle this
system in the interests of international econonic cooperation.
It believed that the primary objective of such cooperation was to
promote the full employment of all the worldfs resources of capitaL
and labour. It would therefore be a contradiction in terms for
New Zealand to sacrifice its economic systen for an international
economic order which could hold out no such pronise.
Yet it seemed that the united states was envisaging just such
an international order. To the United States the controls which
New Zealand irnposed on the movement of capital and goods were
exactly the sort of restrictions which nust becone illegal under the
new regine if it were to have any chance of success. The prosperity,
which New Zealand expected would corne fron the operation of its systen
on a worldwide scale, would come instead from the econonic gains which
would result from the unrestricted flow of capital, goods and services.
Restrictions night be acceptable to cope with balance of papnents
difficulties, but not as a permanent part of policy. Unlike New
Zealand, the United States did not think full enployment as such should
be a central objective of econonic policy - if it resulted fron the
workings of an open econonic system that was accbptable, but it should
not be pursued at the expense of such a system-
This study is not concerned directly with United States-New Zealand
relations but with the international. econonic negotiations insofar as
they provided a forun for the expression of Anglo-New Zealarld
differences. Britainfs position was intermediate to New Zealandrs
and that of the United States. Conscious of its own economic weakness,
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Britain could not contenplate conplete adherence to the Anerican
systen. At the sane time (and this did not change with the advent
of a Labour Government) she was reluctant to give an unqualified
endorsement to New Zealandrs system - and certainly not an open-ended
one. Although New Zealandrs controls operated in Britainrs favour
she believed that in the long te11n they would have a danaging effect
on her trade.
Most Anglo-New Zealand debate took place in the international
trade negotiations, but a glance at the international nonetary
negotiations is desirable. Discussions on an international nonetary
system started in 1942 and culninated in the agreement to establish
the International Monetary Fund (and the World Bank) reached at the
Bretton lrloods Conference in July 1944. Endeavouring to secure Soviet
participation, Britain and the united states tried to be relatively
flexible about the sort of controls countries could operate if they
wished to becone members. Questions of wartime indebtedness were
excluded from the I.M.F. discussions. But the recognition that there
would be a postwar transitional period when many countries wouLd be
operating controls facilitated acceptance of the principle that
there was nothing in the Fund Agreenent
inconsistentwiththernaintenanceandoperation
of a complete system of exchange control except
and to the extent that such a control was in
practice used to prevent the reasonably pronpt
payment and transfer of conmitrnents which had
actually arisen in connection with current
transactions- (32)
Additionally, it was consistently sttessed by New zeaLand that she did
not propose ro alter in any way her right to select inports' 
(33) Nash
32. Quoted tn AJHR., L944, A8, P. 6.33. rbid.
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concluded, and Fraser agreed, that New Zealand should join. while
she would have to accept some constraints on her freedon of nanoeuvre'
for exanple, in respect of any substantial change in the value of
her currency, the Fund was an inprovenent on the Pre-war system'
Moreover, whilst not challenging New Zealandrs controls directly'
its resources could possibly help overcone any future exchange shortag"' 
('o)
The agreenent would enter into force when countries which
collectively accounted for 65 per cent of the Fundrs allocation' had
signed it. If signatures were received prior to 3l December 1945,
such countries would have the status of 0riginal Menbers' 
(35) In
late 1945 the United states approached New zealand to find out whether
itintendedtosign.NewZealandwasinaquandary.officialshad
argued that New Zealand should not join if Britain did not'(36)
Britain however did not make any move until the conclusion of the
Anglo-funerican financial negotiations, and it was only on 15 Decenber
1945 that the bill allowing Britain to join Passed through the House
of Commons. (37) The USSR, by contrast, failed to take up nenbersfrip' 
(38)
New Zealand inforned the united states that it intended to join, but
that the decision would have to wait until June 1946, when the
Government would bring the agreenent before Parliat""t' 
(39) The 1946
session passed however and the agreement was not presented' Although
Fraser and Nash had decided that nenbership did not pose any danger to
New Zealandrs system of controls, others in the parlianentary Labour
34. Sinclair, Walter Nash, pp' 241-43'
35. EAL04/2/5, 24 Oet 1945.36. Ibi.d., l0 Oct 1945.
37. EAl04/2/5, EP, L5 Dec 1945'
38. EALO4/2/5, Passi'm-39. EAI04/2/5, 20 Dec 1945.
-234-
Party disagreed. They argued that IMF nenbership would lock
New Zealand into an international monetary regime which would impose
deflationary conditions, transfer wealth to gotd holders' and
threaten New Zealandrs trade with gritain' 
(40) This latter argument
waspopularwithrightwinggroupstoo,despitethefactthatBritain
herself had joined the Fund. (41)
Inearlylg4TAustraliadecidedtojointheFund,andDalton,
the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, urged Nash to bring New Zealand
in, and thereby strengthen the Connonwealth position in the
organisation. But opposition in the Parliarrentary Labour Party led
bylongstandingcreditreformerslike,FrankLangstone,neantthat
New Zealand staYed outside .(d2)
By
swing.
inport
thistinetheinternationaltradenegotiationswereinfull
TheFund|snajorchallengewastoexchangecontrols;itwas
licensing which was at issue in the trade talks'
ofnointernationalcommercialpracticewastheUnitedStates
more suspicious of than quantitative restriction of trade' which was
seen as a very blatant way of limiting the legitinate access of
foreigntraderstoadonesticnarket.TheUnitedKingdonwasnotas
conpletelyopposedtoquantitativerestrictionoftradeaswasthe
United states. Contenprating a severe balance of payrnents problem
in the postwar period, the British Governnent could see some advantage
inquantitativerestrictions.InAnglo-Anericandiscussionsin
40. EP, 31 JulY L946,
41. Sinclair, Walter
42. Sinclair, WaLter
30 Aug 1946.
Nash, p. 245.
Nash, PP. 245-46.
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september and october 1943 the two countries agreed that quantitative
restrictions could be used in the postwar Ittransition" period and
also to conbat balance of payment crises. But other cases of
quantitative restrictions were considered protectionist and harmful
to the collective interest, a view which Britain had nade fairly
clear to New Zealand as early as Octobet 1942' She
fully recognised the need for new industrial
developnettl itt prinary producing countries'
but tride could not expand if artificial
developnent was fosterLd by excessive.barriers
and thire must be some reasonable linit to the
protection of new industries' (43)
In February and March 1944 Connonwealth ninisters and officials
had uret to discuss econonic issues including conmerciar poricy. 
(44)
There was general acceptance of the Anglo-American position that
Quantitative regulation of imports was to
be generaffy peirnitted during the- period of
transitional ieadjustment after the war'
Subsequently it was to be banned excePt for
cettain recognised cases of which the nost
important *ui"t first, for the inplernentation
of a recognised international connodity
agreementi secondly in order to safeguard
a countryis balance of payments' (45)
As Nash pointed out in a cable to Fraser
Import licensing would not be pernitted for
purPoses of proiecting hone industries or
industries dlerned ttet-ttt"y on grounds of
national security' We have nade it clear
that such prohibition is diametlically
opposed to New Tealand policy' There is
no- doubt however that nost governnents
represented here will insist on ending or
severely restricting the right of signatories
to impose prohibition of inports' (46)
43.EALO4/4/lrecordofConmonwealthpostwarecononictal'ks0ct/NovL942'
P. 11.44. It was an officials neeting but Nash attended'
45. 8T11/2351' surunary of talks Feb/Mar 1944' p' l0'
46. EAI04/4/L, 13 Mar L944.
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Nashrs pessirnism was justified by events, although not innediately'
The tatks on an international rnonetary systern had inpinged on iuport
control matters but the Bretton woods Articles of Agreenent did not
prohibit,eitherinthepostwaftransitionalperiodorthereafter'
theuseofirnportcontrolasapolicymeasureprovidedthatexchange
funds were readily available for all licensed import'' 
(47) But in
Decenber 1945 when the united states published its t'Proposals for
Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Enploymentrr'
Anglo-New Zealand differences emerged into the open' In this document
the section on quantitative trade restriction confined restriction to
the sorts of circumstances already agreed on between the united Kingdon
andtheUnitedStates(withtheadditionofcertaincircunstances
affectingagriculturalproducts).TheUnitedKingdorrstatedthatit
was "in full agreenent on all irnportant points in these proposalsrr but
New Zealand felt unable to endorse this statement prinarily because
of the question of inport control' In a cable to the British
Government, New Zealand set out fu1ly the reasons for its defence of
thepolicyofimportselectionanddenied,inparticular,thatitwas
incompatible with the commitment to increase and expand production,
employment and trade enjoined in the Mutual Aid Agreement:
[New Zealand] holds that an import licensingpolicy in no way contTavenes the purpose and
intenlion of nrticle vII if it provides for
the naximum aggregate volume of imports
consistent with the security of its balance of
PaYments Position'
It also claims that it should not be denied the
right through inport selection to deternine
*f,"t-itpotiEa goi'as are most likely to pronote '
ttre explnsion 6f production both internally and
externally and to achieve the sane objective of
ful1 enPloynent
47. Ibid., brief for PMNZ, 8 Dec 1945'
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.... Your attention is again drawn to the
fact that the abnormal sensitivity of
New Zealandrs economy to external trade
conditions is mainly due to it having the
highest per capita external trade in the
world to the limited range of its exPorts
and to the concentration in one narket of
the bulk of its exportable surplus'
In view of this position, New Zealand adheres
to the opinion that the regulation of imports
is the best nedium for preventing the
development of an exchange crisis " " Thepolicy of licensed selective irnports is
prefeiabfe to that of confining the use of
iegulation of imports to periods when New Zealand
is deerned to be in tenporary balance of payment
difficulties. (48)
Here New Zealand was seeking to give a broad interpretation to rrbalance
of paynent difficultiesr'. But at the sane tine she was prepared to
concede that full ernployment in New ZeaLand'
was unavoidably associated with some measure
of protection for ... secondary industries
since full employment cannot be achieved " '
on the basis of prinary production alone' (49)
(This point related back to the nore general one that while the
industries were needed for enploFnent purposes they werenrt necessarily
competitive with nass production or low labour cost inrpOrts - hence the
need for protection). However eonvinced some New Zea\andets may have
been by this reasoning, Britain was less credulous. Britain accepted
that
in the special circumstances of New Zealand
regutati-on of inports is best means of
"-r5idittg developlnent of exchange 
difficulties
and thaa New Zealand Government would not wish
to be obliged to lift such controls only to be
conpelled io re-iurpose it again on the
r*"irt""rr"e of balance of payment difficulties '
48. EAIO4/4/1, MEA-SSD, 8 Nov 1945'
4s. rbid.
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But it was also Pointed out that
quantitative restriction of imp-orts is an
instrument which as a result of experience
between the wars is looked upon by nany
countries ... as having had a very danaging
effect on world trade. (50)
AttalksbetweenBritainandNewZealandinJunelg46,the
arguments were run over again. Nash had requested the neeting
following the discussion of corunercial policy by Prime Ministers
in May f946. (51) British officials stressed that quantitative
restrictions were acceptable in the postwar period and at a tiure of
adisequilibriuminthebalanceofpayments.Itwasthepermanence
of New Zealandrs systen that was at issue' Nash reiterated
New Zealandts by now familiar argunents. FirstLy, that New Zealandrs
balance of payments was too vulnerable to allow any relaxation: he
rnade particular reference to his
vivid recollection of the terrible state
in which New Zealand [was] in 1959 when
even after restrictions were inposed' the
loss of funds increased because of orders
alreadY Placed. (52)
He stressed that import control would not restrict trade as New zealand
would always use what exchange it had available for inports after other
payments had been provided for. This conforrned with the argument that
New Zealandrs industrial policy was expansionary, not restrictive'
0nthisBritishofficialsrepeatedtheirobjectionstotheuseof
quantitative regulation for protective purposes' Ashwin failed to see
why quantitative restrictions used in order to Protect infant industries
were destructive of world trade. British official's adnitted that the
50. EAL04/4/L, SSD-MEA, 9 Nov 1945'
51. Nash represented New Zealand at the Prine Ministers conference'
52. 8T11/3711, talks, 5 Jun 1946'
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systen ttused, in a single case, by men of goodwilltr might not Prove
restrictive but if it expanded the united Kingdon woul.d be faced
with a trpermanent and arbitrary restriction of exports"' Britain
suggested that New Zealand protect its industries by subsidies, or
tariffs. New Zealand rejected both of these: neither was such a
satisfactory method of restraining inports. (53)
No resolution was reached on these questions before the first
preparatory session of the Conference on Trade and Enployment net in
London in October and November 1946. Frorn this point, through the
second preparatory session at Geneva (April-August 1947) and the
Conference itself at Hjavana (November 1947 - March 1948) the bilateral
element of talks between the United Kingdom and New Zealand became
less significant.
New Zealand found Britain slmpathetic in a general sense to her
difficulty, even although she wasnrt prepared to go all the way with
her on her denands. Basical"ly, Britain felt that it should be
possible to nake some special arrangement for New zealand, but it was
inportant that it not be done in such a way that other countries be
able to exploit it. Moreover, Britain considered that even poor
countries would not necessarily benefit, as New Zealand had argUed,
if richer countlies could use the system against then, for instance to
exclude agricultural irnports. (54)
New Zealand Proceeded on her own
(later Article 51) which she believed
to seek an arnendrnent to Article 33
would have accommodated her
53.
54.
EAL04/4/L, 14 Jun
The record of New
Geneva and Havana
1946.
Zealandr s
is found
role in the international trade talks
on EA104/26/L.
at
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interests. Britain thought that the amendnent
wouLd make it only too easy for countries to
inpose quantitative restrictions for
protective reasons without any effective
lafe-guard against their abuse' (55)
This sentinent was conveyed in a joint message to Nash frorn the
Comrnonwea1thSecretaTy'thePresidentoftheBoardofTrade,andthe
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Nor did New Zealand find nuch support
amongst other countries. Eventually she accepted a redrafting of
Article 26, concerned with responses to balance of payments problems, I
reluctantly accepting that in this way her policies weTe to sone degree
r-s6llegitimised. ''-''
During the years 1945-1948, New Zealandfs unquaLified comnitment I
to a policy of exchange and inport control gave her a distinctive
position in the international cornnunity. Although not a socialist
corintry, she frequently found herself aligned with czechoslovakia,
the only East EuroPean country participating in the trade negotiations'
**********
The end of the war saw a revival in Britainr s interest in New
Zealandrs conmercial policy. The need to conserve foreign exchange
gave added irnpact to Britainrs tepresentations, but she was also
concerned to protect the interests of her exPorters. New Zealand was
prepared to make speciat efforts to favour Britain in her trading
relations, not just because of the shortage of hard currency' but also
because she saw a positive correlation between such preference and
the protection of her own position on the British narket' Nonetheless
55. EAIO4/2/2/1, SECRO, CE, PBT-Nash, 18 Jul 1947'
56. Ibi'd., 27 JUL 1947-
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there ttete clrcumstanees uhere her inport poliel'es ereated
dif,f,erences with Btitai:r, for instance the total ptohibition
on some ilrports and the direet ilajor purchases to Britainrs
c,@tr'etitors.
In the international trade ta!.ks differe:rces of approach
between, New Zealaod and Britain beeane nore evident. But Britain
hetseLf stt1tr maintaiued controLs on iryorts. The liberalisetion
sf trade relations being ptomoted throlgh the talks was a posslbiLity
nather than en aetuality, and the diffetrences did not therefore become
too acrite.
CTTAFTER EIGTT
Food Eloorqts in nhe First Years q,f. Peace 1915-t94:8
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1. Introduction
New Zealandrs expectation of a slump was not borne out in
the first postwar years. Food shortages outlasted the war and
becarne exceptionally acute in Eutope towards the end of the winter
in both Lg45/46 and L946/47 - the latter the worst since the 1880s'
Then in August 1947 Britainr s sevelfe balance of payrnents crisis
powerfully reinforced her need to direct her overseas food procurement
activities to sterling area countries - such as New Zealand - wherever
possibl e.
Britainrs wartime need for New Zealandrs resources went with
the grain of New zeahand export strategy and concerns and this
renained true in the 1945-1948 period. The British narket was too
inportant for New zeaLand not to wish to secure het position in it'
But in the final analysis this had to be a profitable position'
Constraints of the kind accepted in 1944 were acceptable as a long-tern
strategy. In the short-tern they were less welcome. Because the
narket was buoyant, short-term and long-term considerations jostled
throughout the period. The wish to make a good Living had to be
set against the wish to secure the future. Differences of errphasis
between Governrnent and producers conplicated the picture.
Through these early postwar years the Labour adninistration of
Peter Fraser renained in office, with a nuch reduced najority after the
1946 elections. Although rnost prirnary producers could not at this
tine be regarded as Labour supporters, relations between Governnent
and producers were not unsatisfactory' As in the later years of the
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war, the najor conflicts wele ove1. stabilisation and its effect
on producer costs and leturns. In respect of overseas trade policy
there was much more unaninity. Both sides accepted the need for
the continuation of the waltine selling arrangements. Within that
framework however producers pressed for changes. State control of
the dairy industry had been appealing to producers when it neant an
unqualified guarantee of their livelihood. In 1940, when the
guaranteed price was held for the third year in a row' it became clear
that the Government was taking into account conditions overseas'
Frorn that tine pressures built up for the industry to have a greater
say in marketing and price policy. Nash may have been reluctant to
retreat, but Fraser saw the sense of rnaking a change. With the war
over, Labour adopted as election policy the transfer of responsibility
for dairy narketing and the setting of a guaranteed price to a joint
government-industry authority. This policy was inplenented in 1947
with the passing of the Dairy Products Marketing Couunissior, l"t. (l)
The Cornmission took up its responsibilities in August 1947, and prior
to the 1948 contract negotiations it succeeded the Marketing Departnent
as the party to the agreenent with Britain. The successful conclusion
of negotiations in that year enphasised that for the most part Government
and producers had the sane interests in the external livelihood of the
industry.
In the first years of peace the Government did not encounter many
difficulties with the meat producers for whom in any case Government
purchase and control was more particularly identified r'vith wartine
Dairy Products
Report L947/48;
Marketing Conrnission (hereinafter
interview with Sir Arthur Ward,
D.P.M.C.) Annual
21 Apr 1981.1.
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exigencies. In 1948 it was agreed that the Meat Producers Board
should becorne the agent of the Governrnent in respect of the handling
of meat for export within the terms of the bulk purchase contracts'
This gave it an official role in the trade in New Zealand. Contfact
negotiations remained a goverrunent resPonsibility, but representatives
of the industry would be associated with the Governnent in the
discussions, an extension of the infornal consultation which had always
taken place.
Fraser had taken an active role in trade policy in 1959 and 1944
because he was in London for War Cabinet and Connonwealth discussions
at those times. Such conjunctions did not recut in the postwar years'
At the ninisterial level Nasht s position therefore was just as
significant, if not more so, than earlier. Neither of the Ministers
of Marketing - Ben Roberts (1943-46) or E.L. Cullen (1946-49) travelled
oveTseas - at the ministerial level only Nash or' Fraser were ever
involved in substantial negotiations. Ashwinrs inportance remained
unquestioned. The fact that he was Secretary to the Treasury on1'y
serves to emphasise the significance to the Government of the financial
aspects of trade matters. Both he and Nash attended the 1946
negotiations. The 1947 negotiations were conducted by George Duncan'
the forrner Director of the Export Marketing Departnent and of equal
importance to Ashwin in wartime discussionr' (2) In 1948 Ashwin was
once again in London along with Will Marshall, his fonner colleague on
the Econonic Stabilisation Comnission and now Chairnan of the D.P.M'C. 
(3)
2.
3.
Fron January 1946 he was Chairman of the New Zealand l{oo1 Disposal
Connission.
After the war, Ashwin ceased to be Director of the Econornic
stabilisation connission, the position being filled by L.c. webb.
Marshall resigned fron the Commission on taking up his appointment
with the D.P.M.C.
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The critical decisions were thus still taken by a small group of
men who had worked with each other for nany years. In Britain they
continued to deal with the Ministry of Food, the wartine
responsibilities of which continued without nodification.
2. The Quest for Long-term Security 1945-1946
The continuing food crisis suggested New Zealand had little to
worly about in respect of its long-tenn arrangements with Britain,
but this wasnrt entirely the case. The food crisis was intense, but
it was probably short-tern. In October 1945 New Zealand officials
sought discussions at ninisterial and official level to establish
the expectations Britain had about ovelseas food irnport policy in the
postwar years. The election of a Labour Government in July 1945 was
an added incentive. The Dorninions Secretary, Lord Addison, and the
Minister of Food, Ben srnith, were both fairly vague except about the
policy of "averaging out" i.e. the Practice of selling any one product
e.g. butter, at a standard price, even if it was originally from
souTces with different cost structures. New Zealand feLt that this
disadvantaged her, the low-cost producer, in terns of rnarket
recognition, but the British were .d"*"r,t. (4) At a later meeting,
British officials could not be drawn on prospects for the continuation
of the long-term contracts. (5)
4. ESC2/8, surunary of infornal taLks, l0 Oct 1945'
5. MAF 88/406, 31 Oct 1945.
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The fact that the new Labour Government in Britain was expected
to conrnit itself to a policy of pronroting British agricultural
production through a systen of guaranteed prices, and assured markets
for principal products added another dinension to New Zealandts
.f6)r.nqu1r1es.- At present British agriculture was not a threat. But
how far forward could New Zealand look with certainty?
However, in 1946, when the question of revision of the contracts
arose, there was more certainty. Britaints expectations about meat
and dairy produce differed fron each other. Dairy produce was likely
to be in short supply in 1950 and Britain was therefore amenable to
extending that contract foI another trro years. (7) funongst the officials
in the Meat and Livestock Division of the Ministry of Food sone thought
the meat sholtage night have eased by then. As the United Kingdom
was buying on an exportable surplus basis, it could turn out very
expensive to extend the contracts if prices fell, especially as
Argentina and Australia would have to receive the same treatment as
New Zealand. At the very least, it was thought, Britain should wait
until late lg47 before naking a decision. Could not New Zealand be
satisfied with fixed volunes for 1948-1950 rather than the exportable
surplus? It was not as if Britain was leaving New Zealand in the lurch -
it was nost unlikely, given the size of the ration, that British denand
for New Zealand meat would actually decrearu. (8)
6.
7.
8.
DPM, London Food Council
MAF 85/1668, 14 Jun 1946,
MAF 88/409, 31 May 1946,
20 Jun, 5 Jul 1946.
et aL., 30 Nov 1945.
20 Jun 1946.
4 Jul 1946, 5 Jul 1946; MAF 83/1668,
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Such caution did not take account of New Zealandfs deternination'
At a neeting of British and New Zealand officials,(n) tnu latter argued
that if Britain wanted to see New Zealandrs production incteased, as
it seened she did, then it would be advantageous to extend the contract'
It would be unfair if countries which had gained a footing in the
British neat market because of war conditions retained this outlet for
their supplies. Moreover it would be difficult to explain to
producers in New Zealand why one contract had been extended and not the
ott"t. (10)
Nash took the issue up at ministerial level. He reninded the
British that at talks with Sir Ben Snith, the Minister of Food, it
had been agreed that extension of the contracts "should be favourably
considered,,. He reiterated the political difficulties which the
Governrnent could encountel in accepting differing regines for neat and
dairy produce, and also the importance of a four year contract if
producers were to expand output. Without specifically taking note of
these points, Snith accepted that it was reasonable to extend the
contTact. The only reason for not so doing, as far as he could see'
was that Britain night be able to obtain other supplies at a lower
price. Even so Britain would need what New Zealand had to off"t' 
(11)
Although agreement was reached to extend the frozen meat contract to
1950, the position of pigmeat renained distinctive' The United Kingdon
had agreed to take New Zealandfs exportable surplus of pigneat for the
g. The negotiations were conducted by Nash on the New Zealand side'
with the assistance of officials, but as in 1944 both Meat Board(G.H. Grigg) and Dairy Board (w.i. Hale) representatives were in
London.
10. MAF 83/1668, 20 Jun 1946; EA58/2/2/1, NZHCL-MEA' 4 May 1946'
11. MAF 83/1668, 29 Jun 1946, 5 Jul 1946'
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L946/47 season and now agreed to do the sane for the L947/48 season,
but would not, as New Zealand hoped, extend this comnitnent to 1949/50. (12)
The other elenent of long-term security was protection against
price falls. New Zealandrs negotiators in 1946 do not seem to have
been too concerned to establish a guaranteed nininum price for the
full period of the contract - a najor issue in 1944. Probably they
recognised that given Britaints reluctance to comnit herself
wholeheartedly to paynent in ternns of production costs, (see below p.251 )
there was not much point in pressing for it. Britain did accept that
price reviews should be annual rather than biennial, sonething she
had resisted in 1944. British officials surnised that world prices
would rise in 1947 and that Australia and New Zealand would be
reluctant to contract ahead for any longer period than one year.(15)
New Zealandrs economic interests were being protected as much by
market conditions as by the strength of her long-term arrangenents.
3. The 1946 Contraet Negotiations: Short-tenn Profitability
As well as an assured narket, New ZeaLand also sought to maintain
remunerative prices for its frozen neat and dairy produce. In 1944,
she had nade a najor and successful effort to negotiate a supplenent
to her sterling balances through payments allied to the food contaacts.
12.
13.
MAF 88/406, 16 Nov 1945; MAF 88/409,
MB50/2/6, MF-NZHCL, t9 Jul L946.
MAF 88/409, Turnet-Rodden n.d.; MAF
NZHCL-MF, I Jul 1946;
85/1668, 29 Jun 1946.
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Given the relative balance of Britain and New Zealandt s financial
circumstances in 1946 this was not on; nor did Nash attempt it.
This did not preclude New ZeaLand making a conventional application
for price increases invoking the disparity between New Zealandrs
inports and export prices: producels saw the elimination of such a
disparity as important to their efforts to naintain a balance between
costs and returns whilst the balance of paynnents benefit to the
econony as a whole was self-evident. But British negotiators never
had any tine for the price disparity algument, and this was as true
in 1946 as before or later. When Ashwin pointed out that New Zealandrs
clain for an increase in meat prices would have been a lot more
substantial if it had taken into account the increased prices of
British goods, the Ministry of Foodrs response was unsympathetic:
the general question of the overall
increase of prices on trade between the
two countries was a natter for the United
Kingdon Treasury ... the Ministry of Food
could review prices only on a conmercial
basis within the terns of the Review Clause
of the Meat Agreement which provided for
consideration to be given to substantial
changes in the costs of neat production in
New Zealand, (14)
A case based on rises in farm costs was likely to meet a sinilar
response. These had been the predominant criteria by which prices
were adjusted since 1939, given the circunstances that Britain needed
the food and therefore had to pay a remunerative price. To New Zealand
the advantages of continuing with the system, even although the war was
over, were manifest. Farm incomes would never again be threatened as
they were in the 1930s, by prices falling bel'ow costs.
14. MAF 83/f668, 20 Jun 1946.
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In talks with the Minister of Food, Nash presented New Zealandts
case for new contract prices based on present prices plus an allowance
in respect of I'approved additions to costs during the period since
those prices were established". (15) The Minister of Foodrs reaction
was rather cautious. It was no longer so clear that it was
advantageous to stick with this systen, which deprived the purchaser
of the opportunity to take advantage of competitive circunstances.
To put this case on a rather more principled basis, Srnith pointed out
that any autonatic connection between prices and costs would deprive
producers of the incentive to keep costs down. Nash suggested there
could be safeguards against this, but the Minister argued this would
put the United Kingdon in the position of appearing to veto New Zealandfs
donestic policies - a rather ironic argument given the pressure
Britain had applied to get New Zealand to ration. (16) In the upshot
Britain did agree that production costs were an adnissible criterion,
but stressed that this could not be seen as a precedent for future
--.: - ^ ----i -- -- (f 7)prlce revr_ews. -
The other criterion which was set down in the review clause was
the prices offered by other suppliers. This was intended to cover
circumstances where the United Kingdon could expect to secure output
at lower prices. But it was arguable that New Zealand could also take
it into account as a justification for requesting higher prices, a
distinct possibility in 1946, particularly in respect of dairy produce.
It was very likely that Denmark would be paid a nuch higher price than
Australia and New Zealand (although lower than previously) because its
MAF 88/409, 4 Jun 1946.
rbid.
MB50/2/6, 19 Jul 1946.
15.
16.
L7.
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costs were so high.
Nash was not interested in following this argunent through.
stabilisation neant that high prices were not an unqualified good,
but were seen by the Government partLy in terns of their inflationary
consequences. He suggested that it was better for the Danish price
to be lowered than for the New Zealand and Australian price to be
increased "in the interests of general price stabilityt'. (18) If
that could not be arranged, he was happy for the Ministry of Food to
pay more elsewhere, provided they armed the New Zealand Goverrment
with full information so that it courd deal with its own producers. (19)
rrln the long viewrf too, it seemed doubtful whether New Zealand should
seek to obtain the much higher prices that the united Kingdon was
paying to foreign supptietr. (20)
Another issue involving price-setting on which there was some
discussion hlas the future of the lump-sum payments. The natter arose
because New Zealand sought a butter price increase to bring it ahead
of the effective price of l6ls. ld. which Australia was receiving when
her lunp sum payments were taken into account. New Zealand did not
consider that the h:np surn payments she received had anything to do
with her commodity returnE whereas Australiars did: but British
officials were inclined to think that if New Zealand wanted increases
to match up with Australia, the supplernentary payments would have to go.
18.
19.
20.
MAF 83/1567, 4 May 1946.
MAF 83/1668, 5 Ju1, 8 Jul, 1946.
EA58/2/2/1, NZHCT-MEA, 4 May 1946.
Denmark 220s. per cwt for the year
26 JtuL 1946. )
In July, Britain agreed to pay
1946/ 47 (EASg/ 2/ 2/ L, NZHCL-MEA,
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The paynents after all came out of the Ministry of Food vote, and
it was quite evident that they were regarded as a concealed part
of the price by other suppliers, such as Derunark. (21) New Zealand
on het side envisaged upward revision of the palment: in the upshot
they were left untouched and the case for a price increase exanined
independently of thur. (22)
How then was the new butter price of L7ss. arrived at? Nash
explained to representatives of the Dairy Board on his return to
New Zealand that he had asked for 176s. 6d. on a cost basis - as
conpared with the cunent 150s. 6d. But this ran into difficuLties.
Firstly, on a cost basis Australia was entitled to nore than Ne!{
zeaLand - an outcome unacceptable to the latter. secondly, Britain
would only accept 168s. ld. as valid in terms of increased costs.
By her own account, Nash told the British it was imperative that
New Zealand should have 175s. rtto meet the request of the industryr.
He went to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and convinced him of this:
the Minister of Food, said Nash, had cut the ground from under his(2?\feet.'-"/ Australia also received 175s. thus removing the prenium
traditionally paid to the New Zealand product on quality grounds. rt
had been obscured by the lump sum payments anyway; Australia had
pressed hard for parity and Britain concurr"a.Q4)
The industry was particularly anxious to establish that the entire
increase was towards covering costs, because of the court decision that
2L.
22.
23.
24.
MAF
MAF
DPM
MAF
8B/409, Wilson-Rodden, 10 May 1946.
83/f668, DO-UKHCW, 15 Jul 1946.
Cs/L, 31 Aug 1946, MFn and DB.
83/L668, 5 Jul 1946.
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subsidies on local nilk be debited to the dairy industry stabilisation
account. (25) This subsidy would become a major charge on that
account if it was increased to take account of the new overseas prices.
Under the circuinstances, it seened wise to get as great a proportion
of the increased price paid directly to producers as possible, as the
remainder, which would go into the stabilisation accounq would be
eaten up by subsidy payments .Q6) The case for rnaking a full payout
would have been greater if the increase had been rnade entirely in
respect of the increased production costs: hence the inportance of
establishing this. But whether or not the Dairy Board could Prove
its case in debate, the Government was not prepared to pay out the
whole of the increase, a move which it considered would threaten
stabilisation. Nor were the Dairy Board representatives entiTel.y
unsympathetic to this. They recognised that the good years could
not be expected to go on for uu"r. (27)
On meat, New Zealand argued for an increase of 43.35 per cent
over B.P.I. (1939/40) prices for meat, and 48.33 per cent on pigneat.
The British negotiators wanted to know why they should pay out for
increased production costs when not all the payments so made went
directly to the producer. Ashwin explained that the reserve account
into which some of the noney was paid had helped stop inflation, which
in time would help keep down costs. (28) Additionally, the Ministry
of Food wondered why an increase of costs of only 26.6 per cent had been
25. See
26. The
so
the
27, DPM
28. MAF
above, p. L72.
Governrnent absorbed any deficit which night accrue
the fact that charges would continue to mount in it
industry.
Cs/L, 31 Aug 1946; MAF 83/1668, UKHCW-DO, 30 Jul
83/1668, 20 Jun 1946.
on the account
did not worry
1946.
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reported for wool (1944) when in that year a 33.33 per cent increase
in the price of meat had been agreed to, New Zealand replied that
costs of wool and meat production were not the sarne and that it could
not therefore be deduced that payments would increase at the sane rate.Q9)
There was also sone discussion about pigneat prices. Britai.n was not
keen on encouraging pigs at the expense of grain production. But in
New Zealand pig-raising was a by-product of dairy production. New
Zealand argued that pigneat prices needed to be increased at a greater
rate because pig production involved relatively more labour per unit
of production on account of the nore difficult work and the need for
longer hours. Britain accepted New Zealandrs assurance that higher
pigneat prices would not result in any increase in the price or in
denand for grain of which other countries rnight take advantags. (30)
The United Kingdorn Treasury, for its part, felt that the price
increases being demanded for neat were moderate enough. The Ministry
of Foodrs view was that
it was frankly impossible to subject [t'tew
Zealandfs figures] to real scrutiny, but
[that it] did not think the proposals wereI irresponsibler . (31)
However, in the exchange of letters which set out the details of the
new contract, the Ministry did include a refetence to the fact that
part of the increase was being retained by the New Zealand Governnent
for the benefit of the industry. Although this was not inconsistent
with the clain for higher prices on the basis of increased production
88/409, I Jul 1946; MAF 83/f668, 4 Ju1 1946.
85/1668, 20 Jun 1946.
S3/L668, Wilson-Wilson (sic) 22 Jun 1946.
29. MAF
30. MAF
31. MAF
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costs, the Ministry reserved the right to reconsider this aspect in
the futur e.Gz)
On other conditions of the contract New Zealand also sought
revision. The unifying thene was a desire to protect comnercial
opportunities. In discussion Nash raised the fact of Australiars
exploration of Asian butter narkets, on which New ZeaLand was missing
out. While wanting New Zealand butter to go to the United Kingdon
as long as the United Kingdon wanted it
an increase in the percentage allowed for
outside disposal ... would be of considerable
political value. (33)
A sinilar request was nade in respect of neat for which no substantial
provision at all was currently made. New ZeaLand now wanted to be
able to divert 3000 tons. Within the United Kingdom rnarket, New Zealand
pressed for a return to the prewar systen of distribution and branding
which would help ensure that the New Zealand product retained a positive
identification in the eyes of consumers and retail,ers. Dissatisfaction
was expressed with the continuation of restrictions and practices
imposed on the meat trade because of the shipping shortages - telescoPing'
deboning and the embargo on the chilled beef trade. (34)
The extension of the long-term contracts reflected Britainrs
belief that food shortages would continue and it was in large measure
consistent with them, that she declined all of these requests. It
was explained that Australian shipnents, like New Zealandrs were subject
MB50/2/6, MF-NZHCL, 19 Jul 1946.
MAF 88/409, 4 Jun 1946.
MAF 83/1668, 20 Jun, 30 Jul 7946; MAF 88/409, 3 Jun 1946.
32.
55.
34.
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to Combined Food Board allocation - something Britain clairned it
could do nothing about, The 2.5 per cent figure agreed on in 1944
was renoved, but a larger percentage was not substituted. On neat
diversion, Britain did not want to make a concession and then have to
extend it to all suppliers. The natter was deferred. On the other
issues, New Zealand had to accept that the existing system would be
continuing for some tine. (35)
4. Long-tern Security: the International Dimension
Apart from the influence of other countries such as Australia'
Derunark and Argentina on the bilateral relations between New Zealand and
Britain, there was a multilateral dimension arising fron the
elaboration of Anglo-Anerican plans for a new international comnercial
order. New Zealandrs concern about the implications of these plans
for her trade with Britain was a persistent theme in the first' postvrar
years. That concern reflected not just the elaboration of plans'
but the underlying econonic and political suprenacy of the United States
and its capacity to structure the worldrs econony to its advantage,
but to the possible disadvantage of the export trade of a snall country
like New Zealand.
At the end of November 1945, New Zealand was acquainted, shortly
in advance of their publication, with the official United States
"Proposals for a Conference on Trade and Employmentrr, and this produced
5s. rbi.d.
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a surge of concern. In late October, following on connunication
from London about the progress of American thinking, the New Zealand,
Government stressed to Britain that it
could not agree, unless adequate safeguards
were provided by other neans, to reduction
of preferences involving reduction in duties
to level which night seriously prejudice
New Zealandrs industries or the market in the
United Kingdom for our products. (36)
The Dominions Office assured New Zealand that the United States was
no longer, as had once seened to be the case, seeking to sweep away
all preferences. New Zealand was rrot entirely convinced though that
financial or other exigencies might not lead Britain herself to sell
imperial preference down the river.GT) Britain denied this but its
econonic weakness and dependence on the United States meant that the
issue lingered in the background. In his talks with the Chancellor
of the Exchequer in February 1946, Fraser stressed the inportance
New Zealand attached to her trade with Britain. He then nade an
unsolicited observation about American dissatisfaction with the
preference New Zealand showed for United Kingdorr firrns in placing
import orders. The inference could be taken that Britain needed
New Zealand as rnuch as New Zealand needed Britain - naybe ,no"". (38)
Practically, though, New Zealand accepted that there was room for
reciprocal bargaining regarding her duty preferences in the British
rnarket provided her position was safeguarded by other means, €.9. quotas,
bulkpurchase arrangenents and commodity agreenents. (39) Since 1939,
bulk purchase agreenents had far outweighed imperial preference as
devices for giving New Zealand favourable access to the British narket.
36. EAL04/4/ 1, MEA-SSD, 24 Oct 1945.37. EAL04/4/L, L7 Oct 1945.
38. 0035 W1662/3/28, 19 Feb 1946.39. EAL04/4/ 1, merno ST-PM, 8 Dec 1945.
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But they too were not necessarily cornpatible with Anerican plans
and interests. Fraser told Dalton that New Zealand and the United
Kingdom should settle the long-term contracts quickly before the
Loan Agreement cane into force. Dalton reckoned that there would
be no problems. Keynes, who was also at the neeting, added that
as New Zealand was a low cost supplier, she need not fear any pressure
fron the Anericans to nake contracts conforn to comnercial principles. (40)
This was realised in New Zealand too. A menorandum by
G.D.L. White of the Econonic Stabilisation Comnission, reckoned, on
the basis of reports of Anglo-Anerican discussions, that while Anericans
had rnisgivings about the contracts, especially if they continued for
long periods, they were not about to take issue with theur. They were
most concerned about Britainfs bacon contracts, which did not involve
rr l \
New Zealand. t*'/
The 1946 round of negotiations on the contracts coincided with
the debate in the United States Congress on the British loan, and
British officials did not want a favourable decision on that to be
jeopardised by having attention focussed on the conclusion of a
bilateral contract. Anxiety was not allayed by the pTesentation of
an American aide-memoire criticising a wheat contract made between
Britain and Canada as contrary to the Conference proposals. Accordingly
Britain asked New Zealand to refrain from publishing details of her
(43\
contracts,\*') The loan agreenent was approved and the loan becane
effective as at 15 July, on 25 July. At the same tine, New ZeaLand
DO35 Wt662/3/28, 19 Feb 1946.
EAL04/4/L, memo 6 Feb f946.
MAF 83/1668, draft cable n.d.; MAF 88/409, 14 Jul 1946; MBSO/2/6'
MF-NZHCL, 19 Jul 1946.
40.
41.
42.
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was infonned that the aide-memo'Lt,e was no longer a problen, and
therefore at the end of the month the details of the agreenents were
nade publi.. (a3)
Ful1 international negotiations on the basis of the United States
proposals began in October 1946. The fortunes of inperial preference
have been discussed in chapter seven, in the context of New Zealandrs
preferential treatnent of British goods. The tariff discussions held
at Geneva concurrently with the drafting conference which took place
there from April to August 1947 saw much negotiation over preference
but no threat to New Zealandts position in the British narket
naterialised. Difficulties over bulk purchase did not arise either,
although Nash had anticipated problens. He felt that the draft
Charter for an International Trade Organisation did not give a very
clear-cut recognition of bulk buying - were Britaints purchases of
New Zealandrs produce under the contracts rrsolely in accordance with
commercial considerationsrt as Articl" so(aa) required? Corrunonwealth
delegations agreed that the article as it stood did al.low bulk purchases
and no progress was nade in amending it. Nashfs request that New
Zealand record a reservation on the articles reached the delegation too
late to be effect"a. (as)
Nash hinself attended the Conference at Havana and endeavoured to
amend Article 30 so as to more fully validate the bulk purchase agreements.
But Wellington thought that as t'connercial considetations" was not
properly explicated at any stage in the articl,e New Zealand should not
43. EASS/2/Z/ 1, NZHCL-SEA, 25 Jul 1946.
44. As it ultinately became.
45. The record of New Zealandts participation in the conference is found
on EA104/26/I.
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attenpt to define it. By providing a special paragraph for bulk
purchase New Zealand wouLd be raising doubts - which uright not have
previously been veTy plonounced - about whether bulk purchase was in
fact allowed tmder paragraph I of the article. Britain, in particular,
wanted to avoid the debate which night ensue if an attenpt was nade
to be nore specific. Nash had talks with other Conunonwealth
delegations and in consequence withdrew the proposed anendnents to
Article 30. (46)
Reporting on the conference back in wellingtbn in June 1948,
Nash argued that the articles concerned with state trading did not
affect bulk purch"r". (47) American concern about the contracts,
despite the fact that there was now consideration being given to their
renewal for seven years, seems to have ebbed, perhaps in the light of
Britainr s L947 balance of payments crisis.
During 1948, the first murmurings about closer econonlc
association between Britain and Europe were also heard- The
establishrnent of the O.E,E.C. (Organisation for European Eeonomic
Cooperation) to adninister the European Recovery PLan through which
funds were channelled fron the United States to Europe, raised the
prospect of attenpting an econonic integration of European States'
The United Kingdon was involved in these discussions sone of which took
place at Havana. The New Zealand delegation there had talks with
the British on the possibility of obtaining frorn Britain an agreed
minute or exchange of lettels which would connit Britain to
IDLA.
Ibid., Dom'ini,on, 12 Jun 1948.46.47.
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consulting her Connonwealth partners before accepting any conmitment
to enter into a custons union. (48) Britain was quite adanant that
this would be the case - an attitude which was maintained at the
economic discussions held in London later in the year. Private
conversations held by G.L. Greensnith, Deputy Secretary to the
Treasury and New ZeaLandt s representatives at these discussions,
indicated that a Custons Union was seen as too disruptive and
unjustifiable until defence and finance artulgenents were very rnuch
more satisfactory. (49)
5. 1947 Negotiations: Short-term Profitability
The contract negotiations in 1946 had settled the nain outlines
of New Zealandrs meat and dairy export trades for the succeeding four
years. By providing New Zealand with unrestricted access for as
much butter, cheese and frozen meat as it wished to export, the
agreements made in that year pushed into the middle distance one of
the principal concerns of New Zealandts econonic diplonacy. This did
not mean that New Zealand had nothing to talk to Britain about, though.
The prices set in 1946 cane up for possible revision after one year
and the price movenents by which New Zealand judged its need for
increases - in the costs of inputs, the terms of trade, and prices
paid to other suppliers - suggested to varying degrees the need for
revision of the schedules. For Britain, the 1946 agreement did not
resolve all issues either. If the supply situation for either meat
EAL04/26/1, NZDH-MEA, 17 Mar 1948.
T6L/3/4, Greensnith-Nash, 27 Sep 1948.
48.
49.
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or dairy produce eased, New Zealand would find the price schedules
under pressure. Equally though, if the supply situation renained
difficult, Britain would be looking to New Zealand to increase its
outPut.
On rneat, there was little or no justification for a price
increase on the grounds of relativity with other suppliers as the
terms enjoyed by Australia and Argentina were rmrch the sane as
New Zealandrs. Australia itself did not think it had a case for
an increase in neat prices, except perhaps in sone ninor respects.
The Australians did think a case could be made fot sorne increase
based on the relative prices now being paid to Argentina, on the basis
that pre-war differentials in narket prices should no longer aPPl)r,
but they did not intend to raise this provided no further increase
was granted to Argentina for the year ended 30 Septenber 1948.(50)
The New Zealand Meat Board did not seek increases either, except in
the event of increases for Australia or Argentina. By the time the
negotiations started, Britain was deep in the throes of the balance of
payments crisis brought on by convertibility and the Board announced
publicly that because of this it would not seek price increases. (51)
Nor did other significant issues arise in the 1947 neat
negotiations. Walter Mulholland, chairman of the Meat Producers
Board, suggested to Nash that the lump sun payments be put into pric"r, (52)
but Nash disagreed, consistent with his Governmentrs stabilisation policy:
nor did the British raise the issue. Britain did agree to bring
EA58/2/2/1, Nash-Fraser, 21 Apr, 20 May L947.
Ibi,d., DMK-MMk; 14 Aug 1947, reply 23 Aug L947 Southetn CYoss,
30 Aug L947.
MB50/2/6, lrtulholland-MPB, 50 May L947.
50.
51.
52.
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pigmeat prices into line with the rest of the meat contract,
i.e. it would take the exPortable surplus until rnid-1950. And it
was agreed that discussions on arrangements to be made after 1950
would conmence before the end of 1948. 0n relaxing the restrictions
associated with wartine shipping, New Zealand made little Progress
except that Blitain did agree to allow sone beef to be shipped bone-in,
a case New Zealand pushed strongly on the grounds of donestic labour
shortages. This concession was not publicised as Britain did not
want to have to face pressules frorn major beef exPorteTs, notably
Argentina. The matter of meat shiprnents to secondary exPort markets
was again deferred - New TeaLand had in fact done little business in
those few destinations to which it was allowed to ship. (53)
While the rough approximation of New ZeaLand neat prices with
those paid to other suppliers nade for stability, the disparity on
butter and cheese prices had the opposite effect. Britain had agreed
to pay Derunark 242s. per cwt for butter in 1947 (cornpared with the
current New Zealand price of 175s.) and in May had settled on a price
for Canadian cheese, which would justify New Zealand in receiving 125s.
conpared to the current 102s. 6d. (54) The industry could be expected
to be in favour of pursuing the relativity argunent. As in 1946 the
Government was not so sure. It knew that the discrepancies were not
entirely real, that in the Danish case, for instance, there was a nuch
higher cost structure: even at 242s. the Danish producer was making a
loss and was subsidised by the Goverrunent. (55) Moreover the effect of
MBSO/2/6, 6 Jun L947, T Series 75 2/S/7, Duncan-MMk, 5 Sep 1947-
EA58/2/2/1, Nash-Fraser, 21 Apr, 17 May L947.
T Series 75, Aid for Britain report, 1948.
53.
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a substantial increase on New Zealandr s own econonic policy had to
be consid"""d. (56) As with neat, the convertibility crisis pronoted
caution: the Governrnent info:med New Zealandrs negotiators that it
did not
want to enbarrass United Kingdorn by pressing
for prices in line with those paid or likely
to be paid to the Danes for butter or Canada
for cheese. (57)
This suggestion carries Nashrs tlademark. George Duncan was prepared
to be cautious too, but this did not reflect political sensitivity or
a cornmitrnent to stabilisation so much as a recognition that butter
prices had to be kept in a realistic relationship with margarine
. ts8)prlces. -
What about seeking increases to neet costs? Britain had
expressed sone nild dissatisfaction with this criterion in 1946.
The Governnent did not want to tabulate costs in detail because labour
costs wele cuTlently under review by the newly-established Dairy
Products Marketing Comnission, But a clain was made for an increase
to 205s., which embraced increased costs and al.so sone allowance.for
relativity and terms of trade, despite the caveat on the fott"". (59)
Given that New Zealand had received a 24s. 6d. increase in 1946,
British negotiators expressed surprise at the request for a further 30s.
They did not think New Zealand had nade a convincing case on costs
and they rejected the terms of trade argurent on entirely predictable
grounds, stating that they could not accept it as a basis for
56. EA58/2/2/ l, Nash-Fraser' 17 May 1947.
57. ELSS/2/2/1, MMk-Duncan, 23 Aug L947.
58. Interview with Sir Arthur Ward, 21 Apr 1981.
59. Ibid., Duncan-NMk, 27 Aug 1947.
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deterrnining the price to be paid for any particular commodity, and
adding in t1ryical1y understated fashion that Britain herseLf faced
very unfavourable terms of trade. In the light of rrall relevant
circumstancesrr however Britain was prepared to offer zoor. (60)
In reply New Zealandrs representatives inforrned their British
counterparts that they were not Prepared to reconnend to their
Government acceptance of any price below 205s, George Duncan, the
chief negotiator, was due to leave for New Zealand four days after the
Iast neeting and having regard
to the exhaustive and frank nature of all
our discussions
he was convinced that New Zealandrs argument
would be merely repetitive and would not
bring any increase in the counter offer
rnade by the Ministry of Food. (61)
He proposed that any further action be initiated fron New Zealand.
Thus, for the first tine since the neat negotiation in 1940, the
nid year negotiating rognd did not produce a settlenent. It is not
certain why this was so. The difference between the two offers was
not all that great. A.H. Ward, who was a menber of the New Zealand
delegation, suggests that the British thought that New Zealandrs
concern for stabilisation would encourage acceptance of the lower
figure.(62) The United Kingdon Treasury too may have been putting
pressure on the Ministry of Food. Almost certainly difficulties in
60. EA58/2/2/1, Duncan-MMk, 3 Sep 1947.61. rbi.d.
62. Ward, Conmutd of Cooperatiues, p. 134. It also seems that Goodfellow
had told the British that New Zealand would settle for 200s.(interview, 21 Apr 1981).
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Negotiations with Denmark were another factor: at one point the
Danes ceased ,trippitg. (63)
It was Britain which eventually conceded. After having
made an improved offer of 202s. 6d. at the end of Qctober, which
New Zealand also declined, 205s. was agleed to. It is perhaps
therefore the New Zealand position which should be exanined.
Ward calls 205s. a rrfair asking price't but the New Zealanders adnitted
that it was not based so1ely on costs. This neant that the dairy
industry could have remained remunerative even if the full 205s. had
not been paid. New Zealand negotiators stressed in their submission
that they regarded the deternination of prices to be a natter entirely
separate from the question of what measures New Zealand night take to
assist Britain in her financial difficultiur. (64) But did New Zealand
in fact calculate that Britainrs difficulties, and in particular, her
need to get as great a proportion of her supplies as possible fron
@+^)
sterling area sources, would force her to pay 205s?
If this was the case then it was at odds with the publicly stated
attitude of the Governnent and the response of public opinion to the
crisis. The food crisis had not passed away conpletely in 1946:
the European winter of 1946-47 was exceptionally severe and proved to
be a major setback to the continentts fecovery, and the return of the
food supply situation to normal. The food crisis was given an added
dirnension by the dollar shortage. British officials had realised at
the end of the war that their countryr s financial circumstances made
65. EA58/2/2/1, 3 Sep, 12 Sep
64. Ibid., 3 Sep 1947.
6+h. Specoletr,,c !.,artioc puf lr; Jrr
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it imperative for her to secure as much of her supplies as possible
frorn the sterling aTea, and the abrupt termination of lendlease at
the end of the war in the Pacific reinforced this judgement. (65)
The negotiation of the financial agreement with the United States eased
Britain's situation but the convertibility crisis of August 1947
brought it back with full force.
6. The 1947 Crisis: the Lure of Dollar Markets
In Attleets cabled appeal to Fraser of 12 August 1947 fot
assistance in the crisis, New ZeaLandrs exports featured prominently
You wil.l have seen that I stated in the
House of Commons that the 1evel of
distribution of foodstuffs in the country
depends prinarily upon the degree to which
we are able to obtain supplies from other
than hard currency sources. Your Goverrunent
and people have recognised over the past years
our need for naximun supplies of staple food
stuffs fron New Zealand and I know of the
efforts which have been made to naintain then.
Any steps which can be taken to increase and
accelerate these supplies of meat, daity
products and animal fats would be a
contribution of the highest inportance in the
paesent crisis. (66)
Although the crisis was essentially a financial one, it was Britainrs
need for New Zealand food which nade the biggest inpact on public opinion
in New ZeaLand. The propaganda of the Aid for Britain National Council,
established in the wake of a parlianentary conference held in August
1947 focussed heavily on the need for New Zealand to
65. Keynes, CoLleeted Witi,ngs, vol . 24, p. 335.
66. EASS/2/2/L, 12 Aug L947.
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produce nore food and ship it faster ...
put more naterials, capital, labour, energy
into making more of the things that natter most. (67)
It recognised that
our nain contribution nust be in the
form of increased exports to the United
Kingdom .... The sound policy is for New Zeal.and
to increase our primary production to a maximun
and at the same time keep down our costs. (68)
The genesis of this rhetoric in wartine propaganda is apparent.
New Zealand would help Britain 'rwin the peace" as she had helped
her with the war. Through the district cornmittees of the Aid for
Britain Council which in large part took over the work of the Food
for Britain committees which had been established in 1946, individuals
were able to express their support for the cause by handing in
coupons and making food gifts available for Britair,. (69)
As was the case during the war, the rhetoric of support for
Britain was underpinned by the fact that Britainrs need was New Zealandrs
opportunity. Increased production had always for New ZeaLand, farmers
been the preferred solution to econonic difficulties: they had
resisted quotas in the 1930s and during the shipping crisis in 1941.
The Government, for its part, welconed the increased export receipts
which resulted from increased production. (70)
But there were points of divergence between the British and
New Zealand positions. While the public response to the crisis
generous and uncritical, both producers and Government sometimes
67. Ag 1037, Sep 1947-68. Ibid., n.d., Aug f948.
69. Ibid.n pass'i,n, see above, p. ?LL.
70. EA5S/2/2/L, LZ Aug 1947.
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things differently. The difficulties encountered in securing
agreenent on butter and cheese prices have already been discussed.
Perspectives also varied on the natter of prornoting New Zealand
exports to the dollar area - the first rneeting of the balance of
paynents conmittee considered this as one way in which New Zealand
could respond to Britainrs dollar crisis. (71)
The product about which there was nost discussion was butter.
Producers liked the idea of the high North American prices. New
Zealandrs owl dollar shortage would be eased, whilst the nove would
fit into the plan for opening - or re-opening - narkets in anticipation
of an end to the bulk purchase systen. This had of course been a
persistent if subdued theme in contract negotiations fron 1939, and
in the 1947 discussions Britain had agreed that in addition to the
existing reservation to specified destinations, New Zealand could ship
1500 tons of butter and 1000 tons of cheese to other markets.Q2)
The fact that New ZeaLand had just concluded a trade agreement
with the United States made the plan seen practicable as well as
desirable. Under the agreement New ZeaLand had the right to supply
the United States market with up to around 25 000 tons of butter between
November and February (the off season for production in the United
(17\
States) . t'"''
But if for all these reasons the plan was an appealing one, the
arguments against it proved nuch weightier. Any najor diversion would
7r.
72.
73.
T6L/I, I Sep L947.
ESC 2/8, NZHCL-MEA, 23
EAL04/26/L, 7 Oct 1947:;
Aug 1947.T6l/l/L, 31 Oct L947.
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almost certainly run into problems with New Zealand public opinion,
which would see it as entailing a sacrifice of the interests of
British consumers. When in mid-1946 Britain had agreed to the
diversion of a snall anount of butter to United States forces in the
Pacific, a storm was created until the New ZeaLand Govetnnent stated
that the shipment was being nade at the express request of the British
Government. The diversion of some butter to Canada at the beginning
of 1947 to neet a seasonal sholtage was made with the approval of
the British Governnent, but was still done with a minimun of publicitr. (74)
Watersiders cleated special difficulties. The turn-around in ships
at New Zealand ports was a constant source of dissatisfaction in
Britain and the object of representations fron the Brritish to the
New Zealand Government. But no other group exceeded the watersiders
in the fervour of their publicly-expressed support for Britain.
During the row in 1946 the watersiders had refused to load the butter
for a while, and it was thought this response night be repeat"a. (75)
If these domestic considerations were inportant, it was
nevertheless the case that they mirrored Britainrs own outlook.
Although she needed dollars as well as food, her preference in respect
of New Zea?and, was definitely for food. According to Ashwin,Q6)
token shipnents to the United States were acceptable, but nothing nore
could be considered. In October 1947 Nash was denying that any plan
to sell food products to the United States existed: a statement which
if not actually incorrect, did not convey an accurate sense of the
Governrnentrs thinking. In Decenber, reports appeared in the New Zealand
74.
75.
76.
EA58/2/2/1, SSD-MEA, 28 Dec
EA58/2/2/1, 20 Feb 1947, 12
T6I/\/I, 31 Oct 1947.
1946.
Aug 1947; T6L/I/L,31 Oct 1947.
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press of Canadars preparedness to import around 5000 tons of butter
(at the equivalent of 500s. per cwt). New Zealand officials nade
it clear that New TeaIandrs butter was allocated to Britain and
that it was nost unlikely that the Latter would agree to release
such quantities .Q7)
The other conurodities over which there was sone discussion
were hides and pelts. In L946/47 a considerable Proportion of the
total export volune of pickled pelts and calfskins had been diverted
to the United Kingdorn at the cost of sone ill-feeling amongst
Anerican traders. New Zealand proposed a re-direction back to the
United States urarket as a way of earning more dollars. This idea
met with differing responses from the Board of Trade and the Treasury.
The former, after some initial hesitation opposed: the latter was in
support. The Board of Traders preference prevaited. (78)
These differences were on the periphery rather than at the centre
of the development of New Zealandrs exltort trade to Britain. The
principal impact of the crisis was undoubtedly that it prolonged for
nore years the reliance of Britain on production fron sterling area
countries like New Zeal,and and therefore its preparedness to enter
into long-term a?rangenents so as to encourage increases in outPut.
tuserring Post, 15 Dec 1947 .
8 58/2/2/1, Sep 1946, paesim; T6I/L/L, 51 Oct L947.
77.
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7. 1948: The 0ffer of Seven Year Contracts
At the end of L947 a special food nission visited Australia
and New Zealand fron Britain. The heads of the meat and livestock,
and the dairy produce divisions of the Ministry of Food - Sir Henry
Turnet and J.W. Rodden respectively were members. The delegation
came to New Zealand in Decenber 1947 and again in early 1948 and
familiarised itself with the prospects of increased production in
New Zealand and the extent to which supply would be increased if
contracts were extended - thus was re-made the connection between
contracts and increased production. (79)
In May, Ministry of Food officials net to discuss the results
of the food mission. It was recognised that neither Australia nor
New ZeaLand would be likely to undertake far-reaching developments in
food production unless they were given long-term assurances. The
feeling in the Ministry of Food was that a aeport should be prepared
on the whole question of increased production in the Southern Doninions.
Australia and New Zealand, it was agreed
must be protected against a repetition of
the experience they suffered in the inter-war
period where their share of the United Kingdom
market was arbitrarily limited. If Australia
and New Zealand were to be persuaded to incur
far-reaching conrnitnents in regard to capital,
etc., in long-tern develoPment plans they must
be given adequate long-tern assurances
regarding an outlet for their supplies.
Sonething up to ten years undertaking would be
necessary. It would not, however, be
necessary to conclude ten-year contracts with
prices fixed for the whole period. What would
be required would be an assurance to Australia
and New Zealand that the United Kingdon would be
79, I{ard, Comnand of Coopenatiues, p. L43, D.P.M.C -, Annual Report,
1947/48, p. 23.
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prepared to take the whole of their
exportable surplus of the foodstuffs in
question with prices fixed for the early
years of the contract and a plan devised
whereby prices for the later years would be
deternined in relation to current circumstances. (80)
The need to provide an assured market was thus grounded in historical
as well as economic realities. However the Ministry of Foodrs
attitude was not one of unqualified generosity. It was felt that
the contract should be contingent on New Zealand - and Australia -
keeping their side of the bargain. One idea was for the United Kingdon
to ask the Dominions to submit detailed plans of the developments they
were prepared to undertake to increase food production in return for a
long-tern assurance of a narket. If Australia and New Zealand did
not fully inplernent their comnitnents, the United Kingdom woul'd then
have the opportunity to repudiate the balance of the undertaking:
or at reast to seek a revision. (81) The balance of need between the
two sides would be critical in deternining whether oI not Britain
could rnake this sort of condition.
If the Ministry of Food itself sought to linit its commitnents
this was even truer elsewhere in Whitehall. Treasury in particular
was not very keen on long-tenn contracts, anxious as it was to linit
Britainrs long-term commitments as much as possible. It wanted
agreenents to specify quantities and to be for limited periods only.
Apart fron the lack of freedon of manoeuvre, Treasury was afraid that
New Zealand and Australian currencies would become alnost as hard as
dollars. However under certain circumstances Treasury would agree to
contracts: it was in essence up to the Ministry of Food to fight for
MAF 88/410, 31 May 1948.
lb't d..
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then if it wanted then. Putting sone sort of. quid pro quo into
the deal would nerp. (82)
Anongst the interested parties in New ZeaLand support for
long-tern contracts was universal. In Novembet 1947 the Meat Board
had agreed to seek a ten-year agreement with the United Kingdon. (83)
The Dairy Products Marketing Cornnission, although prepared to pay
close attention to other narkets, recognised that the United Kingdon
was, for the foreseeable future, the only outlet for the bulk of
New Zealandrs butter and cheese. (84) The Governmentts attitude
was similar. Ashwin, it is true, thought it would be unwise for
New Zealand to accept the long-term proposals without several
reservations, but these were related to price, not to the principle
of long-tern sale to one narket. (85) The report of the Aid for
Britain National Council emphasised that there was no substitute
for the British market - if it should fail the danage would be
incomparably greater than any tenporary advantage that night have
been gained by selling at higher prices elsewhere. (86) Thus the
basis for an agreement existed in terns of pre-disposition on both
sides.
New Zealand representatives were to arrive in Britain in June
to discuss meat and dairy prices and possibly extension of the
contracts. Officials in the Ministry of Food were not sure that it
would be practicable to get apploval for extended contracts so
quickly, particularly at Ministerial level, and it was decided
82. rbid.83. MBs0/2/6.
84. DPMC, 4.R.,
85. T series 75
86. Ag 1037.
1947/48, p. 23.
2/8/1, 2 Apr 1948.
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negotiations should be limited to a determination of prices for
the following one to two years. The question of the long-term
extension of the existing undertakings could be left until the
autumn. (87)
Both Rodden and Turner pointed out, however, that New Zeal.and
(and Australian) negotiators night not be too happy at having this
question postponed, consistent with their own interest in long-tenn
contracts. At the talks held on dairy products on L7 June, just
after the New Zealand delegation arrived, Britain proposed an
extension to 1952, and when New Tealand pressed for a longer period'
Britain in due course agreed. With neat, things moved rather nore
slowly. At the talks at the end of June, Turner stalled, saying
that a long-tern contract was a natter of high policy involving
Australia as well as New Zealand and rnight well be deferred for
consideration trntil the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in
October (and suggested that in exchange for a long-term understanding,
Australia and New Zealand should undertake a definite prograrune of
expanding neat production for export). But with the announcenent
of the dairy contract, the New Zealand negotiators could not accept
this. Ashwin and G.H. Grigg (Mulhollandrs successor as Chairman of
the New Zealand Meat Producerst Board) told the British that they
would look foolish unless a similar deal were concluded on neat.
Grigg adnitted that at the previous meeting they had been prepared to
accept a letter of assurance to tide thern over the next two nonths
before the long-term contract could be negotiated but that with the
87. MAF 88/410, 31 May 1948.
are found on MAF 88/410,
Details of the 1948 contract negotiations
passi.m.
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butter and cheese announcement they now realised they had nade a
mistake. New Zealand producers would think there had been a hitch
and would slow dovm plans for increasing production - a threat which
constituted a neat reversal of Britainrs bargaining strategy.
British negotiators pointed out that their fears would be met by a
letter fron the Ministry of Food, at which point the New Zealand
representatives argued that an "irrevocablett letter was very little
different fron the contract. If it were enbarrassing for the
United Kingdon uts d. uis Australia to do one, it would be just as
anbarassing to do the other. Ashwin and Grigg did not want to
cone back in three nonthsr tine, and with Feaveryear, representing
the Treasury, present, it was agreed to recomnend an extension of the
contract to 1955. (88)
Yet again, the only product over which Britain would not accede
to New Zealandrs requests in respect of the contract was pigneat.
In 1946 New Zealand had been successful in assirnilating pigmeat to
the general meat contract. But Britain was not prepared to naintain
this parallel treatnent over a long tine period: over-production of
pigmeat could develop much more quickly than could that of other
meats. New Zealand representatives replied that any lirnitation of
production would create rra nervous unrestrr with producers: therefore
pigneat should not be singted out for different treatment fron other
neats. At least, there should not be any publication of a possible
limit. It was emphasised that as pig production was ancillary to
dairy production, and dairy farmers were not all that keen on it,
there was unlikely to be any najor increase in production. However,
88. rbid.
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the Ministry of Food could not agree to a seven year pigmeat
contract with a floor price only 7.5 per cent below existing prices.
Despite Ashwin reiterating his point that New Zealandt s situation
was different from that of other purchasers, it was agreed that the
exportable surplus would be purchased only until 1952, but for each
of the three rernaining years of the principal contract two yearst
notice would be given as to quantity to be purchased. (89)
How would prices be set under the long-term contract? The
norn in the past (1945 was the only exception) was an annual round
of negotiation. The criteria used to justify any adjustnent were
inevitably a shifting conbination of costs and returns on the open
narket. This was in essence an expression of the fact that there
were two considerations that could not be ignored - the need for
profitability and the pressure of the narket. In the 1948 agreenents
there was no departure from this pattern. Grounds for adjustment
were stated to be rfsubstantial changes in the export prices thus
current in any other important countriesr or I'any other substantial
changes in conditionsr'. No specific reference was nade to production
costs, but they were not excluded as a criterion either.
With a seven year period to consider, both sides could envisage
disadvantageous price novements against which the contract could provide
a buffer. New Zealand was still worried about a slunp, whilst
Britain could inagine a prolongation of postwar shortages and high
prices. This combination of interests suggested the establishrnent of
8s. rbu.
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a fixed floor and ceiling but this would have been very inflexible
oveT Seven years. A 7.5 per cent maxinum annual variation was
agreed on instead, that is, over any twelve-nonth period prices could
not Vary by more than 7.5 per cent. This deal was worked out for
butter and cheese. When the natter carne up for discussion on the
neat contlact, the sane figure was agreed to, there seening to be no
reason to depart from the precedent. Both sides were satisfied with
this result. Whether they would renain so over seven years depended
very nuch on what narket prices and costs would do in the interit. (90)
A clause in the meat contract spelt out New Zealandrs
commitment to increasing meat output for export by approxinately
50 000 tons per Eurnrrn by 1955, and dairy production by about 20 per cent.
But there was no penalty clause which would becone operative if
New Zealand failed to deliver. This was the sane situation as 1944'
and it was hardly surprising. If New ZeaLand said a contract was
necessary to increase production and Britain annulled the contract
because production did not increase, where would that leave her?
Certainly not with nore food and naybe with less. Moreover, because
of supply shortages New Zealand was able to nake her agreenent to
these clauses even nore contingent - details wete to be left for
settlenent after the necessary consultations had been made with the
Ministry of Supply about Blitainrs trndertaking to provide plant and
rq'r I
materials.'-^'
90. rbi.d.
91. ESC2/8, MF-UKHCW, 20 Aug 1948.
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8. The 1948 Negotiations: Short-term profitability
New Zealand had agreed with Britain on extending the contracts
but her own reason for wanting talks in 1948 was to get Britainrs
agreement to revising prices and other conditions of the contTact
for the 1948-49 season. For the first tirne the negotiations on
butter and cheese were conducted by the Dairy Products Marketing
Conmission not the Government. But in tems of the conduct of
relations with Britain, the change was not all that substantial.
The Cornmission was bound to take cognisance of Governnent trade Policy
where directed (section 12 of the D.P.M.C. Act 1947). Marshall, its
Chairrnan, and the chief negotiator in 1948 had sat with Ashwin on the
Economic Stabilisation Connission. Ashwin hinself 1ed the tean for
the neat talks. His negotiation of an end to 1uttrp suln Paynents
ensured that a najor point at issue between producers and Goverrunent
was put to rest.
Discussions in Wellington in the early nonths of 1948 had
concerned the case New Zealand would present for price increases.
It was not clear how sympathetic the United Kingdon would be to such
a request. On the grounds of costs alone, New Zealand could not
nake out a case for a very large increase. Meat producers could
clain on the disparity between their return and inported costs, dairy
producers on the grounds of relativity with other suppliers- (92)
But there was no certainty that Britain would accept either clain.
Moreover, the situation was complicated by the fact that the last
92. T series 75 2/8/1, 14 Apr 1948, meno.
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of the annual payrnents agreed to in 1944 had now been made.
The New ZeaLand Government wanted to keep the lunp sun Payments
in some forn or other, recognising that otherwise it could not
sustain the clairn that the money was paid to it and not to producers.
But if New Zealand asked for najor price increases on grounds other
than those of increased production costs, then Britain could
justifiably terminate the lurnp sun payments, as the formal reason for
paying then was as a contribution towards holding down production
costs through stabilisation poli.i"r. (93) By cornparison, both
the British Government and producers in New ZeaLand wanted to do away
with the payments. The latter wanted to include then into prices:
the former recognised that this would probably have to happen although
it night draw a reaction fron Austttti". (94)
The United Kingdom Treasury duly informed the New Zealand
negotiators that there would be no nore Payments and the negotiators -
Marshall and Ashwin for dairy produce, Ashwin for neat - proceeded to
take account of this in seeking price increases. The Governrnent in
Wellington was angry at the course events took. Although it
recognised that there was a certain inevitability about the termination
of the payments, it did not expect negotiators to accept that
compensation could be sought through increased prices. Ever since 1944
it had been stressed by Govemment spokesmen that the lunp sum paynents
were not paid I'in respect of produce sold in the United Kingdonrr.
e5. rbid.
94. MBSO/2/6, 7,9 Apr 1948; DPM MP, 4 Jun 1948; MAF 88/410, 10 Jun 1948.
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Now it would look as if they had been. But Wellington could do
little. A proposal that Britain subsidise her exports to
New Zealand had not succeeded. Britain herself had always regarded
the lunp sum payments as connected with produce prices- If they
went, New Zealand either took price increases or nothing at all. (95)
For butter, Ashwin urorked out that incorporating the lunp sun
payments into the price would bring it up to 219s. (fron 205s.): he
asked for 246s. The clain was helped most by its relative noderation
compared with the prices Britain was currently paying other suppliers -
in particular, Denmark. Danish prices were supposed to be steadily
reduced as peacetime conditions returned but this plan had broken down
and in the forthconing season Denmark wouLd be paid 321s. 6d. - which
still represented a loss to the Danish producer. (96)
At the opening talks, Marshall was able to stress that New Zealand
did not want the highest possible prices, certainly nothing like the
Danish price, but it did need an increase which would cover recent
import price increases. Although Britain did not accePt this last
argument, she clearly was prepared to accept some increase and a
figure of 235s. was agreed on - still well below the Danish price, but
an additional 16s. over and above the previous seasonfs price inclusive
of the lunp sun payment. (97)
Settlement of meat prices was rather nore protracted. Ashwin
advanced a clain for a 22.5 per cent increase which took into account
MAF 88/410, 18 May 1948; T40/648, NZHCL-I{EA, 12 Jul 1948; DPM MP,
DPMC/W-DPMC/L, I Jul 1948.
DPM MP. This file has nost details of the price negotiations for
butter and cheese.
DPM MP, passim.
95.
96.
97.
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a 7 peT cent increase from assinilation of the lunp sun payrnents'
The extra 15 per cent was defended on the grounds that a lecent
survey showed farn costs at 63 per cent above prewar conpared with a
rise of only 43-44 per cent in neat prices. Compensation for import
price increases and rnaintenance of relativities with Austral'ia and
Argentina nade up the unspecified balance of the clain. The forner
point was pushed hone by reference to Britainrs request that New
ZeaLandrrlive within her incomefr - a task which required a reasonable
irr*oru. (98)
Britain tried to disguise the increase it had paid to Argentina'
It had increased the naize rather than the rneat Price and was paying
out a t.10 nillion lunp sum. But New ZeaLand, farniliar with such
devices fron tines when they had worked to her advantage' was not
going to be so easily misled, as Turner recognised. On the other
hand, Turner thought Australia would be unlikely to accept that fParityf
between Australia and New Zealand entailed New Zealand getting an
extra 7 per cent because of its lunp Sun payments (Australia vras
asking for a 15.5 per cent increase). (99)
The Meat and Livestock Division passed Ashwin on to the Treasury,
and Ministry of Food officials thenselves had talks with Treasury.
The lattel was only prepared to give New Zealand the sane increase as
Australia - not only did this preserve parity, but it net New Zealandrs
increase in production costs. Treasury recognised the Ministry of
MAF 88/410, passim.
rbi.d.
98.
99.
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Foodrs interest in getting increased production but did not want
this to be at the cost of connitting the United Kingdorn to the
payment of high prices over a period of years - which would follow
given the price stability crause in the contract. Ashwinfs vigorous
argunent failed to shift the British frorn this position - perhaps
because Turner implied that Britain would have to investigate internal
arrangements in New Zealand very closely if any further increase
were conceded - an allusion to British dissatisfaction with the
stabilisation account systen. Accordingly the 15 per cent increase
was agreed on for the first year of the seven year contract. (100)
New Zealand may not have got what it had asked for in prices but it
had done all right. The revaluation of the New Zealand pound in
August certainly suggested that the country could absorb a decline
in the domestic value of its overseas earni.ngs.
While New Zealand welcomed the long-term contracts she lobbied,
as in L946, for modifications in the wartine distribution systen
yet she mrst have realised that there was a connecticn between
Britaints need for food, her need to ration it, and her preparedness
to nake long-tern agreenents. Butter had been identifiable to the
consumer by country of origin since october L947, but New Zealand now
wanted an assurance that it could be distributed r:nder its oun name
and through approved agents. rnmediate and conplete decontrol was
not sought - it was known that whereas butter now retailed at ls. 4d.
per lb compared with margarine at gd. per 1b, with unrestricted trade
the respective prices would be 2s. 6d. and ls. gd. But for meat, an
orderly return to private trading was hoped for, and also an end to
I00. Ibid., T series 75 2/8/1, MEA-NZHCL, 19 Jul 1948.
restrictions
feel able to
to change in
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related to the shipping shortage. Britain did not
accede to any of these requests or give any corunitnent
the near future. (1ol)
The relatively high prices received for butter and cheese and,
to a lesser extent, neat on world narkets encouraged New Zealanders
to think in terns of increased diversion of production to markets
other than Britain. This possibility had arisen in 1947 and had
been presented to Britain as a way of earning dollars, an algunent
that had not found favour with the Ministry of Food. There were
other arguments that could be invoked though. The developrnent of
alternative narkets would be useful "if and when it became necessary
to conpete with margarine in the United Kingdon'r, (102) and the tariff
agreement with the United States now provided an opportunity. More
potently, in that it exploited Britainfs interest in increased
production, there was the argument that increased dollar sales were
necessary to finance purchases of essential faruring inputs - e.g.
fencing wire - which were in short supply - or unobtainable - outside
the dollaT area. As some shortages became acute through 1948 this
possibility was often canvassed. (105)
In their respective discussions on dairy and meat natters, both
Marshall and Ashwin raised the question of supplies' Marshall linked
it to the need to earal dollars only obliquely, but Ashwin explained
that
101. DPMC, Annual Repont, L947/48, p. 25; MAF
102. MAF 88/410, 17 Jun 1948.
103. ESC 2/8 May 1948; DPM MP, 12 Jul 1948.
88/410, passim.
See also chapter 6.
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in view of dollar stringency ... his
Government night find it necessary to
ask the United Kingdom to agree to the
shipment of meat to other narkets including
the U.S.A. to earn dollars for New Zealand' (104)
However he went on to say that I'it was not yet clear . -. whether
this necessarily would in fact atise". New Zealand did not intend
to behave like Argentina, diverting production without consulting
Britain. Given the publicts outlook, it was not likely that the
Government or the producers could have got away with such a nove.
It was agreed on rneat that the matter did not need to be pursued
any further as provision existed for New Zealand to raise the
question of sales to other narkets at any tine. For dairy products
the 3 per cent ceiling on diversion renained, despite MarshalLrs
arguments.
It should not be assurned that this caused great dissatisfaction:
the sense of long-terrn commitnent was strong. In September, the
united states approached New zeaLand with a proposal to supply
approxinately 1000 tons of meat (nostly beef) per month to United
States forces in the Pacific. Not only the Ministry of Food but the
Meat'Producerst Board itself was against the idea. (105)
**********
Through the 1945-48 period, New Zealandrs neat and dairy export
trades continued to be the beneficiaries of Britainrs scarcity of
104. MAF 88/4L0, 28/29
105. T series 75 3/6,
above pp. 204-206.
Jun 1948.
Sep/0ct 1948. For further discussion see
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foreign exchange, and world wide food shortages. Both Governnent
and producers r4tere sensitive to Britaints plight, and shared in
consideTable neasure the popular wish to help Britain as nuch as
was possible. But conmercial considerations weTe not banished'
For one thing, Britain herself continued to adhere to comnercial
criteria in her dealings - and behind her was Pressures fron the
international connunity. And to New Zealand, conmitnents accePted
in anticipation of a depression seened rather restrictive when
narkets lrere buoyant and there was uPwaTd pressure on prices.
In 1948 New Zealand again connitted most of its dairy and meat
production to the British narket and accepted a 7.5 per cent
restriction on upward price movements in any one year. lfas this
unbusinesslike behaviour? Against the then current circunstances
one nust set continuing anxiety about postwar slunp, concefil (in
respect of butter) about conpetition from nargarine, the possibility
of a return to conditions of the 1930s, recognition of the
difficulties that could be encountered in other markets. Government
and producers disagreed about the enphasis but were broadly in
accordance. If depressed conditions did return both would be
satisfied with the arrangements. But if the market lenained buoyant
there would be friction.
CHAPTER NINE
The End of the Siege Econorny 1949-1954
1. Supplies, dollars and sterling
2. Inport po1icY
3. Wool after the war, L946-L952
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1. Sterling, Dollars and Sgplies 1949-1954
At the end of 1949 a new Government took office in New Zealand.
The National. Party, which was to hold power fot the next eight years,
was conmitted to a liberatisation of the econorny. It wished to
turn the country away fron some of the directions it had taken under
Labour. In the early months of 1950 it ended wartime controls over
prices, wages (somewhat ambivalently) and land sales. Petrol and
butter - the only two products still rationed - were decontrolled,
and licensing of imports was sharply curtailed. A resunption of
overseas borrowing for development purposes was considered. The
comnitment to Linit state intervention in prirnary product narketing
was upheld in principle, although the implenentation of devolutionary
measures was deferred.
How would Britain react to the changes? Since the end of the
war Britain had encouraged New Zealand to pursue economic policies
which restrained both consurnption and investment, thus easing pressure
on limited resources. The limitation was most acute in respect of
foreign exchange: constant invocations to save dollars and to lrlp
Britain save dollars by naintaining supplies to her, were a central
part of postlrar econonic diplomacy.
Nationalrs new policies were bound to put a strain on New Zealandts
collaboration with British policy. The pressures placed on the bulk
purchase contracts by New Zealandts prinary producers in 1950-52 will
be detailed in the next chapter. There would also be pressure on
inrports. The Government did not liberalise inports fron the dollar
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zone but demand for British production which rright otherwise have
gone to dollar countries would mount.
National did not intend to harn Britainfs essential interests.
In fact loyalty to Britain was one of the partyrs catch-cries.
This was particularLy true in the wider political sphere. Neither
S.G, Holland, the new Prime Minister, nor F.W. Doidge, his Minister
of External Affairs 1949-51, chose to believe that Britain was a
waning influence in the world, and they participated with her in
Middle East defence planning. Yet they could not totally ignore
the collapse of British power in the Pacific in 7941/42. The
solution, in l95l as in L942, was to seek to harness American power
in the support of British (Corunonwealth) interests. To Holland and
Doidge this was the appeal of ANZUS: it protected the Comnonwealth
in the Pacific against aggression from Japan, or any other power, as
NATO protected it in Europe. There was sone ernbarrassment that
Britain herself was not included in ANZUS - it was on this gtound that
New Zealand welcomed the establishment of SEAT0 in 1954.
How then did National reconcile its pro-British stance with
its new policies? National saw current British policies in party
political terms. A Labour Government heLd office in Britain, but
only just. In the February 1950 election its 1945 najority of 146
had been whittled away to just six. Moreover the British Conservatives
were as determined to see an end to rtstate controlrr as was the
National Party. Thus there was sone justification for arguing that
its poLicies were in line with at least some segments of British
opinion. In the meantine however, the anxieties of the incumbent
B itish Goverrunent had to be faced.
-29r-
In February 1950 talks were held in wellington between
British and New Zealand officials at which Britainrs diffidence
about sone of New Zealandrs proposed changes was nade plain.
The need to continue discouraging imports from the dollar zone was
stressed. The New Zealanders pointed out that this meant paying
more for inPorts, but their British countelparts thought this less
likely since devaluation. New Zealand raised the question of a
dollar loan. Britain agreed in principle but stressed that the
consequent investment should provide for an ultimate increase in
dollar earnings. (1)
These discussions about dollar earnings took place in novel
circumstances - a surplus on New Zealandrs dollar account of $7.3 nillion,
nostly a result of high wool prices. This increased the pressure to
spend dollars. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, with the
attendant blitz by the United States on all kinds of raw naterial
supplies was driving prices to dizzy heights, It was against this
background that New Zealand and other sinilarly placed Dominions
engaged in further dollar discussions with Britain. At informal tal'ks
held in Septenber 1950, at which New Zealand was lepresented by
F.W. Doidge, the new Minister of External Affairs, the stringent
criteria for dollar expenditure which had been agreed to in JuIy 1949
came under pressure. Britain wanted all sterling countries to
naintain the comnitment agreed to in 1949 to restrict total dollar
inports to a volurne not greater than that which corresponded in 1949/50
to 7s per cent of 1948 expenditut". (1t) New Zealand supported a rubric
I. ICI62/1. record of talks, Feb 1950.
la. ICL06/2, passt)m, SeP 1950.
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which took account of the fact that it night
not be possible for all of the countries" '
to restiict their expenditure on dollar
inports to [75 per cLnt of the 1949 level] '
We recognise that additional expenditure
nay be required for exceptional inports
notably for stockpiling arising fron
strategic needs.
We agree to continue to linit dollar imports
according to criteria of essentiality no
less stringent than those which have guided
the administration of dollar import policy
since JulY 1949. (2)
To agree with Britain meant accepting a policy difficult to
adrninister plus the retention of the rinequitable reference back to
1948" - sonething New Zealand had disliked when first introduced. 
(3)
In upshot the diffeTence of opinion prevented any agreenent being
reached, other than a bland statenent of the "need for continuance of
strict economy in dollar expenditu1"". (4)
The New Zealand High Comnissioner wanted to assure Britain that
the absence of an agreed mathenatical formula wouLd not frin any way
affect the continued application of the strict criteria of essentiaf ity", 
(5)
but Doidge preferred simply to assure the Chancellor of New Zealandrs
agreement to the need for strict u.orro*y. (5) Doidgets caution was
prophetic. The outbreak of war in Korea had Led to a great strain
being placed on the availability of a number of commodities, particularly
raw naterials, because of the requirements of the United States defence
procurement programne. In the early nonths of 1951 the question of
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
rbid.,
hi.d.
rbid.,
IDLA.
IDLA. ,
MEA-NZG, 20
NZHCL-MEA,
MEA.NZHCL,
Sep 1950.
5 Oct 1950.
Oct 1950.
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liberalising dollar inports into New Zealand was raised with
Britain, and the suggestion was broached again by C'M' Bowden'
the Minister of Industries and comrnerce, when he visited London
for a Supply Conference in mid-1g51.(7) Bowden nade representations
to Britain for ,'the maintenance of supplies essential to the New
Zealand econony". He asked that steel, copper and aluniniun be
exported to New Zealand at least to the same extent as in 1950, ild
that New Zealandts allocation of tinplate be substantially increased
as soon as the new British rnill at Mafgan went into production'
He also had a nunber of requests, covering itenrs such as zinc,
newsprint, textiles and textile rnachinery, &d some cheni."tr. 
(8)
Due to its own serious sholtage the united Kingdon could not helP
New Zealand with steel, copper, zinc, or nost chemicals' However'
New Zealand was told that newsprint would continue to be available
at the current rate, as requested, and that the supply of tinplate
and aluminium should improve later in the year' New Zealand was
also granted a special concession on zinc oxide'
While grateful for the consideration shown New Zealand, Bowden
stressed the concerar over the supply of essential materials, especially
steel - a shortage would affect exPorts and economic stability' At
the Connonwealth Ministerial Conference on Supply and Production,
which Bowden also attended united Kingdom representatives explained
the difficulties Britain faced in increasing steel and capital goods
production particularly because of the shortage of coal' ore and scrap'
Britain defended the bilateral agreements which were stil1 curtent'
T6L/4/2,
Jb1,d.
7
8.
MEA-MIC, 13 Jun 1951.
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explaining that only 20 per cent of total steel exports were so
allocated conpared with the 66| per cent directed to the Conmon"eaLth' 
(9)
By the tirne that the connonwealth conference took place in
Septenber 1951, what one observer called the "lunatic phasel of
United States stockpiling was ouut. (10) But whilst during that
phase the sterling areas balance of payments situation had eased, by
septernber 1951 deterioration had set in again. cornrnonwealth Ministers
at the Conference ernphasised that currency difficulties should not be
allowed to stand in the way of the procurement of the steel and
capital equipnent necessary for the expanded Production of raw
naterials. (11) on its side Britain explained that it was restricting
domestic steel consurnption and steel exPoTts to other than Cornnonwealth
eountries and those covered by bilateral agleenents. This would
presumably be meant to assure sterling countries that they could
expect to get their supplies from a sterling source'
The deterioration in the sterling arears balanee of paylents
had occurred partly because the United Kingdon could not neet all the
increased demands on it for capital goods and nany exports were
directed to Europe and Japan. In a memorandum in Novenber 1951 it
was pointed out that New Zealand would need to confine inports from
non-dollar areas to essentials, just as had been the case with the
dollar area during a crisir. (12) But through the renaining months
of the crisis supply issues did not play a significant role,
9. EA lO4/S/ l, MIC-MEA, 28 SeP 1951'.
10. fbi'd.., ootnini,on, 29 Jun 1951 , also EP, 10 Sep l'951'
11. Ibid., 28 SeP 1951-
L2. IC L02/2, 30 Nov 1951.
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reflecting the continuing underlying inprovement in the productive
capacity of Britain and other Conmonwealth countries.
In October 1951 Britain went to the polls again, and this tiure
the Conservatives did secure a najority. It has been noted they
had proclaimed very vigorously their wish to decontrol the British
economy. But the balance of payrnents situation they faced on taking
office meant that the focus had to be on energency neasures and this
neant seeking the cooperation of sterling holders like New Zealand.
Meanwhile there r{ere murmurings in 1951 about the fate of the
sterling area if countries in current account surplus with the dollar
area like Australia chose to make individual payments arrangements. (13)
As the Neu Zealmtd Herald had pointed out in August 1951 when the
crisis first broke, atthough it would be unfortunate
if Britain's apparent inability to record
Corunonwealth earnings in dollars were to
cause differences of opinion within the
sterling area
if Britain asked New Zealand to place further restrictions on dollar
spending
such a request would have to receive every
consideration; we are still probably paying
for some of the postwar dollar deficits of
Mr Nash. (14)
Consistent with this reasoning New Zealandrs cooperation was
proffered but with some caveats. At the Conmonwealth Finance Ministerts
neeting in January L952 New Zealand was asked to increase its surplus
T6L/4/I, 1951, passim.
NZII, 29 Aug 1951.
13.
14.
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with non-sterling countries fron an expected t5 nillion to t12 million.
New Zealand expected that it could neet the objective without
re-introducing inport licensing for all inports. (r5) However,
because of the continued deterioration of the Sterling Area position
New Zealand was subsequently asked to raise the target surplus to
t25 Milfion on an annual basis, and within this, a deficit with the
dollar area not exceeding t8 nillion - the expectation that New Zeal'al,:rd.
would have a deficit with the dollar area reflected the deterioration
evident in New Zealandrs own paynents.
While it was decided that there would be no general re-licensing
of irnports from sterling area or the European Payments Union (EPU),
irnports of motor vehicles from all countries were put under licensing
control, and all licences for imports fron'rscheduled countries'r -
nainly the United States, Canada and Japan - were cancelr"a. (16)
Although Britain would have liked New Zealand to inpose restrictions
on EPU country imports it was pointed out that New Zealand ran
surpluses with them, and it was likely therefore that New ZeaLand
could expect retaliatory action if she did lirnit t""du. (17)
At the beginning of July L952, Holland was able to inforrn the
Chancellor of the Exchequer that New Zealand had accunulated a surplus
of around t20 million on transactions with the non-sterl.ing area for
the year ended June 1952 within which there was expected to be an
approximate balance with dollar cotrntries. It was expected that
irnports fron both would fall in the future because of measures already
15. T6l/4/2, CE-MFn, 4 Mar 1952 (licensing had been sharply reduced in
19s0)
16. T6L/I, 11 Mar L952, Dominion, 13 Mar 1952.
17. T61/f, meno 50 Jun 1952.
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taken (in the case of the EPU countries this referred to exchange
control ), but Holland stressed that he did not exPect to
reach the 825 nillion annual taTget over the second hal'f of 1952 -
because of falling prices for wool, hides and skins, only a t10 rnillion
surplus was expectud.(18) Nonetheless as ln 1948-50, New Zealandrs
perfornance was better than she predicted. For the June I9S2/53
yeat, the target of a surplus on transactions with the dol1ar area of
t25 nillion was .*"u"dud. (19)
The 1951/ 52 baLance of payments crisis narked a turning point
in Britainrs postwal economic travails. It was the last such crisis
in which the foreign exchange constraint created supply difficulties'
both for Britain and for the Connonwealth. Recovery from the crisis
meant an end to a dimension of Anglo-New Zealand relations present,
with the exception of the lendlease years, since 1939. Dollars were
no longer rationed, supplies of manufactured goods, industrial inputs
and food were available in sufficient quantities'
New Zealand and Britain still had a conmon interest in building
up the strength of the Conmonwealth econornies so that sterling could
rnove to full convertibility with all other cumencies, including the
dollar. But the emphasis no$, was on measures to promote economic
growth and prevent inflation, rather than on the defensive strategies
which had dorninated the postwar period. Fron the Finance Ministersl
conference in January 1952, through the conrnonwealth Econonic conferences
of Decernbet 1952 and January 1954 to the neetings later on in the decade'
18.
19.
T6L/I,
Holmes,
PMNZ-CE, 7 Jul 1952.
I'New ZeaLand in the World Econonyf', p' 12'
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successive conmuniqu6s enphasised the connitnent to nultilateralisn
and the need for each countTy to take measures which would strengthen
its balance of paynents and thereby the reserves of the sterling area
as a whole. (20) This low key approach meant that Britain no longer
sought to directly influence the economic policies of other
Commonwealth states. Rather, she intended that the conpetitiveness
of her own econony would pronote confidence in sterling and its
continued role as an international trading currency'
WhiLe dollars were short, even dollar borrowing was frowned on,
unless it produced dollar earnings fairly rapidly or, if over the
Ionger-term, on a substantial sca1e. New Zealandrs particular plan
was to establish a plant in the Bay of Plenty to pTocess the tinber
resources of the Volcanic Plateau. Atternpts to involve British
interests failed and New Zealand looked to the United States for
finance. In 1953 a 816 million loan was negotiated with the
Export-Inport Bank to provide the necessary firnds.QI) The approval
given to encourage dollar investnent at the Connonwealth Econonic
Conference in Decenber 1952, although directed specifically at equity
investment, had given the green right to New zea|and.. Moreover Hotland
was able to point out that the tinbel processing project would linit
the need to inport newsprint from North America' Surplus newsprint
could be nade available to Australia with the sane end in ui"*' 
(22)
During 1953, the possibilities of attracting investnent eapital
frorn the United States were canvassed after the Anerican Arnbassador
20. Polk, Stenli.ng ,2L. Ibid., p. 13.
22. NZH, 4 Jan 1952,
ff ; AJIB, 1954 A1, 1955 A1.
1952.
pp. 263
19 Feb
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had raised the question directly with the New ZeaLand Goverrunent' 
(23)
rn the rneantine, Britain herself was no longer restricting the outflow
of investnent capital to commonwealth countries' Thus the resumption
byNewZealandofapolicyofoverseasborrowingcoincidedwiththe
reappearanceofconditionswhichfavouredsuchborrowing.
Thesterlingareahadexperiencedrnajorpaynentscrisesin1945'
Ig47, 1949, l95f-52. 1953 passed without any recurrence and it
became clear that Britain had nade a successful adjustnent to Postwal
conditions. Sterling area balance of payments crises were not
banished for ever: they recurred later on in the decade and in the
1g60s, and as long as New Zealand held reserves in sterling she was
involved. But such crises recurred in conditions sharply different
frorn those which had prevailed in the 1940s and early 1950s' No
longer was Britain a nation besieged. The diplonacy of the later
sterling crises lacked that foundation in acute political and resource
needs which had characterised the earlier episodes.
Policv and British Interes!!-r- 19a9$l
DespitethechangeofGovernnentinNewZealandtherewas
continuity in issues of comrnercial diplonacy in the early 1950s
the postwar years. Both inperial preference and protectionisn
at issue.
with
were
23. EA35/29/6, 14 Dec 1953.
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In the first postwar years, New Zealand had used its inport
licensing systen and inperial preference to direct imports towards
Britain, away fron hard currency sources in particular. It seerned
unlikely that the new Governnent would reverse this policy: its
criticisms when in opposition had been aimed at the Goverrunentrs
purported insensitivity to British interests rather than at its
care for then. Moreover National intended to - and did - dismantle
a large part of the irnport licensing systen, about which British
officials had so frequently rnade representations. A Board of Trade
was established in 1950 to adninister inport policy' although the
approval of the Departnents of Industries and conmerce and customs
was sti1l required for products which required licenses.
Nonetheless, it could not be assumed that all would be pl'ain
saiting. Under a planned regine, Britainrs share of New Zealandts
inport trade had reached historically high levels - liberalisation
would probably cause a decrease. secondly, there was detectably
less determination in New Zealand than there had been to protect
Britainrs favoured position. The idea that preference for British
goods and a low tariff would help New Zealandts exports did not carry
as much conviction as in past years. Perhaps because there were
opportunities in other markets the inclination was rather to see
existing preferences as a barrier because they precluded New Zealand
from making reciprocal arrangements with other countries. Moreover'
whilst New Zealand stil1 gave substantial preference to Britain, it
was not clear that she derived any advantage (or would when bulk
purchase ended) fron the concessions extended to New Zealand in exchange'
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In the 1940s Britain had invoked foreign exchange shortages as
a response to expressions of dissatisfaction. This became less
plausible in the 1950s. As with exports the decade saw a return to
a pattern of relations uninfluenced by any substantiaL collaborative
comnitments to protect scarce resources and nurture strength.
AttheGATTnegotiationsheldinTorquayinlg5l,NewZealand
sought British approval to t'unbind'r certain preferential' rates' as
part of the process by which she negotiated tariff reductions with
other parties to the Agreenent. Britain agreed to the changes in
return for. "compensationrrwhich took the forrn of binding other itens'
In addition New zealand gave Britain an undertaking, conveyed in a
confidential exchange of letters, that when revising duty rates it
would:
(1) Give British industry an opportunity^t9
put forward its views on the level of duty
under the British preferential tariff'
(2) Give the British governnent an opportunity
to put forward views on the necessary
preierence nargins and allow British industry
iul1 opportuniiy to rnaintain its places-in
the New- Zealand narket in full competition
with foreigr imPorts. (24)
Given the sirnilarity of these comrnitments to those entered into
by Nash in 1939, it is not sulprising that they renained confidential'
But the time was past when New Zealand trade could be locked into a
British patteen. While higher prices were rnaking other markets look
attractive to exportetis, lower prices had the equivalent effect on
24. EA58/212/1, DEA brief, 14 Jan 1958'
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irnporters. Moreover, if New
access for its exPorts to new
concessions in exchange' In
unsuccessful, attemPt to seek
margins. (25)
Zealxtd wanted to negotiate inproved
narkets, it had to be prepared to nake
1954 New Tealand made a further' but
British agaeement to changing preferential
0ther differences over irnport policy did not have so much long-
termsignificance,buttheydidsuggestthattheNationalGovernnent
was reluctant to al1ow sentinent a place in connercial life' criticisn
aboutpoolingoftenderscontinued.InSeptenberlg50Hol].andquoted
five instances of tenders at the same pric eQ6) - involving
respectively14,Lsrllrl0and5identicaltenders'Thefactthat
sone tenders fron outside Britain were half the British price nade
this practice particularly g"tting. 
(27) These compLaints recurred
later in the a"".d". (28) Additionally, there were conplaints about
the quality of British goods' One Member of Parlianent listed
crockery, knives, Saws and pliers as instances of British products
which were defective in one respect or another. 
(29) This was a tine
when feeling about the contract prices for meat and daLry Products
was particularly strong, and it. seened that what New Zealand was losing
on the swings it was also losing on the roundabouts. 
(30)
**********
25. T6I/I/8, memo 25 Aug 1954'io. gxse/z/2/l, DomLni,on, 7 sep 1950'
27. Ibid., Dom'i.n'i'on., 18 Jan 1951' 
--- 
!..,28. rbi.d.., w, 14 Feb 1953, EP, 1955' pagglm
29. Ihid., DomLnion, 4 JuL 1952'
30. Ibi.d.-, EP, Dec 1952 , EP' 14 Feb 1955'
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TheliberalisationofNewZealandtradearousedsoneconcefnln
Britain,andsotoodidevj.denceofprotectionisn.Thistooktwo
forms. on the one hand, National found itserf poritically unabl'e
to return to the open economy of the pre-1935 period' The idea
that the Governnents were responsible for naintaining enplolnnent and
incones was now widely accepted. This did not create problerns in
relations with Britain as such because it was accepted that such
policieswerenotofnecessityharnfultoBritishinterests.But
there was particular conceln about the protection which continued to
be extended to sone of the industlies which had grown up in the war
and postwar periods. The Board of Trade was supPosed to look at
sensitive areas and ways in which protection could be lessened' but
its inquiries proceeded very slowly. Nonetheless, British comnercial
interests had the opportunity to nake representations to the Board of
Trade, and however sceptical Britain nay have been of New Zealandrs
intentions in this sphere, the direction of policy was acceptable'
This was not so when controls wete re-inposed to countet a balance of
paymentscrisis.AIldtheabandonmentofdirectimportcontrol
without any comrnensurate cutback in domestic consunption or investnent
made it more than likely that New zealand would in due course face a
shortage of foreign exchange. Indeed through the 1950s the pattern
of expansion - foreign exchange crisis - contraction natching the
PatternofthreeyeatLyelections,becanneoneofthemostprominent
features of the countryts political econony'
Theconsumptionofresourceswhichtheexpansionaryphaseof
econonic cycle entailed was of dirninishing concern to Britain in
1950s. But there was accordingly that nuch less enthusiasn for any
the
the
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protectionist by-products of the contractionaTy phase. The first
areers
such episode occurred in L952, in the wake of the sterling/own crisis.
On I April the Government introduced a system of exchange allocation
for all foreign exchange, including sterling. The systern had much
the same restrictive effect as licensing, but it was administered
through the Reserve Bank, not through Customs and Industries and
Comnerce, and the fact that it did not restrict inports as such
allowed the Government to deny charges that it now accepted the
validity of Labour's policy. A basic allocation of 80 per cent of
the exchange purchased by private inporters in 1950 was to be nade
available to private importers in 1952 and additional exchange would
be made available to cover celtain contingencies. Implernentation
of the exchange control scheme which followed shortly after the
Governmentts decision to cope with the dollar shortage, produced a
revival of criticisur of New Zealandrs import policy on a scale not
seen since 1948. At the Commonwealth Finance Ministersr Conference
in January 1952 it had been agreed that freedom of trade within the
sterl.ing area v,as one of the fundanental advantages of sterl.ing area
cooperation. If any country wanted to ensure that it was in balance
on overall account it could act internally rather than through
restrictions on imports. In an an)de-memo'tre, Britain expressed the
hope that New Zealandfs measures, which affected imports, would go
no further:
Should there however be any question
hereafter of the unavoidable inposition
of new restrictions, directly affecting
inports from the United Kingdom, it would
be of very great assistance to the United
Kingdon Government if before any such action
is taken by any such government concerned,
they would be inforned of what is intended
. 6'.irfhdequate time to deal adequately with ...
ct'iticism ... .
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So far as the United Kingdorn Government
themselves are concerned, they have not
hitherto irnposed import restrictions on
goods frorn other Corunonwealth countries'
ind they would hope that the need to do so
will not arise... . (31)
In the event, the New Zealand Government did not take any further
restrictive measures. presurnably this was rnainly because there was
no need rather than no inclination. The secretary of External Affairs'
A.D.Mclntosh,hadindeedadvisedagainstawrittenreplytothe
aide-memo,Lre on the grounds that if New zeaLatd, agreed in fuLl with it'
it might be enbarrassing if the Government later 'rneeded to take some
uTgent action regarding inports and did not have nuch tine for prior
consultatiorr,,. (32) rn a rnessage to the Chancellor of the Exchequer
inJuly::gsz,HollandregrettedthattheneedtoensurethatNew
zealand achieved external balances for the year ended June 1953 had
required cuts in imports from the united Kingdon, - it was inevitable
given that such a large proportion of irnports were bought from the
united Kingdom. He expressed the hope that if wool and other exports
soldathigherpricesinlg53theseverityofthecutscouldbe
r?<1
mitigated. [55J But the Government did not revoke those measures it
had already taken: and through the renaining months of 1952 and into
1953 there was a steady stre.rm of representations from British exporters
whose orders had been cancelled by New Zealand inporters because
exchange was not available. (34)
A particular problem arose because, on 8 May 1952' the Reserve
Bank had agreed to make exchange available for goods on firm order
31. T6I/L, 22 Apt 1952.
32. T6L/I, 24 LPr L952,
33. T6r/4/2, PM-CE, 7 Jul
34. rCL02/2, MEA-NZHCI, 13
1952.
Jun 1952.
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before 1 April Lgi?, but failed to follow through its conmitnent in
this respect. In sone cases, diffiCulties were comPounded because
some of the firms affected were those with whon New zealand had taken
stTong action in the innediately preceding rnonths to obtain essential
tsslsupplLes.'
Whatever the adninistrative difficulties, the effective level
ofexchangeapprovedinlg52eventuallyreachedthefigureof
f.200 nillion. The recovery in wool prices made a big difference and
the import bill in fact was as high as in 195I'
In April 1953 a substantial deputation fron the UKMNZR Association
net J. Watts, the Minister of Industries and corunerce. It rnade
tepresentationE particularly over the fact that the basic exchange
allocation for 1953 was to be only 40 per cent of the 1950 figure'
watts pointed out that more exchange would be available above that
figure on application - indeed it was expected to allocate around
[17 million for private inports in 1953, which would allow the sane
inport volume as in 1952, owing to the drop in some material prices,
for instance steel , zine and textit"r.(36) The irnprovement in the
external. situation - for both the sterling area and New Zealand -
continued through 1953 into 1954'
From the Chancellor of the
which discussed the inProvenent
between this and measures taken
Exchequer, Holland received a message
in sterling area reserves and the link
in New Zealand but added the hoPe
35.
56.
ICL02/2, passim,
ICLAZ/2, neeting
Jun/Jul 1952.
2 Apr 1955.
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that you rnay find it possible in the
near future to carry still further the
lifting of restrictions on inports fron
this cIuntry ..' I need not tell you how
welcome we Lhould find it if you felt able
to let in inPorts freelY"' (37)
Hollandfs reply allowed the chancell"or to expless his pleasure
that your external position has now inproved
to the point at whi;h you have.felt able to
terrninate the exchange allocation systen on
imports. l*luch appreciate your assurance
that you have no ilsire to continue restrictions
on imports for any longer than is necessary' (38)
3. Wool after the War 1946-1952.
TheconcernofbothwoolgrowersandGovernmentwhenthefirst
postwar season comnenced in July 1946 were straightforward enough'
Producers looked forward to a retufn to i-"'"' ' rir;^t\'
The Government accepted that through the Joint organisation it had
thebestchanceofprotectingtheindustryandthecountry|s
finances fron a narketing and financial debacle'
Withhindsight,weknowthatsuchanxietieswereunfor:nded.
Estimates based on pre-war consumption patterns reckoned that it
would take at least ten years to dispose of all the acctrnulated stocks' (39)
But the market, contrary to expectatiorg proved far more buoyant than
this calculation envisaged. This was in conforrnity with the overall
s7.
58.
39.
T6I/L, 24 Jun 1954.
Ibi.d., 16 Aug 1954-
T161, 54551'L/Z wooL paper attached to
Helsley, 29 SeP L944-
18 Jul 1944; T161 545511/3
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pattern of world econonic activity, particularly in the United States,
and, with the Marshall Plan, in Europe too. At the end of the 1949/50
season, the fourth of the Joint 0rganisationts operation, only
484 000 bales were still stockpiled, compared with 13 000 000 at
the beginning of the 1945 season (of which around 1l 000 000 were
owned by Britainl. (40)
New Zealandrs experience paralleled that of the organisation as a
whole, with a few variations. During the wartine period, Britain
had been unable to use or se]| so utuch of the coarsel or inferior tyftes
of wool. This meant that New Zealand stocks were under-represented.
Coupled with the leaner weight of New Zealand bales, the slower
disposal of New Zealand wool, and the rising trend of prices, this
helps explain why average overall sale receipts per bale during the
Joint Organisation period were [33 sterling for New Zealand, compared
with f30 for Australia and t-23 for South Rftic"' (41)
As was to be expected with these conditions, the role of the
reserve price was peripheral rather than central to the operation of
the trade. Nevettheless there were sone periods where conditions
were depressed. In 1947/48 the Wool Disposal Comnission bought in
r08 000 bales, and by its action induced comnercial buyers to bid
higher, a result which pleased growers and influenced thern in favour
of a reserve price system. (42)
40. Edwin McCarthy, WooL Di.sposaLs
pp.15,105,110.
41. Greensnith, WooL Cormnt'ssiort, P-
42. Ibid., p. 15.
L945-52: The Joi.nt Otgmi'sation,
13.
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Expecting to be supporting prices, the Goverrunent found itself
anxious about high prices. But neither the Joint 0rganisation nor
the Wool Disposal Conmission had been established for anti-inftationary
purposes. The Labour Goverrunent resisted proposals to raise the
reserve price, but this could rnake little difference: the new
Government accepted a L2.5 per cent increase in the reserve for the
1950/51 season but even with that adjustnent it was still only around
50 per cent of the value of average current realisatior,r. 
(43) with
the boom in the early stages of the 1950/51 season as a result of
the Korean War, a wool proceeds retention scheme was introduced under
which one-thir'd of the proceeds from current sales were frozen' With
the price fall in 1951 the scherne was discorrtirr,red. (44) In the
neantime though, there had been discussion about narketing arlangenents
after the demise of the Joint Organisation'
It was intended that a review of operations after five years take
place, but so successful had the organisationfs trading been that
the 1950 London Conference met to discuss plans for the Post-Joint
organisation period. At the conference, the Australian, New Zealand
and South African Governnents put forward proposals which would use
the profit fron the Joint Qrganisation to continue sone kind of market
support. The najor objective of the plan as agreed was ilto set a
lower limit to najor declines in the wool market.t' Although there was
also reference to the sale of bought-in wool so as to regulate upward
price movements, there would not be a price ceiling to natch the price
ftoo". (45) It was natural that Britain, as a consuming country should
43. T40/721, memo 13 Jun 1950.
44, Greensnith, WooL Contnissi-ort, P. 21.
45. McCarthy, ,Ioint Organisatton, p. 133.
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be rather less enthusiastic about the schene than the producing
countries. It could involve her in the subsidy of producersf incomes
on a scale she had never envisaged for food producers. 0n the other
hand the large profits Britain had nade fron the operations of the
Joint 0rganisation - around t.100 000 000 - suggested that she could
at sone stage benefit frorn participation. However she postponed a
decision by requiring that the plans received general international
assent. (46)
In the interim, there was discussion in New zeala7Jd. The new
Governnent, in accordance with the philosophy of producer control, was
witling to accede to the wool growersr wishes, The latter had little
to lose. The prospect of a postwar depression had neant that all
concern was focussed on price support, and although prices had been
buoyant, this bias renained.
There was a nore specific reason too. Profits fron the sale of
wartime wool had accTued to Goverrunents and not producers. In August
1946, Nash informed the Wool Board that any profit would be used as
the nucleus of a post-Joint Organisation rnarketing plan or, if such a
plan did not eventuate, trwould be expendedrr for purPoses "as rnay be
agreed upon between the Wool Board and the Government.rr In exchange
the producers agreed to a similar disposition of the anount which had
arisen fronr their contributory charges to the Joint Organisationrs
operating expenses. Because of the profits earned, the sums
46. T40/72I. Second Interin Report
Greensnith, WooL Corwni.ssion, PP.}rgani,sation, p. 131.
on the Commonwealth lllool. Conference;
29-32; McCarthy, Joint
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accunulated (the charges were tied
than needed to ureet those expenses'
contributory charges was just ovet
profits accruing to the Governrnent
( 47)sterI].ng. - '
to realisations) were far higher
But even so, the total of
g6 000 000 at 30 June 1951'' whereas
amounted to just on f20 000 000
This was a substantial surn of money and the change of Government
nade it even more accessible. In his letter, Nash had stated that:
any post-Joint Organisation rnarketing
plan shall ... be acceptable,both to.the
Government and the Wool Board, that its
policy shall be determined by rnutual
agreement, and that its administration shall
te lointty by the Government and the
industry through equal rePresentation 
.on
any boaid or controlling authority' (48)
While Holland, in continuing the arrangement' specifically
alluded to Nashrs letter, the phraseology of his own letter was much
looser, simply referring to any plan trwhich nay be hereafter nutually
agreed upon ..."(49)
conforming to this outlook, the Government allowed producers to
take the decision on whether or not to support the new schene' Given
its bias in favour of price support, and the Governrnentrs own attitudes
to the disposition of profits, their support for the pLan, conveyed to
the Government in May 1950, came as no surpri'"' (50)
The International wool study Group, which met in october l'950,
47. Greensmith, WooL ConwrLssion, PP' 19-23'
48. f'bid., p. 26 quoting Walter Nash, 27 Aug 1948'
49. rbid., p. 27.
50. Ibid., P. 29-
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did not take strong exception to the proposals insofar as it
would benefit producers and consumers, whiLst given the existing
price level, it seened unlikely that reserve prices as proposed could
have a marked effect on the narket. However it was agreed that
there should be further consultation if buying-in operations assumed
substantial proportions. (51)
Whether Britain would have resorted to some other device to
escape from its commitnent to the scheme is not yet known but events
disposed of the p1an. Australian Participation was subject to a
referendun of woolgrowefs, who turned it down in August 1951. Thus,
the abolition of the Wool Disposal Conrnission on I January 1952 and
of the Joint 0rganisation as from 22 January, narked the end of
Anglo-New ZeaLand collaboration in wool narketing. New Zealand
however proceeded with its own reserve schene establishing, with full
producer support, a Wool Corunission, which came into operation on
I January 1952. (52) Thus one long-term result of the wartine
organisation of the wool trade was to involve the Governrnent nore
permanently in the affairs of that industry than had previously been
the case. But the resumption of free market conditions meant that
the Government could not exPect to enlist the British - or indeed any
other - Governrnent in support of its responsibilities and concerns in
this sphere.
51. ftid., pp. 32-34.
52. T4O/72L, MEA-NZEW, 12 Sep 1951; McCarthy, Joint 2rganisati-on,
pp. LZg, 131-54; CM(50)31, 12 Jun 1950, Greensnith, WooL CotunLsei'orl,
pp. 3s-38.
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1. Introduction
For both the dairy and neat trades the seven yea" contracts
agreed on in 1948 provide a base point for understanding the
experience of the succeeding years. For both trades two itrlpoltant
aspects affecting future profitability had been settLed. Meat'
butter and cheese were all to enjoy unrestlricted access to the
British narket and a modified form of floor price. Fron the point
of view of both Government and producers, this was very satisfactory'
Producers believed their livelihood was in good part protected by
this guaranteed access to their major narket, whilst the Governnent
could expect foreign exchange earnings to be stable over an extended
period. For their part, a buoyant rnarket kept woolgrowers happy
through the period.
while seeking long-tern security, New Zealand had always kept
an eye open for short-term opPortunities. Tension arose during the
period of rising prices 1950-52 when the Ministry of Food tried to
hold New Zealand to the contracts. On the other hand, when the
narkets weakened New Zealand became all too well aware that the
protection afforded by the contracts was less than conpl'ete' This
a$rareness was underlined by Britaints decision to retuln the food
trades to private hands. There was a surge of anxiety in both the
neat and dairy industries. Meat producers received a fifteen year
extension of their unrestricted access in 1952, but in future prices
would be determined by the market. For butter and cheese producers
the prospects were even nore uncertain. supply trends were nuch nore
unfavourable than for meat. There would be no guarantee of unrestricted
access and it was probable that they night face very low prices or
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restricted access or a difficult combination of both.
The National Government, which took office in Decenber 1949'
was corunitted to increasing produceT control of the rnajor pastoral
industries. This night have been expected to create difficulties
at any stage when producer and Goverrunent interests diverged: the
alternative that the Government would cease altogether to have
interests in these industries was hardly realistic, given that they
earned such a large ploPortion of New Tealandrs foreign exchange'
But for two principal reasons difficulties were avoided. Firstly'
in the dairy industry, the establishnent of the Dairy Ptoducts
Marketing Commission in 1947 had met nost of the grievances of that
sectoT in respect of producer control without the Governmentrs
interests being sacrificed. The Comnissionrs chairman, W' Matshall'
was respected by the industry, but also had the confidence of the
Labour Governnent, as demonstrated by his former membership' along with
Walsh and Ashwin, of the Econourie Stabilisation Connission' This
confidence was extended to Marshafl by the new Government.
There were also changes in the neat industry. From 1948 the
Meat Board acted as the Goverrunentrs agent in the handling of rneat
r1\for exporttr) a1d this satisfied the Board for the tine being' The
National Governnent did not take any furtheT steps to devolve power
until a surge of producer criticisn in 1952'
There was indeed little pressure to increase the degree of
1. \4850/2/6, 1948, il.d.
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producer control, and nore significantly, few major divergences on
external policy through the 1949/54 period. The main conflicts
between Labour and the producers had come over stabilisation policy
and the inpact it had on producer returns. The new Goverrunent, it
is true, tended like the o1d to be rather less deternined to push
Britain for higher prices than were the producers both because of
concern about inflation and a recognition of the interaction between
the different aspects of New Zealandrs econornic relations with Britain
over the longer terrn. But it was not so concerned as Labour had
been to segregate a proportion of any price increases once they had
been nade - of course the size of the funds already in the stabilisation
accounts made this a practicable as well as a politically wise stance'
And on other aspects of marketing policy there was very little
difference in aPProach.
During the 1945-48 period the elaboration of plans for a new
international commercial order had provoked occasional concern in
New Zealand as to the implications of such moves for its trade with
Britain. In the 1949-54 period such concerns ebbed. The failure of
many countries, notably the United States, to ratify the Charter of the
International Trade 0rganisation neant that the organisation did not
become operational. what remained was an Interim corunission
established to adninister the general agreement on tariffs and trade
reached during parallel negotiations. The signatories to G'A'T'T'
(as the Interin Conmission was known) met seveTal times during 1949-54'
in attenpts to lower tariff and other trade barriers between them and
Conmonwealth preferences in Britain occasionally became an issue'
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Prior to the fifth G.A.T.T. conference held at Torquay in
Septenber 1950, the United States sought decreases on British
preferences on dairy products and some other itens. Both New Zealand
and Australia made strong representations to Britain, but the United
States did not in fact pursue the mattet.Q) Sinilarly, prior to the
seventh session of G.A.T.T., held in late 1955, Britain stated its
intention of naintaining duty free entry of rnajor Corunonwealth p"od,r"ts. (3)
Intra-European cooperation did not naterialise as a threat either.
In 1949, it was proposed that Britain put a large part of her private
import trade on an open general licence to O.E.E.C. countries, but
not to the outer sterling area (because of Britainrs non-discrirnination
obligations to the United States). The volurne and nunber of itens
exported by New Zealand which would have been directly affected was
insignificant: for instance, such goods as meat extracts and canned
vegetables. But it was seen as a thin edge of the wedge and New
Zealand was relieved that the proposal was not followed up. Later in
the year there were further general discussions, with continental
countries feeling that Britain was not putling its weight in Europe, and
the United States continuing to prornote the idea of economic unification.
Again, Britain steered a course which avoided any conmitment to
integrate its econorny with Europe in any way which would prejudice the
discharge of its Conmonwealth responsibiliti"r. (4) The subsequent
focus of European attention on smaller-scale schenes, which culurinated
in the fornation of the Coal and Steel comnunity in 195O renoved the
issue fron the agenda of British concerns.
ESC?/LL, NZDT-MEA, 17 Sep 1950.
EA35/29/5, 2 Sep 1955.
ESC?/LL, 2 Sep, 12 Dec 1949.
2.
3.
4.
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2. Meat: The Market ltleakens 1949-1950
The meat contract negotiations in 1949, the last under the
aegisoftheLabourGovernment'werefair1yuneventfu1.The1949/50
season was nore closely linked to its predecessors than successors. I
In the postwar years New Zealand meat prices were comParable to those ,
paid other suppliers to Britain(5) 
"rrd there was little dissatisfaction
with the bulk purchase arrangenents. Nevertheless Walsh, who
represented the Governnent at the neat negotiations, was abl-e to
point to evidence that New Zealand prices were well below world levels.
Argentinars new (May 1949) price was estinated to be 25 Per cent to
30 per cent more than New Zealandts 1948 prices. Walsh sought a
7.5 per cent increase - in terns of the 1948 agreement - which the
British agreed ao. (6) But how acceptable would the price clause be
if prices remained buoyant? While in terms of narket trends New Zealandrs
price increase was moderate, ideas of diverting meat to North America
were also discouraged because of recognition of Britainrs need for
meat supplies. Diversion was mooted at the Conmonwealth Finance
Ministers talks in July but turned down by Britain who wanted neat
more than dottars. (7) Argentina had failed to supply the additional
meat promised under the February 1948 Andes Agreernent despite price
increases and promises of essential supplies. AustTalian neat
production was also slipping and New Zealand, depite all the efforts of
the Aid for Britain Campaign, exported 7000 tons less in L948/49 than
tn L947/48 - and this despite the pronise in the 1948 contract to be
5. Walsh 270, Rowland-Walsh, 19 May 1949.
6. Walsh 267, Jun 1949.
7. T6L/I/L, 11 Aug 1949.
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producing an additional 50 000 tons per annum by rSSS. 
(8) A
further approach was nade by New ZeaLand in Novernber but again the
Ministry of Food demurred, invoking the same reasons it listed on
the earlier occasiorr. (9) The one area of production to which the
united Kingdom was not so concelned to give special encouragenent
was pigneat and she refused again to extend the contract to 1955' 
(10)
on the other hand tetescoping cane to an end at the beginning of the
1949/50 season despite the continuing shortages'
If on the whole the outcome of the negotiations was satisfactory,
there were nevertheless sone indications of long-tern anxiety'
G.H. Grigg expected the price increase to be the Last one for some
tine. It was fortunate that prices could fall by no more than
7.5 per cent in any one year. (11) Walsh, for his part' in further
discussions with Strachey, the Minister of Food, after the contract
negotiations had been concluded, raised unsuccessfully the matter of
a fifteen year right of free entry as a way of encouraging New Zealand
to increase productiorr. (12)
In 1950 signs multiplied that the long period of shortages rnight
be coming to an end. Britaint s donestic production of neat
particularly of beef, had increased substantially since the war and
total neat supplies available in the united Kingdon were only 4 per cent
below the 1939 1evel. (13) This favourable situation encouraged
Britain to take a stTong stand against Argentina. For the new season
8. ESC2/8, Dom'Lnion, 17 Oct 1949'
9. T40/7, UKHCW-NZG, 22 Dec 1949.
10. Walsh 267, Tutner-Walsh, 30 Jun 1949'
11. Walsh 265, Dowinion, 3 SeP 1949'
12. Walsh 256, Walsh-PMNZ, 29 Jun 1949'
13. ESC2/8, NZH, 3 Ju1 1950.
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Britain proPosed to cut the average price for Argentinian neat by
over 7.5 per cent whilst Argentina, in reply suggested an increase
front'97tof'l40perlongton.Britain,accordingtotheMinister
of Food, was deternined to show the Argentina Goverrunent that 
trwe are
not going to be bracknaiLed any longer"'(l4) At the beginning of
July, Argentina suspended all sales'
Britain,sstrongstandincreasedawarenessinNewZealandthat
times were changing and that she could not necessarily expect to
secure increases on the scale of 1948 and 1949. NevertheleSS this
did not precl"ude New Zealand presenting a case for an increase'
In late l-949 Australian prices had been increased as an incentive to
increaseproductionandNewZealandreckoneditshouldreceivea
parallel increase as was usual. There were also increases in costs
for which New Zealand sought compensation again, as had been usual' 
(15)
Because of the deadlock with Argentina, the Ministry of Food
asked New Zealand to postpone the negotiations for three months: it
did not want to be seen to be discussing, and maybe paying out'
increases to one trading partner whilst attenPting to impose a
reduction on another. Moreover, Australia was in the throes of
negotiating a fifteen year agreenent and it seened useful to wait
until that was sorted out. (16)
The postponement caused some uneasiness in New Tealand' It
was most unlikely, said Ashwin, who had led the negotiating tean in
L4. Ag 2339, quotation from rnemo, NZHCL-SEA' 3 Apr 1950'
15. ESC2/8 , Press, 24 Jun 1950'16. Ibid,., NZH., i .l,tl 1950, Domi'n'ion, 1 Sep 1950'
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June, and then returned to New Zealand, that prices would be lowered
but that this needed to be said at all was indicative. Producers
for their part expressed some dissatisfaction at the fact that they
were being paid less than Argentinean exportu"r. (17) At talks with
the New ZeaTand Government in mid-July, Patrick Gordon Walker e:plained
that higher Argentinian prices reflected Argentinian tactics. (r8)
In the press there were reports of and corunents on renewed discussion
of the need for New Zealand to explore other markets besides Britain,
sonething the dairy producers had been keen on for years. This
discussion indicated correctly the fact that while the supply position
had inrproved the world narket for meat was far fron being a buyerts one.
When negotiations resuned at the end of September, New Zealand
returned to its case for a full 7.5 per cent increase, invoking both
relativities and cost increases, S.A. Chisholm (the Meat Boardrs
representative in London, and acting as New Zealandt s principal
negotiator) thought New Zealandrs bargaining power would be increased
because Britain had still not reached agreenent with Argentina.
But Britainrs strong stand with the latter expressed its deternination
to hold the line against all suppliers including Australia and New
z""t"rra. (19) The Ministry clearly did not think it would be able to
impose a price reduction or even a standstill on New Zealand but it
attempted to exploit the terms of the contract to hold the New ZeaLand
increase to a minimum. Australia had not yet reached agreement with
Britain. Currently, Australiars contract was on an annual basis and
hnd., NLII., 13 Jul 1950, Auekland Star, 10 Jul 1950.
CM(s0) 48, 20 Jul 1950.
MB S0/2/6, Chisholn-ST, 12 Oct 1950; ST-Chisholm, 12 Oct 1950.
L7.
18.
19.
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there was no floor price. Thus while Austral'ia could negotiate
price increases, it was not protected against falls. As New Zealand
was, it should no longer exPect its prices to move in tandenr with
Austratia,r. (20) In fact the Ministry proposed renoving fron the
contract that part of the article on price-fixing which allowed either
party to invoke the prices paid to other suppliers as grounds for
t".ririor,(21) (in the event, this was not pursued but held over to the
next yearrs negotiations). whil.e the Ministry argued that New Zea]allld
couldnotbothhaveitscakeandeatit,italsoreckonedthaton
cost grounds, New Zealand was only entitled to an average 5'5 per cent
increase and this in the end was what she accepted for mutton' lanb
"rd buef. 
(22) The only exception was pigrneat for which a 4s' 3d'
per pound increase was agreed - this was a substantial rise which broke
the 7.5 per cent barrier, but only over a small part of total
production.
Unsurprisingly,inviewofthediscussionathoneandtheprices
current on the North Anerican market, the question of diversion was
raisedbytheNewZea]'anddelegation.Asinlg4g,fortheSame
reasonsrBritainwasunlikelytobereceptive:lg4Shadbeenapeak
yearformeatinports-lg4ghadseenadecline.Thelong-tern
contract was airned at encouraging increased production - if this did
notoccuritwasevenlessacceptableforproductiontobediverted.
And the troubles with Argentina could only confirn this view'
NeverthelessthedelayinnegotiationsallowedtheNewZealarrders
20. Ibid,, 8 Nov 1950.2L. rbnd.
22. fbid., Domi'nion, 29 Jan 1951'
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fruitfully to Practise some quick
that in the first round of talks
release up to 5000 tons, without
Food, when the natter was raised
interpretation very reluctantly'
Our note of the rneeting
as to the circumstances
was taken. (23)
footwork. New Zealand reckoned
it had been agreed that she could
any conditions. The MinistrY of
subsequentlY, accePted this
inforrning Chisholm that
supports our view
in which that decision
In other words, the Ministry had intended that under certain
circunstances diversion would be restricted or prohibited. More was
tocone.NewZealandclairredthatanyneatsuPpliedtoBritish
colonies would be over and above the 5000 tons - the Ministry of Food
contended that it was I'clearly understoodrr at the neeting on 30 June
that such shipnents would be included in the quota. But trif Ashwin
feels strongly" the point would be conced ua'Q4) rn the final
agreement oil cornpany instalLations and such like were included within
the quota, but colonies were left out' A percentage - 2 per cent -
rather than a toru,Iage basis vtas agreed on - this favoured New zealand
too. (25) Nor, despite the trouble with Argentina, did Ashwin agree
with the Meat Board that the proposed shipnents to North funerica
should be postponed - they would not go until around April 1951 he
informed K.J. Holyoake, the Minister of Marketing and Minister of
Agriculture, by which tine there would certainly have been a settlen""t' 
(261
23. MB 50/2/6, MF-Chisholm, 22 Aug 1950'
24. rhnd.
25. MB 50/2/6, 20 Oct 1950-
26. T40/7, ST-MMk, 8 Nov f950.
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3. Meat: The Buoyant Market, 19!L-1952
Britain's dispute with Argentina dragged on' but with the
waterfront strike in New zea\and, the lure of high wool prices which
was affecting the sheep kill in both Australia and New zealand' price
hadbeconesubordinateininportancetotheneedforsupplies.
In April, a settlement was reached between Britain and Argentina which
revived the dissatisfaction which producers had felt with the trend
ofeventsinlg50.Althoughnotfullyapprisedofthedetailsof
the settlenent producers learnt that Britain was reportedly paying
more for Argentinian than New Zealand lamb despite the superior
qualityofthelatter.ItseemedthatArgentinawasbeingrewarded
forintransigence,NewZealandpenalisedforitscooperativeness.
TheChairnanoftheMeatBoardcomplainedtoHolyoakethat
as agents fo:r loyal producers [the 
-Board]
had for several years Past been influenced
by feelings of slnti-mentality towards its
kinfolk ii tfre United Kingdorn whereas on the
present outlook it appearia to have pursuedfo, i", ioo fottg r.r"ii"-policy of self-sacrifice. (27)
The Australians successfully induced Britain to abandon the agTeenent
which was to keep their prices fixed until the beginning of the 1952
season. Beef prices were increased and this increase was passed on
to New Zealand(28) lnaking for a total increase for New Zealand beef
for 1950/51 of around 7'5 per cent)' But this hardly satisfied the
producers who were now deternined to seek what was called rrworld parityrl
whichmeant,ineffect,keepinginstepwithAustralia.Throughthe
winter the press was full of comnents from producers, often echoed by
27. MB 50/2/6, MPB-MIvlk, 9 !'la)r 1951'
28. Ihi'd., McClurnpha-ST, 20 Apr 1951'
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editorial writers, about the inequities of the bulk purchase system
and,inparticular,thepriceclause'ThatNewZealandhadagreed
totheT.5percent'snake|asawayofprotectingitselfagainsta
slump was largely overlooked - or argued to be irrelevant' For
instance tne Mana,tatu Times argued that devaluation of sterling had
undermined the fairness of the 7.5 per cent clause and rerunerative
,19)
returns were necessary if farrners were to increase production' 
\'
Theknowledgeofopportunitiesinothelmarketsfuelledthe
dissatisfaction' G.H' Grigg, Chairrnan of the Meat Producerst Board'
said the renaining four years of the contract would be used to explore
theirpotentialitiesandhopefullytoestablishapelmanentoutletin
North R u"i.". (30) The often outspoken J.D. onnond, the deputy
chairman,wasreportedtohavesaiditwastineNewZealand|'twisted
the lionrs tail and sent some of our neat to the United Statesrr'(31)
In fact the lure of the dollar ignited as nuch as fuelled dissatisfaction
with bulk purchase. As the southland Ti'mes pointed out' if there
werenoAnericannarket,producerswouldnotbesokeentoleavethe
(32\
systen.' '
AlthoughGovernmentdisquietwasnotexpressedsovocally'it
toofoundtheexistingsituationunsatisfactory.InJunelg5l,the
Ministry of Food informed New Zeal.and that it was prepared to grant
the full alrowable 7.5 per cent increase for the 1951-52 season'(33)
Theexperienceofthelastfewmonths,inparticulartheoutcomeof
29. 9 oct 1951.
50. NZH, 29 Jun 1951'
31. MB 50/2/6, ExPress, 20 Jul
32. T series 75 3/6, SouthLan'd
33. T4O/648/3/sL/s2, NZHCL-MEA'
1951.
Times, 29 Aug 1951 '
11 Jun 1951.
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the Argentinian negotiations, nade the Governnent cautious about
accepting too quickly what had been sought in vain in 1950. It was
decided that as Australia still did not have a long-tern contract
[the negotiations initiated in 1950 had not yet reached finality)
New Zealand would let Australia go first in the hope that if she
secured an increase this would enhance New Zealandrs chanceS of
breaking the 7.5 per cent barri"t. (34)
Sureenough,Australiadidsecuresubstantialincreases:
7.5 per cent on lanb, 15 per cent on first grade mutton, 10 per cent on
other grades, and between 10 per cent and 50 per cent on U"uf' 
(35)
With this precedent New Zealand presented a strong case for an increase
over the 7.5 per cent ceiling. New Zealand had become Britainfs
largest and nost reliable supplier of neat - supplies fron Australia'
and from Argentina, despite the April settlenent' were falling'
There were good exPectations of substantial increases in output through
increased aerial topdressing of Pasture, particularly once the
sulphur shoTtage had eased. Low prices would discoutage investnent
and promote pressure for diversion to more lucrative markets ' The
increases New Zealand was seeking averaged about 18 per cent, compared
witharound24pelcentforAustralia,itwasestinated.Itwas
contended that the 7.5 per cent clause was a clause designed to liurit
fluctuations beween conmodity prices and prices generally' If the
latter had moved pernanently upward then it was not equitable to
maintain the former at the old level' (36)
34. MB 50/2/6, 12 SeP 1951.
35. Manantatu Iimes, 9 Oet 1951.
so. T40/648/3/5L/S|, NZHCL-MEA, 26 Sep 1951; MEA-NZHCL' 15 Oct 1951.
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The Ministry of Food, naturally, did not take all that kindly
to this presentation. Vague allusions were made to the fact that
New Zealand had decided to wait on the Australian negotiations:
now "difficulties'r existed. More specifically, it pointed out that
New Zealand had to realise that acceptance of the 7.5 per cent clause
meant that prices would inevitably diverge fron Australiafs at some
(37)
stage.'
Having given New Zealand the bad news, Herbert, the Ministryfs
repTesentative, said that nevertheless, Britain was prePared to make
special concessions above the 7.5 per cent ceiling as a special
"quality paymentrr outside the agreement on the understanding that
such an arrangenent did not set a precedent for future years, New
Zealand was hoping that the principle of a special adjustment was
recognised but the absolute amounts were not so appealing.
Traditionally rnost New Zealand meats had enjoyed a quality premiun
over their Australian equivalents. The increase Herbert was offering
around 9 per cent overall - would have wiped out these differences
alnost completely. This was not good enough. Moreover, it was
now known that Australiars fifteen year agreernent, the details of
which had been finatised, included provision for a floor price. (38)
At this point negotiations were interrupted by the British general
election, which saw a Conservative Govemment returned to office.
Subsequently the offer got bogged down in Treasury. Apart from
reaching agreement on a 2 per cent diversion (or 7000 tons whichever
37.
38.
Ibi.d., NZHCL-MEA,
IbNd., NZHCL-MEA,
1951.
1951, MEA-NZHCL, 18 Oct 1951.
12 Oct
16 Oct
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was the greater) nothing was achieved until the New Year. As in
1940, the delay forced the New Zea|and Goverrunent to set the fob
buying schedules without any firm knowledge of how they would relate
to the prices paid by Britain. The new schedules revised prices
by an average of 7.5 per cent over 1950/51. (59) In January Lg52,
Britain made a nuch rnore satisfactory offer, rrout of the bluerr as
Chishohn put it. The traditional preniun over Austral.ian nutton and
lamb would be naintained, although not that for beef. 0vera11, there
would be an average increase of around 15 per cent, nuch closer to lthat
New Zealand had asked tot. (40) An exchange of letters between
Herbert, the chief Ministry of Food negotiator, and Ashwin, conveyed
the understanding that the 7.5 per cent increase in the Heads of
Agreenent had not been invalidated by the settlenent:
We would hope that in future years' in the
best interests of both parties, inflationary
movements or other economic circunstances will
not again necessitate a special arrangenent
for increasing prices by more than 7.5 per cent. (41)
Mry had Britain agreed to override the clause on this particular
occasion after the initial resistance? In their exchange of letters
Ashwin and Herbert recorded the agreement of their two Governments to
the I'urgent necessityrr of increasing still further exports of neat
fron New Zealand, to Britain. As in April 1.951, the supply situation
had becorne critical. The volune of exports was declining frorn all
three najor oveTseas producers. On 26 Januar)r, S.G. Holland, the
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, in London for the Finance
Ministersr Conference, inforned Holyoake that stocks of neat - and butter
50/ 2/ 6, Chisholm-Evans,
50/2/6, 17 Jar. 1952.
50/2/6, Herbert, MF-ST,
17 Jan 1952; T40/648/3/51152, 20 Dec 1951.
14 Feb 1952.
39. MB
40. MB
4L. MB
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and cheese - were so low that the Ministry of Food would have
exhausted one or nore of these products before new shiprnents arrived.
New Zealand was asked to despatch at least four shiploads of neat
as quickly as possiure. (42) Ormond, who had gone over for the
latest stages of the talks thought that, quite apart fronrBritainrs
extremityr, it was
a golden tine to enhance New Zealandrs reputation.
Release of news would please public and arrival
of ships would save [U.K.] governrnent nost
serious embarrassment. (43)
The appropriate action was taken in New Zealand, with the new and
docile Auckland Waterfront Union agreeing to work two vessels on
Auckland Anniversary Day and also the following Saturday and Sunday. (44)
Britainrs plight did not just advantage New Zealand for the
current season. New Zealand was also offered the chance to nake an
arrangement like that which Australia had agreed on in 1951.
Australiafs agreernent was to run for fifteen years, from 1952 to L967.
It provided for unrestricted duty free entry to the British market
for all Australian neat over that period. AdditionalLy, a schedule
of minimum prices was agreed on and a provision for price increases
to be tied to changes in costs. Frorn Britaints point of view the
aim of the agreement was, as with the long-term contract with New
ZeaLand in 1948, to encourage an increase in production. The link
between this and the price increases was not spelt out in a
contTactual forrn but there was a linit on how much neat Australia
could divert to other narkets without Britainrs agreement.
42. r40/648/slSL/s2,
43. rbnd.
44. rbid., MEA-NZHCL,
PMNZ-MMk, 26 Jan L952.
28 Jan 1952.
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New Zearand was agreeable to accepting the fifteen year right
of trnrestricted entry. This pushed well into the future any
prospect of a return to the quantitative restrictions she had faced
between 1932 and 1943 and kept the quantitative issue off the agenda
of meat producer concerns. (45) But she decided not to make the
more elaboTate arralgenents to which Australia had agreed' It is
not certain why this was the case. unlike New Zealandrs 1948 price
clause,Australia'sdidnotcloselylinitherabilitytosecure
increases. Possibly there was a general feeling that such intricate
arrangements could become traps - for instance over diversion - and
that they were better avoided'
4. Meat: Producer-Government Relations and ffi
Negotiations
Thecontractnegotiationsforthelgsl/szseasonhadachieved
a nuch more substantial increase than had originally been expected but
a certain amo'nt of dissatisfaction lingered amongst producers who
were perhaps less inclined than the Governnent to see any relationship
between meat negotiations and Britaint s current financial difficulties
other than when it worked to their advantage'
When 0rnond left
as saying that since
for Britain in mid-January L952, he was quoted
the end of the war, Treasury officials in both
45. Ibi.d., PMNZ-MMk, l-4 Feb 1952'
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countTies had rrpretty well controlled the discussions on comrodity
prices" but this tine farmers would have a say. (46) Although the
Meat Board accepted the settlement reached, the General Manager,
J.J. Evans, for one, thought that anything below the terns accorded
Australia was rrnot only bad business but shabby treatnenT".(47)
Producer dissatisfaction with the conduct of the trade and
the role of Governrnents, New Zealand as well as British, nounted
through the year. The Governnent had got the Meat Board to agree
that the new seasonrs schedules would not be altered, regatdless of
what settlenent was nade with Britain. It was recognised that it
would be unfair to make any alterations to the schedule during the
currency of the season and irnpracticable to nake retrospeetive
payments. Nevertheless the discrepancy between the 7.5 per cent
increase nade in Novenber and the average 15 per cent increases
agreed on in January aroused the producerst ire. Meat prices were
adjusted in April to neet the fall in wool and hide values but
despite Government assertions that the January increases trbelonged
to the farnersrr, dissatisfaction lingered into the new season.
At that time, the Governnent announced that the new prices for 1952-53
would be paid out in full. In the meantine, further difficulties
had arisen because of the Ministry of Foodrs wish that the schedules
of prices be altered to encourage lighter-weight loads - a nove that
net with much producer resistance when an attenpt at partial
irnplementation was nade in March and Apri1. (48)
series 75 3/6,
50/2/6, 29 Jan
2339, passim.
Domini.on, 15 Jan 1952.
1952.
46. T
47. MB
48. Ag
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Although these problems seemed to belie the fact, the National
Government was not inclined to go looking for trouble wit,h the
industry. Increasing producer control was after all one of its
policies. Early in June 1952, Holyoake proposed to Cabinet that
the Meat Board be given a nore active role in neat narkets and
price'fixing natters than it had previously enjoyed and that, in
particular, the negotiations for 1952/53 be conducted by a delegation
in which a nominee of the Meat Board would play a full, rather than
a merery advisory totu. (49) The delegation eventually comprised
E.J. Fawcett, the Director-General of Agriculture, Ormond, now
Chairnan of the Meat Board, and Holyoake hirnself. Interestingll,
the Meat Board nade a special plea that Holyoake be included to give
political weight to the negotiating tean. Holyoake, a farmer, had
better relations with the producer interests than Holland, a
businessman by background and by his own (private) admission,
i11-informed on narketing issues. (50) Despite differences that
energed in the 1952 negotiations, Ornond praised Holyoake for the
part he played and claimed that at all tines rutual understanding
had been maintained. (5r)
Apart fron the complicated question of re-arranging the
schedules, the 1952 discussions focussed, as negotiations always had
since 1948, on the question of price increases. Although the Ministry
had stated that the deal made for IgSl/52 was exceptional, New ZeaLand
sought another substantial increase for the forthconing season.
She night have been prepared to work within the Heads of Agreement,
Ibi.d., CP(52)667, 11 Jun 1952.
MB 50/2/6, Jan L952.
Ag 2339, Domini,on, 22 Sep 1952.
49.
50.
51.
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but the operations of the new fifteen year Anglo-Australian
Agreenent, which comnenced with the L9S2/53 season, had an unsettling
effect. The price clauses of this agteement provided for Australia
to submit details of production costs as a basis for price increases.
In 1952, this secured Australia a 16.6 per cent increase for
sheeprneat prices and a mo1'e substantial increase for beef. It
looked to New Zealand. as if the discrepancy which had threatened
to open up in L}SL/$2 between Australian and New ZeaLand prices was
now going to become entrenched because of the differing price regines
under which the two countries were operating. New Zealandrs
negotiators subrnitted cost data prepared by the Meat Board and on
this basis the Ministry agreed to a I2.5 per cent increase. In so
acting, the Ministry was recognising that it had becone quite
gnrealistic to expect New Zealand to stay within the 1948 straitjacket
when Australia was being treated so differently. Accordingly, the
tern of Clause 10 of the Heads of Agreenent were revised. A naximrrn
variation of 10 per cent, rather than 7.5 per cent, would be allowed
between any two successive seasons. The extent of the increase up
to 10 per cent would be determined by the outcone of Australiars
negotiations, that is, New Zealand would receive any increase up to
l0 per cent paid to Australia. New Zealand could also clain a
further increase above that paid to Australia if its own cost novenents
justified it and this could exceed 10 per cent. If Australia got an
increase of more than 10 per cent therefore, New Zea|and could only
secure it if its own cost structure justified it. Additionally to
al1 this the price schedule for 1950/51 becane a floor price for
(tr 2)future Years.'"
52. Ibnd., draft press statement for Holyoake, 20 Mar 1953.
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The revision of Clause 10(c) of the Heads of Agreenent was
agreed to by the Meat Board, but not aL1 that bodyrs dissatisfactions,
nor those of its members, had been met. Ornondts participation in
the 1952 negotiations had not worked out particularly well. He had
withdrawn at one point in the proceedings, basically because he
wanted to push for a bigger increase than the Governnentrs
representatives were prepared to stand out for. Echoing his connents
the year before about twisting the lionrs tail, he talked of driving
a ttight bargain'. Afterwards he explained that
If Britain was in a tight corner ... he
would be the first to advocate that New
Tealand should do everything to help the
Mother Country. This did not nean ...
that the New Zealand producers should be
or become the lowest-priced sellers of
quality meat on the worldrs market.
New Zealand was
entitled to at least the same treatnent fron
the United Kingdom as is accorded other
countries. If we are exPected to take less
then the United Kingdom should be prepared to
sell its goods to us for less than it does to
other countries. (53)
This was, of course, a most unlikely outcone and nuch of the
dissatisfaction about the settlement was expressed in corunents, also
reniniscent of the previous year, about the inequities of the bulk
purchase system and the I'lew Zealand Goverrunentf s role in it. The
Domi,nion argued editorially that the Governrnent should step out of
meat marketing, something it had indicated sone tine ago that it was
prepared to do.
Then the meat industry would be separated
fron politics and there would be little
chance of the conflicting and enbarrassing
developnents such as have just been witnessed
in London, with the producersr representatives
53. Ibid., DonrLnion,22 Sep 1952.
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denouncing as unfair something all other
negotiators appear pleased to have obtained. (54)
This was being naive: no doubt deliberateLy so. What would happen
was not that politics would be banished but that a different political
interestr producers rather than that of the Government, would be
in the ascendant. The Government was concerned about inflation:
one of the reasons why it was reluctant to press Britain for bigger
increases was that its commitnent to pay out all of any increase
secured tied its hands in terns of dealing with the inflationary impact
of the increases, not to nention the spread effect that any such
increase would have on other producersr e.g. wheatgrowutr. (55)
Nonetheless, the Goverrunent, unlike its predecessor' had sone
receptivity to the idea of greater producer control. In Decenber 1952
the Board approached the Governnent with a proposal that it should be given
the ful1 responsibility for negotiations. After securing the
agreenent of the Ministry of Food the Government agreed, subject to
two conditions. The contract would rernain a Governnent to Goverrunent
one. The Board could negotiate within the franework of the contract
but any proposals for changes - for instance, to the price formula -
would have to be referred back to the Goverament, as the party to the
agreement. This meant too that the future of the contract was also
a matter on which the Governnent would take the final decision. (56)
The transfer of power put an effective end to the activities of
the Marketing Departmentrs Export Division. Its responsibilities in
54.
55.
56.
16 Sep 1952.
Ag 2339, Ti,mata Herald, 16
Ibnd.,11 Feb 1955,25 Feb
Sep 1952.
1955.
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respect of dairy produce had been transferred to the Dairy Producersl
Marketing Comnission in 1947 and now its role in meat export was also
ended. The Department of Agriculture became again, as it had been
before 1936, the agency of Government with prinary responsibility
for relations with producers, although, of course, Treasury played a
significant role, particularly in the person of its longstanding
Secretary.
5. Meat: The Weakening Market and the End of Bulk Purchase
1953- 19s4
Ironically, the change fron Government to produce" responsibility
did not make for any difficulties with Britain of the kind that night
have been expected fron Ormondrs criticisurs in 1952. In 1953, with
the revised article 10 operative, the negotiators did not feel they
needed to wait for the Australians to conclude their talks. They met
the Ministry of Food at the beginning of July 1955 and asked for just
l0 per cent more for lamb and only 5 per cent for beef - and expected
to be cut back on both. (57) This was indeed the outcone for Lanb
on which 7.5 per cent vtas secured. For beef New Zealand did wait
until Australia had finished its discussions and settled on 5.5 per cent
with a prerniurn for some particular products. (58)
Had power brought responsibility? The Hawa Ste noted that
Comnents made by farners suggest that they
are moderately satisfied with the price or
s7.
58.
Ag 2559, 2 Jul 1953.
Ibi.d., 2 Oct 1953.
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at least that they are not anxious to
start a debate on the subject. The
chairman of the neat and wool section of
the Auckland province of Federated Farmers
said rtWe are very lucky to get it. We
should be satisfied with something reasonable
.... The delegation over there has done very
well and the people of New Zealand should be
well satisfied.'r (59)
The preparedness to be satisfied with a nodest increase was matched
by the maintenance of the diversion quotas at the existing level.
It was the Ministry which suggested that a larger quota could be
discussed if the need arose. (60) The days of conparing North
Anerica and British prices were over for the time being. And nore
change was in the air, which may have induced a sense of caution.
The Conservative Government which took office in Britain in
October 1951 was connitted to ending the wartime procurement systen,
both because of pressure fron domestic trading interests and because
of a belief that market forces would produce a more satisfactory
supply situation than bulk contracts. It had been rmabl.e to act
in its first year in office - certainly not in regard to meat. The
unsatisfactory level of supplies fron Argentina and Australia neant
that meat was still scarce through nost of 1952 and the financial
crisis inhibited Britain yet again fron purchasing fron hard currency
161)sources. -
Inproving conditions allowed renewed consideration of the issue
in 1953. Paragraph 14 of the 1948 Heads of Agreement provided that
the two Governments would discuss the arrangenents to apply after the
expiry of the contract in 1955, not later than 31 July 1953. When
Jul 1953.
50/2/6, 7 Aug 1953.
50/2/6, EC Debs, 22 May l9S2; Ag 23J9, Domi.nion, ZZ Sep l9SZ.
59. 24
60. MB
6I. MB
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the New Zealand Government enquired about this in March 1953 it
was informed that British policy was to return the meat trade to
private enterprise as soon as possible. The agreenent did not, as
some producers had reckoned, require two yearsr notice of ternination
. (62)EO De glven. - '
The New Zealand Government felt that in terns of conditions
prevailing in 1955 termination might be detrinental to New Zealandfs
econony - it was thinking of the possibility that neat prices on the
open market night be depressed. Producers were anbivalent. Whilst
some were convinced that the bulk purchase system was limiting their
profitability, others recognised that it did provide sone security
which would not obtain on the open market. The Meat Board inforned
the Government that it was prepared to agree to a return to private
trading but wanted a two year notice of intention to ternin.t".(63)
The fact that the Meat Board was solely responsible for the 1955
contract negotiations meant that there was an opPortunity for
producersr views to be expressed rnore clearly to the Btitish than
rnight previously have been the case. The subject was not put on the
agenda, but there was an informal discussion. The Meat Board
representatives put forward two proposals: firstly that two yearst
notice of intention to terninate be given, and secondly that the
transition be staggered with a year of trading through private
agencies in Britain before the contracts themselves ended. This
presunably was intended to allow the producers to get some idea of
1953; NZHCL-MEA,
1953; MPB-lt{Ag, 28
62.
65.
Mar
Mar
Ag
Ag
2339, MEA-NZHCL, 11
2339, MEA-NZHCL, tl
I Apr 1953.
Apr 1955.
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what unrestricted market conditions were
borne by the Ministry of Food rather than
were unfatorr""bl". (64)
with the cost being
producer if conditions
like
the
Unsurprisingly in view of earlier statements, the Ministry
declined both proposals. In all the discussions, it ernphasised that
the British Governrnent wished to terminate as soon as possible -
hopefully at the end of the L953/54 season. It was argued that
New Zealand could benefit financially from this, that is, that prices
would likely be higher under free trading than under bulk purch"r". (65)
In November the British Government published a White Paper,
Cmnd 8989 Decontrol of Food and Marketing of Agri.eultu.ral fuoduee
in which plans were announced for a returrt to private trading on
I July 1954. The issue was therefore no longer whether or not bulk
purchase should continue, but whether it should end in ten or in
twenty-two months tine. The New Zealand meat contract was the only
one which extended beyond July 1954: Britain aPproached her to see
whether she would agree to an early ternination. The news of this
request was leaked in New Zealand, causing the Government and Meat
Board considerable enbarrassnent as it was clear they had had some
knowledge of the possibility since the niddle of the year. (66)
The Ministry wanted a decision by Christrnas, but New Zealand
stalled. The Australians were negotiating their future arrangements
MB 50/2/6, 8 Jul 1955.
Ibid., 30 Sep 1953,
Ag 2339, MF-NZHCL, 25 Nov 1953, MEA-NZHCL, 25 Nov 1953.
64.
65.
66.
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with the United Kingdon, including the question of a floor price.
The 1951 agreement provided for the floor price to be the price
ruling in 1950/51 or 'ras modified". It was thought modification
in an upward direction was not unlikely and it seerned worth waiting
for a settlement to be reached on this. If the floor price was
high there would be less anxiety about terninating bulk purchase.GT)
It was decided to send a delegation to London to discuss future
plans and in January producer interests net Government officials and
the Minister of Agriculture to agree on a conmon policy. A nunber
of points of view surfaced in the meeting. Ashwin felt that the
decision should be made entirely with reference to expectations about
prices. If prices were expected to rise, the contract should be ended;
if not, it should continue. Meat operatols, i.e. freezing conpanies
and exporters, wanted termination, but producers were still ambivalent.
They realised that if New Zealand was the only country sel,ling under
bulk purchases she would be at a disadvantage - presunably they thought
the Ministry of Food would not necessarily rnake the same effort to
naximise leturns as would a private distributor. A price guarantee
would nake termination more acceptable. There was also the question,
raised by Holyoake, of what would happen to existing stocks of New
Zealand and Australian meat. lllhat effect would their unloading have
on the ,natketr(68)
The general feeling of the neeting was sunmed up as being a
preparedness to terminate early provided there were adequate safeguards
2339, nerno DGAg-ffig, 24 Nov 1953.
2339, L9 Jan 1954.
67. Ag
68. Ag
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in respect of price and marketing, As the Cabinet memorandun put
it subsequently, New Zealand wanted the best of both worlds - in
particular, it wanted to be protected against a price fall but saw
no need for protection against a price 
"ir". 
(69)
There were two specific points on which the delegation, led
by Fawcett and Ornond, was to seek a favourable outcone before
agreeing to termination: fLoor prices and safeguards about
liquidation of stocks being used to influence the rnarket. It can
hardly have been a surprise to learn that the United Kingdon tefirsed
to consider the first of these. Informal conversations in London
in Decernber had made it quite clear that Britain would not agree to
a floor price in exchange for New ZeaLandrs agreenent to early
termination. (70) In March it was pointed out, to give a formal, cast
to a stance which was in full accordance with Britainrs own interests,
that the 1952 Anglo-New ZeaLand neat agreement provided that
quantities, prices, and other conditions of
sales will be determined in the ordinary course
of trade when bulk purchase is discontinued. (71)
However, Britain did agree that adequate safeguards could be available
to ensure that f'stocks accumulated under the contract would not be
used to bear (i.e. depress) the market'r. In fact the delegation
learnt enough to reassure itself that stocks were not substantial enough
to have this effect anyway.
For 0rmond and the delegation, this information tipped the balance.
Although they had no definite information they understood that the
2339, CM(54)218, 26 Mar 1954.
2339, NZHCL-PMNZ, 8 Dec 1954.
2339, CM(54)2L8, 26 Mar 1954.
69. Ag
74. Ag
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floor prices Australia had been offered were well below the current
contract prices. But in any case, Ornond believed that higher
prices were likely and would continue for some tirne. The real issue
therefore was
not whether we should carry on the contract.
The vital question is whether we can afford,
as the largest exporter of meat in the world,
to a1low other exporting nations to have the
opportunity of setting out into world narkets
and capturing the most desirable avenues of
trade in meat. (72)
Onnondrs fighting spirit was to the fore: although hardly in a
najor cause, as whatever happened free trade would returrt in 1955.
The Meat Board and other producer interests accepted the delegationrs
recomnendation and with this acquiescence, Cabinet approved the
termination of the contract as of I September 1954. (73)
6. Dairy Produce: The First Postwar Diffigulties, 1949-50
For the dairy, as for the meat industry, the 1948 Agreenent
provided a satisfactory protection against both market restriction
and a sudden fall in price. World milk product production increased,
and with that increase cane restrictions on market access outside
Britain. Inexorably too, derationing of butter and margarine came
closer. Under these circumstances the value of the contract
arrangements was appreciated by both the industry and the Governnent.
Nevertheless there was an undercurrent of dissatisfaction. The
TDLA.
tb1d..
72.
73.
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preniun on butter and cheese sold in markets other than Britain
remained substantial through to 1952 when it began to contract, and
then disappeared. Through the earlier period, despite accunulating
signs that the international milk products trade was beconing over
supplied, producers were ready to rail against a systen which
prevented then from taking full advantage of narket trends. In
the last years of the contract such criticisrns were rareLy heard.
The first round of negotiations was fairly uneventful. New
Zealand put forward a claim for the full allowable 7.5 per cent
increase for both butter and cheese, The usual argunents were
advanced - cost increases, as well as the higher prices paid other
suppliers. It was felt in New Zealand that although revaluation
night have been expected to nake imported inputs cheaper, increased
British export prices had largely wiped out this advantage.Q4)
Britain accepted the clain, albeit reluctantly.
In reporting on the agreernent Marshall, chief negotiator once
again, was careful to point out to producers that the period of high
prices was at an end. Dairy prices had already fallen heavily on
the continent and Government price support schemes were operating in
both Canada and the United States. More than anything else, the
high price paid to Denmark had aggravated New Zealand farners. But
negotiating at the sane time as the New Zealanders, the Danes had
accepted a reduction fron 32Ls.6d. to 27Ls.6d., for butter - the
latter only 19s. above New Zealandfs new butter price. In retunl
the Danes secured a long-tern contract on conditions similar to New
74. Walsh 270, Rowland-Walsh, 19 May 1949.
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Zealandrr. (75)
In 1949 these trends were straws in the wind rather than anything
rnore substantial and New Zealand sought an increase fron 3 per cent
to 7.5 per cent in the proportion of its exportable surplus that
could be diverted to other narkets in order to take advantage of the
current high prices. The issue was not just raised at the
negotiations but also at the Comnonwealth Finance Ministersr Conference
where it was presented as a way of increasing sterling area dollar
. (76)
earnr-ngs. - The Ministty of Food quite definitely preferred food
to dollars and Peter Fraser agreed with then.07) Diversion had
encountered political difficulties in the Past. At the Anglo-New
ZeaLand officials talks held in Wellington in February 1950, the
point was raised again. The British said New Zealand should divert
from its own consumption. This was surely tongue-in-cheek. The
butter ration in New ZeaLand had been increased in October 1949 and was
abolished in June 1950.
Through the 1949-50 season evidence accumulated of the
oft-predicted end to the sellersr market. In the United Kingdon
stocks of edible fats (butter and rnargarine) were at their highest-ever
levels and butter intports were increasing. Denmark, Sweden and
Norway were all increasing production. If rationing and subsidies
were abolished nargarine would probably sell for less than half the
price of butter. Prices were falling in North Anerica. Price
support systems carne into operation in both the United States and
Euening Post, 28 Jun, 2 Jut. 1949.
T61/3/5, 21 Jul 1949.
T40/648/3/49, Nov 1949.
75.
76.
77,
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Canada and New Zealand lost its small but useful narket in Canada
to prcotected donestic producers. There were rePorts that the
United States night have to start giving butter away - or dunping it -
although Marshall reckoned that this reflected a seasonal pattern as
nuch as a long-te"r aturrd. (78)
Despite these signs, as the negotiating season approached the
usual comnents were heard about the need for increases: observations
were made that the Danes were paid nore and that the term of trade
had moved against New Zealand. Cabinet, attracted by high prices,
approved another request to increase the divertable quota. Marshall
renained cautious. He pointed out that if narket prosp€cts weakened
the last thing New Zealand wanted to have done, was to have limited,
of its own volition, its access to the British narket. New ZeaLand,
he thought, would be unlikely to get good prices outside Britain for
much nore than 7.5 per cent of its exportable surplus of butter. (79)
Whatever Marshallrs view nay have been about the state of the
narket, he did not let then affect his presentation of a case to the
Ministry of Food for a price adjustnent. As in 1949, the full
allowable 7.5 per cent increase was sought on the grounds of prices
paid to other producers as well as increased costs in New Zealand.
Aware perhaps that Britainrs negotiating position was rather stronger
than in previous years, he emphasised that New Zealand had accepted
prices below the narket for years and some adjustrnent was it, o"d"t. (80)
T series 75 3/4/L, press reports Mar and Jun 1950.
T40/648/3/50, 9 May, 23 May 1950.
DPM MP, 25 Jun 1950.
78.
79.
80.
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The Ministry of Foodts negotiators must have been as aware as
Marshall of trends in the nilk products market. They toLd the New
Zealanders that they did not think New Zealand was entitred to an
increase at all. There had not been cost increases sufficient to
justify a price adjustment: large suns had been paid into the dairy
industry account which was in credit - to the tune of tlg s00 000
as of 51 July 1950. Moreover the Marketing connission had talked
of costs increasing sharpry over the next season which the Ministry
said broke the pattern of reinbursement for costs already incurred.
Not only did Britain expect to hold prices, it envisaged decreases.
It was prepared to forego inposing then on milk powders despite
the very weak state of that market but wanted them on second grade
buttur. (81)
Marshall took vigorous issue with the Ministryrs arguments.
They took no account of the devaluation of sterling and associated
cost increases. These and other increases had taken place over
preceding months. Payments into the Dairy rndustry Account were
entirely a donestic natter, and, in any case, were part of a
stabilisation policy which had benefitted the British Governrnent in
the past. Despite this rhetoric, the comnission did not present
detailed figures for costings and in fact based nuch of its case on
the preservation of relativity with other suppliers. On this Britain
made the expected comnents about higher cost structures and New
zeaLandrs acceptance of the 7.5 per cent band which other suppliers
ra 
"\did not enjoy. t"/ Marshall had been aware that the market was
81. rbnd., MF-DPMC, 7 Ju1 1950 (see also ward, connand of cooperati.ues,p. Is1).
82. rbnd.
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weakening but he nevertheless found the Ministryrs attitude
inexplicable. It was clear, he cabled Holyoake
that a predetermined decision (had been)
made on an overall policy basis when we
cannot get logical consideration of our
clain when we are told that we have in
past received a price which it was felt
was not duly justified, that there was
no substance in our claim ... we think
that a serious aspect of buLk selling has
been revealed....
Marshall was in no doubt
that if we lose this battLe, subject only
to protection afforded by contracts they
will under bulk buying, as a buyersr narket
develops, pay us just what they think is
appropriate and take only such quantities
as they think they need. (83)
Marshallts fellow producers reacted nore aggressively when news of
the deadlock in negotiations reached New TeaLand. Unlike the tine
of the last breakdown - L947 - there was no financial crisis to
induce a darnpening of the indignation. Farrners were joined by nany
newspapers which
broke well established habits to print sone
angry denunciation of the British governrnent
[which] used language oddly reminiscent ofthat hurled at an unsympathetic colonial
office eighty years earlier for it alluded
crfptically to conduct which if persisted in
night break up the Enpire .... (84)
These views came through in talks held in Wellington between the
Commonwealth Secretaty, Patrick Gordon Walker on the one side, and
Holland, Holyoake and F.W. Doidge, the Minister of External Affairs,
on the other. Holl.and said the widespread dissatisfaction in the
country was unfortunate at a time when 'rwe should be denonstrating
unity in all mattersrr - presumably a reference to Korea. He
DPMC-MMk,19
Neu Zealand.,
154.
83.
84.
DPM MP, Chairman
F.L.W. Wood, Thil
Coopetatives, p.
Jul 1950.
p. L72, qtoted in Ward, Conrtand' of
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wondered whether Britain was discriminating against a new Government -
this Gordon Walker rejected out of hand. Holland invoked his
predecessor - Nash had al.ways said New Zealand was entitled to clain
cost increases. But Gordon Walker would not budge. The nost
New Zealand could establish was that negotiations had not been
conctuded. (85)
An exchange of letters between Holland and Attlee followed.
Despite threats fron Holland there was no further progress:
My Minister of Agriculture and I have had
nunerous conferences with farmer organisation
representatives and there is strong feeling
over higher prices being paid to other
countries ... The Minister of Agriculture
feels that there will be an adverse effect on
canpaigns to secure greater quantities in
accordance with undertakings given when
New Zealandrs year contract was inaugurated. (86)
The Corunission published the correspondence which had passed between
the two sides and announced that it would divert up to 7.5 per cent of
the exportable surplus to other markets pending an overall agreenent
to take advantage of the higher price
obtainable ... to help offset the loss
we expect to incur this season on shipnents
to the United Kingdom if we have to supply ...
at last seasonrs prices. t87)
New ZeaLand had proposed the 7.5 per cent diversion at the opening
session of talks reminding Britain that it had accepted the 3 per cent
quota in 1949 on the understanding that it could raise the issue again
in 1950. Although the Minister feigned alarn rrat the proposal to
Vary a recently-concluded agreement'f 5 per. cent had been proposed as
the conpronise figur". (88) Learning of the Conmissionts intention in
85. T40/648/3/50, 20 Jul 1950.
86. Ihid., PMNZ-PMUK, 28 Jul 1950.
87. DPMC-MF, 25 Aug 1950.
88. DPM MP, Chairnan, DPMC-MF, 23 Jun 1950.
-349-
August, however, the Ministry reserved
issue again.
the right to raise the
7. Dairy Produce: Boon and After 1950-1953
Although the Ministry of Food may have had narket forces as
well as the contract on its side in June and July 1950, the Korean War
boom ensured that this was no longer the case by the end of the year.
In Decenber the Comnission decided to seek a resumption of talks.
It feLt that the world-wide increase in commodity prices that had
occurred since the outbreak of the war in Korea now justified an
increase - a perhaps unintended comment on the validity of the case
presented in Jnt". (89) More specifically, because of cost increases,
New Zealand was now selling at a loss - producers were receiving 254s. 
'
the conmission only 252s. 6d. (90) But the only agreement which was
reached was on diversion - 10 per cent - i.e. more than even New
Tealand had suggested in June, although with the caveat that quantity
of cheese so directed was not to exceed 12 000 tons,
Not until April was the Cornnission advised of the award of the
full 7.5 per cent increase backdated to the beginning of the season.
The increase was nade on the grounds that production costs had increased
exenplified in the increased prices to
producers which the New ZeaLand authorities
have since then found it necessary to pay for
butter and cheese. (91)
89.
90.
91.
fbnd., 8 Dec 1950.
T series 75 3/4, NZH,
DPMC, AnnuaL Report.,
19 Jan 1951.
19s0/s1.
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This was indeed the case. Insofar as it reflected a worldwide,
not just a New Zealand situation, Britain had little choice but to pay.
In other words, rnarket pressures were exerting their influence.
This situation undoubtedly facilitated a ready settlenent in
the 1951/52 season when another 7.5 per cent increase was agreed
without any difficulty in June. The tenor of the publicised
exchanges was in narked contrast to those of the previous year.
The Minister of Food, Maurice Webb, wrote to Marshall that he rnuch
appreciated his
renarks about the spirit in which the recent
discussions have been conducted. In a
moving sentence at the end of your sPeech you
said that we should continue to travel the
same road together .... Our interests in the
long term and yours are indeed conplementary
in this field. That is to say, we hope that
you will continue to send to this narket - where
the long term contract systern gives security
to your producers on the one hand and an
assurance of supplies to the United Kingdon on
the other - a steadily increasing tonnage of
butter and cheese. (92)
New Zealand was also able to take advantage of higher prices in
other markets because Britain agreed that up to 15 per cent of the
exportable surpluses of butter and cheese could be diverted to other
narkets, although this would include colonies and other territories
hitherto supplied out of the Ministryrs quantities. But opportunities 
I
were beconing linited. The Defense Production Act Anendments of 1951 |
prohibited imports of butter and skin milk powder and restricted inports
of cheese. Cheese exports to Canada fel1 as Canadian producers were
no longer supplying Britain. Nonetheless sales in outside narkets
92. DPMC, Annual Report, I95L/52.
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overall fulfilled the major expectation held of them, supplying
New Zealand with proceeds S1 517 000 in excess of what the sane
produce would have earned if sold to Britain. Butter sold at an
average price of 363s. (UK 314s.) and cheese at 212s. (UK 176s.).(93)
Through L95I/52 world erports of dairy produce declined.
Severe drought conditions in Australia, drought and foot and nouth
disease in some parts of Europe, and Britainrs inability to buy
Canadian cheese because of her dollar shortages, all contribut.a. (9a)
During the year, in response to a speciaL appeal fron Britain, the
Comnission agreed to supply an additional 4000 tons of butter and
cheese by reducing the quantity available for sale to other narkets.
These circunstances were favourable to New Zealandt s wish for
increased prices and the maximum 7.5 per cent was obtained for the
L952/53 season. The amount reserved for other narkets was adjusted
downwards slightly from 1951/SZ - 12.5 per cent of butter exports and
l0 per cent of cheese exports. A total of 8115 000 was earned in
excess of United Kingdorn realisations. This was sold at prices
which for butter averaged out below those sustained in 195L/52 -
555s. 5d., (down 7s. 7d,) and were about the sarne for cheese. Within
the British narket the long-expected reduction in nilk powder prices
was rnade taking then back to the LgSl/Sz level. (95)
The long period of rising prices, which had shown signs of
ending in 1949-50, was indeed now closing. Through L952/53, despite
93.
94.
95.
DPMC, Annual Report,
rbid., pp. 2L-22.
DPlvtC, Anrutal Report,
rgsL/s2,
L952/53,
p.
p.
24.
13.
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drought in Europe, supplies of most dairy products increased and in
the United States additional nilk powders were added to the list of
prohibited inports. Britain was no longer under financial constraint
as she had been in 1951/52. The price increases agreed for the 1955/54
season reflected this easing of the supply situation: butter went
up from 314s. to only 326s. and cheese fron L76s- to 182s. 6d.' -
increases of slightly under 5 per cent and under 4 per cent
r96\respectlvety. - t) The setting of quotas for sale outside Britain at
10 per cent for butter and 7.5 per cent for cheese reflected nore
limited opportunities. In L952/55 larger quantities of butter vtere
sold in Europe (a total of over 15 000 tons to the four largest
narkets) but the conditions which had allowed this had passed. In
f953/54 the biggest single rnarket was the U.S.S.R., which inported
just under 9999 tons and no other market absorbed nore than 1000 tons.
Sirnilarly there were drops in cheese exports, especially to the
United States: over-production brought in its train protection in
favour of domestic producers. (97)
8. Dairy Produce: Terrnination, 1953-54
As the signs nultiplied that the narket for dairy products was
taking on once again some of the characteristics last seen on a
substantial scale in the 1930s, New TeaLandts concern gfew about the
future of its trade with Britain. Although preferential duties
96.
97.
DPMC, Annual Report, 1952/53, PP. 3, 13-14.
Ibid., pp. LL-L?, DPMC, Annttal Report, 1952/53, p' 13'
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provided some protection the long-term contracts were even more
inportant. Since 1945 New Zealand had enjoyed unrestricted access
and since 1948 sone protection against downward price movements.
But helpful though these arrangenents were, it had becone evident
in 1950 that they would not provide that strong an arnour against
any persistently unfavourable trends in production and prices. Such
trends were clearly undermining Britaint s need for a bulk purchase
system, a sentinent reinforced by the ideological predispositions of
the new Conservative Government.
During the 1952 negotiations, the Comrnission had raised the
matter of arrangements in the period after 1955 and reached a
tentative agreement with the Ministry of Food on a continuation of
the current contract beyond that date. This brought the Ministry
some way towards concuming with the wish of both the Conurission and
the Board that the contract be extended for a further two years. (98)
But by 1953 it was evident that Britain was speeding up plans for
decontrol. While New Zealandts contract, Like Australiats and
Denrnarkrs, ran until 1955, there was nothing to stop Britain ending
rationing urttiut. (99) In a letter of 1 July 1953 the Ministry did
agree to give as much notice as possible of any changes which would
affect the New Zealand dairy industry, and in particular, of any
possibility of the decontrol of milk products. (100) In late 1,953
it was announced that rationing would end, and that bulk buying would
cease in 1955. Significantly, the Ministry could not accept
98. Ag 2339, 22 Apt L952; MEA-NZHCL, l1 Mar 1953 (sic).99. DPMC, Annual Report, 1952/53, p. 9.
100. Ward, Cormnutd of Cooperatiues, p. 159.
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responsibility for satisfactory marketing conditions in
Its marketing personnel would be returning to their own
its administrative staff did not have narketing skiLls.
19s4/ss.
organisations;
(101)
Whatever New Zealandrs decision about 1954/55, it was clearly
inportant for it to consider its long-tern marketing strategy and
the Commission took steps to acquire United Kingdon conpanies which
would allow it to participate directly in distributiorr. (102) But
whereas the meat producers were prepared to trust the open narket
ahead of time, the Cornmission thought that the return for butter and
cheese night well be less on the open market than under the contract
for one of two alternative reasons - a consuner preference for
margarine rather than butter and the likelihood of depressed butter
prices. Accordingly, the Commission attempted to negotiate prices
for the 1954/55 season. The Ministry proposed a 3.75 per cent
reduction in the butter price and the full allowable 7.5 per cent
reduction for cheese. The Connission thought that these prices
were not justified, particularly in the case of butter. Talks then
followed to see if the Ministry would agree to share with the
Corunission any loss - or profit - which would arise fron market
operations. Neither the Ministry nor the Minister would agree.
Assurances about the disposal of stocks wa-s'given, and also an
assurance that United Kingdon purchases of cheap butter in the United
States would total less than 10 000 tons.(103) (on this latter issue
New Zealand feeling was anbivalent - Marshall, for one, was as concerned
to keep butter conpetitive with nargarine, which coutd mean welconing
I}L. Ibid., p. 161.
I02. Ibid., pp. 159-60.
103. DPMC, Anruml Report, L953/54, passi.m.
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imports to hold the price down, as he was to restrict access of
other suppliers to the British market). (104) A further safeguard
for the season was that negotiations could be reopened if either
Australia or Denrnark secured more advantageous tenns than those
offered to New Zealand, but this did not eventuate.
With these assurances and after full consultation with Holyoake,
the Cornnission and the Board decided that it would be wise to
terminate. They felt there was
a danger of long-term injury to New Zealand
and its dairy trade if the contract were
continued and the freedorn which both trade
and consurners are expecting is not realised.
The plain fact is, that the British people are
heartily tired of control of food in all its
related aspects, and that bulk selling of dairy
produce generally speaking has reached the end
of its acceptability. (105)
So the dairy industry foll,owed the neat industry into a career on
the open market which it had foregone, without too nuch hesitation,
fifteen years earl.ier.
**********
The period 1949-54 has a certain unity in the history of
New Zealandrs export diplonacy with Britain, because it covers the
last years of the long-tern contracts, The security for its trade
in neat, butter and cheese which New Zealand had secured in 1948
proved to be alnost entirely contingent on Britainrs shortages of
both food and foreign currencies. As these shoftages ebbed -
L04. T40/648, NZHCL-MEA, 8 May 1954.
105. DPMC, Anrual Repoz,t, 1953/54, p. 7.
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hesitantly in 1949/50, with increasing monentun fron 1952, so did
Britaints corunitnent to the long-term contTact systen. New Zealand
faced the prospect of a return to market conditions and a need to
fight as it had in the 1930s for even linited protection of its
position in the British narket. New Zealand producers and to a
nore linited extent the Government had found the bulk purchase systen
restrictive in the years L950/52 when New Zealandrs contract prices
were often substantially below world prices. But world butter and
cheese prices fell fron 1952 and by that date there was a close
approxination in meat prices too as there had been before 1950.
Such a feeling of restrictiveness was very nuch therefore the ninor
thene to the more pronounced feeling that New Zealand, through the
contracts, had some security against both a collapse in the price level
and restriction in its access to the narket.
Although tenninated nine years after the end of World War If'
the contracts remained at bottom an expression of the dislocation
which that conflict had entailed. Over most of that period Britainfs
shortages of food and foreign exchange meant favourable trading
conditions for New Zealandts exports. New Zealandrs acceptance of
the contracts meant that she did not exploit these conditions as ruch
as at tilnes she rnight have. This was not because the contracts
provided unqualified security - this was never Britaints intention.
But New Zealand was anxious about the inpact war might have on her
economy and controlled trading seened a better bet than the vagaries
of the open narket - palticularly to a Labour Government. Foreign
policy and sentiment both endorsed the choice.
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In peacetime, persistently buoyant market pressures might
have driven New Zealand out of the system. As it transpired, it
was Britain which determined on the restoration of the open narket.
It was thus with some apprehension that New Zealandrs food export
trades faced the kind of insecure conmercial environment which
they had last known in 1939.
CFIAPTER ELEVEN
After I954
- 359-
The econonic relationship between New Zealand and Britain
evolved within the franework of Britainrs free trade Ernpire.
New Zealand was self-governing in natters of conrnercial policy' as
in other spheres. At the sane tine her economic Life was closely
interl.ocked with, and dependent on, the British econony.
In the early 1.930s New Zealand faced severe economic
difficulties, and she sought assistance fron Britain. Britain was
prepared to make concessions but they fell far short of New Zealandrs
expectations. Where else could New ZeaLand turn though? The
international econornic climate was hostile to attempts to diversify
economic relations. Plans to protect New Zealandersr living
standards fron the unfavourable consequences of external econonic
fluctuations also ran into difficulties, not Least because Britain
was reluctant to finance such experimentation.
Against this background Britainf s policies in ltlorld War II
narked a sharp change in direction. Britain sought New Zealandrs
col.laboration in its policy of conserving and mobilising resources
for the war effort. New Zealandts dependence on Britain neant that
cooperation made sense. A policy of conservation of resources also
accorded in nany instances with the Governmentrs wish to linit
overseas indebtedness and control imPorts. New Zealandt s loyalty
to, and political association with Britain - both underlined by her
belligerent status - reinforced the commitment to econonic
collaboration. There were difficulties of course. In the niddle
years of the war, New Zealand found some of Britainrs comnitments
to her were not as unqualified as she had hoped. 0n the other hand,
- 360-
New Zealand herself did not always practice as much restraint as
stages of the war,
to bargain hard over
Britain would have wished. In the latter
the world food shortage encouraged New Zealand
the terrns of her bulk purchase contracts.
Britaints postwar shortage of foreign exchange neant that the
period of stringency continued for nearly a decade. New Zealand
continued to give Britain her support for nuch the same reasons which
had obtained during the war. Pressures to diversify trade relations
were felt in New ZeaIand, whilst Britain for her part occasionally
took issue with New Zealandrs overly restrictive import policy, but
by and large the consensus held. The National Governnent which
took office at the end of 1949 was particularly connitted to
liberalisation. Fortunately its first nonths in power were a
relatively buoyant time econonically. Later, in 1953, Britain eased
foreign exchange restrictions. In 1954 rationing for meat and dairy
produce ended. The period of stringency uras over.
Did this mean that New Zealand-British economic dipLornacy would
revert to its pre-World War II character? In the dairy industry in
particular there were some farniliar signs. In the first year of open
narket trading the Dairy Products Marketing Conmission made a loss of
[I 550 000, although this was all on cheese, for which stocks had been
particularly high reLative to consumption at the end of bulk purchase.
In 1955/56 the positions of butter and cheese were reversed: a loss
of tl 800 000 on butter which was more than conpensated for by a
S6 700 000 surplus on cheese. The real difficulties came in the two
following seasons. Increased British butter production was matched
by a flood of imports. Britain was the only substantial butter narket
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with unrestricted access, so many countries with butter surpluses
offloaded their output in Britain, often at below-cost prices. In
April 1957 a joint Government-producer delegation travelled to London
to seek action fron the British Government on ffdunping" as it was
known. Britain responded by passing anti-dumping legislation and by
allowing New Zealand butter and cheese a right of unrestricted duty-free
entry for ten years. This brought dairy produce into line with neat.
But these measures could not prevent the industry naking a loss of
t13.7 million on its trading for the L956/57 season, an outcome which
halved its reserves.
When the new season got under way it quickly became evident that
trading conditions would if anything be worse than in the previous
year. In February 1958 New Zealand sought the inposition of anti-
dunping duties. Britain was reluctant to invoke the legislation
because of possible adverse effects on other aspects of her trade
relations. But in May 1958, having formally announced that "subsidised
imports have caused material damage to the New Zealand Dairy Industryrr, (1)
a number of European countries were asked to restrict their exports to
the British narket. This move in and of itself came too l-ate to
ameliorate the outcome of a season even nore disastrous than its
predecessor, and the Dairy Industry Account went heavily into deficit.
As had been the case in the 1930s, the dependence of the dairy industry
on the British market was reinforced by the difficulties the industry
faced in selling elsewhere. In f956/57 saLes of butter only 2469 tons
were sold to non-British markets, a third of the volume so disposed
in 1953/54, and rniniscule conpared with the 149 000 tons New Zealand
1. Ward, Cormnand. of Coopez,atiues, p. 177.
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shipped to Britain in the later year.(z)
If the dairy industry faced circunstances renarkably like the
1930s, the same was not true of the meat industry. Through the
middle and late 1950s supplies and prices heLd up. In 1956'
Argentina, for the first time in a decade, exceeded New Zealandrs
shipments to Britain but New Zealand secured t70.2 rnill.ion for its
better quality meat compared with Argentinars t56.5 million. (3)
At the sane tine, the Meat Board was beginning to look at other
narkets, particularly North Anerica and Japan. The forrner proved a
particularly lucrative market for beef by comparison with Britain.
The experience of the meat export trade was also reflected in
the wool industry which traditionally exported its products to nany
different markets. Moreover non-traditional exPorts, especially
timber products, were beginning to assune inportance in New Zealandrs
trade. Buoyant international economic conditions were the si.ne qua non
of this expansion, which was also uratched by an expansion of sources
of supply of inports. The collective impact of these developments
on the significance of New Zealandrs trade with Britain was marked'
In 1948/49 that country took 73.4 per cent of New Zealandrs exports and
supplied 55.1 per cent of its imports. By 1956/57 these figures were
down to 58.8 per cent and 51.4 per cent respectively.
Diversification became more than a response to decontrol'
to the buoyancy of international economic trading conditions.
and
In
2.
3.
Tbid., p. I74.
Hayward, GoT.den Jubilee, p. 70.
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L957, the National Governnent initiated its most vigorous effort
to date to change the structure of New Zealandts comrnercial policy
to favour diversification. New Zealand sought a revision of the
Ottawa Trade Agreenent she had concluded in 1952. she did not want
its preferential provisions intensified. Rather, she sought their
modification, the acquisition of the right to reduce British
preferences in the event that she rnight want to negotiate trade
agreenents with third countries. The request had added validity
because inflation had eroded the worth of New Zeatandts preferences
in the British market whilst Britainrs preferences in New Zealand,
being set as percentages, were unchanged in value. Britain stalled:
she did not want to see her position in the New ZeaLand market eroded.
Discussions at Prime Ministerial level broke the deadlock with Britain
conceding nost of New Zealandts requests. Again, a healthy world
economy facilitated the change. Britainrs economic relations with
Europe and North America were expanding: New Zealand was not quite
as inportant as in the past.
During 1958-60 the need to reduce New Zealandts vulnerability to
overseas economic fluctuations attracted renewed concern. Labourrs
return to office coincided with the severest balance of payrnents crisis
(precipitated in part by the collapse of dairy product prices) New
Zealand had faced since 1939. Both events encouraged discussion
about the need for more self-reliance. The appointment of W.B. Sutch
as Secretary of the Department of Industries and Commerce gave a further
inpetus.
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But tines had noved on since 1939. The experiences of the
1940s and 1950s had revived the conviction - sharply dented in
the 1930s - that dependence on overseas trade and finance was
conpatible with the naintenance of enrployment and living standards
in New Zealand. Prosperity was underpinned by a host of insulating
neasures which were the substantial inheritance fron tabourts prewar
st,rategy: stabilisation accounts, industrial protection, social
security. These had been continued, albeit with sone rnodifications,
by National. Britain had long since grown accustomed to, if not
entiTely enpmoured of, such devices and prograrunes.
Independence pe" se therefore did not attract nuch of a hearing
in New Zealand. Moreover the chosen neans to the end was iurport-
substituting industrialisation - not a headline grabber when real
Iiving standards were higher than ever before. Even the nenory of
the 1957/58 crisis fast receded, other than as a black mark against
the Governnent. I'llith Nationalfs return to office at the end of 1960,
the policy lost momentum.
In the meantine, diversification policies were facilitated by
bureaucratic changes in New ZeaLand, and justified by deveLopnents
in inteTnational politics.
The institutions of New Zealandrs econonic diplonacy had
reflected the intinate, non-foreign character of relations between
the two countries, and this rernained largely unchanged through the
1940s. But it had been implicit in the failure of attenpts at closer
relations in the 1950s that sone more sophisticated and co-ordinated
structure might be necessary.
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In the 1940s, econonic diplonacy had been dorninated by nen
like Nash, Ashwin, Duncan and Marshal.l. Restrictions on travelling
in the war years reinforced this tendency to personalisation. But
some institutional evolution occurred. The successive rounds of
international econonic negotiations frorn 1942 on pLaced heavy denands
on New Zealandrs civil servants, and on Nash, who attended an
extraordinary number of conferences. Tn Lg47 two interdepartrnental
corunittees were established: a balance of payments connittee to
handle the inpact of the dollar shortage, and a trade policy connittee
to handle the international trade negotiations. In 1,948 G.D.L. White
joined the Department of External Affairs fron the Econouric
Stabilisation Conmission. After the change of Government in 1949,
Foss Shanahan, Deputy Head of the Prine Ministerrs Departnent, was
instrunental in the establishnent of the Cabinet and 0fficial Comrittees
on Economic Policy, which inter alia superseded the cornmittees
established in 1947. The fact that after 1949 (and until 1957) the
Prime Minister no longer held the portfolio of External Affairs nust
have been a factor pronoting these innovations. External Affairs
played an active role in the Officials Conrnittee through uren like
Shanahan and White, reflecting not only their personal capacities,
but also the growing recognition that econonic issues required an
active diplonacy. In this respect, the National Government accepted
the importance of the Department, whilst decrying the value of its
more purely political work.
How far did these changes irnpinge on the character of relations
with Britain? During and after the war, the need for Conmonwealth
consultation on defence, political and econonic issues had precipitated
a flood of conferences of varying kinds, officials level, ninisterial
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level, including all or some of the Dominions. But the war also
accelerated the growth in the international stature of the Doninions.
New Zealand in particular, became used to regarding itself, and being
so regarded, as an independent state in international affairs.
As its connections with other countries nultiplied, so did the
relationship with Britain lose something of its particuLar character.
It seened natural that the Departrnent established to handle external
relations should provide an input to all aspects of United Kingdon-New
zea)'and relations, not just those aspects with which it was
traditionally concerned. This developrnent was not very pronounced in
the early 1950s, but in the successive rounds of discussions with
Britain in 1956-1958 External Affairs played a major role. Thus
New Zealand became accustorned to seeing its relations with the United
Kingdom in terms of relations between two independent Governnents -
a conception which had been difficult to sustain in the l9s0s.
Beyond New Zealand, other nore dranatic changes were occurring.
Economic collaboration with Britain in World War II had been underpinned
by the political association of the two countries. In the 1950s this
association r{as under pressure at its central point - Britainrs
capacity to deploy power in Asia and the Pacific. Britain had
returned to these parts of the world at the end of the war, but it
became apparent that she did not have the resources - and/or the
political will - to do other than engage in a long retreat. Indiars
connitnent to non-alignrnent dislodged the keystone of any post-inperial
strategy: Britain was left with debatable positions in the Middle East
and Malaya. At the end of 1956 the Suez deb6cle rnade it difficult for
New Zealand to sustain any illusions which she retained about British
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power. Suez nade painfully clear the lirnits on Britaints ability
to act independently of the United States. No longer could
comfortable assumptions about Americats preparedness to underpin all
aspects of British power be entertained. These developnents were
bound to affect any judgenent of the merits of a policy of continued
econonic dependence: in another war, New Zealandts economy might
be far more severely penalised than in the last one.
Despite all these changes however, dependence as well as
diversification renained a sund in New Zealandts policy throughout
the 1960s and into the 1970s. As in the 1950s, this was particularly
the case with the dairy industry. Despite efforts at diversification,
over 80 per cent of New Zealandts dairy exports went to Britain in
1964 and over 62 per cent in 1970. In both years, Britain took nore
than 90 per cent of New Zealandrs butter, and in 1970, three quarters
of its cheese, compared with 86 per cent in 1964. The dairy industryts
substantial expansion into other narkets was in other products besides
butter and cheese, such as casein and milk por"d""r. (4)
The task of protecting New Zealandts position on the British
narket operated at two levels - the future of the trade in the event of
British entry into the European Economic Corununity, and year by year
dealings with Britain over the current condition of the narket.
The European Economic Corununity question first arose in 1961, when
Britain decided to apply for membership of the Comnunity. Quite apart
from the more general questions which this raised about future relations
4. Ward, Corwnand of Cooperati,ues, p. 229.
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between Britain and other Comrnonwealth countries, it had specific
implications for New Zealandrs butter and cheese trades. The
Cornrnunityr s conmon agricultural policy protected the livelihood of
farners within the Conmunity by a systen of levies and subsidies
which effectively excluded outsiders fron a share of the narket'
The policy already applied to dairy products (but not to meat or wool) '
In mid-1961 Duncan Sandys, the Corunonwealth SecretaTy, visited New
Zealand and gave the Government assurances that
in the course of any ... negotiations ltojoin the Connunity] the British Government
would seek to secure special arrangements to
protect the vital interests of New Zealand
ind other Comrnonwealth countries, and . - - would
not feel able to join the European Econonic
Conmunity until such arrangenents were secured' (5)
In January 1963 de Gaulle vetoed British entry for the time being
so the credibility of this assulance was not Put to the test. In
the meantine the dairy industry had rnoved into a new phase in its
trading relations with Britain. The 1958/59 season had been a
buoyant one which had wiped out the deficit built up over the two
preceding seasons, but in 1959/60 conditions of over-supply reappeared,
for both cheese and butter. Clearly sone kind of managenent of the
narket was necessary. In the case of cheese this proved relatively
straightforward, because it could be achieved through infonnal
collaboration by Australia, New Zealand and Britain, the three
principal suppliers. Butter was more difficult, and nore sensitive'
At the end of 196L New TeaIand accepted a British plan for voluntary
restraint by all suppliers - the dreaded quotas of the 1930s.
5. A,IER 
' 
1961' AZ1.
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Resisted so vigorously at that tirne, they were now seen as the lesser
of two evils. Indeed, favourable price novenents through the
renainder of the 196l/62 season, and in 1962/65, helped soften much
of the antipathy to such controls.
Yet even this system was not foolproof. In the latter part of
the decade trading conditions deteriorated once again and the industry
faced deficits and reductions in the guaranteed price that brought
back nemories of 1956-1958. In 1968 voluntary restraint was extended
to cheese as well as butter and this improved cheese prices but the
real recovery cane with the L970/71 season. As in 1958/59 drought
in Europe came to New Zealandfs aid and by the end of the lg7L/7z
season the Dairy Industry Account was back in surpl,us.
New Zealand was not just relying on the weather however.
Deteriorating trading conditions in the late 1960s coincided with
renewed interest by Britain in joining the European Connunity.
New Zealand recognised that entry was now only a mattet of time.
The Dairy Board, which had amalganated with the Dairy Products
Marketing Comnission in 1961, now becane particularly active in seeking
alternative narkets, and this policy was beginning to bear some fruit, as
the figures quoted earlier suggested. In the early 1970s the
transfornation was even rnore dramatic, with seventy per cent of
milk product sales being made outside Britain by 1974. (But gross
receipts were in money terms the sane in both years despite
substantial inflation over the intervening period).
Diversification did not mean that New Zealand had abandoned the
British market, but it reflected the fact that it was now obliged to
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see that narket in a different light. Negotiations for British
entry to the Comrnon Market resumed in 1971. Hard bargaining on
New Zealandrs part coupled with strong diplonatic support from
Britain, secured an agreement which would cut back her butter e)cPorts
by twenty per cent over five years and her cheese exports by eighty
per cent. In quantitative terms this was a nuch better deal than
New Zealand night have expected, and although the pricing clause
was harsh, price increases in 1974 and subsequently provided sone
amelioration. Beyond these arrangenents hovJever there was no doubt
that the primary challenge to the industry was not to Protect its
position in Europe, but to find and secure profitable narkets elsewhere.
Through the 1960s and 1970s the dairy industry was in a
distinctive position: its dependence on the British market nore
conplete, the threat to its position on that market more substantial
than that of any other trade. The only other export that could
conceivably have faced a sirnilar threat was sheepneat which still went
overwhelningly to Britain through the 1960s. In 1971 Britain
inposed a levy on sheepneat imports to bring herself into line with
European Economic Corununity practice but this did not in and of itself
significantly affect the profitability of the trade. It was only at
the end of the 1970s that the European Economic Connunity started to
talk seriously about a conmon sheepmeat policy. But the fact that
the Connunity was ordinarily a net irnporter of sheepmeat' coupled with
the substantial diversification of New Zealandrs lanb trade which had
by then taken place, ensured that the new regine was acceptable to
New Zealand.
Through the 1960s and into the 1970s diversification was as much
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a matter for the Governrnent as for particular export industries.
The threat which British entry into the European Economic comrunity
posed for the dairy industry was seen more generally in terns of
the need for New Zealand to reduce its dependence on a Britain which
was questioning longstanding dirnensions of its economic and politicaL
position in the world. And fortunately the 1960s, f.ike the 1950s,
provided a benign economic environment in which to pursue such an
objective. When the expansion of new exports was added to the
diversification of markets for old ones, the effect r{as quite
dranatic. Britain, which took 52.9 per cent of New Zealandrs exports
in 1959/60, took just 35.5 per cent in 1969/70.
Whilst active steps were being taken to pronote New ZeaLand
elports the supply pattern of the countryrs import trade also continued
to becone nore varied. Fron 43.4 per cent in 1959/60, Britain
supplied only 29.5 per cent of inports in 1969/70. Capital came
from other sources as well - the International Monetary Fund, which
New Zealand had joined in 1961, the United States, and increasingly
from Europe. These declining relative trends reflected in part the
fact that Britainrs economy was growing more slor+ly than others in
Europe and North funerica. The cutting edge of this decline was the
failure of sterling to securely re-establish itself as a najor
international trading currency. Britain had to watch its balance of
payments continually, and in the mid 1960s restrictions were inposed
on the outflow of capital. These caused New Zealand sone concerrr
- but not as much as they would have once- New Zealand was now able to
finance nuch of its own development and she also operated on other
capital markets. In the years after the devaluation of sterling in
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L967, steps were taken to wind down the reserve firnction of the
currency. New Zealand accepted this change, and in effect moved
outside the sterling area, a shift facilitated and justified by the
changed nature of her trading relations. Britainfs decision (later
nodified, but not completely reversed) to withdraw its rnilitary
presence fron Asia, announced in the aftermath of devaluation, underlined
the linkages between the recession of her econonic and political
power.
In 1973 Britain finally becane a full nember of the European
Econonic Connunity, and the transformation of econonic relations
between the two cormtries entered its final phase. The bilateral
structute of British-New Zealand conmercial relations, dating in sone
respects from the previous century, and for the nost part from 1932,
was dismantled. A New Zealand-European Econonic Connunity relationship
succeeded it. And while defending its interests in the Comnunity,
New Zealand aLso continued to foster econonic relations with other
countries. By the beginning of the 1980s, trade with Britain
accounted for only fifteen per cent of total trade. The doninant
relationship of one era had becone one of nany in the next.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Prinary Sources
l. Unpublished official records
The najor sources for this thesis were the officiaL records of
the New Zealand and British Goverrunents deposited at the National
Archives, Wellington, and the Public Record 0ffice, London,
respectively.
(a) New Zealand
The official records of New Zealandrs econonic diplomacy in this
period are not in good order. The best kept are those fron External
Mfairs, but that Departnent did not naintain a systematic coverage of
supply, marketing and financial natters. The records of Industries
and Conmerce, the Marketing Departnent, and Treasury, the principal
Participants in these areas, are internittent rather than systenatic.
The war history narrative for the Marketing Departnent is invaluable,
but there is nothing comparable for supply or financial relations.
Now that the Nash papers are accessible it nay be possible to fill
in sone of the lacunae in the official records. Regrettably no senior
civil servant - nost particularry, neither Bernard Ashwin nor George
Duncan, have left collections of papers.
The files listed are all, with a few exceptions annotated
accordingly, held at National Archives, Wellington. Pernission was
secured from the appropriate government departnent to see those files
to which access is restricted.
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National Archives classifies the records it receives according
to its own system and this is used in this bibliography.
Note: in the footnoting in the text there is a departure fron
the National Archives systen. Most of the files exanrined are fron
the registered subject file series for their respective departnents.
These are catalogued in each instance as series 1, e.g. Ag I, EA 1.
In this study, this enurneration is ornitted, and series I files are
recorded by group code and file nunber only. Ttrus: EAl I04/4/L is
referred to as EAIO4/4/L. Where no series nunber is provided this
systen is also followed. Thus: DPM 63/I, Cab 129/5/1, (Sinilarly,
files which are not held at National Archives are recorded by
deparfinent and file nwnber). Where files are fron series other than
series 1, they are so recorded. Thus: T series 75 3/4/1. The only
exception is T series 72, the records of the Economic Stabilisation
Conunission. Its files are recorded by the abbreviation ESC plus the
file number. thus: ESC 2/8.
artnent of Aericulture
The extension of the responsibilities of the Prinary Products
Marketing Departnent (henceforth Marketing Departnent) in 1959
effectively ended any rnajor role for the Departnent of Agriculture in
external policy. The Departnent recovered significance in the early
1950s when those responsibilities of the Marketing Deparfinent which
were not devolved to producer boards or allied organisations passed
back to Agriculture.
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A I Registered subject files
L037 Aid to Britain [1948]
LZ43 Eastern Group Conference 1940-1951
1260 International Materials Conference lg5l-1953
L342 Wool Conference 1939-1960
2332 Meat Elport Control Act
2333 Meat Export, general
2339 Meat prices and agreernents 1916-
21095 Inport of meat into the United Kingdon
A l-0 Unregistered files
5 Marketing rndustry in New Zealand 1880-1.946: draft of a book
A 15 Miscellaneous
7 Wat History Narrative
A Cabinet Secretariat was first established in 1948, and with
some exceptions there are no records before that date. Detailed
records commence with the change of Governrnent at the end of 1949.
Most have not yet been transferred to National Archives and are not
accessible to historians.
Cab I Cabinet meetings 1949-: papers
CM(49) Papers for neetings December 1949
CM(50) I' rr tt 1950
CM (51) " rr rr
CM (52) rt rf rr
cM(s3)
cM(s4)
r95l
1952
frff1953
f t rf 1954
Note: These papers can
also be found on the fiLes
of the departnents which
prepared then.
ll
ll
I
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Cab 2 Cabinet ninutes 1949-1950 (Prine Ministerrs copies)
cM(4e) I , CM(s0)88
List of files of first National Government (no series no.)
L29/S/I Cabinet connittee on external economic affairs 1949
Custons Department (CUS)
Records held at National Archives on import policy for the war
and post-war periods would appear to be a very srnall sarnple of the
records w\ich the Departnent must have generated. Nonetheless it
seens that they are all that survives. For the war, WAII L0/107
provides sorne further information.
CUS I Inward letters and registered files
22/805 Policies and principles of the New Zealand tariff 1948-f958
The Dairy Products Marketing Conmission was established in 1947
and nerged with the Dairy Board in 1961. It inherited the
responsibilities, and with them the records (coded DPM), of its
predecessor, the Marketing Departnent, in respect of dairy produce.
A11 of the Marketing Departnent records which the Dairy Products
Marketing Conunission had in 1957, plus some of its own, were transferred
to the National Archives in that year. Together the two lots forn
the DPM group.
Sone files pertaining to the activities of the Marketing Departnent
Export Division in respect of meat and wool were also included, but the
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coverage is far fron systenatic. Where are the rest of the files
of the Marketing Departnent, whether handed on to the Dairy Products
Marketing Commission or not? They do not aPpear to have been
inherited by either the Departnent of Agriculture or the producer
boards: presumably they have been destroyed. Information about
the Marketing Department t s activities has to be supplenented fron
other sources: Treasury and External Affairs files, or the war history
narratives of the departnent. The bibliography of the narrative of
the Export Division gives sone indication of the nunber and coverage
of the files which can no longer be located.
The DPM group is not classified into series. For unnunbered
files, the box number, in parenthesis in this listing, is a useful
finding aid.
L4/2/3 Dairy produce negotiations on agreement with Britain
1939-1942
BZ Long-term contracts, 1942-1.946
Bz/L Long-term contracts, meat, L944
B3/2 Presentati-on of case for price increase to United Kingdon, L944
W/q Estinates given re claim on United Kingdorn for sterling palments,
r943
B4/2 Stabilisation re Joint Comnittee 1945
C3/L Farm and factory adjustment 1946; guaranteed price:
miscellaneous 1946 -L947
C3/5 Paynent of extra costs because of war L94L/1942
DL/3 General correspondence 1943
W/f f939-1940 negotiations
D3/2 Governrnent and Dairy Board 1939
D3/7 1939 United Kingdom visit
D4/S Econonic Stabilisation Confeaence
-s7g-
W,fL Mea.t ni,see1.1aneous, including thnited Kingdon/New Zealand 1.943
8413 Talks with Mtulisrry of Fosdn l94L
F1/8 London Food Csunsil: postwar pol.icy, etc.
HII Dfaft af MIER, 1940 I{SOB
W/2 But-ter and cheese 1941
MtlS Dairy, nisceltreneous lg41
G.M. Pottinger private f,lIes [Boxes l7rL8l
Meat, miseellanesus
[qndon Food eoucil
Fisher and Caupbell
esnnercial policy
F.A.0. Lg46-L947
x941" 1945
and Conbined Food Board 1.945-
x946
United Kingdon/l{ew Zealand
1943-1944
dairy products 1948
butter and eheese 1949, 1950
Leldlease, ternination, 1945
Conm.nieatiorrs re lYar P1ans ete ., lggg
Fottinger, sqrmary of, cabLes 19.42-1946
Dunean, comile.rcial policy 194g-1946
Mra,rshall papers
G.uarauteed prices and the dairy fa,:rue
I.E.,F.C. fbod allocation, L946-I}4T
Food and other suppllo$ t6 the, United Klngdon
during the wan: draft parlia^nentary paper
)
)
)))
)
)
)
)
)
)
))
))
)
)))
)
)
)
)
)
)
[Box 21]
lBox 22f
O*tP):
[Box 23]
[Box 3s]
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The Department, which changed its name to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 1970, was established in 1943. It inherited the
responsibilities and records (coded PM) of the Prime Ministers
Department. The two departrnents were not separated trntil 1949,
were reunited in 1957, and separated again in 1975.
The Departrnent was not active in external economic policy until
the 1950s, but kept records of connunications between New Zealandrs
representatives overseas and other branches of Governnent.
EAl Registered subject files
58/2/2/L United Kingdon-New Zealand trade relations to 1948
I04/L/L Economic affairs: general
704/2/l Finance and cumency, general 1929-1957
LO4/2/5 Bretton Woods 1944-L952
104/2/2L/1 IMF general 1945-1958
I04/6/31/ I Wool: general
I04/6/3L/4 Joint Organisation
104/26/L International Trade Organisation 1946-1948
I53/L7/2 Prine Ministers Conference, London, 1939: urinutes of
meetings
lS3/L7/3 Prime Ministers Conference, tondon, 1939: papers issued by
Conference
153/20/4 Meeting of Empire Prine Ministers 1944: naster set of
telegrams exchanged with Prine Minister, April-June 1944
153/20/6 Prine Ministers Conference, London I944t ninutes of meetings
L53/23/I Prime Ministers Conference, April-May 1946: general
IS3/23/3 Prine Ministers Conference, April-May 1946: ninutes
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HeLd at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3s/2e/s
58/2/2/L United Kingdon-New Zealand trade relations, lg48
No!e: (a) many IC files are not dated in the series lists
(b) wartime Ministry of Supply files could be expected to
have been retained by the Department but it seens that
many were destroyed (see War History entry)
ICI Registered subject files
f01/1 Trade, New Zealand policy
L02/L New Zealand tariff
LA2/2 hnport licensing: general
102/L/2 New Zealand tariff reviews: Board of Trade procedure
IC106l1 New Zealand financial (overseas) policy
ICIO6/2 United Kingdorn financial: balance of pa nents
ICL62/\ Trade policy re United Kingdon
ICL62/2 United Kingdon inport policy
IC32 London Office 1945-1959
33 G.W. Clinkard, personal correspondence, 1943-1946
Treasury (T)
Tl Registered subj ect files
27/9 Wool, general
4O/7 Meat Export Control Act 1949
40/648 Prinary Products Marketing Act 1939
40/648/3 Meat and dairy products, long-term contracts, 1946-1952
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40/648/5 History of New Zealand prinary products negotiations,
1939- 19s0
4O/72L Wool, including wool marketing; International Wool Study
Group 1950-1960
40/835 Econonic stabilisation 1930-1940, including report on
the Econonic Stabilisation Conference 1940
6L/I Balance of payments 1946-1952
6l/L/l Minutes, balance of palmrents cqnnittee' L947-1952
6L/L/8 Cabinet corunittee on econonic policy 1952-l'955
6I/L/9 Econonic policy in New ZeaLand, general questions,
1952- 1958
6L/3/3 Connonwealth Liaison Connittee 1951-1958
6I/3/4 Comnonwealth Conference 1948
6I/3/4/2 Comnonwealth Conference 1948
6L/3/2L Review of New Tealand trade policy, 1956-1957
6L/4/I Balance of payrnents, united Kingdon, general, sterling
area,1949-1959
6L/4/2 Balance of paynents, United Kingdour, sterling area dollar
reserves 1947-1956
6I/5/7/S Raw naterials, wool, 1951-1954
T25 Minister of Finance: papers
ZS Reports fron Secretary to Treasury to Minister of Finance,
1949-19s0
T72 Econonic StabiLisation Commission 1942-1950 (ESC)
L/3 Minutes L943, 1949
2/S External relations, United Kingdon, 1943-1951
z/ll Commercial Policy, G.A.T.T. 1947-1951
2/LI/6 Dollar position, balance of payments - 1950
5/12 Correspondence with Ministerrs 0ffice 1943-1951
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Office papers (no file nunbers)
Farn products and stabilisation 1940-1945
Noted and reports 1943-1948
Farn products stabilisation 1943-1948
Notes on stabiLisation policies 1944-1948
Notes on dairy and neat stabilisation 1944-
1948
Stabilisation in postwar, financial aspects
Stabilisation agreenents with primary
producers I943-L947
Postwar stabilisation talks 1945
Stabilisation of fann production
Notes on stabilisation
Ministerial nemoranda
(See also WAII 10/1fl)
[Box 112]
[Boxes L20-L22]
[Box J.27]
[Box r29]
[Box r50]
[Box 131]
[Box 132]
[Box 133J
[Box 137]
[Box 141]
[Boxes L42-L431
T73 Food for Britain 1946-1947
T75 Marketing Advisory Council (MC)
2/8/r New Zealand-United Kingdom trade, long-tern contracts 1945-
1955
3/4 Dairy industry, general, 1951-1953
3/4/I Dairy produce, butter, 1941-1950
3/6 Meat, general, 1945-1953
6/5/5 Dairy industry marketing negotiations 1951-1952
Note: These files are all part of MAC 1, the registered subject files
under the old classification. MAC 2 - MAC 8, the remainder of the series,
occupy one box.
Rehabilitation Board
War History of Rehabilitation in New
(Paper in possession of Department of
Zealand 1939-1965.
Social Wel.fare)
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r1 War II: icial Histor es II
WAII 10 Civilian Namatives
59 Marketing Department,
Note: This docunent
Export Division, by K.R. Miller and R. Rowl.ey
is cited in the text as Miller and Rowley,
7S
76
89
History
Notes on the developrnent of the Prirne Ministerrs Departnent by
H. Tenpleton
Prine Ministert s Departnent (two volunes of niscellaneous papers)
Ministry of Supply
Note: not a continuous history. The writer notes the severe
lacunae in Ministry of Supply records
Custons Departnent
Economic Stabilisation
Note: includes proceedings of Econonic Stabilisation Conference
1940 and draft typescripts on various aspects of domestic econornic
policy, plus a mass of unsorted rnaterial
116 Economic background to New ZeaLand politics by H. Witheford
(b) United Kingdon
I spent a limited period in London in 1979, so tine prevented me
frorn examining all the relevant naterial held at the Public Record Office.
Moreover, at that time, files closed after 31 Decenber 1,948 wete not
available for perusal. I took the decision to concentrate on Ministry
of Food, Board of Trade and Treasury records rather than to. directly
tackle the Dorninions Office holdings. The I'systenft for the latter is
very conplex and difficutt to naster (for instance, there is no naster
series of cables exchanged between the High Corunission and Whitehall) and
it seemed better to spend rny tirne in other ways. I also decided not
to work through Ministry of Supply files systematically, after looking
quickly at some material. I did find sone infonnation on wool on
L07
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Board of Trade and Treasury files which was a help.
A11 the files recorded below are held at the Public Record
0ffice, Kew.
Board of Trade (BT)
BTll Conurercial papers and correspondence
1458 Possible increase in New Zealandts war effort 1940-1941
1697 Negotiations on a postwar wool organisation Lg4L-Lg4z
I7I2 Restrictions on cotton exports 1941
L739 Lendlease L94I-L942
2016 Export diversion to New ZeaLand L942
2053 Proposals for trade agreement,s with the United States, L942
2276 Postwar United Kingdorn/New Zeal.and comnercial policy
235L Conference with Dominion representatives February-March 1944l
277L Connercial and econornic relations with the United Kingdom,
1945
37LL Representations to New Zealand on quantitative restrictions,
L946-1947
3716 Walter Nash. Board of Trade visit 1947: correspondence
with the Board
37L7 Walter Nash. Letter to Board of Trade, New Zealand inport
requirenents
3758 Dollar crisis talks L947-I949
3767 Dollar crisis talks: draft telegram to Trade Cournissioners,
L947
4045-4049 Development of secondary industry in New Zealand 1939-1949[n.b. chronological order in reverse of file order]
4076 1948 bulk purchase
4077 Effect of GATT non-discrinination on New Zealand
4082 Fencing wire 1948-1949
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Doninions Office (D0)
DO35: Dominions original correspondence
Wt662/3/28 Sterling balances 1946
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
l*lAF inherited all the files of the Ministry of Food, which are
accordingly catalogued in the Pub1ic Records Office under MAF
cLassifications .
Ir{AF 83 Supply Departrnent and Secretariat, Ministly of Food
164 New Zealand neat negotiations August 1940 - Decenber 1941
257 Imports from New Zealand in the third year of the war,
March 1941 - February 1942
f037 ) Long-term contracts with Australia, New Zealand and South
1038 ) Africa, April L944 - Decernber 1945
1149 Reciprocal trade with New Zealand, July 1940 - April 1945
1f58 ) Dairy products from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa,
1159 ) Novenber 1940 - April 1945
1180 )
1181 ) Meat supplies from the Southern Doninions 1.942-1945
1182 )
L244 Southern Doninions meat, May - Decenber 1942
f365 Meat fron the Southern Doninions 1943-L944
1475 Enpire Prime Ministers Conference March - June 1944
L476 Long-term contracts, New Zealand, L944
1566 ) Supplies fron the Southern Dominions, 1944-1945
1s67 )
f616 Appeal to Australia and New Zealand for increased exports'
March 1946
L623 Prime Ministersr visits, April - May 1946
1668 Revision of long-term contracts with Australia and
New Zealand, 1946
-3817-
L672 Butrk purehases,, generaL pol.icy,:, JuLy lg46
1864 custolns union with EEpire [sic:: in fac.t nrislabex,ted,
should be Europ.e] Octobet 1,94V - June 1948
2905 Long-tem contracts, neat, lg4S-194S
MAF 88 Meat 1939-1959
116
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Purchase of meat frolr New zealand, April 1940 - ,Decenber 1g41
l{eat snpplies Australia and New Zealard,, l{arch 1941 -
January 1942
23:6 Meet purehase, I$erv Zealand, 1941-1942
4.05-4Ll Long-term contracts, meat, 1944-1948
T160 F,inarrce Dlvision 1887-1948
FLZ7LS New Zealandrs financial position 1939r-19411 (parts 1-10)
F$32A102 Feter Frase? visit l9S9
T16l Sypttly Divi,sion, 
I
S4551.1 Purchases sf Australian and New Zealand wsol tr959-1946 1pet" I162)r551255 Long-torrr csntract$, postwar Ig4S-1944
2,, Rrblished officLal recortls
Apendieea ta ttte rIownal,s of +tte Esuae of fupneeentatdpes, 19g6-1960
Daitg fuodtrcbe Mm:lceti;tag eotwrrLes'io,n Anteg,L Eepoft, L94T|4S - lg54/ss
flouoe of Corunons Debates
ila,t hea,lattd 9ffi,ctieT te:qrboak, selected votumes
N:ai fieatl.anqd, Pqslianenfury Defutes
=3gg-
5, UnpubliShed qnofficial records
Meat Froducers Board (l{B)
5.0/216 .Annual United KingdomlNew Zealand agricultural
consultations 1959-1956
Papsrg of F.P. Walsh [Turnbull Ms 2741
26 Notes on Nerry Zef,Land-rs sterllng exchange position,
Febrrlary 1949
256 Meat correspondenee (rmf,iled) 1945-1962
260 Meat 1945
265 Meat schedules 1949-1950; Hidesn wool meeting, 7
Septenber 1949
267 Meat 1949
268 Meat 1949
27A Meat pr:ices United Kingdon
4. Publlshedlsrqfficiq.l reeqrds
&ted.r,q Poa*, 1941, 1945-1949
na't Zealand, Herald, 1951-1954
Orrc fumdsed Ie,ass of Naite: I*te Neo Ze,aXand flenaI;d C ntqtrd'al
Reaord, 7868=7983
Note: relevant press connents are kept on rrany off,icial files.
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